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People enjoy weekend shopping in downtown Dublin, Ireland – a country with a diverse migrant population. 
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non-Irish nationals. A further 32 nationalities with populations ranging between 1,001 and 10,000 accounted 
for 19.7 per cent. Nationals from over 150 different countries made up the rest of the non-Irish population. 
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Chapter 2
Syrian refugee children get ready for class in Turkey. Many of these children are originally from Aleppo and 
escaped the ongoing civil war. Today, the children attend class at the Syrian Social Gathering, a multi-service 
centre supported by IOM. The centre provides services to all Syrian refugees, such as free legal advice for women, 
adult education in the evenings, and psychosocial care for those who have undergone traumatic experiences in 
the Syrian Arab Republic. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed) 
Chapter 3
A woman and her child pose outside of their makeshift home built from a collection of fabrics inside the Farm 
Centre internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in Maiduguri, Nigeria. She joins several others who have had 
their villages razed by the armed group, Boko Haram. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)
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Candida Antonia Basurto Holguín is an 80-year-old Ecuadorian woman who lives in the community of El Juncal, 
Tosagua, province of Manabí, Ecuador. She lost her house and belongings during the 2016 7.8 magnitude earthquake 
that devastated her community. IOM, the Government of Japan and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection department (ECHO) supported Mrs Basurto by building her temporary shelter. © IOM (Photo: 
Carolina Celi)
Part II
The Farm Centre IDP camp is one of several IDP camps in Maiduguri, Nigeria. As the insurgency by Boko Haram 
has spread in Northeastern Nigeria, many Nigerians have fled from their villages to Maiduguri, the only safe 
haven within Borno state. As the number of IDPs within the state grew, they began to occupy various sites 
ranging from public school buildings, incomplete housing projects and farming centres. © IOM (Photo: Muse 
Mohammed) 
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largely on repairs and is amazed by the little care many people put into their electronics. He compares this to his 
homeland, where people used to be much more careful with their valuables but today simply choose to replace 
their electronics with newer ones. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)  
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The Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Bentiu, South Sudan was established in December 2013 and currently 
houses an estimated 120,000 IDPs. Many people displaced by conflict in South Sudan have increasingly fled to 
UN PoC sites for safety. The UN and various humanitarian agencies are working together with the community to 
improve the living conditions in the PoC area. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed) 
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Toronto, with a population of 2.7 million people (5.9 million in the Greater Toronto Area) is among the most 
multicultural cities in the world. In 2006, the City of Toronto was home to almost 8 per cent of Canada’s 
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Appendices
A Syrian woman looks out towards the Swiss Alps while on her flight to Toronto. It’s her first time aboard a flight 
as she heads towards starting a new life with her family in Canada. She is among tens of thousands of Syrians 
refugees who were resettled in Canada in 2015 and 2016. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)
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Foreword 
This report is the ninth in the World Migration Report series. Since 2000, IOM has been producing world 
migration reports to contribute to increased understanding of migration throughout the world. Indeed, it is 
one of IOM’s key contributions, and it has taken on heightened importance in an era of “post-truth” politics, 
“information overload” and “fake news”. The chance for evidence and knowledge to help explain migration 
and how it is changing seems to be diminishing at a time when, more broadly throughout the world, facts and 
expertise seemed to have increasingly taken a back seat to opinion and politics.
IOM is now the United Nations’ migration agency. Even though our Organization has worked in close partnership 
with the United Nations since our inception, this recognition and the responsibilities that it embodies have 
made us reflect deeply on all aspects of our work, as we undertake the transitions necessary to fully assume 
our new role. We have an obligation to demystify the “world” of migration to policymakers, practitioners, 
researchers, students and the general public. It is our intention to promote a balanced understanding of 
migration’s complexities, present relevant data and information in an accessible way, explain salient, complex 
and emerging issues and share over 65 years of our diverse experience across the world. 
The World Migration Report 2018 – the first since IOM assumed its role as the United Nations Migration Agency –
seeks to achieve this goal. We have refined and reinvigorated the series to prioritize its longer-term contribution 
to fostering a better and more balanced understanding of migrants and migration. We have strengthened our 
collaborative partnerships with scholars and applied researchers because we want to draw benefit from their 
varied expertise and knowledge. We made these changes to increase the World Migration Report’s utility and 
enhance its contribution to the interconnected areas of migration policy, practice and research that has a strong 
evidence base. 
The report also acknowledges IOM’s continuing emphasis on migrants’ rights and to paying closer attention 
to those migrants most in need of assistance. This has not come about since joining the UN but has involved 
sustained effort over recent years and decades, particularly (but not only) in the areas in which IOM works to 
provide humanitarian assistance to people who have been displaced, including by weather events, conflict and 
persecution, or to those who have become stranded. IOM provides assistance, support and services to those 
migrants who are in need, rather than those who have the capacity and means to navigate migration processes 
themselves. Likewise, IOM remains committed to supporting Member States in developing regions which can 
most benefit from technical support to enhance their capacity to manage migration, such as through statistical 
data collection, reporting and analysis, the development of border management and immigration policies and 
practices, and the practical integration of migrants in communities.
In this era of heightened interest and growing activity affecting migration and migrants, we hope this 2018 
edition of the World Migration Report, IOM’s flagship publication, is a close companion and a useful reference. 
We hope it helps you to make better sense of this challenging and dynamic topic as you endeavour to carry out 
actions and interventions that serve to improve the situation of migrants and the societies in which we all live.
William Lacy Swing
Director General
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1 REPORT OVERVIEW: MAKING SENSE OF MIGRATION  IN AN INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD1
Introduction
International migration is a complex phenomenon that touches on a multiplicity of economic, social and 
security aspects affecting our daily lives in an increasingly interconnected world. Migration is a term that 
encompasses a wide variety of movements and situations involving people of all walks of life and backgrounds. 
More than ever before, migration touches all States and people in an era of deepening globalization. Migration is 
intertwined with geopolitics, trade and cultural exchange, and provides opportunities for States, businesses and 
communities to benefit enormously. Migration has helped improve people’s lives in both origin and destination 
countries and has offered opportunities for millions of people worldwide to forge safe and meaningful lives 
abroad. Not all migration occurs in positive circumstances, however. We have in recent years seen an increase in 
migration and displacement occurring due to conflict, persecution, environmental degradation and change, and 
a profound lack of human security and opportunity. While most international migration occurs legally, some of 
the greatest insecurities for migrants, and much of the public concern about immigration, is associated with 
irregular migration. 
The prominence of migration as a public policy issue and newsworthy topic has perhaps never been more 
pronounced. Migration is increasingly seen as a high-priority policy issue by many governments, politicians 
and the broader public throughout the world. Its importance to economic prosperity, human development, and 
safety and security ensures that it will remain a top priority for the foreseeable future. This is becoming more 
pronounced at the national level as the focus on migration intensifies, but it is also evident at the international 
level. Incremental advancements in international cooperation on migration have taken a further step with 
States committing to agree a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018. 
Barely a day goes by without multiple media reports – whether in traditional or newer forms of media – focusing 
on aspects of migration, frequently on negative aspects. While this may reflect, in part, the changing nature of 
migration in certain regions of the world, it is important to be aware how media and news are constructed and 
produced – news reporting continues to place greater emphasis on “bad” news. Social media is widely acknowledged 
as a forum that provides little or no filter, with the consequence that there tends to be much greater emphasis on 
opinion than on facts and analysis. Amid the often polarized political, public and media discussions and debates 
on migration, evidence, knowledge and balanced analyses that encompass historical insights as well as strategic 
implications appear to have little space or traction. Nonetheless, such aspects continue to be critical to developing 
a better understanding of the various forms and manifestations of migration, as well as how best to enhance its 
opportunities and benefits and respond to the challenges that it can present. 
Against a backdrop of growing interconnections between people and States, making migration safer and better 
regulated have become key global priorities. This is reflected, for example, in the United Nations 2016 New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which sets out the intention of States to develop a global compact 
1	 Marie	McAuliffe,	Head,	Migration	Research	Division,	IOM	and	Martin	Ruhs,	Associate	Professor	of	Political	Economy	at	the	University	
of	Oxford.	The	opinions	expressed	 in	this	 report	are	those	of	 the	authors	and	do	not	necessarily	reflect	the	views	of	any	of	 the	
organizations	or	institutions	with	which	the	authors	are	affiliated.
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on migration as well as a separate global compact on refugees by the end of 2018. The specific content and 
commitments agreed in these Compacts are still under discussion at the time of writing this report. However, 
the fact that States have agreed to discuss and negotiate these new instruments of global governance shows 
that there is growing recognition of the importance of improving our common understanding of the dynamics 
and complexities of international migration and displacement, and of addressing these issues at a global level. 
In this context, the World Migration Report 2018 seeks to use the body of available data and research to 
contribute to more evidence-based analysis and policy debates about some of the most important and pressing 
global migration issues of our time. By their very nature, the complex dynamics of global migration can never 
be fully measured, understood and regulated. However, as this report shows, we do have a continuously growing 
and improving body of data and evidence that can help us make better sense of the basic features of migration 
in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. 
How is migration changing?
In most discussions on migration, the starting point is usually numbers. The current global estimate is that 
there were around 244 million international migrants in the world in 2015, which equates to 3.3 per cent of the 
global population.2 A first important point to note is that this is a very small minority of the global population, 
meaning that remaining within one’s country of birth overwhelmingly remains the norm. The great majority of 
people in the world do not migrate across borders; much larger numbers migrate within countries (an estimated 
740 million internal migrants in 20093). That said, the increase in international migrants has been evident over 
time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a greater rate than had been anticipated by some. For 
example, a 2003 projection was that by 2050 international migrants would account for 2.6 per cent of the global 
population or 230 million (a figure that has already been surpassed).4 In contrast, in 2010, a revised projection 
for 2050 was 405 million international migrants globally.5 However, in formulating global population projections 
(of which international migration is one part) demographers note that “international migration was the variable 
that had shown the greatest volatility in the past and was therefore most difficult to project with some accuracy”.6 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, which is in part related to significant economic and geopolitical events (such 
as the global financial crisis in 2008 and the current conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic), it is likely that the 
underlying fundamentals related to increasing connectivity will see the trend continue. Given the considerable 
rise in migration in certain parts of the world over the past few years, it is likely that the next estimate of the 
global number of international migrants produced by UN DESA will show a further rise in the scale of international 
migration and perhaps also in the proportion of migrants in the global population.
In recent years we have also seen a significant increase in displacement, both internal and across borders, which 
has largely stemmed from civil and transnational conflict, including acts of violent extremism outside actual war 
zones. Current data indicate that in 2016 there were 40.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide 
and 22.5 million refugees.7 Further, the total number of people estimated to have been displaced globally is the 
2	 UN	DESA,	2016.
3	 UNDP,	2009.
4	 See,	for	example,	IOM’s	2003	World Migration Report,	which	drew	upon	UN	population	data	(UN	DESA,	2002)	and	migration	data	
(IOM,	2000).
5	 IOM,	2010.
6	 UN	DESA,	2003.
7	 IDMC,	2017;	UNHCR,	2017.
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highest on record. At the time of writing, more than half a million Rohingya refugees had fled from Myanmar 
to Bangladesh since late August 2017, adding further to the world’s displaced population. It is likely that 2017 
estimates of displacement will remain as high as the 2016 global figure, if not reaching higher. 
When considered together, these numbers paint a concerning picture of migration and displacement globally, and 
more pointedly, they indicate that such large numbers of people moving (including under duress) are related in part to 
significant events, such as conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.8 The global migration picture must, therefore, be seen 
as a sum of many parts and it is important to put recent developments in specific regions into global and historical 
contexts. Migration corridors that have developed over time often have a foundation in geographic proximity, but 
they are also shaped by trade and economic factors, conflict and human (in)security, and community and ethnic ties, 
as well as smuggling and trafficking. Further chapters in this report examine these aspects, including by geographic 
region (see chapter 3); a global overview of migration and migrants is presented in chapter 2.
Notwithstanding a natural tendency to focus on the challenges that migration presents, so that they can be 
better understood and therefore managed, it is well worth revisiting briefly what we know about some of the 
considerable benefits of migration. In a period of heightened internal and international displacement (and 
related irregular migration), the enormous benefits of migration can become somewhat lost in the debate. The 
need to rebalance considerations of migration has been recognized by many international organizations, and 
there has been a recent resurgence in critical examinations of the relationship between human development, 
economic growth and migration at the global level. Recent work by the IMF, McKinsey Global Institute and the 
OECD, as well as the ongoing work of the World Bank and regional development banks, highlight the importance 
of ensuring that we remain focused on the successes of migration as well as the challenges.
Benefits of migration 
Migration can generate very large benefits for migrants, their families and countries of origin. The wages that 
migrants earn abroad can be many multiples of what they could earn doing similar jobs at home. For example, a 
study conducted in 2009 found that the ratio of wages earned by workers in the United States to wages earned 
by identical workers (with the same country of birth, years of schooling, age and sex, and rural/urban residence) 
abroad ranges from 15.45 (for workers born in Yemen) to 1.99 (workers born in the Dominican Republic), with a 
median ratio of 4.11.9 The wage differences and relative income gains from migration are largest for lower-skilled 
workers, whose international movements around the world are the most restricted.10 The increase in migrants’ 
earnings can also lead to considerable improvements in the welfare and human development of migrants’ families, 
either directly if they are with the migrant in the host country, or indirectly through remittances. Importantly, 
the beneficial effects of migration for migrants and their families go beyond economic impacts and frequently 
include improvements in other dimensions of human development, such as education and health.11 For example, 
according to a recent report by the World Bank, “migrants from the poorest countries, on average, experienced 
a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling of school enrolment rates, and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality 
after moving to a developed country”.12 
8	 UN	DESA,	2017.
9	 See	Clemens,	Montenegro	and	Pritchett,	2009.	
10	 See,	for	example,	the	influential	study	by	Gibson	and	McKenzie	(2011),	which	evaluated	the	costs	and	benefits	for	migrant	workers	
from	participating	in	new	low-skilled	labour	immigration	programmes	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand.
11	 See	UNDP,	2009.	
12	 World	Bank,	2016.
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In addition to benefiting individual migrants and their families, there is a large research literature that evidences 
the wider beneficial effects that emigration can have for migrants’ countries of origin.13 Emigration can reduce 
unemployment and underemployment, contribute to poverty reduction, and – with the appropriate supportive 
policies – foster broader economic and social development in origin countries in a variety of ways. For example, 
the remittances sent by migrants back to their countries of origin provide significant financial capital flows and 
a relatively stable source of income. Remittances are generally a less volatile and more reliable source of foreign 
currency than other capital flows in many developing countries.14 According to the World Bank, in 1990 migrants 
remitted around USD 29 billion to lower- and middle-income countries in 1990.15 This amount had more than 
doubled to USD 74 billion in 2000 and reached USD 429 billion in 2016.16 Globally, remittances are now more 
than three times the amount of official development assistance. Migration can also result in the transfer of skills, 
knowledge and technology – effects that are hard to measure, but that could have considerable positive impacts 
on productivity and economic growth. Beyond these economic impacts, emigration can generate beneficial 
societal consequences for countries of origin, including poor and fragile States. For example, it is increasingly 
recognized that migrants can play a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.17 
There is widespread agreement that migration can also generate economic and other benefits for destination 
countries. The precise nature and size of these benefits at a given time critically depends on the extent to which 
the skills of migrants are complementary to those of domestic workers, as well as on the characteristics of the 
host economy. In general, immigration adds workers to the economy, thus increasing the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the host country. There are also a variety of ways in which migrants can have positive effects on labour 
productivity and GDP per head, e.g. if migrants are more skilled than national workers and/or if immigration 
has positive effects for innovation and skills agglomeration.18 By nature or necessity, migrants are often more 
likely to be risk takers, and this quality has led to enormous contributions to many destination countries in areas 
such as technology, science, the arts and a range of other fields. In addition to enhancing national income and 
average living standards in destination countries, immigration can have a positive effect on the labour market by 
increasing labour supply in sectors and occupations suffering from shortages of workers, as well as helping address 
mismatches in the job market. These positive labour market effects are not just evident in high-skilled sectors, but 
can also occur in lower-skilled occupations.19 Immigration increases both the supply of and the demand for labour, 
which means that labour immigration (including of lower-skilled workers) can generate additional employment 
opportunities for existing workers. Of course, immigration can also have adverse labour market effects (e.g. on 
wages and employment of domestic workers), but most of the research literature finds that these negative impacts 
tend to be quite small, at least on average. Beyond the labour market and macroeconomy, the immigration of 
young workers can also help with easing pressures on pensions systems of high-income countries with rapidly 
ageing populations. Finally, in contrast to popular perceptions, a recent OECD study found that the net fiscal 
effects of immigration, i.e. the taxes migrants pay minus the benefits and government services they receive, tend 
to be quite small and – for most OECD countries analysed in the study – positive.20  
13	 For	a	recent	brief	review,	see,	for	example,	World	Bank,	2017.	Also	see	UNDP,	2009.	
14	 World	Bank,	2016.	
15	 World	Bank	Databank,	2017.
16	 World	Bank,	2017.
17	 For	a	critical	discussion	of	different	forms	of	diaspora	engagement	in	conflict	settings,	see,	for	example,	Van	Hear,	2011.	
18	 For	a	review	of	the	research	evidence	on	these	issues,	see,	for	example,	Migration	Advisory	Committee,	2014.
19	 See	Ruhs	and	Anderson,	2010.
20	 OECD,	2013.
5WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018
The World Migration Report Series
IOM’s first World Migration Report (WMR) was published in 2000, initially as a one-off publication designed to 
increase the understanding of migration by policymakers and the general public. Its contribution to migration 
policy as well as migration studies was timely, and its success heralded the world migration report series. Since 
2000, nine world migration reports have been produced by IOM (see text box below) and it has become the 
organization’s flagship publication series. Its continued strong focus is on making a relevant, sound and evidence-
based contribution that increases the understanding of migration by policymakers, practitioners, researchers and 
the general public.
World Migration Report 2000
World Migration Report 2003: Managing Migration – Challenges and Responses for People on the Move
World Migration Report 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration
World Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy
World Migration Report 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change
World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration
World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Well-Being and Development
World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility
World Migration Report 2018
At a time of heightened concern of migration, and its increasing complexity and growing interlinkages with a 
multitude of other public policy issues, there is an even stronger case for maintaining the series’ contribution to 
understanding migration. However, as the profile of migration has increased, so too has its various manifestations 
and its increasingly complex processes, including those that are becoming more transnational in nature. It is not 
hard to comprehend why people may at times feel overwhelmed by what they may read in media on migration, 
some of which may confound and confuse readers rather than clarify in a balanced way some of the complexities 
that continue to emerge under the ever-widening umbrella-term of “migration”. In light of this, the world 
migration report series has been refined in order to focus on two key contributions for readers:
• Part I: key information on migration and migrants (including migration-related statistics).
• Part II: balanced, evidence-based analysis of complex and emerging migration issues.
It is our intention that the two parts of this and future world migration reports, therefore, provide both overview 
information that helps to explain migration patterns and processes globally and regionally, as well as insights 
and recommendations on major issues that policymakers are or will soon be grappling with. Refinement of the 
series is also in recognition that as the focus on, and complexity of, migration intensifies, reports limited to a 
single theme have the potential to understate or miss entirely the broader changes that are occurring in migration 
transformations globally. A world migration report series that is better able to provide overview information on 
migration and migrants along with analyses of more topical issues, is more likely to be an important resource for 
a greater number of people. In addition, we are cognizant that IOM’s capacity as a publisher of migration-related 
material provides ample opportunity for thematic reports to be produced outside of the world migration report 
series (see, for example, the discussion in chapter 4 on IOM’s research-related publications).
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A further consideration of the series is its intended “value-add”. As an intergovernmental organization, and a 
new United Nations related organization, it is critical that IOM ensures the world migration report serves the 
public in providing information and analysis that is relevant, accessible, sound, accurate and balanced. IOM 
also recognizes, however, the existing substantial published material on migration, and so the world migration 
report must also be able to serve as a significant reference publication on migration that is able to draw on 
existing body of evidence and knowledge. Given recent work on migration governance, such as IOM’s Migration 
Governance Framework and the Migration Governance Index (now called Migration Governance Indicators) 
produced in collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit, the need to avoid duplication or significant 
overlap is a genuine one. In this way, the world migration report series has been reframed to offer a strategic 
focus on complex and emerging issues facing migration policymakers, rather than describe or assess current 
policy and governance on migration. The series is intended to complement rather than duplicate existing work. 
World Migration Report 2018 
This edition of the world migration report is the first in the revised series designed to better contribute to 
understandings of current and strategic migration issues. Part I, on “key data and information on migration”, includes 
separate chapters on global migration trends and patterns; regional dimensions and developments; and a discussion 
of recent contributions to migration research and analysis by academia and a wide range of different organizations, 
including IOM. These three chapters have been produced institutionally by IOM, drawing primarily on analyses by 
IOM experts, practitioners and officials around the world based on data from a wide range of relevant organizations.21 
The six chapters in Part II are authored by applied and academic researchers working on migration and mobility. 
They cover a range of “complex and emerging migration issues” including:
• the development of global governance frameworks for international migration; 
• the relationship between migration and rapidly changing levels and types of transnational connectivities; 
• migrants’ perspectives on migration journeys; 
• media reporting on migration and migrants; 
• the relationships between migration and violent extremism; and 
• migrants and cities. 
While the choice of these topics is necessarily selective and subjective, all the chapters in Part II of this report 
are directly relevant to some of the most prominent and important debates about migration in the world today. 
Many of these topics lie at the heart of the conundrums that face policymakers as they seek to formulate effective, 
proportionate and constructive responses to complex public policy issues related to migration. Accordingly, the 
chapters aim to inform current and future policy debates by providing a clear identification of the key issues and 
questions, a critical overview of relevant research and analysis, and a discussion of the implications for future 
research and policymaking. The chapters are not meant to be prescriptive, in the sense of advocating particular 
policy “solutions”, but informative and helpful to what can be highly contested debates that preclude ”silver 
bullet” solutions. In many of the chapters, the need to formulate multifaceted responses that take into account 
relevant evidence as well as emerging strategic issues is highlighted as critical for migration policy and practice.
21	 Guy	Abel,	a	global	expert	on	migration	data,	also	contributed	to	the	analysis	in	this	part,	especially	to	the	analysis	and	presentation	
of	statistical	data	in	chapter	3.
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All the chapters of the World Migration Report 2018 are relatively self-contained and can also be downloaded 
as individual chapters and contributions. There are, however, a number of important cross-cutting themes and 
issues that are discussed throughout the report. For example, a major cross-cutting issue relates to the important 
variations of migration and its impacts, as well as of public and policy debates about migrants, across space (e.g. 
between different countries and regions), demographic groups (e.g. by gender and age), and/or across different 
levels of governance (distinguishing, for example, between policymaking and debates at the level of cities, 
subnational regions, States, world regions and globally). The report’s emphasis on highlighting geographic, 
demographic and political variations is meant to provide a more nuanced and – we argue – more accurate picture 
of global migration, than the highly simplified and often misleading pictures of global migration sometimes 
painted by popular media reports. To be more effective and evidence-based, public and policy debates on global 
migration issues need to be aware and take account of these important variations. 
A second key issue discussed and highlighted throughout the report is that migration is not an isolated 
phenomenon that can be effectively analysed, debated and regulated without considering a range of important 
interconnections across: 
• “space” (e.g. between policies of different countries), scale and levels of governance (e.g. linking cities, 
regions, States, supranational and global governance structures); 
• migration types, categories and policies (e.g. considering the links and often blurred lines between 
migration for work, protection, family reasons and study); 
• “time” (e.g. across temporary and permanent migration flows and polices); and 
• migration and wider public policies (such as labour market policies, welfare policies, education and training, 
housing policies, etc.). 
These interconnections and linkages are critical to understanding and responding to global migration and mobility.
Overall, the World Migration Report 2018 thus suggests that, to make better sense of migration and regulate 
migration more effectively, we need to be aware of and consider the important geographic, demographic and 
geopolitical variations of migration issues, as well as to recognize the many interconnections in the analysis and 
policymaking on migration. Although these fundamental insights are in many ways obvious, they are frequently 
ignored in public and policy debates on migration and migrants around the world. They should instead be at 
the heart of debates about migration, including the current international debates about how to develop a new 
global compact on migration as well as a global compact on refugees. Where relevant, the various chapters of 
this report highlight key insights and implications for these two global compacts. 
Part I
Chapter 2 provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international 
migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, 
asylum seekers and IDPs – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter highlights the growing body of 
IOM programmatic data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, migrant 
health, resettlement, displacement tracking, diaspora mapping and human trafficking. While these data are 
generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant IOM 
programming and operations globally. The chapter also discusses key data gaps and challenges. 
Following the global overview, chapter 3 provides a discussion of key regional dimensions of, and developments 
in, migration. The discussion focuses on six world regions as applied by UN DESA: Africa, Asia, Europe, 
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Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania. For each of these regions, the analysis includes: 
i) an overview and brief discussion of key population-related statistics; and ii) succinct descriptions of “key 
features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses, 
including from international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration 
patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, descriptive narratives of “key features and recent 
developments” are presented at the subregional level. 
There is a substantial amount of research and analysis on migration that is being undertaken and published by 
a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. Chapter 
4 provides a selective overview of such contributions, focusing mainly on academics and intergovernmental 
organizations and covering the period 2015–2016. The knowledge derived from rigorous analysis and research 
can and should play an important role in informing people, including policymakers and migration practitioners, 
about the changing world around us, including migration. Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics 
of the different types of research and analysis being produced on migration is important for people who may 
be studying migration, working on migration policies or in migration practice, or trying to develop a better 
understanding of migration. 
Part II
Chapter 5 critically discusses the global governance of international migration. The chapter first reviews some of 
the major global norms and institutions relevant to the global governance of migration and then discusses the 
following three themes and recent developments:
• key dialogues and initiatives instrumental to building momentum and confidence towards greater action 
at the global level; 
• specific initiatives build normative frameworks to enhance protection of migrants;
• the integration of international migration into global-level responses on other issues. 
The chapter argues that the step-by-step process of consultation, cooperation and confidence-building that has 
taken place to date has shown that progress can occur, albeit in incremental ways. The authors of the chapter 
suggest that this incremental progress remains the most promising path towards more effective global migration 
governance. 
Recent advances in transportation and telecommunications technology have heralded massive changes in how 
we access information and interact globally in real time. Increasing transnational connectivity is shaping how 
people move internationally in ways that were not previously possible. Chapter 6 examines what this increasing 
transnational connectivity means for mobility and migration, and how related processes are being shaped. 
Following a brief overview of the key advances in transportation and telecommunications technology globally, 
the chapter discusses how transnational connectivity is affecting migration processes via impacts on migrants, 
non-State actors and States. The authors provide examples of how transnational connectivity can affect these 
different migration actors and conclude with implications for migration governance, including the global 
compact on migration. 
Chapter 7 discusses the importance of understanding migration from migrants’ perspectives, principally by 
listening to and learning from migrants through rigorous research. While all migrants make decisions before 
and during their journeys – some decisions being of greater consequence than others, and even involving 
life and death scenarios – this chapter focuses more on people who have fewer means and more restricted 
9WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018
choices. The chapter first provides a brief discussion of migrants’ self-agency (i.e. migrants’ abilities to make 
and act upon decisions and choices) and the continuum of agency that explains variations in choice when it 
comes to migrating. It then analyses four key issues and factors that can have important impacts on migrants’ 
considerations and decisions during the migration process: (mis)information, preference for visas, risk and 
reward, and pressures to migrate. The chapter also reviews recent advances in research methods and technology 
that are making migrant-centric research more feasible globally. The authors argue that better understandings 
of migrants’ choices about migration and migration journeys are of fundamental importance to more effective 
policymaking on migration. Their chapter concludes with implications for research and policy initiatives, 
including those related to the global compact on migration. 
The media can play an important role in shaping how and what people think about migration, including 
policymakers and migrants themselves. Chapter 8 critically discusses media reporting on migrants and migration. 
Drawing on existing research in different countries, the analysis addresses four key questions: What do media 
around the world say about migration and migrants? What impacts does this coverage have on what members 
of the public, policymakers and migrants themselves think and do? How does the practice of journalism itself 
contribute to coverage? What implications arise from recent experiences of media and migration for future 
research and practice? The authors argue that variations of media coverage of migration partly reflect the 
considerable differences in how countries’ media systems operate. While there is a growing body of research on 
the relationships between media, public opinion and policies on migration, the authors argue that much more 
research needs to be done into the role of the media in transit and origin countries – and particularly migrants’ 
own use of, and preferences for, different types of media. This is especially important for understanding how 
and to what extent information sources shape perceptions. 
Around the world, a number of political leaders, reflecting varying degrees of popular sentiment, are linking 
migrants and migration with the rising threat of violent extremism. Recognizing that this is a sensitive topic 
that has attracted significant media attention, chapter 9 provides an analysis of the existing evidence on 
the relationships between migration, violent extremism and social exclusion. The chapter starts with a brief 
overview of definitions and data, emphasizing the need for analytical clarity, pointing to a shortage of reliable 
data, and highlighting the challenge of distinguishing causation from correlation. Next, a simple typology of the 
intersections between migration and violent extremism is developed, following the logic of the migration cycle 
from departure to settlement and, at times, return. The chapter ends with a series of preliminary implications 
for further policy debate. 
Chapter 10 is a follow-up to World Migration Report 2015, which was devoted to a single theme: the relationship 
between migration and the cities of the world. Building on the foundations of WMR 2015, the chapter looks at 
the role of the modern city in migration governance, taking advantage of some of the recent research on the 
evolving nature of cities and their roles in the world. This includes discussion of sanctuary cities and, more 
generally, the role of cities in responding to the recent large-scale displacements and migrations. The authors 
argue that the continuing growth in the influence of cities over social and economic affairs and over migration 
trajectories, both international and internal, demands greater attention from both scholars and policymakers. 
Overall, this world migration report has been produced to help deepen our collective understanding of the 
various manifestations and complexities of migration. We hope that all readers are able to learn something new 
from this edition, as well as to draw on its contents as they undertake their work, study or other activities.
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2 MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS:  A GLOBAL OVERVIEW
Introduction
Human migration is an age-old phenomenon that stretches back to the earliest periods of human history. In 
the modern era, emigration and immigration continue to provide States, societies and migrants with many 
opportunities. At the same time, migration has emerged in the last few years as a critical political and policy 
challenge in matters such as integration, displacement, safe migration and border management. In 2015, there 
were an estimated 244 million international migrants globally (3.3% of the world’s population) — an increase 
from an estimated 155 million people in 2000 (2.8% of the world’s population).22 Internal migration is even 
more prevalent, with the most recent global estimate indicating that more than 740 million people had migrated 
within their own country of birth.23 
It is important to understand international migration and its various manifestations in order to effectively 
address evolving migration dynamics, while at the same time adequately accounting for the diverse and varied 
needs of migrants. International movement is becoming more feasible, partly thanks to the digital revolution, 
distance-shrinking technology and reductions in travel costs.24 Factors underpinning migration are numerous, 
relating to economic prosperity, inequality, demography, violence and conflict, and environmental change. 
While the overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and 
study, many people leave their homes and countries for other compelling reasons, such as conflict, persecution 
and disaster. Overall, displaced populations such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) comprise 
a relatively small percentage of all migrants; however, they often capture and demand collective attention and 
action as they frequently find themselves in highly vulnerable situations. These are the people who are often 
most in need of assistance. 
This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, 
practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview 
of information on migration and migrants. The chapter draws upon sources of data compiled by the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The chapter provides 
an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It 
also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and 
IDPs – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter highlights the growing body of programmatic IOM data, 
particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, migrant health, resettlement, 
22	 UN	DESA,	2015a.
23	 UNDP,	2009.	
24	 See,	for	example,	chapter	6	of	this	report	on	transnational	connectivity.
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displacement tracking, diaspora mapping and human trafficking. While these data are generally not global 
or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant programming and 
operations globally. As the United Nation’s new migration agency, with activities relevant to all the themes 
discussed in this chapter, IOM has the capacity to provide further insights on migration and its various dynamics, 
including the diverse needs of migrants.
This chapter also highlights the challenges in achieving comparability and uniformity in data collection that 
make a comprehensive analysis of global migration trends difficult. Recent and ongoing efforts to collect and 
improve data have led to an expansion in available migration data. However, issues of fragmentation, and lack 
of uniformity and comparability, remain key challenges in developing a truly global picture of all key aspects of 
migration.25 Similarly, defining migration and migrants is complex, as discussed in the text box below.
Defining migration, migrant and other key terms
Outside	of	general	definitions	of	migration	and	migrant,	such	as	those	found	in	dictionaries,	there	exist	
various	specific	definitions	of	key	migration-related	terms,	including	in	legal,	administrative,	research	and	
statistical	spheres.a		There	is	no	universally	agreed	definition	of	migration	or	migrant,	however,	several	
definitions	are	widely	accepted	and	have	been	developed	in	different	settings,	such	as	those	set	out	in	
UN	DESA’s	1998	Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration.b
Technical	 definitions,	 concepts	 and	 categories	 of	migrants	 and	migration	 are	necessarily	 informed	by	
geographic,	legal,	political,	methodological,	temporal	and	other	factors.	For	example,	there	are	numerous	
ways	in	which	migration	events	can	be	defined,	including	in	relation	to	place	of	birth,	citizenship,	place	of	
residence	and	duration	of	stay.c		This	is	important	when	it	comes	to	quantifying	and	analysing	the	effects	
of	migration	and	migrants	(however	defined).	We	encourage	readers	to	refer	to	primary	sources	cited	in	
the	chapter	for	information	on	specific	definitions	and	categorizations	underlying	the	data.	A	summary	of	
key	technical	definitions	of	migration-related	terms	is	provided	in	appendix	A.
Readers	may	also	find	the	IOM	Glossary on Migration	to	be	a	useful	reference.	 The	glossary	is	available	
at	the	IOM	online	bookstore:	www.publications.iom.int/.
a			See,	for	example,	Poulain	and	Perrin,	2001.	
b			UN	DESA,	1998.
c			See,	for	example,	de	Beer	et	al.,	2010.
25	 In	 general,	 explanatory	 notes,	 caveats,	 limitations	 and	methodologies	 on	 specific	 sources	 of	 data	 can	 be	 extensive	 and	 are	
therefore	not	included	in	this	chapter.	However,	sources	have	been	clearly	identified	so	that	readers	can	refer	to	them.	
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International migrants: numbers and trends
UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws 
on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.26 
The United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration defines an international migrant as 
any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” 
(those who have changed their country of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and 
“long-term migrants” (those who have done so for at least one year). However, not all countries use this definition 
in practice.27 Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants by, for example, applying 
different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions, as well as data collection 
methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants. 
Overall, the estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past four-and-a-half decades. The total 
estimated 244 million people living in a country other than their country of birth in 2015 is almost 100 million more 
than in 1990 (when it was 153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million; see table 1).28 
While the proportion of international migrants globally has increased over this period, it is evident that the vast majority 
of people continue to live in the country in which they were born. Most international migrants in 2015 (around 72%) 
were of working age (20 to 64 years of age), with a slight decrease in migrants aged less than 20 between 2000 and 2015 
(17% to 15%), and a constant share (around 12%) of international migrants aged 65 years or more since 2000.
Table	1.	International	migrants,	1970–2015
Year Number of migrants Migrants as a %  
of world’s population
1970 84,460,125 2.3%
1975 90,368,010 2.2%
1980 101,983,149 2.3%
1985 113,206,691 2.3%
1990 152,563,212 2.9%
1995 160,801,752 2.8%
2000 172,703,309 2.8%
2005 191,269,100 2.9%
2010 221,714,243 3.2%
2015 243,700,236 3.3%
Source:		UN	DESA,	2008	and	2015a.
Note:		 The	number	of	entities	(such	as	States,	territories	and	administrative	regions)	for	which	data	were	made	available	in	the	2015	
UN	DESA	Revision of International Migrant Stock	was	213.	In	1970,	the	number	of	entities	was	135.
26	 Data	 are	 also	 provided	 to	 UN	DESA	 by	 territories	 and	 administrative	 units.	 For	 a	 summary	 on	 UN	DESA	 stock	 data	 sources,	
methodology	and	caveats,	please	see	UN	DESA,	2015b.
27	 UN	DESA,	1998.	
28	 UN	DESA,	2008.	
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Snapshot of International Migrants
The	international	migrant	population	globally	has	increased	in	size	but	remained	relatively	stable	 
as	a	proportion	of	the	world’s	population	
The	proportion	of	international	migrants	varies	significantly	around	the	world
Note:		 Names	and	boundaries	indicated	on	this	map	do	not	imply	official	endorsement	or	acceptance	by	IOM.
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244	million	international	migrants	in	2015	out	of	a	global	population	of	7.3	billion:	 
1	in	every	30	people	
52%	of	international	migrants	are	male,	48% are female 
Most	international	migrants	(72%)	are	of	working	age	(20–64)	years
* Age groups above 75 years omitted (male 4.5%, female 6.8%). 
Note:		Snapshot	based	on	infographics	by	IOM’s	Migration	Research	Division	and	Global	Migration	Data	Analysis	Centre	(IOM,	
2017d),	which	draw	on	UN	DESA	data	(UN	DESA,	2015a).
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Europe and Asia hosted around 75 million migrants each in 2015 – 62 per cent of the total global international 
migrant stock combined (see figure 1). These regions were followed by North America, with 54 million 
international migrants in 2015 or 22 per cent of the global migrant stock, Africa at 9 per cent, Latin America 
and the Caribbean at 4 per cent, and Oceania at 3 per cent. When compared with the size of the population 
in each region, shares of international migrants in 2015 were highest in Oceania, North America and Europe, 
where international migrants represented, respectively, 21 per cent, 15 per cent and 10 per cent of the total 
population.29 In comparison, the share of international migrants is relatively small in Asia and Africa (1.7% 
each) and Latin America (1.5%). However, Asia is the region where growth in the resident migrant population 
between 2000 and 2015 was most remarkable, at over 50 per cent (around 25 million people, in absolute terms).30
Figure	1.	International	migrants,	by	major	region	of	residence,	2000	to	2015	(millions)
Source:	 UN	 DESA,	 2015a.	 Datasets	 available	 from	 www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
estimates2/estimates15.shtml	(accessed	22	June	2017).
The United States of America has been the main country of destination for international migrants since 1970.31 
Since then, the number of foreign-born people residing in the country has almost quadrupled — from less 
than 12 million in 1970, to 46.6 million in 2015. Germany has been the second top country of destination per 
UN DESA estimates since as early as 2005, with over 12 million international migrants residing in the country 
in 2015. Prior to 2005, the Russian Federation had been the second largest host country of international 
migrants for roughly 15 years, since the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991. A list of the top 
20 destination countries of international migrants is provided in the left-hand column of figure 2 below.
29	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
30	 Ibid.	
31	 UN	DESA,	2008;	UN	DESA,	2015a.	
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The list of largest migrant source countries is shown in the right-hand panel in figure 2. Nearly half of all 
international migrants worldwide in 2015 were born in Asia,32 primarily originating from India (the largest 
country of origin), China, and other South Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Mexico was the second largest country of origin, followed by a number of European countries that have sizable 
numbers of emigrants.
Figure	2.	Top	20	destinations	(left)	and	origins	(right)	of	international	migrants	in	2015	(millions)
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	Datasets	 for	the	2015	Revision	available	at	www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
estimates2/estimates15.shtml.
32	 UN	DESA,	2016.	
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In regard to the distribution of international migrants by countries’ income group,33 about two thirds of 
international migrants resided in high-income economies in 2015 – around 157 million. This compares with 
77 million foreign-born who resided in middle-income countries (about one third of the total migrant stock) and 
almost 9 million in low-income countries in the same year. 
UN DESA estimates of foreign-born populations do not reflect immigration status or policy categories (such as 
students, highly skilled migrants, or refugees). Capturing such attributes is inherently difficult for several key 
reasons. First, a person’s immigration status can be fluid and change quickly, arising from circumstances and 
legal-policy settings. For example, many international migrants who may be described as ‘‘undocumented’ or 
“irregular” enter countries on valid visas and then stay in contravention of one or more visa conditions. In fact, 
there are many paths to irregularity, such as crossing borders without authorization, unlawfully overstaying 
a visa period, working in contravention of visa conditions, being born into irregularity, or remaining after a 
negative decision on an asylum application has been made.34 Second, countries have different immigration policy 
settings and different ways of collecting data on migrants, which makes it difficult to establish a harmonized 
approach to capturing irregular migrant stocks globally. The pace of change in the migration policy arena also 
poses an extra dimension of complexity, as people may slip into and out of “irregularity”. Various analysts use 
different methods to produce intermittent estimates of irregular migrant populations. Table 2 shows a few 
existing estimates of irregular migrant populations in selected countries and regions. However, these should 
be treated with caution, as the estimation exercise can often be imprecise (for example, there are variations in 
the estimates of irregular migrant populations in the European Union and the United States). This is partly a 
reflection of the problematic nature of quantifying irregular migrant populations, given the often clandestine 
nature of irregularity, the difficulty in accessing administrative data on immigration status, and the fact that a 
migrant’s status can change.35 Migration flows are discussed in the following section.
Diaspora populations or transnational communities?
The	term	diaspora	is	used	in	academic	and	policy	circles	to	refer	to	people	(and	often	their	descendants)	
from	a	specific	country	who	are	living	abroad.	However,	there	is	no	single	agreed-upon	definition	of	
the	term.	In	fact,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	term	transnational communities	may	better	describe	
the	 reality	 of	 contemporary	 migration	 experiences,	 where	 migrants	 may	 establish	 and	 maintain	
connections	with	people	in	their	home	communities	or	migrants	in	other	countries.	Indeed,	IOM	uses	
the	terms	diaspora	and	transnational communities	interchangeably	(IOM,	2017c).	See	appendix	B	for	a	
further	discussion	on	the	term	diaspora	and	the	difficulties	in	quantifying	global	diaspora	populations,	
as	well	as	IOM’s	work	in	this	area.
33	 Per	World	Bank	Country	Income	Group	Classifications,	in	World Bank Country and Lending Groups. Available	from	http://datahelpdesk.
worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups	(World	Bank,	n.d.a).	
34	 Gordon	et	al.,	2009.	
35	 Koser,	2010.	
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Table	2.	Estimates	of	irregular	migrant	populations	in	selected	countries	and	regions
Country/region Year Estimated population (stock) Source
Australia 2011 58,400 (a)
European	Union
2008 1.9–3.8	million (b)
2008 8	million (c)	
Germany 2014 180,000–520,000 (d)
Greece 2011 390,000 (e)
Israel 2015 150,000 (f)
Italy 2008 279,000–461,000 (b)
Russian	Federation* 2011 5–6	million (g)
South	Africa 2010 3–6	million (h)
Spain 2008 354,000 (i)
United	Kingdom 2007 417,000–863,000 (j)	
United	States
2014 11.1	million (k)
2016 11.3	million (k)
* Estimate refers to irregular migrant workers.
Source: (a)	 ANAO,	 2013;	 (b)	 Clandestino	 Research	 Project,	 2009a;	 (c)	 Frontex,	 2010;	 (d)	 Clandestino	 Research	
Project,	 2015;	 (e)	 Clandestino	 Research	 Project,	 2012;	 (f)	 Fleischman	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 (g)	 OECD,	 2012a;	  
(h)	 South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2010;	 (i)	 Clandestino	 Research	 Project,	 2009b;	 (j)	 Gordon	 et	 al.,	 2009;	  
(k)	Krogstad,	Passel	and	Cohn,	2017.  
International migration flows: definitions, numbers and gaps
While data on migrant stocks are widely available, data on global migration movements (flows) are much more 
limited. Available UN DESA estimates on global migrant stocks are extensive and global in scope; however, 
the database of migration flows only encompasses 45 countries.36 Capturing data on migration flows is 
challenging for several reasons. First, while international migration flows are generally accepted as covering 
inflows and outflows into and from countries, there has been a greater focus on recording inflows. For 
example, while countries such as Australia and the United States count cross-border movements, many others 
only count entries and not departures.37 Additionally, migration flow data in some countries are derived from 
administrative events related to immigration status (for example, issuance/renewal/withdrawal of a residence 
36	 Laczko,	2017.
37	 Koser,	2010.	
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permit) and are thus used as a proxy for migration flows. Furthermore, migratory movements are often hard 
to separate from non-migratory travel, such as tourism or business. Tracking migratory movements also 
requires considerable resources, infrastructure and IT/knowledge systems. This poses particular challenges for 
developing countries, where the ability to collect, administer, analyse and report data on mobility, migration 
and other areas is often limited. Finally, many countries’ physical geographies pose tremendous challenges 
for collecting data on migration flows. Entry and border management, for example, is particularly challenging 
in some regions because of archipelagic and isolated borders, and it is further complicated by traditions of 
informal migration for work.38
Migration flows 
There are currently two main international datasets on international migration flows, both of which are 
derived from national statistics: UN DESA’s International Migration Flows dataset and OECD’s International 
Migration Database.39 Since 2005, UN DESA has compiled data on the flows of international migrants to and 
from selected countries, based on nationally available statistics. The latest revision (2015) comprises data 
from 45 countries that collect this information (only 43 on emigration flows), up from 29 countries in 2008 
and 15 countries in 2005.40 Progress in extending the dataset is encouraging; however, the ability to conduct 
trend analysis is limited.41 
Researchers and analysts have made numerous attempts to better understand global or regional migration 
flows by using changes in migrant stock data as a proxy for flow data. Guy Abel and Nikola Sander recently 
undertook a sophisticated approach to this issue by analysing changes in international migrant stocks to 
estimate migration flows, visualizing data using circular plots.42 Figure 3 provides an update to this work by 
presenting estimated migration flows between 2010 and 2015.43
38	 Gallagher	and	McAuliffe,	2016.	
39	 Other	projects	have	made	contributions	to	the	monitoring	of	migration	flows	at	a	regional	(non-global)	level.	Of	note,	the	Migration 
Modelling for Statistical Analyses (MIMOSA)	 project	 (commissioned	 by	 Eurostat)	 measured	 migration	 flows	 (immigration	 and	
emigration)	as	well	as	population	stocks	 in	Europe	(de	Beer,	van	der	Erf	and	Raymer,	2009;	Raymer	et	al.,	2011).	The	 Integrated 
Modelling of European Migration (IMEM)	project	(Raymer	et	al.,	2013)	notably	presents	bilateral	migrant	flow	data	disaggregated	by	
age	and	gender,	but	is	also	limited	to	countries	in	Europe.	 
40	 For	UN	DESA	migrant	flow	data,	as	well	as	for	the	specific	countries	included,	please	see	UN	DESA,	2015c.	
41	 For	a	summary	of	UN	DESA	migrant	flow	data	sources,	methodology	and	caveats,	please	see	UN	DESA,	2015d.
42	 Abel	and	Sander,	2014.	
43	 Prepared	by	Guy	Abel	in	2017.	
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Figure	3.	Estimated	regional	migration	flows,	2010–2015
Source:	 UN	 DESA,	 2015a.	 Datasets	 for	 the	 2015	 revision	 of	 International	 migration	 flows	 to	 and	 from	
selected	countries	available	from	www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
empirical2/migrationflows.shtml.	
Note:	 The	direction	of	the	flow	is	indicated	by	the	arrowhead.	The	size	of	the	flow	is	determined	by	the	
width	of	the	arrow	at	its	base.	Numbers	on	the	outer	section	axis,	used	to	read	the	size	of	migration	
flows,	are	in	millions.	So,	for	example,	between	2010	and	2015,	there	was	an	increase	of	around	 
4	million	people	in	Northern	America	who	were	born	in	Asia.
The OECD data on migration flows have been collected since 2000, which allows for limited trend analysis, as 
shown in figure 4 (though data are not standardized, as explained in the note under the figure).44 The data 
estimates suggest that permanent migration inflows to OECD countries increased from 3.85 million in 2000 to 
7.13 million in 2015, with a temporary lull occurring around the time of the global financial crisis (figure 4). 
Germany was the main OECD destination country in 2015, with over 2 million new international migrants (more 
than double the levels registered in 2000) arriving that year, followed by the United States (just over 1 million) 
and the United Kingdom (about 480,000 new migrants).45
44	 This	subsection	is	based	on	data	from	the	OECD	International	Migration	Database,	available	from	OECD,	2015.	For	additional	data	on	
migrant	flows	and	other	migrant	data	in	OECD	countries,	please	see	OECD,	n.d.a.
45	 These	are	the	top	OECD	countries	for	permanent	inflows	of	foreign	nationals	for	which	data	were	made	available	in	2015.	
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Figure	4.	Inflows	of	foreign	nationals	into	OECD	countries,	permanent	migration,	 
2000–2015	(millions)
Source:	 OECD,	2015.			
Note 1:	 Data	are	not	standardized	and	therefore	differ	from	statistics	on	permanent	migration	 inflows	 into	selected	
countries	contained	in	OECD’s	International	Migration	Outlook	2016	(OECD,	2016a	and	2016b).
Note 2: The	35	countries	typically	included	in	OECD	statistics	are	the	following:	Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Canada,	Chile,	Czech	
Republic,	Denmark,	Estonia,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Israel,	Italy,	Japan,	Republic	
of	Korea,	Latvia,	Luxembourg,	Mexico,	the	Netherlands,	New	Zealand,	Norway,	Poland,	Portugal,	Slovakia,	Slovenia,	
Spain,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	Turkey,	United	Kingdom	and	United	States.	In	some	years,	data	for	particular	countries	
are	not	made	available:	data	were	made	available	for	31	countries	in	2000,	and	33	countries	in	2015.	Notably,	data	for	
Greece	have	not	been	reported	since	2012	and	data	for	Turkey	have	not	been	reported	since	2010.
Disaggregation of migration flow data by sex and age
Data	on	age	and	sex	profiles	of	international	migration	flows	are	not	available	from	UN	DESA	or	OECD.	 
A	methodology	for	sex	disaggregation	of	bilateral	migration	flows	using	UN	DESA	stock	data	is	presented	
in	Abel,	 Samir	 and	Sander.d	Raymer	et	 al.e	 provide	bilateral	migration	flow	estimates	by	 sex	and	age,	
but	only	 for	 European	 countries.	 Finally,	Nawrotzki	 and	 Jiangf	 estimated	bilateral	net	migration	flows	
disaggregated	by	age	and	sex	for	the	year	2000;	the	 information	is	contained	in	the	publicly	available	
Community	 Demographic	 Model	 International	 Migration	 (CDM-IM)	 dataset.	 Statistics	 on	 bilateral	
migration	flows	are	also	available	from	the	Determinants	of	International	Migration	(DEMIG)	Country-
to-Country	database,	which	contains	bilateral	migration	flow	data	for	up	to	34	countries	over	the	period	
1946–2011.	The	database	also	provides	gender	breakdowns,	where	available.
d			Abel,	Samir	and	Sander,	2013.	
e			Raymer	et	al.,	2013.
f				Nawrotzki	and	Jiang,	2015.
Typically, migration flow data of the sort described above encompass people who have migrated (or are residing) 
regularly on a visa or entry permit. Most such data do not capture irregular migration flows, which involve 
“movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving country”.46 
46	 IOM,	2017a.		
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It is important here to distinguish irregular migration (flows) from irregular migrants (stocks), as they are 
interlinked, but conceptually and practically distinct, although the two terms are often incorrectly used 
interchangeably.47 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a person may, for example, enter a country regularly 
on a valid visa (thereby not engaging in irregular entry) and then overstay or contravene a visa condition, for 
example, and thus become irregular. Estimates of irregular migrants (stocks) were discussed in the previous 
section. For further discussion on irregular migration flows, see appendix C.
Human trafficking and migrant smuggling
Trafficking	 in	 persons	 often	 involves	movements	 within	 countries	 or	 across	 international	 borders.	 In	
different	contexts,	migrants	(including	workers,	refugees,	asylum	seekers	and	IDPs)	can	become	victims	of	
human	trafficking.	Due	to	the	clandestine	and	underreported	nature	of	this	activity,	however,	systematic	
data	collection	is	problematic	and	global	estimates	of	human	trafficking	are	limited.	For	information	on	
available	data,	as	well	as	on	IOM’s	work	in	this	area,	see	appendix	D.
Global-level	data	on	migrant	smuggling	on	routes	traversing	land,	air	and	sea	are	unavailable.	Tragedies	
involving	smuggled	migrants	are	often	a	key	glimpse	into	the	potential	scale	and	vulnerabilities	associated	
with	such	movements.	In	recent	years,	in	recognition	of	the	need	for	a	better	understanding	of	migrant	
smuggling	dynamics,	efforts	have	been	made	 to	 review	existing	data	and	 research	 (see,	 for	example,	
McAuliffe	and	Laczko,	2016).
See	appendix	A	for	definitions	of	the	terms	trafficking in persons	and	smuggling of migrants.
Migrant fatalities and IOM’s Missing Migrants Project
In	the	wake	of	the	tragic	events	of	October	2013,	in	which	an	estimated	368	migrants	died	in	the	sinking	
of	 two	 boats	 near	 the	 Italian	 island	 of	 Lampedusa,	 IOM	 began	 collecting	 and	 compiling	 information	
on	migrants	who	perish	or	go	missing	on	migratory	routes	worldwide,	within	its	Missing	Migrants	Project	
(MMP).	 Information	on	migrant	 fatalities	 is	 collected	daily	and	made	available	on	 the	Missing	Migrants	
Project’s	online	database,	managed	by	IOM’s	Global	Migration	Data	Analysis	Centre	(GMDAC).	MMP	also	
provides	analysis	of	 issues	and	data	on	migrant	deaths.	Data	 sources	 include	official	 records	of	 coast	
guards	 and	 medical	 examiners,	 media	 stories,	 reports	 from	 non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs)	
and	United	Nations	agencies,	and	 interviews	with	migrants.	Data	collection	challenges	are	significant.	
For	 instance,	 the	majority	 of	 deaths	 are	 among	migrants	 travelling	 irregularly,	which	 often	 occurs	 at	
sea,	 or	 in	 remote	 areas	 (chosen	with	 the	 aim	 of	 evading	 detection),	meaning	 bodies	 are	 not	 found.	
Few	 official	 sources	 collect	 and	make	 data	 on	migrant	 deaths	 publicly	 available.	 Relying	 on	migrant	
testimonies	and	media	sources	may	also	be	problematic	due	to	inaccuracies	and	incomplete	coverage.	
47	 McAuliffe,	2017.
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According	 to	 IOM’s	 MMP,	 7,927	 migrants	 worldwide	 died	 or	 went	 missing	 in	 2016,	 26	 per	 cent	
more	 than	 the	 number	 of	 deaths	 and	 missing	 migrants	 recorded	 in	 2015	 (6,281).	 The	 number	
of	 deaths	 and	 missing	 migrants	 recorded	 in	 the	 Mediterranean	 Sea	 increased	 by	 36	 per	 cent	
in	 2016,	 from	 3,785	 in	 2015	 to	 5,143	 in	 2016.	 The	 Mediterranean	 accounted	 for	 more	 than	  
60	per	cent	of	migrant	deaths	and	missing	migrants	recorded	by	MMP	in	both	years. Nearly	1,400	deaths	
and	missing	migrants	were	recorded	in	North	Africa	in	2016,	mostly	due	to	the	harsh	natural	environment,	
violence	and	abuse,	dangerous	transportation	conditions,	and	sickness	and	starvation.	Figures	for	other	
regions	are	highlighted	below.
Recorded migrant deaths and missing migrants worldwide, 2016
Source:	 IOM,	n.d.i.				
Note:	 Figures	correspond	to	deaths	that	occurred	during	the	process	of	migration.	All	numbers	reflect	only	those	incidents	about	
which	 IOM	 is	aware.	An	unknown	number	of	deaths	 remain	unreported	and	therefore,	 these	data	comprise	minimum	
estimates.	Figures	include	both	bodies	found	and	migrants	who	are	missing	and	presumed	dead.	Names	and	boundaries	
indicated	on	this	map	do	not	imply	official	endorsement	or	acceptance	by	IOM.
For	more	on	MMP,	see	https://missingmigrants.iom.int/about.	New	data	sources	are	constantly	added	
and	efforts	are	ongoing	to	improve	data	collection	globally.	For	a	discussion	of	the	challenges	of	collecting	
data	on	migrant	deaths,	please	see	http://missingmigrants.iom.int/methodology.
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IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programmes
IOM	 has	 implemented	 assisted	 voluntary	 return	 and	 reintegration	 (AVRR)	 programmes	 since	 1979.	
IOM’s	AVRR	support	 to	migrants	comprises	a	 range	of	activities,	and	typically	 includes:	 the	provision	of	
pre-departure	counselling,	the	purchase	of	flight	tickets,	administrative	and	travel	assistance	and,	where	
possible,	the	provision	of	reintegration	assistance.	
On	average,	between	2005	and	2014,	IOM	assisted	34,000	migrants	per	year	through	AVRR.	In	line	with	
the	rise	 in	the	volume	of	migration	in	recent	years,	the	number	of	returns	has	significantly	 increased.	
In	2016,	AVRR	support	was	provided	to	98,403	migrants	returning	from	110	host	or	transit	countries	to	 
161	countries	or	territories	of	origin.	This	amounts	to	a	41	per	cent	increase	compared	with	2015	(69,540).	
Of	the	98,403	AVRR	beneficiaries	in	2016,	approximately	32	per	cent	were	women	and	27	per	cent	were	
children.	Over	3	per	cent	of	these	returnees	were	victims	of	trafficking,	unaccompanied	migrant	children,	
or	migrants	with	health-related	needs.	Approximately	39,000	beneficiaries	were	provided	with	financial	
support	in	cash	and/or	in	kind,	before	departure	or	upon	arrival	in	their	countries	or	territories	of	origin.	
Top 10 host/transit countries and countries/territories of origin of AVRR 
beneficiaries (2016)
Host or transit countries Countries or territories of origin
Germany 54,006 Albania 17,976	
Greece 6,153 Iraq 12,776	
Austria 4,812 Afghanistan 	7,102	
Niger 4,788 Serbia 	6,978	
Netherlands,	the 4,635 Kosovo/UNSC	1244 	5,889	
Belgium 4,117 Ethiopia 	5,675
Yemen 2,594 The	former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia	 	4,986	
Finland 2,116 Iran	(Islamic	Republic	of) 	4,485	
Djibouti 1,803 Ukraine 	3,438	
Norway 1,459 Russian	Federation 	2,058	
As	 highlighted	 in	 the	 above	 table,	 in	 2016,	 the	majority	 of	 AVRR	 beneficiaries	 (83%)	 returned	 from	
the	 European	 Economic	 Area	 (EEA)	 and	 Switzerland,	 particularly	 from	Germany,	Greece,	 Austria,	 the	
Netherlands	 and	 Belgium.	 Returns	 from	 the	 EEA	 and	 Switzerland	 increased	 from	 55,851	 in	 2015	 to	
81,671	in	2016.	Recent	trends	also	indicate	that	South–South	returns,	including	from	transit	countries,	
are	increasing.	In	2016,	returns	from	Niger	and	Morocco	to	countries	such	as	Cameroon,	Guinea,	Guinea-
Bissau	and	Senegal,	for	example,	amounted	to	more	than	6	per	cent	of	the	global	total.	The	main	regions	
of	origin	 for	AVRR	beneficiaries	 in	2016	were	South-Eastern	Europe,	Eastern	Europe	and	Central	Asia	
(49%	of	total),	Asia	and	the	Pacific	(16%),	and	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(16%).	Together,	the	top	
10	countries	and	territories	of	origin	accounted	for	72	per	cent	of	the	total	number	of	AVRR	beneficiaries.
For	more	information,	see	www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration	and	www.iom.int/
sites/default/files/our_work/DMM/AVRR/AVRR-2016-Key-Highlights.pdf.
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Migrant workers
The latest available estimates for the global stock of migrant workers, which are based on 2013 data, indicate 
that there were roughly 150.3 million, accounting for a little under two thirds of the global stock of international 
migrants (232 million) in that year.48 When compared with the global population of international migrants of 
working age – regarded as 15 years or older (207 million) – migrant workers account for more than 70 per cent. 
For a range of reasons, however, these global figures are likely to be underestimates.49 While earlier global 
estimates of migrant workers are available (36–42 million in 1995, 86.2 million in 2000 and 105.5 million in 
2010), the ILO notes that these cannot be compared with the 2013 figures, due to definitional differences and 
changes in methodology and data sources. 
In 2013, most migrant workers – an estimated 112.3 million (75%) – were in high-income countries, with another 
34.4 million (23%) in middle-income countries. Only about 2 per cent of migrant workers went to low-income 
destination countries. The share of migrant workers in the total workforce across the clustered income groups 
was relatively low (around 1.4%) and quite similar across low- and middle-income countries, but much higher 
(at 16.3%) for the high-income group of countries.
Male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by almost 17 million in 2013, with 83.7 million 
males (55.7%) and 66.6 million females (44.3%), in a context where males comprised a higher number of 
international migrants of working age (107.2 million against 99.3 million). See table 3 for further breakdowns.
Table	3.	Migrant	workers,	by	sex	and	income	level	of	destination	countries	(2013)
Low income Lower middle income
Upper middle 
income High income Global Total
M F Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F Total
Migrant	
workers	
(millions)
1.8 1.8 3.5 9.4 7.5 16.9 10.4 7.2 17.5 62.1 50.1 112.3 83.7 66.6 150.3
As	a	
proportion	
of	all	
migrant	
workers	(%)
1.2 1.2 2.4 6.3 5.0 11.2 6.9 4.8 11.6 41.3 33.3 74.7 55.7 44.3 100
Source:	 Based	on	ILO,	2015.			
Most migrant workers were engaged in services in 2013 (106.8. million or 71.1%). Manufacturing and construction 
(26.7 million or 17.8%) and agriculture (16.7 million or 11.1%) accounted for the rest. Of the more than 
70 per cent engaged in services, almost 8 per cent were domestic workers. 
48	 The	content	in	this	subsection	is	based	on	and	drawn	from	ILO,	2015.	Please	refer	to	this	document	for	explanatory	notes,	deeper	
analysis,	and	limitations	and	caveats	associated	with	the	numbers	and	trends	presented.	More	generally,	information	on	foreign-
born	employment	in	OECD	countries	is	available	from	OECD,	n.d.b.
49	 See,	for	example,	ILO,	2015.
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In 2013, there were an estimated 11.5 million migrant domestic workers, comprising more than 17 per cent of 
all domestic workers (67.1 million) and over 7 per cent of all migrant workers. Of the 11.5 million, 8.45 million 
were female and 3.07 million were male. Migrant domestic workers were overwhelmingly located in high-income 
countries; and this was true of both female and male migrant domestic workers (see figure 5). IOM’s work on 
migrant health, as discussed in the following box, is particularly relevant for migrant workers and refugees 
(discussed in the next section).
Figure	5.	Migrant	domestic	workers	by	destination	country	income	level	and	sex	as	of	2013	 
(millions)
Source:	 ILO,	2015.			
IOM’s work on migrant health
IOM	 delivers	 and	 promotes	 preventative	 and	 curative	 health	 programmes	 through	 its	 Migration	
Health	Division.	Upon	request	from	receiving-country	governments,	IOM	provides	physical	and	mental	
health	assessments	for	migrants	prior	to	their	departure,	whether	for	the	purposes	of	resettlement,	
international	employment,	or	 for	obtaining	 temporary	or	permanent	visas.	Specific	services	 include	
tuberculosis	testing	and	control;	HIV,	syphilis	and	hepatitis	tests;	physical	exams;	laboratory	diagnostic	
services;	medical	escort	services;	and	pre-departure	immunization.	
Such	 health	 assessments	 contribute	 to	 the	 epidemiological	 knowledge	 base	 on	 selected	 migrant	
populations,	 allowing	 for	 the	 development	 of	 evidence-based	 programmes	 and	 health	 interventions.	
Data	collection	is	standardized	and	centralized	among	IOM	country	offices,	which	also	enables	IOM	to	
decrease	processing	time,	conserve	resources	and	integrate	all	migration	health	activities	at	the	country	
level.	IOM	is	also	in	the	process	of	developing	a	medical	data	repository	to	facilitate	analysis	of	current	
and	historical	operational	data.	
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In	 2015,	 IOM	 conducted	 more	 than	 346,000	 health	 assessments	 among	 migrants	 in	 more	 than	 80	
countries,	 covering	 both	 immigrants	 (65%)	 and	 refugees	 (35%).	 The	 majority	 of	 assessments	 were	
conducted	 in	Asia	 (45%),	 followed	by	Africa	(29%),	the	Middle	East	 (14%)	and	Europe	(13%).	 In	2016,	
IOM	conducted	almost	450,000	health	assessment	 (52%	 immigrants	and	48%	refugees),	 representing	
an	overall	27	per	cent	increase	compared	with	2015.	Again,	the	majority	of	assessments	were	carried	
out	in	Asia	(35%),	followed	by	Africa	(30%),	the	Middle	East	(23%)	and	Europe	(12%).	These	figures	are	
consistent	with	a	steady	growth	in	the	number	of	global	health	assessment	activities	conducted	by	IOM	
over	the	preceding	five	years.	
Beginning	in	2012,	IOM	engaged	with	US	agencies	to	develop	and	implement	a	vaccination	programme	 
for	 United	 States-bound	 refugees	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 US	 Refugee	 Admissions	 Program.	 The	
programme	 sought	 to	 introduce	 vaccinations	 early	 in	 the	 resettlement	 process	 to	 protect	 refugees	
against	many	of	the	common	vaccine-preventable	diseases.	By	the	end	of	2015,	this	programme	had	been	
implemented	in	over	12	countries.	Overall,	between	2012	and	2016,	this	programme	was	implemented	in	
21	countries	with	more	than	215,000	refugees	having	received	one	or	more	vaccines.
For	more	on	IOM’s	work	on	migrant	health,	see	www.health.iom.int/.
Remittances
Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to families or communities in their 
countries of origin. The World Bank compiles global data on remittances, notwithstanding the myriad data gaps, 
definitional differences and methodological challenges in compiling accurate statistics.50 Its data, however, 
do not capture unrecorded flows through formal or informal channels, and the actual magnitude of global 
remittances are therefore likely to be larger than available estimates.51 Despite these limitations, available data 
reflect an overall increase in recent decades, from USD 126 billion in 2000, to USD 575 billion in 2016, although 
the past two years have witnessed a decline. Between 2015 and 2016, global (inward) flows of remittances 
contracted by an estimated 2.7 per cent, from USD 596 billion in 2014 to USD 582 billion in 2015, and by 
another 1.2 per cent between 2015 and 2016. Consistent with this trend, remittances to developing countries 
(which account for the majority of the global total) have also declined for two consecutive years – a trend 
that has not been seen for three decades, according to the World Bank. Nonetheless and, notably, since the 
50	 The	content	of	much	of	this	subsection,	unless	otherwise	noted,	is	based	on	and	drawn	from	the	World	Bank’s	data	in	relation	to	
migration	and	remittances,	available	from	World	Bank,	n.d.b;	and	publications	on	the	topic,	available	from	World	Bank,	n.d.c.	 In	
particular,	the	World	Bank’s	annual	remittances	datasets	(World	Bank,	n.d.b),	the	Migration	and	Development	Brief	25	(World	Bank,	
2015),	Migration	and	Development	Brief	26	(World	Bank,	2016b),the	Migration	and	Development	Brief	27	(World	Bank,	2017a)	and	
its	April	21	Press	Release	(World	Bank,	2017b)	are	key	sources	of	information.	Please	refer	to	these	sources	as	well	as	the	World	
Bank’s	Factbooks	on	Migration	and	Development,	 including	 its	 latest,	published	 in	2016,	 for	explanatory	notes,	deeper	analysis,	
caveats,	limitations	and	methodologies	associated	with	the	numbers	and	trends	presented.	
51	 World	Bank,	2016a.	
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mid-1990s, remittances have greatly surpassed Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels,52 defined as 
government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.53 
In 2016, India, China, Philippines, Mexico and Pakistan were (in descending order) the top five remittance-
recipient countries, although China and India were well above the rest, with total inward remittances exceeding 
USD 60 billion for each country (see table 4). Each of the remaining three countries received less than USD 30 
billion in the same year. Many of these countries have remained in the top spots in this century. When remittances 
are viewed as a percentage of GDP, however, the top five countries are Kyrgyzstan (at 35.4%), followed by Nepal 
(29.7%), Liberia (29.6%), Haiti (27.8%) and Tonga (27.8%) in 2016. 
High-income countries are almost always the main source of remittances. For decades, the United States has 
consistently been the top remittance-sending country, with a total outflow of USD 61.38 billion in 2015, 
followed by Saudi Arabia (USD 38.79 billion) and Switzerland (USD 24.38 billion). China, which is classified 
as an upper–middle income country by the World Bank, is also a major source (in addition to its role as a top 
recipient), with an outflow of USD 20.42 billion in 2015. The fifth-highest remittance-sending country in 2015 
was the Russian Federation (USD 19.7 billion). Table 4 provides further details and trends.54
Table	4.	Top	countries	receiving/sending	remittances	(2000–2015)	(current	USD	billions)
Top countries receiving remittances
2000 2005 2010 2015
India 12.84 China 23.63 India 53.48 India 68.91
France 8.61 Mexico 22.74 China 52.46 China 63.94
Mexico 7.52 India 22.13 Mexico 22.08 Philippines,	the 28.48
Philippines 6.96 Nigeria 14.64 Philippines,	the 20.56 Mexico 26.23
Republic	of	Korea 4.86 France 14.21 France 19.90 France 23.35
Spain 4.86 Philippines,	the 13.73 Nigeria 19.75 Nigeria 18.96
Turkey 4.56 Belgium 6.89 Germany 12.79 Pakistan 19.85
United	States	of	
America
4.40 Germany 6.87 Egypt 12.45 Egypt 16.58
Germany 3.64 Spain 6.66 Bangladesh 10.85 Bangladesh 15.38
United	Kingdom 3.61 Poland 6.47 Belgium 10.35 Germany 15.36
52	 See	ibid.,	for	example.	
53	 See,	 for	example,	OECD,	n.d.c,	which	also	contains	data	on	ODA.	There	 is	a	growing	body	of	work	exploring	the	developmental,	
economic	and	social	impacts	of	this	trend.	
54	 Breakdowns	for	2016	were	unavailable	at	the	time	of	publication.
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Top countries sending remittances
2000 2005 2010 2015
United	States	of	
America
34.40
United	States	
of	America
47.25
United	States	of	
America
50.78
United	States	
of	America
61.38
Saudi	Arabia 15.40 Saudi	Arabia 14.32 Saudi	Arabia 27.07 Saudi	Arabia 38.79
Germany 9.04 Germany 12.71
Russian	
Federation
21.45 Switzerland 24.38
Switzerland 7.59 Switzerland 9.99 Switzerland 16.88 China 20.42
France 3.77
United	
Kingdom
9.64 Germany 14.68
Russian	
Federation
19.70
United	Arab	
Emirates
3.68 France 9.48 Italy 12.89 Germany 18.56
Republic	of	
Korea
3.65 Italy 7.55 France 12.03 Kuwait 15.20
Israel 3.26
Russian	
Federation
6.83 Kuwait 11.86 France 12.68
Japan 3.17 Luxembourg	 6.70 Luxembourg 10.64 Qatar 12.19
Netherlands,	
the
3.13
Republic	of	
Korea
6.67
United	Arab	
Emirates
10.57 Luxembourg	 11.35
Source:	 World	Bank,	n.d.b.	(accessed	May	2017).			
Note:	 All	numbers	are	in	current	(nominal)	USD	billion.	
Refugees and asylum seekers
By the end of 2016, there were a total of 22.5 million refugees, with 17.2 million under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.3 million 
refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.55 The total 
number of refugees is the highest on record, although the annual rate of growth has slowed since 2012. There were also 
2.8 million people seeking international protection and awaiting determination of their refugee status, referred to as 
asylum seekers. Of the roughly 2 million first-instance applications for asylum lodged in 2016, Germany remained the 
top recipient, with over 720,000 applications, followed by the United States (262,000) and Italy (123,000). 
UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2016, those under 18 years of age constituted roughly 51 per cent of 
the global refugee population. Indeed, between 2003 and 2016, according to available disaggregated data, 
the proportion of children among stocks of refugees was very high, fluctuating between 41 and 51 per cent. 
The proportion of women remained relatively stable, at between 47 and 49 per cent, over the same 
period. Consistent with broader global dynamics, refugees were increasingly based in urban settings, with 
60 per cent of refugees located in urban areas at the end of 2016.56
55	 The	content	in	this	subsection	is	based	on	and	drawn	from	UNHCR	2016	and	2017.	Please	refer	to	these	documents	for	explanatory	
notes,	deeper	analysis,	caveats,	limitations	and	methodologies	associated	with	the	numbers	and	trends	presented.	UNHCR’s	previous	
Global	Trends	reports,	as	well	as	its	Population	Statistics	database	(available	from	UNHCR,	n.d.)	are	other	key	sources	of	information.
56	 See	UNHCR’s	2016	and	2017	reports	for	limitations	applicable	to	these	assessments	related	to	age,	sex	and	location.	
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Unaccompanied and separated children lodged an estimated 75,000 individual asylum applications in 70 countries 
in 2016 – down from the exceptionally high number of applications in 2015 (98,400), yet still more than double 
the number reported in 2014.57 Consistent with the overall global trends in asylum application submissions, 
Germany received more than half of all reported claims from unaccompanied and separated children. 
As in other years, unresolved or renewed conflict dynamics in key countries contributed most significantly to 
current figures and trends. Of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate at the end of 2016, the top 10 countries 
of origin – Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and Burundi – accounted for roughly 13.5 million, or 
79 per cent. Many of these countries have been among the top sources for refugees for at least five years. 
The ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic saw the number of refugees from that country reach 
approximately 5.5 million. The instability and violence that have made Afghanistan a major source of refugees 
for over 30 years has continued, with the country being the second top origin country in the world, with 
2.5 million refugees; this is a slight decrease from 2015 figures (2.7 million), largely due to returns from 
Pakistan. Large-scale violence that erupted in South Sudan in the middle of 2016 saw it become the third 
largest origin country for refugees, with over 1.4 million at the end of the year. Refugees from Afghanistan, 
South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic comprised 55 per cent of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate. 
Figure 6 shows the trends in refugee numbers for selected major countries of origin between 2000 and 2015. 
The impact of the Syrian conflict is clearly illustrated in figure 6; in 2010, the Syrian Arab Republic was a 
source country for fewer than 30,000 refugees and asylums seekers, whereas it was the third largest host 
country, with 1,005,500 refugees, primarily originating from Iraq.58
Figure	6.	Number	of	refugees	by	major	countries	of	origin	as	of	2016	(millions)
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.	(accessed	on	18	July	2017).
Note:	 Lines	indicate	five-year	trends	and	crosses	indicate	a	single	year’s	data.	South	Sudan	became	a	country	in	2011.
57	 See	UNHCR,	2017,	on	why	these	figures	are	underestimates.	
58	 UNHCR,	2010.	
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In 2016, for the third consecutive year, Turkey was the largest host country in the world, with 2.9 million 
refugees, mainly Syrians (2.8 million). Reflecting the significant share of Syrians in the global refugee 
population, two other bordering countries – Jordan and Lebanon – also featured among the top 10. Pakistan 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts 
of refugees from Afghanistan, the second largest origin country. Uganda, Ethiopia, Germany, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Kenya comprised the rest. The vast majority of refugees were hosted in neighbouring 
countries. According to UNHCR, the least developed countries, such as Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, hosted 28 per cent of the global total (4.9 million refugees). 
It is only when refugees are measured against national populations that high-income countries such as Sweden 
(fifth) and Malta (ninth) rank among the top 10. Figure 7 shows trends in refugee numbers for major host 
countries between 2000 and 2015.
Figure	7.	Number	of	refugees	by	major	host	countries	as	of	2016	(millions)
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.	(accessed	on	18	July	2017).
Note:	 Lines	indicate	five-year	trends	and	crosses	indicate	a	single	year’s	data.	
A key component of UNHCR’s mandate is to seek permanent solutions for refugees. Within this context, 
UNHCR also compiles statistics on the three traditional solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration and 
resettlement. For many, return home is the preferred solution. However, for various reasons, as evidenced by 
the numbers discussed below, only a very small proportion of refugees achieve a solution in any given year, 
contributing to the protracted nature of many refugee predicaments. 
During 2016, over 550,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin – more than double the number in 2015 
and a notable increase from previous years. The majority of returns (384,000) were to Afghanistan, primarily 
from Pakistan. Prolonged and renewed conflicts have contributed to low levels of voluntary repatriation, with 
levels of returns between 2011 and 2015 accounting for only 10 per cent of all returns over the last two decades. 
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While there are many challenges to measuring those benefiting from local integration, UNHCR estimates that, 
in 2016, 23 countries reported at least one naturalized refugee (compared with 28 countries in 2015), with a 
total of 23,000 naturalized refugees for the year (compared with 32,000 in 2015). Canada, which naturalized 
an estimated 16,300 refugees in 2016 (compared with 25,900 in 2015), represents the greatest proportion, with 
France, Belgium and Austria contributing the bulk of the rest.
The number of countries that are a part of UNHCR’s resettlement programmes increased from 33 in 2015 to 37 in 
2016; States in Europe and Latin America, in particular, established new resettlement programmes, or made new 
resettlement commitments. Notwithstanding this increase, the traditional resettlement countries of Australia, 
Canada and the United States continued to conduct the majority of the world’s refugee resettlements. In 2016, 
almost 190,000 refugees were admitted for resettlement globally, representing a 77 per cent increase from 2015 
(107,100). Syrian, Congolese, Iraqi and Somali refugees were the key beneficiaries. Figure 8 provides an overview 
of resettlement statistics for key countries between 2000 and 2016.
Figure	8.	Number	of	refugees	resettled	by	major	resettlement	countries	in	2000–2016	 
(thousands)
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.	(accessed	on	23	June	2017).
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IOM’s role in resettlement
IOM	arranges	safe	and	organized	travel	for	refugees	through	resettlement	programmes,	as	well	as	for	
other	vulnerable	persons	of	concern	moving	through	other	humanitarian	pathways.	Beyond	classical	
refugee	resettlement	and	humanitarian	admission	programmes,	more	States	are	interested	in	or	are	
currently	 carrying	 out	 other	 forms	 of	 admission,	 such	 as	 humanitarian	 visas,	 private	 sponsorships,	
academic	scholarships	and	labour	mobility	schemes.	IOM’s	movement	data	for	resettlement	assistance	
refer	to	the	overall	number	of	refugees	and	other	persons	of	concern	travelling	under	IOM	auspices	
from	various	countries	of	departure	to	destinations	around	the	world	during	a	given	period.	
During	calendar	years	2015	and	2016,	 IOM	supported	some	43	States	 in	carrying	out	 resettlement,	
humanitarian	admission	and	relocation	initiatives	in	over	140	countries	of	departure,	with	significant	
operations	conducted	in	Afghanistan,	Ethiopia,	Iraq,	Jordan,	Kenya,	Lebanon,	Malaysia,	Nepal,	Thailand,	
Turkey	and	the	United	Republic	of	Tanzania.	In	2015,	a	total	of	126,867	individuals	travelled	to	30	States	
under	IOM	auspices	for	resettlement	assistance;	the	top	nationalities	were	Syrians,	Burmese,	Iraqis,	
Afghans	and	Somalis.	In	2016,	a	total	of	204,937	individuals	travelled	to	39	States	under	IOM	auspices	
for	resettlement	assistance;	the	top	nationalities	were	Syrians,	Congolese,	Iraqis,	Afghans	and	Somalis.	
Each	year,	the	gender	breakdown	remains	the	same,	with	51	per	cent	males	and	49	per	cent	females	
resettling	to	third	countries.	Between	2010	and	2016,	annual	resettlement	by	IOM	increased	by	more	
than	103	per	cent,	with	over	100,000	vulnerable	persons	of	concern	in	2010,	and	close	to	205,000	in	
2016.	This	is	largely	due	to	the	emergency	resettlement	of	Syrians	and	admission	of	Iraqi	and	Afghan	
translators/interpreters	through	special	 immigration	visas.	An	 increase	 in	Syrian	resettlement	began	
in	the	latter	half	of	2015,	notably	to	Canada,	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States	of	America,	and	a	
number	of	European	countries	such	as	Germany	and	Sweden.	
Under	 cooperative	 agreements,	 IOM	 provides	 stakeholders	 with	 necessary	 information	 and	 shares	
data	with	key	partners	such	as	UNHCR,	resettlement	countries	and	settlement	agencies.	IOM	works	in	
close	collaboration	with	UNHCR	on	a	regular	basis	to	verify	and	better	align	aggregate	data	related	to	
resettlement,	specifically	around	departures	figures.
For	more	information	on	IOM’s	resettlement	activities,	see:	www.iom.int/resettlement-assistance.
Internally displaced persons
IDMC compiles data on two types of internal displacement: new displacements during a given period, and 
the total stock of IDPs at a given point in time. At the end of 2016, there were 31.1 million new internal 
displacements in 125 countries.59  Disasters triggered by rapid-onset hazards were associated with the majority, 
59	 The	content	 in	this	subsection	is	based	on	and	drawn	from	IDMC,	2017	and	IDMC,	2016.	Please	refer	to	these	documents	for	
explanatory	notes,	deeper	analysis,	caveats,	limitations	and	methodologies	associated	with	the	numbers	and	trends	presented.	
The	year	2016	was	the	first	year	that	IDMC	produced	a	single	and	combined	annual	report	that	included	figures	for	conflict	and	
violence	as	well	as	disasters.	 IDMC’s	previous	Global	Estimates	reports	(available	from	www.internal-displacement.org/global-
report/),	as	well	as	its	Global	Internal	Displacement	Database	(available	from	IDMC,	n.d.),	are	other	key	sources	of	information.	
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at 24.2 million new internal displacements in a total of 118 countries. Conflict and generalized violence 
accounted for the rest, at 6.9 million in 37 countries. In its latest report, IDMC reiterates the complexities 
associated with distinguishing between conflict and disasters as the immediate cause of displacement, and 
it highlights the growing need to identify better ways to report on displacement in the context of multiple 
drivers.60
The total global stock of people internally displaced by conflict and generalized violence at the end of 2016 
was 40.3 million, having fallen from 40.8 million in 2015 – the highest on record since IDMC began monitoring 
in 1998. As with trends for refugees (discussed in the previous section), intractable and new conflicts have 
meant that the total number of persons internally displaced by conflicts and generalized violence has almost 
doubled since 2000, and has risen sharply since 2010. Total global stock figures for persons displaced by 
disasters are unavailable, although efforts are being made to address this issue. Available data indicate that, 
over the nine years since 2008, there have been 227.6 million displacements associated with disasters. Sample 
case data documented in 2015 also suggest that protracted displacement, ranging between 1 and 26 years, is 
affecting hundreds of thousands of people. 
Since 2003, conflicts and violence resulted in an average of 5.3 million new displacements per year. This translates 
into about 15,000 men, women and children being forced to leave their homes every day.61 Between 2000 and 
2015, the average was even higher, at 7.6 million per year or more than 20,000 people per day. The 2016 total of 
6.9 million new displacements falls between the two averages, reflecting an overall rising trend since 2003. In 
2015, Yemen was the worst-affected country in terms of new displacements (2.2 million) followed by the Syrian 
Arab Republic (1.3 million) and Iraq (1.1 million). In 2016, however, Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq 
(which had accounted for more than half of the global total of new displacements for 2015 at 8.8. million), 
recorded significantly lower figures,62 but still featured among the top 10, as did many other countries that were 
on the list in 2015. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, noted as an overlooked area of displacement crisis, 
topped the list in 2016 (with 922,000 people displaced), followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (824,000) and 
Iraq (659,000). When new displacement by conflict and violence is measured as a proportion of the population, 
the Syrian Arab Republic re-emerges at the top (with 4,400 displacements per 100,000 inhabitants), followed by 
El Salvador (3,600 per 100,000 inhabitants) and Libya (2,500 per 100,000 inhabitants). IDMC notes that El 
Salvador has consistently been one of the most violent countries in the last decade; however, the internal 
displacement stemming from criminal and gang violence in that country is largely invisible. 
The 40.3 million people displaced by violence and conflicts at the end of 2016 are hosted in 56 countries 
and territories, although there is little variation in the countries that feature at the top. Colombia (with 
7,246,000 people displaced) and the Syrian Arab Republic (6,326,000) are well above others and together 
comprise close to a third of the global stocks. These are followed by Sudan (3,300,000), Iraq (3,035,000), the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2,230,000), then Yemen, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine and Afghanistan. 
Over 30 million of the global total of 40.3 million people displaced are located in these 10 countries. Indeed, 
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan have featured in the top 10 
every year since 2003. 
60	 Beyond	 conflict,	 generalized	 violence	 and	 disasters	 brought	 on	 by	 rapid-onset	 natural	 hazards,	 global	 figures	 on	 internal	
displacement	do	not	capture	the	many	other	contexts	in	which	people	flee	their	homes,	such	as	criminal	violence,	development	
projects	and	slow-onset	crises	related	to	drought	and	environmental	change.	In	GRID 2016,	IDMC	highlights	their	efforts	to	collect	
data	on	these	forms	of	displacement	and	the	complexities	inherent	in	this	challenge.	(See,	for	example,	IDMC,	2016.)
61	 IDMC,	2017.	
62	 IDMC	 highlights	 possible	 reasons	 for	 these	 changes,	 including	 stabilization	 of	 front	 lines	 of	 conflicts,	 ceasefires,	 restrictions	 on	
freedom	of	movement,	and	changes	in	methodology	for	data	collection.
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Each year since 2008, an average of 25.3 million people have been newly displaced by disasters.63 This is 
far greater than the average for conflict and violence, and reflects the indiscriminate, unpredictable and 
uncontrollable nature of certain hazards. These dimensions are strikingly apparent when considering the 
number of countries hosting the newly displaced: 118 for disasters, compared with 37 countries for conflict 
and violence. In 2016 (as in previous years), disasters triggered by climate and weather-related hazards, such 
as floods and storms, accounted for the bulk of the 24.2 million total (23.5 million or 97%). Since 2009, 
disasters triggered by geophysical hazards have caused an average of 2 million displacements per year, and 
have been the second largest contributor to global figures. However, the figures for 2016 were well below 
average, with roughly 700,000 new displacements recorded. China (7,434,000), the Philippines (5,930,000) 
and India (2,400,000) had the highest absolute numbers in 2016. As in previous years, the 24.2 million total, 
while a little less than the running average, far outnumbers new displacements associated with conflicts and 
violence, as figure 9 shows. IDMC does note, however, that a significant portion of the global total of those 
newly displaced by disasters is usually associated with short-term evacuations in a relatively safe and orderly 
manner.
Figure	9.	Newly	displaced	IDPs	(millions)
Source:	 IDMC,	n.d.	(accessed	on	23	June	2017).
IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix
IOM’s	displacement	tracking	matrix	(DTM)	system	tracks	displacement	in	countries	affected	by	conflicts	
or	natural	disasters.	The	DTM	system	is	designed	to	capture,	process	and	disseminate	information	on	the	
movements	and	evolving	needs	of	displaced	populations	and	migrants.	Data	are	shared	in	the	form	of	
maps,	 infographics,	 reports,	 interactive	web-based	visualizations	and	raw	or	customized	data	exports.	
63	 IDMC,	2017.	
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Based	 on	 a	 given	 situation,	 the	 system	 can	 gather	 information	 on	 populations,	 locations,	 conditions,	
needs	and	vulnerabilities	using	one	or	more	of	the	following	methodological	tools:	
(i)	 Tracking	mobility	and	cross-sectoral	needs	in	specific	locations	to	target	assistance;
(ii)	 Tracking	movements	(“flows”)	and	the	overall	situation	at	origin,	transit	and	destination	points;
(iii)	 Registering	individuals	and	households	for	beneficiary	selection,	vulnerability	targeting	and	
programming;
(iv)	 Conducting	surveys,	to	gather	specific	information	from	populations	of	interest.	
In	2015,	the	DTM	system	tracked	over	14.5	million	people	caught	in	conflict	and	natural	disasters	in	
23	countries.	IOM’s	2015	and	2016	data	were	the	reference	for	several	country	estimates	on	internal	
displacement	 compiled	 by	 IDMCg,h.	 In	 October	 2015,	 the	 DTM	 system	 established	 an	 information	
portal	 on	 migration	 flows	 to	 Europe,	 which	 is	 available	 from	 http://migration.iom.int/europe.	 The	
portal	publishes	information	on	movement	trends,	transit	routes,	and	stranded	and	missing	migrants.	
For	more	information	on	IOM’s	DTM,	see:	www.globaldtm.info.
g			IDMC,	2017.	
h			IDMC,	2016. 
Data gaps and challenges
As evident throughout this chapter, there are several key gaps and challenges associated with the collection 
and analysis of data on migration. The following section provides a brief overview of some of these key gaps 
and challenges. However, there is an important body of work that explores these issues in greater detail and we 
encourage readers interested in the topic to refer to this work.64 
Our knowledge and understanding of the scale of international migration is primarily derived from estimates of 
the stock of international migrants, or the number of people living in a country other than their country of birth 
at a specific point in time. However, the availability and quality of migrant stock data vary considerably between 
countries and regions due to limitations in data collection, such as failure to disaggregate key characteristics. For 
example, censuses, which are an important source of data for measuring migrant stock, are generally performed 
only every decade or so. They often only record immigrants and not emigrants, and do not document age, or year 
of migration.65 For example, some countries do not record country of birth, instead focusing on citizenship. This 
lack of uniformity in concepts and definitions of international migrants at international and national levels makes 
it difficult to estimate global migrant stock figures. 
Data on migration flows are more limited than migrant stock data. Despite increasing efforts to aggregate data 
on migration flows from national sources, and to improve their comparability and standardization, data on these 
64	 See,	for	example,	Poulain,	Perrin	and	Singleton,	2006;	Raymer	and	Willekens,	2008;	de	Beer	et	al.,	2010;	Kraler	and	Reichel,	2011.	
65	 Willekens,	2016.	
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dynamics of international migration are not available for most countries in the world.66 The UN DESA has 
compiled flow data for only 45 countries, while the OECD reports migration flows for some of its members. 
However, in both datasets, the duration used to define a migration event, and the coverage of population at 
risk, can vary, thereby hampering analysis. There is even less information on the scale, patterns and dynamics 
of irregular migration flows, due to the clandestine and fluid nature of this form of migration.67 The recent 
increase in such flows across the Mediterranean has prompted some actors to improve efforts to collect data on 
movements to Europe, but relatively little is known about numbers, patterns and characteristics in other parts 
of the world.68
Knowledge on the global scale and characteristics of labour migration is primarily based on estimates compiled 
by the ILO. These figures likely underestimate the true scale, due to a range of factors, such as the frequent 
undercounting of short-term labour migration movements. As with global migrant stocks, estimates of migrant 
workers and their respective characteristics suffer from statistical, definitional and methodological complexities. 
Estimates of global remittances are available annually through the World Bank but, again, there are caveats and 
considerable limitations associated with the available figures.
Several actors – notably, UNHCR, IDMC, UNODC and IOM – continue to improve the availability and coverage of 
global data on populations in situations of vulnerability (such as refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and victims 
of trafficking), even though data collection in the context of conflicts, violence and disasters is inherently 
challenging. Methodological, operational and political complexities arise due to the nature of emergencies, as 
well as the characteristics, vulnerability and “visibility” of the populations being measured. The shortage of 
quantitative data on movements associated with environmental change, including climate change, however, 
represents a key gap. The multicausal nature of such movements presents particular challenges. Evidence on 
long-term trends associated with disasters, such as duration of displacement and subsequent movements and 
trajectories, is also scarce. These gaps have been recognized and efforts are under way to innovate and overcome 
these barriers. 
Conclusion
In recent years, there has been an undeniable increase in available information and knowledge, as well as 
interest in migration globally. Spurred in part by large-scale movements of migrants (including refugees) and 
a growing interest in international cooperation on migration, governments, international organizations and 
other actors are engaged in ongoing efforts to build a stronger evidence base on the scale and characteristics of 
migration globally. There are also noteworthy gaps in knowledge at the global level. As this chapter illustrates, 
the available information is in many ways limited and fragmented, with more known about certain countries 
and regions than others. There are myriad complexities associated with collecting and comparing data on 
specific facets of migration. Even so, and despite evolving migration drivers and patterns, there is momentum 
for improving the availability and quality of global data on international migration through innovation and 
concerted effort, aided in part by its inclusion in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda69   and technological 
transformations.
66	 UN	DESA,	2015c;	Vezzoli,	Villares-Varela	and	de	Haas,	2014;	Lemaitre	et	al.,	2007;	Poulain,	Perrin	and	Singleton,	2006.
67	 Kraler	and	Reichel,	2011.
68	 McAuliffe	and	Mence,	2017.
69	 UN	DESA,	2015e.
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In this chapter, we have provided a global overview of migration and migrants, based on the current data 
available. Notwithstanding the data gaps and challenges in providing a global big picture, several high-level 
conclusions can be drawn. The available data can provide insights into global migration dynamics and trends, 
and contribute to informed decision-making. They also tell a story. 
While we know that most people in the world continue to live in the country in which they were born, more 
people are also living in other countries, especially those within their region. At the same time, many are 
migrating to high-income countries that may be further afield. International migrants constitute a small – 
albeit growing – portion of the world’s total population. Global data on irregular migrant stocks, on the other 
hand, are unavailable.
Innovations and improvements are required for a better understanding of global trends in regular migration 
flows, so that coverage can expand beyond the 45 or so countries for which information exists. There is also 
growing recognition that people around the world are dying while migrating, particularly when using clandestine 
channels that rely on the services of smugglers and traffickers. This type of information is relatively new, and 
its quality and coverage require improvement. 
Work is the major reason that people migrate internationally, and migrant workers constitute a large majority 
of the world’s international migrants. Most live in high-income countries and are engaged in the service sector. 
Male migrant workers outnumber females, while male migrants also have a higher labour force participation 
rate than female migrants. Most of the top remittance-sending countries remained the same between 2000 and 
2015, as have the world’s top remittance-receiving countries. Overall, total global flows of remittances increased 
substantially between 2000 and 2016. 
Finally, global displacement caused by conflict, generalized violence and other factors is at a record high. 
Intractable, unresolved and recurring conflicts and violence have led to an upsurge in the number of refugees 
around the world, with women and children comprising a substantial portion of the total. While a handful of 
countries continue to provide solutions for refugees, overall, these have been insufficient to address global needs. 
Similar factors have displaced millions of people within their own countries, while displacement associated with 
conflict and violence has nearly doubled since 2000. Yet, each year, new displacements associated with rapid-
onset hazards far outnumber those due to conflict and violence, and there is a recognized need to gather better 
cumulative data. Better data on movement associated with environmental change, including the effects of 
climate change, are also required.
42 Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments
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MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS:  
REGIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Introduction
The previous chapter on global migration data and trends provides an overview of the “big picture” in migration, 
with specific reference to international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows); particular migrant 
groups, including migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons; and remittances. 
Chapter 2 concentrates primarily at the global level, with some reference to regional variance and occasional 
country-level examples. In this chapter, with its focus on regional dimensions and developments, we set out a 
different, but complementary perspective of migrants and movements in different parts of the world. 
Our starting point is geographic, rather than thematic, given that geography is one of the fundamentals 
underpinning migration, both in the present and certainly historically. Notwithstanding recent advances in 
transportation and telecommunications technology – which many argue are shrinking the world we in which 
we live (see, for example, the chapter on mobility, migration and transnational connectivity in this report) – 
geography is often one of the most significant factors in shaping patterns of migration and displacement. Many 
people who migrate across borders do so within their immediate region, to countries that are close by, countries 
to which it may be easier to travel, that may be more familiar, and from which it may also be easier to return. 
For people who are displaced, finding safety quickly is paramount when moving away from disasters and crises 
such as transnational or civil conflict, extreme violence, and rapid-onset hazards such as catastrophic weather 
events. People, therefore, tend to be displaced to safer locations nearby, whether that is within a country or 
across a border.
This chapter seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of 
international migration by using a geographic perspective to present regional migration overviews. The analysis 
in this chapter focuses on six world regions as defined by the United Nations, and used by UN DESA and other 
organizations:
• Africa 
• Asia
• Europe
• Latin America and the Caribbean 
• Northern America
• Oceania
For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (i) an overview and brief discussion of key migration statistics 
based on data compiled and reported by UN DESA and UNHCR70; and (ii) succinct descriptions of “key features 
and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses from 
international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends 
70	 Please	refer	to	chapter	2,	appendix	A	for	definitions	of	key	terms,	such	as	“international	migrant”.
3
44 Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments
and issues within each of the six regions, the descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” 
are presented at the subregional level. For Africa, for example, this cascade approach allows for the presentation 
of insights from statistical data on Africa as a whole, followed by summary information on subregions including 
North Africa, West and Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa. A breakdown of the regions and 
subregions is provided in appendix A. These subregional overviews provide information on migration patterns 
from, within and to the subregions.71 Beyond this, attention has been paid to particular features that exist in 
a subregion, such as labour migration and remittances, irregular migration, migrant smuggling, displacement 
(internal and international), and integration. The subregional overviews are not intended to be exhaustive, but 
are designed to be illustrative of key trends, patterns and issues.
As highlighted in the previous chapter, we now have more data on migration than at any other time in history, 
although important data gaps still exist – migration data across the world tend to be fragmented and lacking in 
uniformity, at times hampering our collective ability to undertake analysis and inform policy, programmes and 
operations.72 The chapter draws heavily on the existing evidence base and sources are provided in footnotes and 
references section. We encourage readers to refer to sources cited in this chapter to learn more about topics of 
interest.
Africa73
Migration in Africa involves roughly equal numbers of migrants moving either within or out of the region. As 
shown in figure 1, in 2015 over 16 million Africans were living in another African country, while an additional 
16 million were living in a different region. The population of African migrants residing within the region grew 
from 2000 onwards, especially during the last five-year period. It is important to note that the large numbers 
and relatively small sizes of some countries in Africa have an effect on how international migration within the 
region is measured and therefore reflected in statistical data. Other factors, such as free movement agreements, 
porous borders, and migration and displacement drivers, are discussed in the key features and developments 
section below. 
Figure 1 reflects that while international migration within the African region has increased since 2000, the 
most significant growth by far has occurred in migration from Africa to other regions. Since 1990, the number 
of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with the growth to Europe most 
pronounced. In 2015, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (9 million), 
Asia (4 million) and Northern America (2 million). 
One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in figure 1, is the small 
number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. While this has increased 
over time, in 2015 Africa was home to a relatively modest 2.3 million migrants from outside the region, most 
of whom were from Asia and Europe.
71	 Please	note	that	subregions	relate	largely	to	migration	dynamics	and	so	may	differ	from	those	of	UN	DESA.	Details	are	provided	in	
appendix	A.
72	 Please	note	that	all	reasonable	efforts	have	been	made	to	ensure	the	accuracy	of	data	referred	to	in	this	chapter,	including	through	
data	verification.	We	regret,	however,	any	data	errors	that	may	remain.	Please	refer	to	primary	sources	for	technical	and	explanatory	
notes,	limitations	and	caveats	on	data.
73	 See	appendix	A	for	details	on	the	composition	of	Africa.	
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Figure	1.	Migrants	to	Africa,	within	Africa	and	from	Africa	between	1990	and	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 “Migrants	 to	Africa”	 refers	 to	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 region	 (i.e.	Africa)	who	were	born	 in	one	of	 the	other	
regions	(e.g.	Europe	or	Asia).“Migrants	within	Africa”	refers	to	migrants	born	in	the	region	(i.e.	Africa)	and	residing	
outside	their	country	of	birth,	but	still	within	the	African	region.	“Migrants	from	Africa”	refers	to	people	born	in	
Africa	who	were	residing	outside	the	region	(e.g.	in	Europe	or	Northern	America).	
The African countries with the largest number of emigrants tend to be in the north of the region. These are 
shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2, where countries are ranked by their overall numbers of migrants (i.e. 
the combination of immigrants in the country and emigrants from the country). In 2015, Egypt had the largest 
number of people living abroad, followed by Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria. In terms of the number 
of immigrants, South Africa is the most significant destination country in Africa, with around 3.1 million 
international migrants residing in the country (or around 6% of its total population). Other countries with high 
immigrant populations as a proportion of their total populations included Gabon (16%), Djibouti (13%), Libya 
(12%), Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia (both 10%). 
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Figure	2.	Top	20	African	migrant	countries	in	2015
Democratic
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note 1:	 The	population	size	used	to	calculate	the	percentage	of	immigrants	and	emigrants	is	based	on	the	UN	DESA	total	
resident	population	of	the	country,	which	includes	foreign-born	populations.
Note 2:	 “Immigrant”	 refers	 to	 foreign-born	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 country.	 “Emigrant”	 refers	 to	people	born	 in	 the	
country	who	were	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth	in	2015.
There are significant migration corridors within and from Africa, many of which are related to geographic proximity 
and historical ties, as well as displacement factors. The size of a migration corridor from country A to country 
B is measured as the number of immigrants from country A who were residing in country B in 2015. Migration 
corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration 
patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Some of the 
largest migration corridors involving African countries, as shown in figure 3, are between North African countries 
such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, Spain and Italy, in part reflecting post-colonial connections. There 
are also significant labour migration corridors to Gulf states – see Egypt to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia 
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for example. Importantly, just over half of the main migration corridors shown in figure 3 were within Africa, with 
the corridor between Burkina Faso to neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire constituting the second largest for Africa overall. 
Selected migration corridors are discussed in more detail below in the key features and developments section.
Figure	3.	Top	20	migration	corridors	involving	African	countries
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 Corridors	represent	an	accumulation	of	migratory	movements	over	time	and	provide	a	snapshot	of	how	migration	
patterns	have	evolved	into	significant	foreign-born	populations	in	specific	destination	countries.
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Displacement within and from Africa is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 4. Most refugees and 
asylum seekers in Africa were hosted in neighbouring countries within the region. The top 10 countries in 
Africa, ranked by the combined total of refugees and asylum seekers both hosted by and originating from a 
given country, are shown in figure 4. In 2016, South Sudan had the highest number of refugees in the region, 
and the third highest in the world. Most were hosted by Uganda and Ethiopia. Somalia has produced the 
second highest number of refugees after its long history of conflict and recent droughts, with the majority 
hosted in neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Other large refugee populations have originated 
from Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and Eritrea. The main drivers of 
displacement include conflict and violence, which in some cases has exacerbated food insecurity issues. Many of 
these countries also host large refugee populations. Figure 4 also shows that several countries are both origin 
countries of significant numbers of refugees, as well as host countries of refugees – namely South Sudan, Sudan 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Figure	4.	Top	10	African	countries	by	total	refugees	and	asylum	seekers,	2016
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
Note:	 “Hosted”	refers	 to	 those	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	 from	other	countries	who	are	residing	 in	 the	receiving	
country	 (right-hand	 side	of	 the	figure);	 “abroad”	 refers	 to	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	originating	 from	 that	
country	who	are	outside	of	their	origin	country.	Chapter	2	(appendix	A)	includes	definitions	of	key	terms	such	as	
”refugee”.	The	top	10	countries	are	based	on	2016	data	and	are	calculated	by	combining	refugees	and	asylum	
seekers	in	and	from	countries.
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Key features and developments in Africa
North Africa74
• Migration of North Africans to Europe and Gulf States continues to be a defining feature of the 
migration dynamics of the region, and one that has developed over several decades. Migration of 
North Africans to countries outside of Africa has been, and continues to be, much higher than migration to 
other countries within the subregion and within Africa.75 Two distinct streams have characterized outflows 
from North Africa: migrants from the north-west (e.g. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) have historically moved 
to Europe, owing to their geographic proximity, previous labour recruitment agreements and post-colonial 
ties,76 while those from the north-east (e.g. Egypt and Sudan) have predominantly sought temporary work 
in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)77 countries. Large income disparities between the origin and destination 
countries, and the high levels of unemployment in North Africa, remain significant drivers of migration. As 
of 2015, about 10.6 million North Africans were living outside their country of birth, with roughly half in 
Europe and about 3 million living in Gulf States.78 
• Although the North African subregion is primarily a migrant transit area, it also hosts notable 
populations of international migrants, including refugees. Libya had the largest number of international 
migrants in the subregion, at over 770,000 in 2015.79 Sudan also had large foreign-born populations 
originating from South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Chad. The number of international migrants in Egypt 
increased between 2010 to 2015, from 295,000 to 491,000, with migrants primarily originating from the 
Palestinian Territories, the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia and Sudan.80 While Morocco has traditionally been 
a country of emigration, it is increasingly becoming a destination country, including of migrants from other 
regions in Africa, who stay for an indeterminate period while looking for a way to cross over to Europe.81 
• Conflict and violence within and in surrounding subregions has contributed to displacement in 
North Africa. At the end of 2016, there were nearly 650,000 refugees from Sudan, the majority of whom 
were hosted by the neighbouring countries of Chad and South Sudan.82 Sudan also had approximately 3.3 
million internally displaced persons (IDPs), making it the country with the third highest population of IDPs 
in the world.83 At the same time, Sudan is also a prominent host country of refugees, with over 400,000 
refugees, most of whom were from South Sudan.84 Algeria also hosted over 90,000 refugees by the end of 
2016,85 while Egypt hosted over 210,000 refugees, primarily originating from the Syrian Arab Republic, the 
74	 See	appendix	A	for	the	composition	of	North	Africa.	
75	 Flahaux	and	de	Haas,	2016.
76	 Natter,	2014.
77	 The	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	 (GCC)	 is	a	regional	political	organization	comprised	of	six	countries:	Bahrain,	Kuwait,	Qatar,	Oman,	
Saudi	Arabia	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates.	
78	 UN	DESA,	2015a.
79	 Ibid.	
80	 Ibid.	
81	 Reifeld,	2015.	
82	 UNHCR,	2017a.	
83	 IDMC,	2017.	
84	 UNHCR,	2017a.	
85	 Ibid.	
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Palestinian Territories and other African countries.86 A volatile security and political situation in Libya 
has contributed to a total population of more than 300,000 IDPs by the end of 2016, while also affecting 
the more than 38,000 refugees and asylum seekers residing in Libya.87 
• As a key hub of transit activity for migrants originating from many countries to the south, the North 
African subregion is confronted with protection challenges associated with irregular migration to 
Europe. Between 2011 and 2016, approximately 630,000 people used the “Central Mediterranean route” 
to reach Italy.88 In 2016 alone, more than 181,000 people were detected on the Central Mediterranean 
route (the main route of arrival via irregular migration to Europe in 2016), with the majority arriving in 
Italy.89 The majority departed from Libya (almost 90%), with other departure countries including Egypt, 
Algeria and Tunisia.90 Of those who disembarked in Italy in 2016, the majority were from Western and 
Eastern Africa (Nigeria, Eritrea, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Mali  and Somalia) and over 
half applied for asylum.91 Of the more than 180,000 migrants who disembarked in Italy in 2016, 13 per 
cent (approximately 24,000) were women, while 15 per cent (28,000) were children – the vast majority 
(91%) of whom were unaccompanied. The proportion of children, including unaccompanied children, 
has increased.92 Others travelled from Morocco and Algeria to Spain, along the so-called “Western 
Mediterranean” route. Protection challenges and serious human rights violations along these corridors 
are profound and include deaths at sea, in the desert and in other transit locations; missing migrants, 
exploitation, physical and emotional abuse, trafficking, smuggling, sexual and gender-based violence, 
arbitrary detention, forced labour, ransom demands and extortion; and other human rights violations.93 
Some migrants – including refugees – also become stranded in countries in the region.94
West and Central Africa95
• Intraregional migration, which is significant in West and Central Africa, is characterized by mixed 
migration flows influenced by multiple drivers. While there are significant data deficits on migration 
flows within Africa and accurate numbers can be difficult to ascertain, more recent estimates reflect that 
the vast majority of international migrants in West and Central Africa move within the subregion.96 The 
high number of people moving within West Africa is linked to several factors, including visa-free movement 
among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, the relatively small sizes of 
many countries in the region and the strong networks among the many ethnic groups scattered across 
the subregion.97 Importantly, intraregional migration within ECOWAS is mostly due to labour mobility, 
with seasonal, temporary and permanent migrant workers moving largely from countries such as Niger 
86	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
87	 UNHCR,	2017a.
88	 European	Commission,	2017a.	
89	 European	Commission,	2017b.
90	 Ibid.	
91	 Ibid.	
92	 Ibid.;	see	also,	IOM,	2016d.	
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and Mali toward coastal countries such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.98 Unlike West Africa, where economic 
factors are important drivers of intraregional migration, conflict and instability have played a larger role 
in displacement to neighbouring countries in Central Africa.99 However, labour migration is not absent in 
Central Africa, with Gabon, for example, home to a large number of migrant workers from within Central 
Africa who work in its oil and lumber industries.100
• Notwithstanding free movement agreements, irregular migration remains prevalent in West and 
Central Africa. For many West and Central African migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean to 
reach Europe, Niger is an important country of transit and as well as a major smuggling hub.101 The use of 
smugglers to cross borders even within free movement areas such as ECOWAS is not uncommon, particularly 
in circumstances where people do not possess documents such as passports or travel certificates.102 It 
is important to emphasize, however, that most West Africans who are smuggled overland begin their 
journeys as regular migrants under the free movement protocol and only violate immigration laws after 
exiting the ECOWAS area.103 Moreover, a number of borders in West Africa are extremely porous, enabling 
unauthorized movements between countries, with several ECOWAS borders cutting across politically 
unstable and sparsely populated areas, which are also characterized by security deficiencies.104
• Conflict and violence linked to political upheavals, communal and ethnic tensions, and Boko Haram 
extremism, have meant that most countries in West and Central Africa are affected by internal or 
cross-border displacement, although the magnitude varies dramatically. As with other subregions 
in Africa, countries in West and Central Africa have long histories of hosting and producing displaced 
populations, often simultaneously. For example, at the end of 2016, there were close to 540,000 refugees 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo globally, while the country was host to over 450,000 refugees 
originating from other countries; this was in addition to around 2.2 million IDPs in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.105 Other countries in the region with similar dynamics in 2016 include Central 
African Republic, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Niger.106 The scale of the displacement crisis in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2016 meant it was in the top 10 globally as (a) a refugee host country 
(ninth); (b) an origin country of refugees (sixth); (c) a country with total new internal displacements 
due to conflict and violence (first); (d) a country with new internal displacement relative to population 
(eighth); and (f) total stock of IDPs (fifth).107 IDMC has termed the situation “an overlooked displacement 
crisis”, while UNHCR notes that the socioeconomic context (one of the world’s poorest countries when 
measured by gross national income per capita), combined with insecurity and access constraints, present 
significant challenges for protection and assistance.108
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• Environmental changes in West and Central Africa are impacting human livelihoods and mobility. 
For example, although precipitations in the Sahel109 are slowly increasing, they are becoming increasingly 
variable, leading to the frequent occurrence of droughts and floods.110 At the same time, rapid population 
growth has led to the intensification of cropping, deforestation and overgrazing, contributing to land 
degradation.111 Despite an increase in the scale of agriculture in the region, food insecurity still affects 
millions.112 For example, as of June 2016, 4.6 million people were severely food insecure in the Lake 
Chad Basin, with numbers expected to increase in 2017.113 Millions of people in West and Central Africa 
depend on Lake Chad; however, the lake’s volume has decreased by 90 per cent in area in the last 40 years 
due to increased drought, as well as human-related causes such as increased irrigation withdrawals.114 
The complex and interconnected environmental changes such as droughts and floods, over-exploitation 
of resources and climate change are contributing factors to rural–urban and cyclical mobility within 
countries and across borders in the region. Migration is one strategy used to increase livelihoods and 
reduce risks in the Western Sahel, particularly in light of uncertain agricultural returns.115 Research has 
also highlighted the interconnections between, on the one hand, impacts of climate change on natural-
resource-dependent livelihoods and food insecurity, and on the other hand, tensions, conflicts and 
mobility.116 
Eastern and Southern Africa117
• For several countries within Eastern and Southern Africa, emigration, immigration and forced 
displacement underpin substantial intra- and extraregional movement, as well as inflows of 
migrants from outside the continent. Eastern and Southern Africa have long been major destinations 
for non-African migrants, with immigrants of largely Asian descent moving to work temporarily or settle 
permanently. Immigration from India has historically been significant in countries such as Uganda, Kenya 
and South Africa,118 while recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of Chinese migrant 
workers moving to countries in the subregion.119 Intraregional labour migration is also well established 
in Southern Africa, where significant numbers of people have traditionally migrated from countries such 
as Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Swaziland to work in key sectors such as mining in South Africa and 
Botswana.120 Owing to its advanced economy and relative political stability, South Africa has experienced 
high volumes of immigration in recent years, attracting migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from 
within and outside Southern Africa. The number of international migrants in South Africa increased 
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 from 1.9 million in 2010 to 3.1 million in 2015.121 Meanwhile, Eastern Africa continues to experience 
considerable levels of outward labour mobility, driven by poverty, low wages and high unemployment.122 
This is most evident in the recent spike in the number of low and semi-skilled East Africans moving to 
GCC States on temporary work contracts. The Gulf States’ proximity to Eastern Africa, the employment 
opportunities they offer, as well as recent labour agreements between countries such as the United Arab 
Emirates and Kenya123 and Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia,124 mean that labour migration to GCC countries is 
likely to rise.
• Migration in Eastern and Southern Africa continues to involve high numbers of irregular 
migrants, characterized by mixed migration flows and underpinned by multiple drivers, including 
socioeconomic factors, conflict and political instability. In addition to socioeconomic factors, conflict 
and political instability remain important drivers of irregular migration to and from Eastern Africa. 
Migrant smuggling is particularly prominent in both subregions, with people increasingly using the 
services of smugglers to reach their intended destinations. Many smuggling networks are based in the 
Horn of Africa, while countries that are members of the East African Community (EAC) such as Uganda 
and the United Republic of Tanzania are largely transit countries.125 The Middle East, Europe and Southern 
Africa are the three major destinations for migrants from Eastern Africa, who use four major routes, 
including the western route via Sudan, into Libya and across the Mediterranean; the northern route via 
Egypt to Israel; the southern route down the Eastern Corridor toward South Africa; and the eastern route 
transiting through Yemen to Saudi Arabia and beyond.126 Similar to Eastern Africa, irregular migration 
is widespread in Southern Africa, involving intraregional migrants such as those from Zimbabwe to 
South Africa as well as those from outside the subregion. Many migrants originate from the Horn of 
Africa, notably from Ethiopia and Somalia. These migrants frequently utilize the services of smugglers.127 
However, these persons often face a significant number of vulnerabilities, including extortion, physical 
and sexual violence, kidnapping and robbery, with many losing their lives as a result of being transported 
in inhumane conditions.128 
• Intractable conflicts, political and communal violence and peacebuilding setbacks have displaced 
millions in Eastern Africa, with most countries in the subregion affected. At the end of 2016, for 
example, there were over 1.4 million South Sudanese refugees (the majority of whom were children) and 
over 1.8 million IDPs.129 Somalia was the origin of over 1 million refugees and more than 1.1 million 
IDPs, while Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda and Ethiopia also produced significant populations of refugees, 
IDPs, or both.130 The scale of displacement stemming from South Sudan and Somalia has meant that 
they are among the top origin countries in the world.131 The civil war in Somalia, for example, has 
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pushed people into other countries in the region, as well as eastward to countries such as Yemen;132 however, 
the unrelenting conflict in Yemen has created intolerable conditions, forcing migrants to return to Eastern 
Africa, while generating new asylum and refugee arrivals, including non-African nationals such as Yemenis.133 
Meanwhile, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania are major hosts of refugees, 
predominantly from the subregion, as is South Sudan – notwithstanding the conflict that has prompted 
large-scale displacement from and within that country.134 The complex and multicausal factors triggering 
displacement and inhibiting solutions have meant that these host countries – some of the least developed 
in the world – continue to provide long-term refuge to a disproportionate share of the world’s displaced.135 
• Environmental change and disasters in Eastern and Southern Africa are prevalent and increasing, 
and are influencing human movement and displacement. The subregion has faced increased variability 
in precipitation and higher occurrence of drought in recent decades.136 These slow-onset environmental 
changes have a major impact on food security, given that agriculture is a dominant economic sector in 
both Eastern and Southern Africa.137 Recently, drought influenced by an El Niño climate cycle in 2015 and 
2016 has caused a humanitarian crisis related to widespread food shortages and famine,138 contributing 
(in addition to other non-environmental factors) to human displacement in a number of countries.139 
Rapid-onset disasters such as flooding in 2016 also displaced around 300,000 people in Ethiopia, 40,000 
in Kenya, 70,000 in Somalia, and thousands more in the United Republic of Tanzania and Madagascar.140
Asia141
Asia – home to 4.4 billion people – was the origin of over 40 per cent of the world’s international migrants in 
2015. Over half (59 million) were residing in other countries in Asia. As shown in the middle panel of figure 
5, intraregional migration within Asia has increased significantly over time, rising from 35 million in 1990. 
Considerable growth has also occurred in Asian-born migrant populations in Northern America (15.5 million 
in 2015) and Europe (20 million in 2015). Migration from Asia to these two regions drove much of the increase 
in the number of Asian migrants outside the region, reaching 40 million in 2015.
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Figure	5.	Migrants	to	Asia,	within	Asia	and	from	Asia	between	1990	and	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 “Migrants	to	Asia”	refers	to	migrants	residing	in	the	region	(i.e.	Asia)	who	were	born	in	one	of	the	other	regions	
(e.g.	Europe	or	Africa).	“Migrants	within	Asia”	refers	to	migrants	born	in	the	region	(i.e.	Asia)	and	residing	outside	
their	country	of	birth,	but	still	within	the	Asian	region.	“Migrants	from	Asia”	refers	to	people	born	in	Asia	who	
were	residing	outside	the	region	(e.g.	in	Europe	or	Northern	America).	
The number of non-Asian-born migrants in Asia has remained at relatively low levels. Europeans comprise the 
largest group of migrants from outside Asia in the region. These numbers include migrants from the European 
part of the former Soviet Union now living in Central Asia. During the same period, the number of Africans – the 
other sizable group of migrants in Asia – has grown.
The two Asian “population giants”, India and China, have the largest absolute numbers of migrants living abroad 
(figure 6). It is important to add that these large absolute numbers of emigrants constitute small shares of the 
total populations of India and China. Migrants from China made up the fourth largest population of foreign-
born migrants in the world after India, Mexico and the Russian Federation. Over two million Chinese-born 
emigrants resided in the United States, which was also home to other large Asian migrant groups from India, the 
Philippines and Viet Nam. Other countries with large numbers of migrants residing abroad include Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, many of whom are in GCC countries.
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In GCC countries, migrants make up high proportions of the total national populations (figure 6). For example, 
in 2015, migrants accounted for 88 per cent of the population in United Arab Emirates; around 74 per cent in 
Kuwait; 76 per cent in Qatar; and 51 per cent in Bahrain.142 Many migrants came from Africa, South Asia (e.g. India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal), and South-East Asia (e.g. Indonesia and the Philippines). Further discussion of 
labour migration, including to Gulf States, is outlined in the key features and developments section below.
It is also important to note that current data on foreign-born migrants also partly reflect significant historical 
events, such as the 1947 Partition resulting in the mass displacement of people from and to India and 
Pakistan. This is evident in 2015 data, which show that over 5.2 and 3.6 million foreign-born migrants 
(respectively) resided in the two countries.
Figure	6.	Top	20	Asian	migrant	countries	in	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note 1:	 The	population	size	used	to	calculate	the	percentage	of	immigrants	and	emigrants	is	based	on	the	UN	DESA	total	
resident	population	of	the	country,	which	includes	foreign-born	populations.
Note 2:	 “Immigrant”	 refers	 to	 foreign-born	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 country.	 “Emigrant”	 refers	 to	people	born	 in	 the	
country	who	were	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth	in	2015.
142	UN	DESA,	2015b.	
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Figure 7 shows the top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, with most of them occurring within the region 
– 13 of the 20. They represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of 
how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. 
The largest corridor is from India to the United Arab Emirates, where 3.5 million Indians were residing in 2015. 
Further discussion of selected migration corridors is included below in the key features and developments section.
Figure	7.	Top	20	migration	corridors	from	Asian	countries
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Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 Corridors	represent	an	accumulation	of	migratory	movements	over	time	and	provide	a	snapshot	of	how	migration	
patterns	have	evolved	into	significant	foreign-born	populations	in	specific	destination	countries.
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International displacement within and from Asia is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 8. Refugees 
from the Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan constituted more than a third of the world’s refugees at the end 
of 2016. The impact of the Syrian conflict on displacement can be clearly seen in figure 8, with refugees and 
asylum seekers from the Syrian Arab Republic dwarfing numbers from Afghanistan. Afghanistan was previously 
the highest refugee-producing country in the region prior to the deepening of the Syrian conflict. In 2016, 
the vast majority of refugees from Asian countries lived in neighbouring countries. Refugees from the Syrian 
Arab Republic, for example, were predominantly hosted in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while refugees from 
Afghanistan were in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, as shown in figure 8, it is also important 
to note that origin countries such as Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are also themselves hosting 
refugees.
Figure	8.	Top	10	Asian	countries	by	total	refugees	and	asylum	seekers,	2016
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
Note:	 “Hosted”	refers	 to	 those	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	 from	other	countries	who	are	residing	 in	 the	receiving	
country	 (right-hand	 side	of	 the	figure);	 “abroad”	 refers	 to	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	originating	 from	 that	
country	who	are	outside	of	their	origin	country.	Chapter	2	(appendix	A)	includes	definitions	of	key	terms	such	as	
“refugee”.	The	top	10	countries	are	based	on	2016	data	and	are	calculated	by	combining	refugees	and	asylum	
seekers	in	and	from	countries.	
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Key features and developments in Asia
Eastern Asia143
• Eastern Asia is in the midst of unprecedented demographic change, with several countries 
experiencing low fertility rates and ageing populations, leading to a reconsideration of immigration 
policies. Countries such as Japan are already undergoing negative population growth, while the Republic 
of Korea has the lowest birth rate and the fastest-ageing population profile among OECD countries.144 
These demographic changes are expected to have significant implications for both social policy and long-
term economic growth, particularly in relation to increasing health care costs and lower productivity 
levels, as the proportion of people of working age reduces.145 These realities are prompting policymakers 
to reassess historically restrictive approaches toward immigration, which have been associated with a 
relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity in some countries, more limited experience in immigration 
policy compared with other regions and subregions, and the relative unpopularity of immigration in many 
countries.146 Both the Republic of Korea and Japan, for example, are increasingly promoting temporary 
foreign labour immigration, with the Republic of Korea employing over 500,000 foreign workers under its 
General Employment Permit System by the end of 2015.147 
• Migration in Eastern Asia is increasingly characterized by significant outward and inward student 
mobility. The number of international students from Eastern Asia, particularly at tertiary level, has 
increased rapidly in recent years, while the number of foreign students within the subregion also 
continues to grow. Driven by the prospect of better-quality education, a high number of international 
students from Eastern Asia study in destinations such as the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom. In the academic year 2015/2016, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan were among the top 
10 countries of origin of international students in the United States, with more than 300,000 students 
from China alone.148 In 2014, of the world’s total population of students studying abroad, one out of six 
were from China.149 However, Eastern Asia is not only a major origin of international students, but is also 
gradually becoming an important destination for foreign students, many of them coming from within the 
subregion. More students from the Republic of Korea, for example, are choosing to study in China, with 
those from the Republic of Korea accounting for the largest number of international students in China in 
2015.150 Japan plans to attract around 300,000 international students by 2020.151 
• Outward labour migration, particularly from China, has meant that the subregion is one of the 
largest recipients of remittances in the world. In 2015, Chinese-born international migrants were the 
fourth largest foreign-born population in the world after Indians, Mexicans and Russians, with nearly 
143	See	appendix	A	for	details	on	the	composition	of	Eastern	Asia.
144	Moon,	2015.
145	World	Bank,	2015.
146	Staedicke,	Batalova	and	Zong,	2016.
147	Park,	2017.
148	IIE,	2016.
149	ICEF	Monitor,	2015a.
150	Ministry	of	Education	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2015.
151	ICEF	Monitor,	2015b.
60 Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments
10 million Chinese migrants living outside of China.152 Global remittance flows in 2016 amounted to an 
estimated USD 575 billion, with China receiving USD 61 billion, the second largest share of remittances 
worldwide after India.153 
• While this chapter is focused primarily on international migration, it is important to note that 
in this context, internal migration remains a very significant feature in East Asian countries, 
involving unprecedented movement of people from rural areas to urban centres. This has most 
notably been the case in China, where the economic and social reforms of the 1980s154 initiated one 
of the largest human migrations in history. Hundreds of millions of underemployed peasants left the 
countryside for the cities, driven by the prospect of employment opportunities and higher incomes.155 
Most people have migrated from China’s Western provinces to its Eastern provinces. The socioeconomic 
dynamics between Western and Eastern China are important factors, with the West characterized by high 
population growth rates, a surplus of workers and lower incomes, while the East contends with a shortage 
of workers in metropolitan areas and boasts both higher incomes and education levels.156 
Southern Asia157
• Migration from Southern Asia to other subregions is a key feature, with many temporary migrant 
workers in the GCC countries originating from this subregion. Since the 1970s, the oil-rich Gulf 
countries have been a major destination for a vast number of temporary labour migrants from South Asia. 
While India and Pakistan were initially the major origin countries of labour to GCC countries, the origin 
of migrant workers has since diversified, attracting workers from Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.158 
Southern Asians currently make up the largest migrant labour workforce in GCC countries.159 The prospects 
of higher wages and accessible employment opportunities have resulted in a significant increase in the 
number of people leaving the subregion in recent years.160 For countries in the subregion with significant 
labour surpluses, migration has relieved labour pressures, while helping to reduce poverty through 
remittances. Indeed, Southern Asia is among the largest recipients of remittances in the world. In 2016, 
remittance inflows to India amounted to USD 62.7 billion, the largest in the world; and in countries such 
as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances exceeded 5 per cent of GDP in the same year.161
• Migration within the subregion is a dominant feature in Southern Asia, driven by economic and 
labour market differentials.162 Intraregional movement, both regular and irregular, is related to strong 
common historical roots, geographic proximity, and cultural and kinship ties between countries.163 In 
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2015, just over 85 per cent of the 14.1 million international migrants in Southern Asia originated from 
other countries in the subregion.164 Major migration corridors include Bangladesh–India, Afghanistan–
Pakistan, India–Pakistan and Nepal–India. There are millions of Bangladeshi and Nepalese labour 
migrants working in India, for example, primarily in the informal sector as construction labourers and 
domestic workers.165 Internal migration within Southern Asia countries is extensive and larger in scale 
than international migration, related primarily to temporary and seasonal migration from rural to urban 
areas.166 Rural–urban migration in Southern Asia is substantial. Between 2001 and 2011, Southern Asia’s 
urban population grew by 130 million people, and is forecast to rise by almost 250 million more in the 
next 15 years.167 
• Irregular migration both within and from the region is common in Southern Asia, and is 
often aided by loose smuggling networks. While the exact number of people undertaking irregular 
migration within the region is not known, partly because of its relatively porous borders, there are 
estimated to be large irregular migrant populations within the region.168 India, for example, is home 
to significant populations of irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal, and to a lesser extent, Sri 
Lanka.169 Additionally, Australia, Europe and the United States are all popular destinations for irregular 
migrants from the region.170 For those heading to Europe, migrants are primarily smuggled through 
Central Asia and the Russian Federation, as well as through the Middle East into the Western Balkans. 
Other irregular migrants are smuggled through to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia for work, or through 
these countries onwards to Australia.171 There have been many documented cases of migrants being 
exploited and abused by smugglers in Southern Asia, including rape, other forms of abuse, and forced 
starvation.172
• Long-standing conflict, political instability, violence, and repression have made Southern Asia 
both a significant source of displacement and a leading host of displaced populations. In recent 
history, every country in the subregion (other than the Maldives) has been an origin or a host of 
displaced populations. Most notably, for over 30 years, large portions of Afghanistan’s population have 
been displaced internally, across immediate borders into neighbouring countries and further afield. At 
the end of 2016, there were 2.5 million Afghan refugees, the second largest refugee population in the 
world, and over 1.5 million IDPs, the tenth largest IDP population in the world; in effect, more than one 
in 10 Afghans were displaced.173 The neighbouring countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
hosted most Afghan refugees and accordingly, featured among the top host countries in the world.174 
Pakistan, with its porous border and close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties, has been 
the major host for decades, with its nearly 1.4 million refugees at the end of 2016 almost exclusively 
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Afghans;175 2016 also saw a 12-year high in terms of returns, as over 380,000 Afghan refugees returned 
from Pakistan.176 Returnees cited a range of interlinked reasons regarding their decision to return, 
including harassment and pressure by authorities, fears of arrest and deportation, economic hardship, 
perceptions relating to improvements in Afghanistan, return assistance packages, and a desire to reunite 
with family.177 Returnees also face a range of reintegration challenges, including access to land and 
housing, employment and livelihoods, access to food and health, and insecurity.178 At the end of 2016, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted close to 1 million refugees, making it the fourth largest refugee 
host country in the world, while both India and Bangladesh continued to host large IDP populations.179
• Southern Asian populations are particularly vulnerable to slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters 
related to natural hazards and climate change. Insufficient infrastructure, high dependency on 
land resources, and highly dense populations living in vulnerable areas are underlying challenges that 
contribute to human displacement in the context of disasters.180 In 2016, there were almost 3.6 million 
new internal displacements due to disasters in Southern Asia, with India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all 
featuring among the top 10 countries in the world for disaster-related displacements that year.181 In 
Bangladesh, disasters such as Cyclone Mora in May 2017 displaced hundreds of thousands of people.182 
In Nepal, disasters caused by the Gorkha and Udayapur earthquakes in 2015 led to immense internal 
displacement,183 while around half a million people were estimated to be displaced by severe flooding 
in Sri Lanka in May 2017.184 Migration and mobility are particularly important coping strategies in 
response to environmental change events in Southern Asia – including sea level rise, coastal erosion, 
flooding and groundwater depletion – all of which are considerable in the region.185 
South-East Asia186
• For many countries in South-East Asia, migration entails significant levels of both emigration and 
immigration, as well as transit migration. Considerable income disparity in the subregion is a major 
factor underpinning the strong trend of people to migrate from lower-income countries to higher-income 
countries within (and beyond) the subregion. There are nearly 10 million international migrants within 
the subregion and just over 20 million total migrants from the subregion, 6.9 million of whom migrated 
to other countries within South-East Asia.187 The advanced economies of Malaysia and Singapore are 
notable destinations for migrants. There is also a strong geographic aspect to migration, with higher 
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177	UNHCR,	2017b;	see	also	IOM,	2017b.	
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levels of migration occurring between countries sharing borders, particularly along Thailand’s border 
with neighbours Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar.188 Intraregional, long-term 
migration corridors are evident, which are mainly dominated by temporary labour migration, with smaller 
components of permanent (skilled and family) migration, student migration and forced migration.189
• Migration involves high proportions of irregular migration, mostly in relation to temporary labour 
migration, but also in response to protection issues and environmental change.190 The prevalence of 
unauthorized entry and irregular migrant populations is linked to a number of aspects, including labour market 
regulation, industry/sector reliance on irregular migrants, human trafficking and migrant smuggling.191 Indeed, 
migrant smuggling is considered to be a widespread phenomenon within South-East Asia, and countries in 
the region are particularly focused on countering smuggling through bilateral cooperation, as well as through 
multilateral mechanisms such as ASEAN and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and 
Related Transnational Crime. Many migrants also transit the region using the services of smugglers.192 Mixed 
migration flows (involving movements of people with and without international protection needs) occur 
as do migration flows underpinned by mixed motivations. Many migrants face exploitation in South-East 
Asia, stemming from their irregular status. Migrant workers in particular industries also face forced labour, 
exploitation and serious abuse (e.g. fishing, agriculture, construction and manufacturing).193
• There has been an absence, in more recent years, of large-scale acute displacement stemming from 
civil or transnational conflict, but there exist instead discrete long-term flows associated with 
systemic persecution and marginalization. The largest populations of refugees in 2016 were hosted 
in Malaysia (92,000) and the largest origin country of refugees and people in refugee-like situations is 
Myanmar, at just over 490,000 in 2016.194 However, the largest intraregional migration corridor based on 
foreign-born population data (see figure 7 in the Asian regional overview) is from Myanmar to Thailand, 
and relates both to displacement due to conflict and violence and to cross-border migration for income 
generation, family reunion and other reasons. Refugee resettlement of people from the region is mainly 
undertaken by “traditional” resettlement countries (e.g. United States, Canada, Australia) and there is 
little by way of “protection infrastructure” within the region.195 There are also large populations of IDPs 
and stateless populations in the region, with six countries in the region hosting stateless populations 
(the largest of which is in Myanmar).196 
• In early 2015, South-East Asia experienced a migration-related humanitarian crisis in the Bay of 
Bengal and Andaman Sea, when around 7,000 migrants became stranded at sea in dire conditions.197 
Migrants were stranded on vessels abandoned by smugglers for several weeks, with several hundred 
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having died during the crisis.198 As the humanitarian crisis grew, countries in the region embarked on a 
series of bilateral and multilateral meetings to formulate an immediate response, including on the rescue, 
relief and temporary shelter of those in need. Subsequent meetings focused on longer-term responses 
such as protecting people at sea, preventing irregular migration and smuggling, addressing the root 
causes of movement, and creating livelihood opportunities for those at risk of displacement and irregular 
migration.199
Middle East200
• GCC countries have some of the largest numbers of temporary labour migrants in the world. 
Driven by oil wealth, GCC countries have undergone remarkable economic development over the last 
few decades, drawing both skilled and semi-skilled workers to various sectors, including construction, 
retail and domestic service. The increase in labour migration to GCC States has created tremendous 
demographic change in destination countries. Today, with the exceptions of Oman and Saudi Arabia, 
migrants make up the majority of the population in GCC countries – comprising 88 per cent of the 
population in the United Arab Emirates, 76 per cent in Qatar and 74 per cent in Kuwait.201 Labour 
migrants in GCC countries primarily originate from Asia, including from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
as well as from regions such as North and sub-Saharan Africa. Income differentials between origin and 
destination countries are a key driver of migration, with the Gulf countries providing higher wages and 
greater employment opportunities to labour migrants.202 Despite progress, regulation and protection 
of migrants’ rights remain a challenge in the region. The Kafala sponsorship system,203 which ties 
migrant workers to their employers and is practised across a number of GCC States, has also come under 
scrutiny. However, a number of Gulf States are gradually taking steps to reform the Kafala system to 
ensure enhanced mobility for migrant workers in the labour market.204
• Civil conflict, intensification of sectarian violence and the proliferation of terrorism (particularly 
by Daesh) have resulted in extensive levels of internal and international displacement in the 
subregion in recent years. Three countries in the subregion – the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and 
Yemen – are facing a “level 3 (L3) emergency” (the global humanitarian system’s classification for the 
most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises) and are key contributors to the world’s total displacement 
figures.205 The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, in its seventh year in 2017, has displaced well over 
half of the country’s population, with over 5.5 million refugees, over 6.3 million IDPs and over 184,000 
asylum seekers at the end of 2016.206 About 65 per cent of Syrians are now displaced.207 Successive 
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waves of displacement in Iraq – a feature since the beginning of the century – have continued and 
intensified in 2016 and into 2017. This has occurred in the context of efforts to retake territory and 
counter Daesh. Over 3 million Iraqis are displaced within the country, and numerous challenges and 
protection risks inhibit sustained return.208 Yemen’s political and security situation has continued to 
deteriorate, and the ensuing violence and volatility has left the country hosting almost 2 million IDPs 
at the end of 2016, down from 2.5 million at the end of 2015.209 High rates of return and secondary 
displacement are also occurring in Yemen, with estimates indicating that during the 24-month period 
ending in March 2017, 10.4 per cent of Yemen’s population have experienced displacement.210   
• The Middle East continues to host a significant share of the world’s refugees. As at the end of 
2016, the Middle East subregion hosted over 45 per cent of all refugees globally, including the refugees 
registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).211 Neighbouring countries 
inevitably share a disproportionate burden when it comes to hosting people seeking refuge in other 
countries, and this dynamic is a key feature of contemporary displacement patterns in the region. 
As countries bordering the Syrian Arab Republic and the principal hosts of Syrian refugees, Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan are all among the top 10 host countries in the world in 2016 (Turkey is first, 
Lebanon third and Jordan seventh).212 The depth of their responsibility is particularly apparent when 
the number of refugees in each country is compared against the national population – in Lebanon, one 
in six people was a refugee, in Jordan, one in 11, and in Turkey, one in 28 – ranking them the top three 
countries in the world under this measure.213 Other countries in the region, including those affected by 
conflict, also host many refugees, including Yemen and Iraq, and even the Syrian Arab Republic.214 The 
close to 5.3 million refugees registered with UNRWA are also located in the subregion.215 
• Irregular migration within and from the region continues to pose challenges for migrants and 
States. The very large numbers of Syrian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries, together with 
protracted conflict and the low probability of return to the Syrian Arab Republic, have seen refugees 
undertaking irregular migration onward to other countries, most notably those in Europe via the 
Eastern Mediterranean route. For example, Syrians departing from Turkey accounted for around half 
of the more than 850,000 who travelled to Greece by boat across the Aegean Sea in 2015; others 
were from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and a range of other countries.216 Migrant smugglers have 
been instrumental in these movements, making significant profits, and at times engaging in abuse 
and exploitative practices.217 There has been considerable political and public focus on the Eastern 
Mediterranean route during the last two years; discussion of the EU-Turkey statement is included in 
the Europe region below.
208	IDMC,	2017.	
209	IDMC,	2017.	
210	IOM,	2017g.	
211	UNHCR,	2017a.		
212	Ibid.	At	the	end	of	2016,	Turkey	hosted	over	2.8	million	refugees,	Lebanon	over	1	million	and	Jordan	over	680,000.	
213	Ibid.	
214	Ibid.
215	UNRWA,	n.d.
216	UNHCR,	2016b.
217	McAuliffe	and	Koser,	2015;	Içduygu	and	Koser	Akcapar,	2016.
66 Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments
Central Asia218
• Migratory movements in Central Asia occur in large part out of the region, and most noticeably 
northward to the Russian Federation. In 2015, for example, there were just under 5 million migrants 
born in Central Asia who were living in the Russian Federation.219 In recent years, the economic slowdown 
and policy changes in the Russian Federation – including the imposition of re-entry bans on migrants 
for administrative infringements – have been partially responsible for a relative decline in migration 
from Central Asia. This has affected livelihoods and income generated through remittances, which are 
an important source of capital for the subregion.220 In response to changes in the Russian Federation, 
migrants have either returned to their country of origin, remained irregularly, or sought out alternative 
destinations, most notably Kazakhstan (see discussion below).221 People from Central Asia also migrate 
to Europe and China, where work and family ties are relatively strong. Germany, for example, was home 
to just over 1 million migrants from Kazakhstan in 2015, second only to the Russian Federation, where 
2.56 million Kazakh-born people resided.222 
• Intraregional migration is a key feature in the region and is underpinned by geographic, cultural, 
economic, political and social links that are historical in nature. Central Asia is home to millions of 
international migrants, mainly from within the region, but also from further afield. Migrants primarily 
originate from countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), many of which are 
current members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).223 In 2015, Kazakhstan, for example, 
had a substantial foreign-born population (3.55 million), of whom 2.35 million were born in the Russian 
Federation.224 Kazakhstan is now predominantly a country of transit and of immigration, attracting 
skilled workers from various countries and, increasingly, becoming a destination for migrant workers 
from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In recent years, Central Asian countries have revised policies 
regulating intraregional migration, including through the conclusion of bilateral agreements on entry 
and readmission.225 For example, the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 allows people 
from its Member States – including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – to move freely to live, work and 
study in other Member States of the Union.226 Further cooperation is currently occurring in the region 
on enhancing the management of mixed flows, including on aspects related to border management, 
migrants’ rights and protection, and irregular migration.227 Both male and female migrant workers from 
Central Asia can be vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, particularly within informal employment such 
as construction, agricultural and domestic work.228
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• Remittances play an important role in Central Asian economies, especially for the less developed 
countries in the region. Two of the world’s top 10 remittance-receiving countries relative to GDP are 
in the region – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.229 In Kyrgyzstan, remittances have been estimated to reduce 
the national poverty rate by 6–7 per cent.230 Remittance flows into Central Asian countries largely reflect 
migration patterns within and from the region, which are closely linked to work and income generation. 
Remittances from the Russian Federation, for example, have been substantial over time, aided by the 
relatively low transfer costs from the Russian Federation to the Central Asian countries. However, the 
recent economic slowdown and policy changes in the Russian Federation have had a negative impact on 
overall remittance flows. Between 2014 and 2015, remittance levels to Kyrgyzstan decreased by nearly 
50 per cent, and by nearly 60 per cent to Uzbekistan, while personal money transfers from the Russian 
Federation to Tajikistan dropped by nearly 70 per cent during the same time period.231 Devaluation of the 
Kazakh tenge between 2015 and 2016 has also contributed to reduced remittance flows to several Central 
Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.232 The reductions are having a negative impact on 
communities, especially those that have a heavy reliance on remittances for basic needs, including food 
and shelter, such as in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.233 Households with family members working abroad are 
faced with a worsening of their living standard that might push some into poverty due to the decrease in 
money transfers. This issue is further exacerbated by a shortage of provisions to accommodate returned 
migrants’ needs and furthering their potentials. 234
Europe235
Almost one third of the world’s international migrants (75 million) lived in Europe in 2015. Over half of 
these (40 million) were born in Europe, but are living elsewhere in the region, which has increased from 
27 million in 1990 (figure 9). In 2015, European to European migration was the second largest regional migration 
corridor in the world (after Latin America and the Caribbean to Northern America). The population of non-
European migrants in Europe reached over 35 million in 2015. Migrants born in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean experienced similar growth patterns over the past 25 years. Each grew steadily in the 1990s, 
more rapidly during the 2000s and finally slowing thereafter. 
In 1990, there were roughly equal amounts of Europeans living outside Europe as non-Europeans living in 
Europe. However, unlike the growth in migration to Europe, the number of Europeans living outside Europe 
mostly declined during the last 25 years, except for the past five years when it rose back to just under 
20 million (similar to the level in 1990). In 2015, European-born migrants living outside the continent were 
based primarily in Northern America. There was also some gradual growth of European migrants in Asia and 
Oceania between 2010 and 2015.
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Figure	9.	Migrants	to	Europe,	within	Europe	and	from	Europe	between	1990	and	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 “Migrants	 to	Europe”	 refers	 to	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	region	 (i.e.	Europe)	who	were	born	 in	one	of	 the	other	
regions	(e.g.	Africa	or	Asia).	“Migrants	within	Europe”	refers	to	migrants	born	in	the	region	(i.e.	Europe)	and	residing	
outside	their	country	of	birth,	but	still	within	the	European	region.	“Migrants	from	Europe”	refers	to	people	born	in	
Europe	who	were	residing	outside	the	region	(e.g.	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	or	Northern	America).	
Many countries in the east of Europe, such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland and Romania have some 
of the largest emigrant populations within the region (figure 10). At over 10 million emigrants in 2015, the 
Russian Federation had the third largest population of its citizens living abroad in the world. The migration 
of people from countries in the former USSR such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Belarus 
accounted for the top four European migrant corridors (see figure 11). After the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
the United Kingdom had the third largest European emigrant population (4.9 million). Many of these lived 
outside the continent, in Australia and the United States of America. Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest 
share of emigrants in comparison with the resident population in 2015, many of whom left during the breakup 
of the former Yugoslavia. Portugal and Ireland, two countries that have long histories of emigration, also had 
high shares of populations abroad in comparison with their population sizes.
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In 2015, Germany had the largest foreign-born population in Europe. Of Germany’s 12 million migrants, the 
largest groups came from Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, with each exceeding one 
million. The populations of France and the United Kingdom each included over 7.5 million foreign-born people 
in 2015. Migrants born in French-speaking North African countries made up some of the largest foreign-born 
populations in France. In the United Kingdom, the largest migrant populations were from India and Poland. 
With foreign-born populations in excess of 5.5 million, Spain and Italy were the fourth and fifth most popular 
migrant destinations in Europe in 2015. Many of the foreign-born populations in these countries came from 
elsewhere in Europe, such as Romania, Germany and the United Kingdom, or from North African countries such 
as Morocco. As illustrated in figure 10, of the top 20 migration countries in the region, Switzerland had the 
highest share of migrants in its population (29%) followed by Austria, Sweden and Ireland.
Figure	10.	Top	20	European	migrant	countries	in	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note 1:	 The	population	size	used	to	calculate	the	percentage	of	immigrants	and	emigrants	is	based	on	the	UN	DESA	total	
resident	population	of	the	country,	which	includes	foreign-born	populations.
Note 2:	 “Immigrant”	 refers	 to	 foreign-born	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 country.	 “Emigrant”	 refers	 to	people	born	 in	 the	
country	who	were	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth	in	2015.
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Figure 11 shows the top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, representing an accumulation 
of migratory movements over time, and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into 
significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. One of the more striking features of the 
main migration corridors involving European countries is that most are intraregional corridors. The Russian 
Federation features heavily in the main corridors. Russian-born populations in former Member States of the 
USSR such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan form some of the largest European migrant corridors in 2015. 
The Russian Federation was also the second largest destination of migrants in Europe after Germany. Further 
discussion of migration corridors and recent changes are in the key features and developments section below.
Figure	11.	Top	20	migration	corridors	involving	European	countries
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Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 Corridors	represent	an	accumulation	of	migratory	movements	over	time	and	provide	a	snapshot	of	how	migration	
patterns	have	evolved	into	significant	foreign-born	populations	in	specific	destination	countries.
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In 2016, Germany hosted the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, and close to half 
were asylum seekers (figure 12). Germany received the largest number of new asylum applications in Europe 
in 2016 (and globally), with most claims made by people from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Some of the largest refugee populations in France and Austria were from the Russian Federation. In 2016, 
France was also host to sizable refugee populations from Sri Lanka and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation were the main European origin countries (figure 12). Over 220,000 
Ukrainian refugees were in the Russian Federation, many moving after conflict commenced in 2013.
Figure	12.	Top	10	European	countries	by	total	refugees	and	asylum	seekers,	2016
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
Note:	 “Hosted”	refers	 to	 those	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	 from	other	countries	who	are	residing	 in	 the	receiving	
country	 (right-hand	 side	of	 the	figure);	 “abroad”	 refers	 to	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	originating	 from	 that	
country	who	are	outside	of	their	origin	country.	Chapter	2	(appendix	A)	includes	definitions	of	key	terms	such	as	
“refugee”.	The	top	10	countries	are	based	on	2016	data	and	are	calculated	by	combining	refugees	and	asylum												
seekers	in	and	from	countries.	
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Key features and developments in Europe
Northern, Western and Southern Europe236
• Intraregional migration is particularly dynamic in Europe. As of 1 January 2016, there were 16 million 
persons living in one of the European Union (EU) Member States with the citizenship of another Member 
State.237 Such a high degree of intraregional migration is made possible by free movement arrangements, 
which enable citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks. The border-free 
Schengen Area, which comprises 22 EU Member States and 4 non-EU Member countries, guarantees free 
movement to over 400 million citizens.238 In 2016, Romania had the highest number of its citizens living 
abroad in other European Union and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries at around 3 million, 
followed by Poland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom.239 However, free movement in Europe faces 
challenges. From the second half of 2015, several Schengen Member States temporarily reintroduced border 
controls.240 There is also a degree of uncertainty following the June 2016 EU membership referendum in the 
United Kingdom about future migration settings arising from “Brexit” negotiations. 
• Migration issues have remained high on the European agenda in 2016 and 2017 and have regularly 
been tackled in ministerial and heads of State or government meetings. Most migrants coming to Europe 
via the Mediterranean crossed by boat from Libya to Italy, or from Turkey to Greece through the Aegean Sea. 
In 2016, nearly 390,000 people arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean region by both land and sea,241 
over 360,000 of whom arrived by sea.242 Following the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, the number of 
arrivals by sea in Greece dropped dramatically, reaching just over 170,000 in 2016, which was a significant 
decrease compared with the over 850,000 arrivals by sea to Greece in 2015.243,244 In 2016, over 180,000 
migrants arrived in Italy by sea, a 16 per cent increase compared with 2015.245 The Central Mediterranean 
route from Libya to Malta and Italy was by far the deadliest route for irregular migrants in the world in 
2016, with estimates of over 4,500 fatalities and missing migrants – the largest number ever reported in the 
region.246 Many more deaths at sea, but also along the different migratory routes, including while transiting 
through the Sahara Desert, were undoubtedly unreported.247 Of the maritime arrivals to Europe in 2016, 
over half came from one of the world’s top 10 refugee-producing countries, particularly the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Afghanistan and Iraq.248 Single women, as well as unaccompanied or separated children, represent 
a particularly vulnerable population of migrant arrivals. In 2016, 92 per cent of all children arriving through 
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the Central Mediterranean were unaccompanied or separated children.249 In 2016, more than 60,000 asylum 
applications were submitted by unaccompanied children in EU Member States.250 
• Arrivals of large numbers of migrants and refugees to Europe via the Mediterranean was at times met 
with anti-migrant rhetoric in the political discourse, policies and media. All in all, the perception of 
migrants in many European societies has tended to be negative: migration of people from outside the EU evoked 
a negative feeling for a majority of Europeans (56%) in a May 2015 survey.251 Across 10 European countries, an 
average of 56 per cent of the public stated that all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be 
stopped.252 Many Europeans largely overestimate the number of migrants and Muslims in their country.253 These 
negative perceptions towards migrants can have concrete implications. As of November 2016, the EU’s Agency 
for Fundamental Rights indicated that violence, harassment, threats and xenophobic speech targeting asylum 
seekers and migrants remain grave, be they committed by State authorities, private companies or individuals, 
or vigilante groups.254 The persistence of negative perceptions towards migration has created challenges for 
governments’ efforts to promote integration. Yet, forecast labour and skill shortages in the short to medium term 
will challenge both employment and economic growth prospects for the EU. For instance, population projections 
estimate a loss of more than 19 million people in the EU labour supply between 2023 and 2060.255 In the context 
of an aging European population, migrants can make an important economic contribution if they are well 
integrated in a timely manner, starting with early integration into education and the labour market. 
South-Eastern and Eastern Europe256
• For most South-Eastern and Eastern European countries, emigration rather than immigration has been 
the key feature over recent years and decades, with fairly low levels of immigration compared with 
other subregions of Europe. Due to this and other factors, several countries in the region are projected to 
experience very significant population decline by 2050 (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, 
the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).257 Emigration from Eastern European countries to Western Europe 
has been a growing trend, particularly since the expansion of the European Union in both 2004 and 2007 
to encompass more Eastern European Member States, while extending the external borders of the European 
Union outward towards non-member countries in the East.258 More recently, this trend has been reinforced 
by the economic slowdown in the Russian Federation (see below). South-Eastern European countries have 
traditionally been countries of emigration, primarily to the European Union. South-Eastern European countries 
have also been migrant transit countries, particularly along the “Western Balkans route”.
• The Russian Federation remains the major destination country in the subregion (and one of the 
most significant in the world). In 2015, the country hosted over 11.6 million international migrants.259 
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Most immigrants have come from neighbouring countries, most notably the CIS260 members, although 
the recent economic slowdown and changes in immigration policies in the Russian Federation have seen 
migrant inflows and remittances outflows fall compared with previous years.261 In 2015, Ukraine also had 
a significant foreign-born population at over 4.8 million, with migrants originating in large part from the 
Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Republic of Moldova.262 However, conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine and an overall economic decline in the country are likely to result in a decrease in the 
total foreign-born population in Ukraine in the next release of international migrant statistics by UN DESA.
• Displacement within and from the region witnessed an increase in recent years, mainly as a direct 
result of the protracted conflict in Eastern Ukraine. As of 2016 there were an estimated 1.7 million 
IDPs in Ukraine.263 Protracted insecurity in Eastern Ukraine has also generated an outflow of migrants 
and refugees to neighbouring states and to the European Union. In 2015, the global number of Ukrainian 
refugees peaked at over 320,000264, and remained high in 2016, declining to just under 240,000.265 A large 
number of Ukrainians have also applied for asylum in the Russian Federation, where Ukrainian asylum 
applications accounted for 98 per cent of the country’s total for 2015.266 To put this in context, the Russian 
Federation received around 85 per cent of all asylum applications made by Ukrainians worldwide in 2015; 
175,500 were made by Ukrainians globally.267 In addition, an increasing number of Ukrainians left the 
country as migrant workers, particularly to Poland. These developments have further added to an already 
significant IDP population in the region, notably in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, many 
of whom are in protracted situations as a result of the conflict/displacement events of the late 1980s and 
the 1990s.
• In 2015 and early 2016, there was a sharp increase in transit migration from and through Turkey 
and the Western Balkans, particularly via the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes 
to reach countries in the north of the EU (primarily Austria, Germany and Sweden). This brought the 
level of mixed migration through these routes to record levels and increased the number of asylum seekers 
and vulnerable migrants in the region. The subsequent establishment of border restrictions along the 
Western Balkans route, followed by the EU-Turkey Statement adopted on 18 March 2016, led to a significant 
drop in the number of people moving along the Western Balkans route.268 However, the closure of the route 
has left more than 70,000 people stranded.269 This situation is linked to increased vulnerability of migrants 
to abuse, exploitation or practices that may amount to human trafficking.270 In this context, as migrants 
could no longer rely on transportation provided by the authorities in the Western Balkans after the closure 
of the route, smuggling of migrants remains a major challenge.271 
260	The	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	consists	of	nine	Member	States:	Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	Belarus,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	
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Latin America and the Caribbean272 
A key feature in the Latin America and the Caribbean region is migration to Northern America. In 2015, nearly 
25 million migrants had made the journey north and were residing in Northern America. As shown in Figure 13, 
the Latin American and the Caribbean population living in Northern America has increased considerably over 
time, from an estimated 10 million in 1990 to just under 25 million in 2015. Another 4.6 million were in Europe, 
an increase from 1.1 million in 1990. 
The total number of migrants from other regions living in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained 
relatively stable, at around three million over the last 25 years. These were comprised mostly of Europeans 
(whose numbers have declined slightly over the period) and Northern Americans, whose numbers have increased.
Figure	13.	Migrants	to,	within	and	from	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	between	1990	and	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 “Migrants	to	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean”	refers	to	migrants	residing	in	the	region	(i.e.	Latin	America	and	the	
Caribbean)	who	were	born	in	one	of	the	other	regions	(e.g.	in	Europe	or	Asia).	“Migrants	within	Latin	America	and	
the	Caribbean”	refers	to	migrants	born	in	the	region	(i.e.	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean)	and	residing	outside	their	
country	of	birth,	but	still	within	the	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	region.“Migrants	from	Latin	America	and	the	
Caribbean”	refers	to	people	born	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	who	were	residing	outside	the	region	(e.g.	in	
Europe	or	Northern	America).	
272	See	appendix	A	for	details	of	the	composition	of	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean.
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Mexico was by far the largest emigration country in Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 14). Over 12.5 million 
people born in Mexico lived abroad in 2015, making it the second largest migrant origin country in the world after 
India. Most Mexican emigrants lived in the United States, which continues to be the largest country-to-country 
migration corridor in the entire world (figure 15). Many other Central American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras also have large migrant populations in the United States, as do South American countries such as 
Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru. Large populations of South American migrants resided elsewhere in the region. 
In 2015, almost 1 million Colombians lived in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, although more recent events 
(discussed below in the key features and developments section) have seen migration patterns change in recent years.
Argentina was home to the largest foreign-born population in the region (with over 2 million migrants), mainly 
from neighbouring countries such as Paraguay and Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela had the next largest migrant population, followed by Mexico and Brazil. In Mexico, there were 880,000 
American-born migrants. As illustrated in figure 14, of the top 20 migration countries in the region, Costa Rica had 
the highest immigrant share of its total population (almost 9%), due to longstanding migration from neighbouring 
Nicaragua. Other countries in the region outside of the top 20 had higher migrant populations as a proportion of 
the total population, such as Belize at 15 per cent.
Figure	14.	Top	20	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	migrant	countries	in	2015
Colombia
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note 1:	 The	population	size	used	to	calculate	the	percentage	of	immigrants	and	emigrants	is	based	on	the	UN	DESA	total	
resident	population	of	the	country,	which	includes	foreign-born	populations.
Note 2:	 “Immigrant”	 refers	 to	 foreign-born	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 country.	 “Emigrant”	 refers	 to	people	born	 in	 the	
country	who	were	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth	in	2015.
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The most striking feature of the main migration corridors within and from the region (figure 15) is the dominance 
of the United States as the main country of destination. Most of the corridors are to the United States, with 
the remainder all occurring within the Latin American and Caribbean region (e.g. Colombia to the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela). These migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements involving 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over time, and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have 
evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.
Figure	15.	Top	20	migration	corridors	involving	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	countries
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 Corridors	represent	an	accumulation	of	migratory	movements	over	time	and	provide	a	snapshot	of	how	migration	
patterns	have	evolved	into	significant	foreign-born	populations	in	specific	destination	countries.
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In 2016, Colombia was the largest origin of refugees in the Latin America and Caribbean region, driven by 
long-standing internal conflict. Most of the refugees from Colombia were hosted in neighbouring Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador. Haiti is the second largest origin of refugees in the region; it was also the 
origin of more than 20,000 asylum seekers, while Mexico was the origin of 64,000, followed by El Salvador 
(62,000), Guatemala (46,000), Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (45,000) and Honduras (35,000). Many of 
these asylum seekers were in the United States.
Figure	16.	Top	10	Latin	America	and	Caribbean	countries	by	total	refugees	and	asylum	seekers,	2016
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
Note:	 “Hosted”	refers	 to	 those	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	 from	other	countries	who	are	residing	 in	 the	receiving	
country	 (right-hand	 side	of	 the	figure);	 “abroad”	 refers	 to	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	originating	 from	 that	
country	who	are	outside	of	their	origin	country.	Chapter	2	(appendix	A)	includes	definitions	of	key	terms	such	as	
“refugee”.	The	top	10	countries	are	based	on	2016	data	and	are	calculated	by	combining	refugees	and	asylum	
seekers	in	and	from	countries.	
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Key features and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean
Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean273
• Migration northward is the predominant trend in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean, 
although there are a number of intraregional trends worth noting. Mexico remains a prominent 
origin country, with thousands emigrating mainly to the United States each year. It is also a significant 
transit country for migrants travelling northward to the southern United States border. However, within 
a context of improving economic conditions and rising educational levels in the country, as well as 
stricter immigration enforcement in the United States, Mexico is an increasingly significant destination 
country for international migrants. The total number of foreign-born persons in Mexico increased from 
around 970,000 in 2010 to nearly 1.2 million in 2015 – a majority of whom were Americans, but also an 
increasingly larger portion of whom were migrants from other Latin American and Caribbean countries.274 
However, the United States is by far the most popular destination of Central American migrants – 78 per 
cent of Central American migrants lived in the United States in 2015, with 15 per cent residing in other 
countries in the region and in Mexico.275 The most prominent intraregional migrant corridors involve 
Nicaraguans, Panamanians and other Central Americans moving to Costa Rica for temporary or permanent 
labour, and Central Americans (primarily from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) migrating to Belize 
because of instability and a lack of employment opportunities.276 In the Caribbean, the most prominent 
intraregional migrant corridors include Haitians migrating to the Dominican Republic.277
• Irregular migrant flows in the region are shifting and becoming increasingly diversified. Mexicans 
represented the vast majority of irregular migrants apprehended while attempting to cross the United 
States–Mexico border for many years. However, in 2014, and again in 2016, apprehensions of Central 
Americans originating from the “Northern Triangle” region of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador exceeded 
that of Mexicans at the United States–Mexico border.278 Additionally, flows of irregular migrants through 
Central America and Mexico have diversified considerably to include large numbers of Caribbean migrants, 
as well as a growing number of Asians and Africans. Overall, there were over 55,000 apprehensions of 
non-Latin Americans at the United States–Mexico border in fiscal year 2015.279 Over 6,000 “inadmissible” 
Haitian migrants reached south-western United States border ports of entry in fiscal year 2015, while 
nearly 8,000 African and Asian migrants arrived at Mexican immigration checkpoints in the first half of 
2016, representing a substantial increase over previous years.280 
• New and diversified flows throughout the region have prompted a response by transit and 
destination countries to increase border enforcement and protection. In response to increasing 
irregular migrant flows, particularly of Cubans and Haitians, Nicaragua closed its southern border in 
November 2015, while Costa Rica closed its border to Cubans in December 2015 and later to all irregular 
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migrants in August 2016.281 Further, Mexico implemented its “Southern Border Plan” in 2014 to reduce 
irregular migrant flows from Central America. Between 2013 and 2015, the number of apprehensions by 
Mexican authorities increased from over 86,000 to over 198,000.282 Migrant smuggling is also a major 
feature of the region, as people attempt to bypass border controls in Central America and Mexico. Along 
the United States–Mexico border, smuggling networks are a profitable industry overseen by international 
crime groups.283 Smuggled migrants are known frequently to fall victim to predatory practices ranging 
from demands for bribes to mass kidnapping and extortion.284 There appears to be low risk of arrest for 
the smugglers, many of whom pretend to be irregular migrants themselves and are often repatriated as 
opposed to apprehended.285 
• Socioeconomic conditions and generalized community-level violence in a number of Central 
American countries contribute to migration, notably of high numbers of women and children. 
The United States received over 250 per cent more asylum claims from the “Northern Triangle” countries 
(El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala) in 2015 compared with 2013, and twice the number of 2014.286 The 
number of unaccompanied children migrating from Central America has also risen substantially, with 
a 1,200 per cent increase in unaccompanied minor children apprehended at the United States–Mexico 
border between fiscal years 2011 and 2014.287 Additionally, the number of asylum applications lodged 
in Mexico has risen substantially in recent years, increasing by 155 per cent from over 3,400 in 2015 to 
nearly 8,800 in 2016.288
South America289
• Intraregional migration within South America has intensified. Overall, the number of intraregional 
migrants in South America increased by 11 per cent between 2010 and 2015, and approximately 70 per cent 
of all immigration in the region is intraregional.290 Fueled by economic and labour market disparities 
between countries, a majority of the region’s migrants move for work.291 Notably, South American economic 
restructuring, as well as increased demand for female migrants by service and care sectors, have also led 
to the feminization of intraregional movement.292 Southern Cone countries of Chile, Argentina and Brazil 
– which all witnessed increases of between 16 and 20 per cent in migrant populations between 2010 and 
2015  – have some of the largest migrant populations in South America, attracting labour migrants from the 
Andean countries, as well as Paraguay.293 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is home to a large number of 
intraregional migrants from Colombia and Ecuador.294 In the context of increased intraregional migration, 
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subregional blocs such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), as well as the Andean Community 
of Nations (CAN), have made notable efforts to liberalize intraregional migration. For example, MERCOSUR 
Residence Agreements have led to enhanced labour migration and a decrease in irregular migration within 
the region.295
• Millions of South Americans continue to reside outside of the region, while at the same time the 
number of migrants from outside the region is slowly growing. Emigration from South America is mostly 
related to work, fuelled by economic crises and political instability in origin countries.296 The United States and 
Spain are the two largest destination countries of South American migrants, with 2.8 million and 1.8 million 
migrants residing in these two countries respectively.297 The countries with the highest numbers of emigrants 
residing outside of South America in 2015 were Colombia (around 1.4 million emigrants), followed by Brazil 
(1.3 million extraregional emigrants) and Ecuador (over 1 million extraregional emigrants).298 At the same 
time, reduced opportunities in labour markets abroad, as well as improved economic conditions in the region, 
are contributing to the return of many South American migrants and a decrease in the rate of extraregional 
migration.299 The number of migrants in South America from outside the region is also growing. For example, 
since 2010, more people have emigrated from the European Union to Latin America and the Caribbean overall, 
than from Latin America and the Caribbean to the European Union.300 Many of these people are not return 
migrants, but rather European Union nationals primarily from Spain, Italy and Portugal.301 Migrants from these 
three origin countries collectively represented a population of over 700,000 people in South America in 2015.302 
Increased numbers of Haitians, Cubans and Dominicans have also migrated to South America.303 
• Though localized to particular countries, conflict and violence contribute to human displacement 
and migration in the region. In Colombia, over 7.2 million people remained internally displaced as of the 
end of 2016 – higher than any other country in the world.304 By the end of 2016, over 300,000 Colombians 
were living as refugees or in refugee-like situations abroad.305 There were also nearly 1.2 million Colombians 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador in 2015. However, as Colombia begins to transition 
out of five decades of violence with peace talks in late 2016 and 2017, deteriorating economic and social 
conditions in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are leading many Colombians to return home, while 
many Venezuelans continue to leave their country, both across the border to Colombia and elsewhere.306 
Asylum applications lodged by Venezuelans in the United States, for example, increased by 168 per cent 
between fiscal 2015 and 2016,307 and from a total of 27,000 worldwide in 2016 to nearly 50,000 in the first 
half of 2017 alone.308
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Northern America309
Migration in Northern America is dominated by migration into the region. As shown in figure 17, over 51 million 
migrants were residing in Northern America from a variety of regions in 2015. The largest group was from Latin 
America and the Caribbean (25 million), followed by Asia (15.5 million) and Europe (7.5 million). During the 
last 25 years, the number of migrants in Northern America has almost doubled in size, driven by population 
growth in Latin American and the Caribbean, and Asia, as well as by economic growth and political stability in 
Northern America.
Figure	17.	Migrants	to,	within	and	from	Northern	America	between	1990	and	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 “Migrants	to	Northern	America”	refers	to	migrants	residing	in	the	region	(i.e.	Northern	America)	who	were	born	
in	one	of	the	other	regions	(e.g.	Europe	or	Asia).	“Migrants	within	Northern	America”	refers	to	migrants	born	
in	the	region	(i.e.	Northern	America)	and	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth,	but	still	within	the	Northern	
American	 region.	 “Migrants	 from	 Northern	 America”	 refers	 to	 people	 born	 in	 Northern	 America	 who	 were	
residing	outside	the	region	(e.g.	in	Europe	or	Africa).
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The number of Northern American migrants living within the region or elsewhere was relatively small compared 
with the foreign-born population in the region. In 2015, more Northern American-born migrants lived outside 
the region – principally in Latin America and the Caribbean (1.3 million) – than had moved elsewhere within 
the region (1.2 million). 
In 2015, the United States had the largest foreign-born population in the world, while Canada had the seventh 
largest. Over 85 per cent of the foreign-born populations in the region lived in the United States, where they 
comprise over 14 per cent of the total population. As shown in figure 18, the share of Canada’s total population 
that was foreign-born (at over 20%) was considerably higher than in the United States in 2015. Canada also 
had a larger share of its citizens who had emigrated (as a per cent of its total home population) compared with 
the United States. 
Figure	18.	Main	migration	countries	in	Northern	America	in	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note 1:	 The	population	size	used	to	calculate	the	percentage	of	immigrants	and	emigrants	is	based	on	the	UN	DESA	total	
resident	population	of	the	country,	which	includes	foreign-born	populations.
Note 2:	 “Immigrant”	 refers	 to	 foreign-born	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 country.	 “Emigrant”	 refers	 to	people	born	 in	 the	
country	who	were	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth	in	2015.
Figure 19 shows the top 10 migration corridors involving Northern American countries, representing an 
accumulation of migratory movements over time and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have 
evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest migrant 
corridors in Northern America all involve migrants either from Asia, or Latin America and the Caribbean, 
to the United States of America. Mexican-born migrants form the biggest migrant group, with over 12 
million living in the United States in 2015. The next largest migrant groups come from populous Asian 
countries, including China, India and the Philippines. Some of the other large migrant groups from 
Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea and Cuba in the United States grew rapidly after conflicts or political changes 
in their countries many years ago.
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Figure	19.	Top	10	migration	corridors	involving	Northern	America	countries
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 Corridors	represent	an	accumulation	of	migratory	movements	over	time	and	provide	a	snapshot	of	how	migration	
patterns	have	evolved	into	significant	foreign-born	populations	in	specific	destination	countries.
The United States hosted over 700,000 refugees and asylum seekers in 2016. As apparent from figure 20, the 
majority were asylum seekers. Refugees in the United States came from a vast range of countries; however, the 
largest refugee populations were from China, Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Egypt and Ethiopia. Canada is also 
host to a large refugee population. The largest origin countries are Colombia and China. Recent changes in refugee 
resettlement to the United States and Canada are discussed in the following key features and developments section.
Figure	20.	Numbers	of	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	in	and	from	Northern	American	countries,	2016
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
Note:	 “Hosted”	refers	to	those	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	from	other	countries	who	are	residing	in	the	receiving	country	
(right-hand	side	of	the	figure);	“abroad”	refers	to	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	originating	from	that	country	who	are	
outside	of	their	origin	country.	Chapter	2	(appendix	A)	includes	definitions	of	key	terms	such	as	“refugee”.
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Key features and developments in Northern America310
• Migration trends in the United States are characterized by high levels of immigration, primarily 
from Latin America and Asia, although the demography of international migrants is changing. 
As of 2015, Mexican-born migrants were still by far the largest foreign-born population living in 
the United States, at just over 12 million.311 However, fewer Mexicans were migrating to the United 
States compared with the past. In addition to economic barriers caused by the slow recovery of the 
United States economy following the 2008 global financial crisis,312 and immigration enforcement 
barriers in the United States, many Mexicans and their children are voluntarily choosing to return 
to Mexico.313 For example, between 2009 and 2014, 870,000 Mexicans migrated to the United States, 
while around one million Mexican immigrants and their children born in the United States moved from 
the United States to Mexico.314 Those Mexicans who returned to Mexico cited family reunification as 
the primary motive for return.315 In contrast, the number of Central Americans living in the United 
States increased tenfold between 1980 and 2015.316 After Mexico, migrants from Asian countries – 
particularly from China, India and the Philippines – comprised the largest foreign-born populations 
in the United States in 2015.317 China and India have now overtaken Mexico in terms of recent 
immigrant arrivals to the United States.318 This trend is expected to continue, and current estimates 
suggest that Asian immigrants will comprise the largest foreign-born group in the United States by 
2055.319 The largest immigration pathway for Asians migrating to the United States is through family-
sponsored visas,320 although many are also students; in 2014–2015, Asian students accounted for 
76 per cent of international students enrolled in United States higher education institutions.321
• Migrant populations in Canada continue to increase, representing a growing percentage of 
the country’s total population. In 2000, foreign-born persons represented about 18 per cent 
of Canada’s total population, increasing to 18.8 per cent in 2005, 20.5 per cent in 2010 and nearly 
22 per cent in 2015.322 However, while migrant populations in Canada have originated primarily from 
European countries in the past, the composition of the country’s foreign-born population has shifted 
to include large populations of migrants from Asian countries. For example, in 2000, the largest origin 
country of international migrants in Canada was the United Kingdom (610,000), followed by China 
(410,000), India and Italy. By 2015, both China and India had surpassed the United Kingdom as the 
largest origin country, with the Philippines newly featuring in the top five and Italy no longer featuring 
among the top five.323 Other Asian countries including Viet Nam and Pakistan also featured in the top 10 
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largest populations within Canada’s total 7.84 million total foreign-born population in 2015.324 In 2015, 
Canada admitted over 270,000 new permanent residents, representing the highest number since 2010.325 
• The estimated number of irregular migrants in the United States has remained relatively stable in 
recent years and is much larger when compared with Canada. Overall, irregular migrants were estimated 
to comprise 3.4 per cent of the total United States population in 2015.326 Taking into account caveats and 
data limitations for measuring irregular migrant populations, as of 2016, the total preliminary estimated 
population of irregular migrants was 11.3 million, of whom half (around 5.6 million) were Mexicans.327 
However, the number of undocumented Mexicans has been decreasing since 2009, while the number of 
Asian irregular migrants in the United States has increased over time, reaching an estimated 1.5 million 
in 2015.328 Overall, while undocumented migrants may enter the country unauthorized, a large number are 
visa overstayers who entered regularly. In fiscal year 2015, there were over 527,000 estimated instances of 
people who overstayed their visas in the United States.329 In Canada, a number of estimates have indicated 
that there are between 200,000 and 400,000 irregular migrants in the country.330 An unspecified number 
of irregular migrants are rejected asylum seekers who have not departed.331 
• The United States and Canada have resettled record numbers of refugees, representing the two 
largest resettlement countries in the world. In 2016, the United States resettled more refugees than any 
previous year since 2010 (nearly 85,000), the majority of whom originated from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (at over 16,000), followed by the Syrian Arab Republic, Myanmar, Iraq and Somalia.332 However, 
the number of refugees resettled to the United States is likely to decline from an expected 110,000 to 
50,000 in 2017.333 Overall, Canada resettled nearly 47,000 refugees in 2016 – the largest number of refugees 
resettled in the country since 1980.334 Refugees resettled in Canada in 2015 and 2016 primarily originated 
from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea and Myanmar.
Oceania335
In 2015, Oceania was the destination for nearly seven million migrants from outside the region. As shown in 
figure 21, the foreign-born migrant population was primarily composed of two large groups from Asia (38%) and 
Europe (37%). Throughout the last 25 years, the Asian migrant group has grown, while the number from Europe 
has remained steady. Migrants from Oceania were more likely to end up within the region than outside. Out of all 
of the six regions, Oceania had the lowest number of migrants outside its region in 2015, partly a reflection of the 
low total population size of the region, although there was a steady increase in their number during the previous 
25-year period. Most of those born in Oceania living outside the region resided in Europe and Northern America.
324	UN	DESA,	2015a.	
325	Immigration,	Refugees,	and	Citizenship	Canada,	2016.	
326	Krogstad,	Passel	and	Cohn,	2017.	
327	Ibid.	
328	Passel	and	Cohn,	2017.	
329	United	States	Department	of	Homeland	Security,	2016.	
330	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	and	Migration	Policy	Institute,	2012.
331	Smick,	2006.
332	United	States	Department	of	State,	2016;	Igielnik	and	Krogstad,	2017.
333	Krogstad	and	Radford,	2017.	
334	UNHCR,	2017c.	
335	See	appendix	A	for	details	on	the	composition	of	Oceania.	
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Figure	21.	Migrants	to,	within	and	from	Oceania	in	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 “Migrants	to	Oceania”	refers	to	migrants	residing	in	the	region	(i.e.	Oceania)	who	were	born	in	one	of	the	other	
regions	(e.g.	Europe	or	Asia).	“Migrants	within	Oceania”	refers	to	migrants	born	in	the	region	(i.e.	Oceania)	and	
residing	outside	 their	country	of	birth,	but	 still	within	 the	Oceania	 region.	“Migrants	 from	Oceania”	 refers	 to	
people	born	in	Oceania	who	were	residing	outside	the	region	(e.g.	in	Europe	or	Asia).	
The vast majority of migrants in Oceania were living in either Australia or New Zealand (figure 22). Most 
countries in the region have skewed migration profiles, being either large net senders or net receivers. For 
example, Tonga, Samoa and Fiji all have high counts of emigrants in comparison with their native population 
and very low shares of foreign-born populations. Their emigrants were located primarily in New Zealand and to a 
lesser extent in Australia. Australia and New Zealand have high shares of foreign-born populations as a portion 
of total population, comprising over 28 per cent and 23 per cent respectively.
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Figure	22.	Oceania	migrant	countries	in	2015
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note 1:	 The	population	size	used	to	calculate	the	percentage	of	immigrants	and	emigrants	is	based	on	the	UN	DESA	total	
resident	population	of	the	country,	which	includes	foreign-born	populations.
Note 2:	 “Immigrant”	 refers	 to	 foreign-born	migrants	 residing	 in	 the	 country.	 “Emigrant”	 refers	 to	people	born	 in	 the	
country	who	were	residing	outside	their	country	of	birth	in	2015.
Figure 23 shows the top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries, showing an accumulation of migratory 
movements over time, and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-
born populations in specific destination countries. The top 10 migration corridors in the region were all to 
Australia, with the largest being of migrants born in the United Kingdom. All the largest migrant corridors in 
the region were based on populations moving to Australia. These include a variety of countries from outside 
Oceania, including China, India, Viet Nam and the Philippines, many of which have experienced rapid growth 
over recent decades. New Zealand had high shares of migrants abroad, predominantly in Australia, and many 
international migrants residing within the country.
89WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018
Figure	23.	Top	10	migration	corridors	involving	Oceania	countries
Source:	 UN	DESA,	2015a.	
Note:	 Corridors	represent	an	accumulation	of	migratory	movements	over	time	and	provide	a	snapshot	of	how	migration	
patterns	have	evolved	into	significant	foreign-born	populations	in	specific	destination	countries.
In 2016 Oceania hosted under 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Australia was the largest host country in 
this region, followed by Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. Most of the refugees in these countries originated 
from Asia, such as Indonesians in Papua New Guinea or Afghans and Iranians in Australia. Globally, there were 
just over 2,000 refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the Oceania region in 2016.
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Figure	24.	Numbers	of	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	in	and	from	Oceania	countries,	2016
Source:	 UNHCR,	n.d.a.	
Note:	 “Hosted”	refers	 to	 those	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	 from	other	countries	who	are	residing	 in	 the	receiving	
country	 (right-hand	 side	of	 the	figure);	 “abroad”	 refers	 to	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	originating	 from	 that	
country	who	are	outside	of	their	origin	country.	Chapter	2	(appendix	A)	includes	definitions	of	key	terms	such	as	
“refugee”.	The	top	10	countries	are	based	on	2016	data	and	are	calculated	by	combining	refugees	and	asylum												
seekers	in	and	from	countries.	
Key features and developments in Oceania
• Migrant populations in both New Zealand and Australia have continued to increase. In 2015–2016, 
New Zealand experienced a net migration increase of 19 per cent over the previous year,336 while Australia, 
experienced a 3 per cent increase in 2015–2016 over the previous year.337 Between 2000 and 2015, the 
United Kingdom continued to be the largest origin country of international migrants living in Australia at 
nearly 1.3 million in 2015, followed by migrants from New Zealand (around 640,000 in 2015).338 A majority 
of the other top origin countries of migrants in Australia in 2015 were Asian, including China, India, 
Viet Nam and the Philippines.339 By the end of June 2016, over 28 per cent of Australia’s total population 
was foreign born.340 The United Kingdom has consistently been the main origin country of migrants in New 
Zealand for decades, with a notable increase in the number of Asian migrants, particularly from China and 
India, as well as a considerable population of people from the Pacific Islands, including Fiji, Samoa and 
Tonga.341 In 2015, New Zealand’s foreign-born population constituted nearly 23 per cent of the country’s 
total population.342 In both Australia and New Zealand, there are a significant number of temporary workers, 
with almost 200,000 people granted a work visa in New Zealand in 2015–2016.343 The largest origin country 
336	New	Zealand	Ministry	of	Business,	Innovation	and	Employment,	2016.
337	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2017a;	UN	DESA,	2015a.
338	UN	DESA,	2015a.
339	Ibid.	
340	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2017b.	
341	UN	DESA,	2015a.	
342	Ibid.	
343	New	Zealand	Ministry	of	Business,	Innovation	and	Employment,	2016.
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of temporary migrant workers in New Zealand was India in 2015–2016, followed by the United Kingdom.344 
In Australia, there were under 100,000 primary holders of temporary work visas as of 31 March 2017.345 Both 
countries also attract a large number of international students. The number of international students has 
increased since 2012 in Australia, reaching a record high of over 700,000 in 2016,346 while there were over 
100,000 international students in New Zealand in 2015, primarily from China, India and Japan.347
• Intraregional migration in Oceania is a prominent and continuing trend. Historically, large numbers of 
people have migrated between New Zealand and Australia (mostly from New Zealand to Australia), assisted 
by movement agreements between the two countries. However, the number of New Zealanders returning to 
New Zealand from Australia increased substantially between 2014 and 2016, with a net gain in the number 
of Australians in New Zealand as well.348 Intraregional migration of Pacific Islanders to both Australia and 
New Zealand is also prominent, as discussed in further detail below. 
• Both Australia and New Zealand participate in refugee resettlement. Australia’s refugee resettlement 
programme is the third largest in the world.349 The country offered a minimum of almost 14,000 places for 
refugees in 2015–2016.350 An additional 12,000 humanitarian places have been made available in Australia 
for people displaced by conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.351 In addition, Australia resettles 
refugees who have been living in neighbouring countries (e.g. Malaysia and Indonesia) who originate 
from other countries, such as Myanmar and Afghanistan. Australia’s policy is to transfer those who arrive 
irregularly as asylum seekers to offshore processing centres on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and in 
Nauru. In July 2013, Australia also announced that all persons arriving by boat would not be resettled to 
Australia.352 New Zealand is also a refugee resettlement country, announcing the resettlement of 750 Syrian 
refugees in 2015–2016. International/Humanitarian Stream approvals in New Zealand also come from the 
Pacific, constituting 1,600 people approved for residence in 2015–2016.353 
• Economic and environmental challenges influence emigration from Pacific Island countries. The 
total number of Pacific-born migrants living in OECD countries is now 420,000, most of whom come from 
Fiji, Samoa and Tonga.354 Development challenges and a so-called “youth bulge” throughout the Pacific 
Islands have introduced significant employment shortages, leading to high degrees of labour emigration, 
particularly to New Zealand, as well as to Australia and other countries.355 Almost 12,000 people from the 
Pacific arrive in Australia and New Zealand each year through seasonal work programmes.356 Environmental 
change and degradation are also among the array of factors influencing many Pacific Islanders to migrate, 
with half of the population in Kiribati and Tuvalu in particular living in overcrowded urban areas on atolls 
344	New	Zealand	Ministry	of	Business,	Innovation	and	Employment,	2016.
345	Australian	DIBP,	2017.
346	Australian	Department	of	Education	and	Training,	2016.
347	Infometrics	and	National	Research	Bureau,	2016.		
348	Stats	New	Zealand,	2016.	
349	UNHCR,	2016a.	
350	Australian	DIBP,	2016.	
351	Ibid.	
352	Refugee	Council	of	Australia,	2017.	
353	New	Zealand	Ministry	of	Business,	Innovation	and	Employment,	2016.	
354	Curtain	et	al.,	2016.	
355	Ibid.
356	Ibid.
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of narrow strips of coral with limited access to water and land.357 Incremental sea level rise, saltwater 
intrusion and drought are important factors among others impacting people’s decision to migrate in the 
region, both internally and internationally.358 In this context, there is also growing discussion around the 
need for planned relocation of groups and communities.359 
Conclusion
There is a tendency in public policy debates to generalize about the characteristics of global migration, its 
impacts on national economies and societies, and the ensuing policy challenges across different countries 
and regions of the world. Indeed, as chapter 2 of this report shows, there are important global trends and 
patterns in migration. There are also clearly some similarities across countries in terms of the economic, social 
and cultural effects of migrants on the domestic population, as well as the fundamental challenges migration 
raises for public policymakers. Considering these similarities and commonalities in the characteristics and 
impacts of international migration is of fundamental importance to global and national policy debates and 
policymaking. A key message of this chapter is that it is equally important, however, to pay attention 
to regional dimensions and variations in international migration and displacement that can have critical 
implications for debates and regulation, especially (but not only) at global and supranational levels. 
This chapter has drawn on a wide range of data and information to provide regional overviews of international 
migration and mobility around the world. The chapter focused on six broad world regions (Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania) and provided discussion of key 
issues and developments in multiple subregions within each of the broader regions. The discussion was 
necessarily limited and selective in its approach, aiming to highlight key features rather than to provide a 
comprehensive overview of international migration and mobility in each subregion. As chapter 2 on “global 
trends and patterns” shows, there are important gaps in data and information about global migrant stocks 
and migration flows. As this chapter has shown, the same caveat applies to the analysis of regional migration 
trends and patterns. In addition, there are large variations in the quantity and quality of data and research on 
migrants across different regions of the world. These geographic asymmetries in the availability and quality of 
data and research on migrants should be a key issue of concern for global and national policymakers.
Overall, the chapter points to important differences across regions and subregions, as well as growing 
complexities in migration dynamics around the world. To give a basic example of regional differences, 
migration in Asia has been predominantly intraregional (i.e. from one Asian country to another) which 
far exceeds migration to other regions of the world (i.e. from Asian to non-Asian countries). In Africa, 
intraregional migration has always been and remains important, but the number of African migrants who 
have moved to other parts of the world (especially Europe, North America and the Middle East) is now roughly 
the same as the number of African migrants who have moved within the region. In contrast, in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, migration is dominated by emigration to other world regions, especially North America, 
with intraregional migration playing a relatively limited role.
357	Curtain	et	al.,	2016.
358	UNESCAP,	2015.	
359	See,	for	example,	Georgetown	University,	n.d.,	for	a	range	of	resources	on	planned	relocation.	
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A key aspect and illustration of the important, but often underappreciated complexity of migration dynamics 
in different regions of the world, is that a number of countries are simultaneously “producing” large numbers 
of refugees who flee to other countries as well as “hosting” sizable refugee populations from other countries. 
It is well known that many countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, experience large immigration 
and emigration flows, often driven by two-way flows of labour migrants, family migrants and students. It is 
perhaps less well known that, as shown in this chapter, this also applies to some countries in the specific case 
of refugees. Examples include Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq.
These differences and complexities (some of which are specific to place and time, while others are 
relatively common across regions) raise important questions and challenges for policymaking. For example, 
fundamental differences in migration experiences and dynamics across regions clearly need to be considered 
when discussing desirable regimes for the global governance of international migration. Differences can also 
have implications for applying good practices and in ensuring that governance approaches are tailored to 
meet regional dimensions. Similarly, growing complexities in migration dynamics create direct challenges 
for national regulators and have important consequences for the most desirable forms of governance and 
cooperation across countries. Greater recognition of regional and subregional migration patterns, variations 
and complexities, would assist in formulating strategic and sustainable policy responses.
94 Migration research and analysis: Growth, reach and recent contributions
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4 MIGRATION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS:  GROWTH, REACH AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS 
Introduction
As the interest in migration has risen over time, so too has the amount of information published on this 
increasingly complex and most pressing global issue. Ideally, the knowledge originating from rigorous analysis and 
research on migration should be the prime source and starting point for informing policymakers, practitioners, 
students, scholars and the public about migration and how it is changing. However, the growth in publically 
available material on migration makes this increasingly hard. In an era of “information overload”, it can be 
challenging to identify, collect and digest relevant and robust material on migration.
This chapter provides an overview of research and analysis on migration being undertaken and published 
by a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. 
Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics of the different types of research and analysis being 
produced on migration is important for anybody working on migration policies, studying migration, or wanting 
to develop an informed opinion on migration.  
The chapter shows that there has been a dramatic increase in the research and analysis of migration. While it 
is impossible to retrieve, count and classify every single piece of research on migration, we provide an account 
of basic quantitative aspects, such as estimates of the volume of articles/books published in recent years. Our 
qualitative analysis summarizes topics from a sample of academic articles, as well as key content from a set of 
intergovernmental organizations’ flagship publications. We also provide basic measures of “reach” and “impact” 
of published material.  
It is important to highlight at the outset that there are fundamental differences in the publishing processes 
for academic and non-academic material, and each has its strengths and weaknesses. The academic publishing 
system is largely focused on producing journal articles and books. This process typically involves multi-stage 
reviews and editorial comments involving authors, editors and reviewers. Most published academic research 
(“white” literature) are behind paywalls (that is, not freely accessible), and often managed by commercial 
publishers. In contrast, the production of research and analysis publications outside of academic publishing 
(“grey” literature) generally involves faster and simpler processes that are typically, although not always, 
characterized by more limited peer review. Contributions to the grey literature (such as research reports, 
working papers and government/official documents) are usually freely available. A report such as this, designed 
to contribute to our collective understanding of migration in an increasingly interconnected world, would 
clearly be incomplete without describing the role of grey literature, which has been “recognized as a key source 
of evidence, argument, innovation, and understanding”.360
The volume, diversity and growth of both white and grey literature preclude a systematic review of all the 
material produced and published on migration in 2015 and 2016. Instead, this chapter highlights examples 
360	GreyNet	International,	2014.
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of key contributions made during this period, published in English by a selection of academic journals and 
intergovernmental organizations. The next section describes the different actors involved in migration research 
and analysis. The third section features recent, selected contributions from academia and intergovernmental 
organizations. The fourth section outlines the reach and impact of some of the migration research materials 
published. 
Main producers of migration research and analysis
Academia
Ideally, researchers create new knowledge that is supported by strong evidence and is useful for others. Research 
findings are produced for, and disseminated to, different target audiences. Traditional academic work can be 
highly technical and narrowly focused, although academic researchers are increasingly encouraged to disseminate 
their work beyond academic spheres.361  Some communication of research findings, for example, involves the 
spreading of knowledge to non-experts, including members of the general public, through means such as media 
(traditional and newer forms) and events such as public lectures/seminars, science festivals and so forth. 
Researchers analysing policy-relevant issues are often keen to engage with policymakers to impart knowledge 
that can inform policy deliberations and help shape policymaking. Effective research contributions for policy 
audiences tend to take the form of short papers and blog articles, as well as policy workshops, interactive expert 
meetings, high-level consultations and conferences. The turbidity of the policymaking environment and the 
high turnover rate of ministers, senior officials and others can make communication challenging, partly because 
shifts towards managerialism in public administration have seen expertise and content knowledge diminish over 
recent decades.362 At the same time, information overload is challenging knowledge-building and policymaking 
processes, while policy complexity and interlinkages continue to grow.363
In academia, the dissemination system rotates around publication, with some forms of publication (such as 
academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others. A key strength of academic publications 
is that they have usually been peer-reviewed by experts in the field, which typically enhances the robustness and 
credibility of the research. The growing number of outlets for academic publications is, however, characterized 
by a wide range of quality standards applied in peer-review processes. Arguably, one of the weaknesses of 
academic research is that the pressure to publish has contributed to a large quantitative – although not always 
a corresponding qualitative – increase in academic output in recent years. Appendix A provides a summary of 
academic publishing, including details of peer-review processes, citations and impact assessment.  
Within the many thousands of peer-reviewed journals currently being produced covering all disciplines, 
topics and research fields,364 we identified over 130 migration-related journals publishing in English, French 
or Spanish.365 Mainstream academic publishers tend to publish in English, which has both the advantage of 
standardizing outputs and the downside of excluding those who are not able to submit manuscripts with an 
acceptable level of English.
361	McAuliffe,	2016.
362	Box,	1999;	Kirkpatrick,	Ackroyd	and	Walker,	2005. 
363	Nutley	and	Webb,	2000;	Weinberger,	2011.
364	Ware	and	Mabe,	2015.
365	A	list	of	the	journals	can	be	found	on	the	IOM	website	on	the	research	page	(www.iom.int/migration-research).
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Number of academic publications on “immigration” or “emigration”
The	figure	below	shows	the	search	results	of	the	query	“immigration”	or	“emigration”	in	Scopus	–	the	
largest	database	of	academic	peer-reviewed	 literature.	 Journal	articles	 constitute	 the	 largest	 share	of	
publications,	with	a	clear	and	constantly	increasing	trend	peaking	in	2015.	The	long-term	trend	suggests	
an	increasing	scholarly	production	on	migration	matters:	is	this	just	a	reflection	of	the	general	expansion	
of	academic	literature	production,	or	is	migration	research	developing	for	specific	reasons?
Source:  www.scopus.com.
Note:  Querying	the	term	“migration”	alone	returns	figures	that	are	more	than	10	times	higher.	However,	these	include	usage	of	
the	term	“migration”	in	disciplines	that	are	irrelevant	to	the	current	research,	such	as	computer	science	(data	migration),	
biology	(cell	migration),	zoology	(bird	or	fish	migration)	and	many	others.	Using	the	Scopus	advanced	search,	we	excluded	
subject	areas	such	as	chemistry,	physics,	astronomy,	neuroscience	and	so	forth.
Governments
Historically, government administrative data on persons entering and/or leaving a country’s territory constitute 
the earliest sources of information on international migration.366 The earliest scholarly work on migration in the 
modern era, however, was on internal migration dynamics based on national census data collected by authorities in 
the United Kingdom.367 To this day, data enumerated by population censuses, population registers, representative 
surveys and other official statistical sources often constitute the basis for migration-related databases. The centrality 
of migration-related data within a government context is recognized, for example, by the IOM Development Fund, 
which supports (among other things) capacity-building of Member States on migration-related statistics. 
Beyond statistical data collection, administration and reporting, some governments are also significant contributors 
of information on migration, particularly in the form of policy-related materials, such as evaluations, studies 
and discussion papers. They may also commission research with partners in academia, applied researchers, 
intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. The increasing relevance of migration has led to governments 
366	Poulain,	Perrin	and	Singleton,	2006.
367	Ravenstein,	1885.
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providing funding for empirical work, thereby opening up new research areas and broadening the scope of migration 
studies.368 This has led to some criticism of government-commissioned research being overly focused on policy issues 
and for, at times, suggesting “simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues”,369 or of researchers 
being used to legitimize immigration policy.370 There has also been some evidence of researchers being pressured into 
“produc[ing] politically useful results” in policy-related research more generally.371 Understandably, issues addressed 
in government-commissioned dedicated migration research vary widely, and can depend on the countries’ role in 
the migration process.372 Equally, there is recognition that policy-irrelevant research is also crucial – particularly 
migration research that looks beyond the policy frames of reference to explore less visible aspects of migration.373 It 
is also important to note that research commissioned by governments can provide useful and rigorous examinations 
of migration – particularly in partnership with academic and other researchers, who can bring different perspectives, 
knowledge and analytical approaches to the examination of complex, multifaceted migration issues, including by 
drawing upon administrative data that might not otherwise be accessible. As Khalid Koser has noted:
…genuine collaboration and partnerships have the ability to recognize the different but 
complementary expertise that resides inside and outside of government. In the right 
circumstances, powerful and productive partnerships can be formed that are able to draw 
on critical thinking to address complex migration issues in a policy relevant and strategic 
manner.374
Indeed, some have argued that there should be much greater efforts to collaborate, and that “researchers 
need a better understanding of the policy process [...] and policy makers should become more involved in the 
conceptualisation and conduct of research”.375
In addition to funding discrete research projects, such as through calls for proposals or direct commissioning, 
some governments have also implemented formal migration research programmes. While multifaceted, 
multi-year research programmes are much less common than the funding of research on a project-by-project basis, 
they have been implemented in a range of countries. Some of the benefits include the ability to better link aspects 
of migration research and analysis, as well as the ability to examine issues from a longer-term perspective and from 
a range of angles and disciplines. Broader research programmes (rather than specific research projects) also offer 
governments the ability to support comparative research spanning multiple geographic locations. For example, 
the Migrating out of Poverty research programme is a seven-year research programme consortium funded by the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and coordinated by the University of Sussex. 
It focuses on the relationship between internal and regional migration and poverty and is located in five regions 
across Asia, Africa and Europe. In contrast, the Australian Irregular Migration and Border Research Programme is 
focused on a narrow thematic topic (irregular migration and border management) but with an emphasis on placing 
Australia’s experience in broader global and migration contexts.376 One innovative, large-scale government-funded 
368	Castles,	2010.
369	Ibid.
370	Boswell,	2008.
371	The	LSE	GV314	Group,	2014.
372	Iredale,	Asia-Pacific	Migration	Research	Network	and	UNESCO,	2001.
373	Bakewell,	2008.
374	Koser,	2014.
375	Black,	2001.
376	McAuliffe	and	Parrinder,	2015.
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research mechanism is the New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-operation in Europe (NORFACE) – 
a collaborative partnership of national research funding agencies from 19 European countries in the area of social 
and behavioural sciences. In 2007, NORFACE established a research programme on migration, focusing on three 
main themes: Migration, Integration, and Cohesion and Conflict. The programme ran for five years (2009 to 2014) 
and involved 12 transnational research projects on aspects of migration, including mapping European migration 
flows, migrant integration, labour market outcomes and transnational families.377 
Intergovernmental organizations 
As publishers and institutional authors, intergovernmental organizations make specific contributions to our 
collective understanding of migration and mobility. In some circumstances, such organizations may be the 
only source of information, and multiple references to publications by intergovernmental organizations are 
therefore often found in academic literature. A commercially published edited volume or article on an aspect of 
international migration or displacement, for example, can typically refer to material from the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and/or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), among others. Some university guides 
on conducting migration research refer to materials produced by a range of intergovernmental organizations 
(such as the Georgetown University Research Guide on International Migration and Refugees and the Berkeley 
Law Library Global Migration Issues Research Guide). Scholarly publications also note that intergovernmental 
organizations are now among the main producers of information on migration, which reflects a broader growing 
interest in the issue of migration.378 
Although definitions of intergovernmental organizations may vary, Davies and Woodward define the term 
as “formal, continuous structures founded by an authoritative instrument of agreement between members 
(including two or more sovereign States) or an existing international organization through which members 
pursue their common interest”.379  Since the first half of the last century, the number, diversity and influence 
of intergovernmental organizations have grown,380 so much so that a systematic review of contributions on 
migration by such organizations is well beyond the scope of this chapter. The focus of this chapter is on global 
contributors within the UN system, specifically UN DESA, UNHCR, ILO, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNODC and IOM, which in 
no way diminishes the work of other organizations, including those operating at a regional or national level.381 
As programmes or units within the principal organs of the UN or semi-autonomous, specialized or related 
agencies, the intergovernmental organizations discussed in this chapter all have global reach, access to the 
inputs and expertise of diverse stakeholders and, in some cases, global operations that enable them to shape 
discourse and practice on migration and mobility. 
377	Caarls,	2016.
378	See,	for	example,	Mason,	1999;	Pécoud,	2015.
379	Davies	and	Woodward,	2014.
380	Ibid.
381	Many	other	intergovernmental	organizations	(both	UN	and	non-UN)	also	produce	material	on	aspects	of	migration,	including	the	
World	Bank,	 the	Organisation	 for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	 (OECD),	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund	 (IMF)	and	
the	International	Centre	for	Migration	Policy	Development	(ICMPD).	Future	editions	of	the	World Migration Report	are	expected	to	
highlight	the	work	of	additional	intergovernmental	organizations.	Future	reports	will	also	highlight	some	of	the	growing	body	of	work	
by	not-for-profit	and	for-profit	international	non-governmental	organizations	(INGOs),	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	
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The mandates, missions or competencies of some of the organizations (such as IOM and UNHCR) are focused on 
specific forms of migration and displacement, while others have responsibilities relevant to particular aspects: 
UN DESA for data; the ILO for migrant workers; OHCHR for migrants’ rights; UNICEF for migrant children; and 
UNODC for transnational criminal aspects (such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling). Their various 
mandates enable these intergovernmental organizations to collect significant quantities of data and/or 
access data from States. These organizations also convene and report on dialogues and conferences related to 
migration and mobility, in addition to generating and publishing background, technical, operational, state-of-
the-art and agenda-setting research and analysis, including on global statistical data. As with other publishers, 
intergovernmental organizations are not immune to criticism related to quality, framing and agenda-setting. 
However, there is clearly also recognition of the responsibility of producing rigorous and robust data and 
research. Intergovernmental organizations, for example, routinely work in collaboration with leading migration-
related data analysts and researchers as a means of drawing on critical skills and expertise. 
IOM produces a large number of research and analysis publications on a range of aspects of migration. Given 
the organization’s focus on the provision of technical assistance and direct support to migrants and Member 
States, publications produced by IOM outside the realm of research and analysis typically include corporate 
reports (such as meeting/workshop reports and Migration Initiatives), training materials, handbooks and guides, 
and information materials for migrants (including graphic novels). It is worth acknowledging the mandate 
and context within which IOM operates as well as its status as a new UN-related organization.382 IOM’s role 
as a service-delivery agency over 65 years has necessarily shaped how it articulates aspects of migration, 
including the links between its operations and migration practice, as well as migration policy and governance. 
Programmatic data, for example, have been a mainstay of IOM migration data – a reflection of IOM’s strong 
and enduring role in migration and displacement, including for example, the support of internally displaced 
persons, the resettlement of refugees globally, health assessments, assistance to victims of human trafficking, 
and support to migrants returning home. Concomitantly, IOM has long recognized the need to support more 
nuanced understandings of migration, including through its focus on specific thematic areas (such as migration 
health and environmental migration). 
Think tanks
The role of think tanks in informing policymaking is capturing increasing political and academic attention. 
Despite the growing prominence of think tanks, a generally accepted definition of the term remains elusive. 
For the purpose of this discussion, we draw on a global think-tank index definition developed by the University 
of Pennsylvania:
Think tanks are public-policy research analysis and engagement organizations that 
generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international 
issues, thereby enabling policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about 
public policy. Think tanks may be affiliated or independent institutions that are structured 
as permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions.383
382	IOM	was	established	as	an	intergovernmental	organization	in	1951	and	became	a	UN-related	organization	in	September	2016.
383	McGann,	2016.
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As major contributors to grey literature, and in an era of increasing contestability of policy advice to 
governments, think tanks have emerged as important producers of migration-related information and analysis. 
This has become particularly pronounced as the interest in mobility, migration and displacement globally 
has increased, and governments have sought to adapt to increasingly dynamic and complex environments. 
In this context, and in the absence of any available data on this issue, we sought to quantify changes in the 
number of think tanks working on migration over recent decades. In examining this issue and quantifying 
the trend, the first step involved reviewing the University of Pennsylvania’s listings of think tanks working 
on migration. We supplemented this initial review by conducting online searches to identify additional think 
tanks globally. We defined “working on migration” as having worked regularly on migration-related topics 
for a minimum of five years, including publishing migration-related material and/or convening events on 
migration. Our review is limited to material published in English, although we recognize that there is likely 
to be sizeable output in other languages also. We also note, however, that more than half of all think tanks 
worldwide are located in the United States of America and Europe.384  There are many think tanks located in 
non-English-speaking regions that publish in English. While noting language and geographic limitations, we 
found that there has been enormous growth in the number of think tanks working on migration globally, as 
shown in figure 1.
Figure	1.		Number	of	think	tanks	working	on	migration	and	publishing	in	English,	1970–2015
Source: 	 Based	 on	 the	 University	 of	 Pennsylvania’s	 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report,	 with	
supplementary	research	conducted	on	migration-related	aspects.
384	Ibid.
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In the context of think tanks in general having proliferated in the late twentieth century, figure 1 shows a 
rapid increase in migration-related think tanks since the year 2000, which highlights the growing importance of 
migration in social, (geo)political and economic agendas. Given the number and nature of high-profile migration 
events of recent years – such as the mass displacement of people within and from countries in conflict such as 
the Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen; the mass migration of 
hundreds of thousands of people to Europe; the 2015 maritime migration crisis events in the Andaman Sea and 
Bay of Bengal; the role of anti-immigration sentiment in the “Brexit” referendum; and the 2017 US Presidential 
executive order on border security and immigration enforcement – we expect that migration will continue to 
receive the attention of a growing number of think tanks. 
Research conducted or reported by think tanks, however, is of variable quality. While it is necessary for think 
tanks to establish and maintain networks to ensure that their research is relevant, the need to avoid undue 
pressure from interest groups, political parties, media and lobbyists is central to credibility. That said, the 
think tank sphere is characterized by a diversity of voices and agendas. Think tanks tend to act as brokers of 
policy knowledge, centres of research and incubators of new ideas, including by providing advisory services to 
governments and civil society, conducting training activities, publishing research reports, collaborating with the 
media and undertaking advocacy work. Many thinks tanks produce high-quality work and thus play an important 
role in generating and disseminating new data and information about migration. For example, commenting on 
recent work by the Overseas Development Institute, Carling385 noted that:
Grey literature is, by definition, flexible in format and content. This flexibility can be used 
to great effect in documentation of migrant smuggling experiences. Hagen-Zanker and 
Mallett (2016),386 for instance, combine illustrative primary research, solid ties with the 
academic literature, and excellent research communication in their report on migrant 
journeys to Europe.
Examples of think tanks working on migration
Afghanistan	Research	and	Evaluation	Unit	(Afghanistan)	
Brookings	Institution	(United	States)
Bruegel	(Belgium)
Center	for	China	and	Globalization	(China)
Centro	de	Divulgación	y	Conocimiento	Económico	para	la	Libertad	(Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela)
Danish	Institute	for	International	Studies	(Denmark)
Institute	of	Southeast	Asian	Studies	–	Yusof	Ishak	Institute	(Singapore)
Inter-American	Dialogue	(the	Americas)
Friedrich	Ebert	Foundation	(Germany)
385	Carling,	2016.
386	Hagen-Zanker	and	Mallett,	2016.
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Lowy	Institute	for	International	Policy	(Australia)
Migration Policy Institute (United States)
Overseas	Development	Institute	(United	Kingdom)
Pew	Research	Centre	(United	States)
South	African	Institute	of	International	Affairs	(South	Africa)
Note:		Drawn	primarily	from	the	University	of	Pennsylvania’s	2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.	The	examples	reflect	the	
geographic	diversity	of	think	tanks	working	on	migration.	The	think	tank	above	in	bold	is	the	only	one	in	the	list	focusing	
exclusively	on	migration.
Blogging: growth, utility and concerns
In	the	last	two	decades,	there	has	been	a	massive	increase	in	the	amount	of	material	being	produced	
on	the	Internet,	particularly	in	the	form	of	blogs.	Blogs	(short	for	“weblogs”)	first	appeared	in	the	mid-
1990s	and	are	typically	concise	articles	posted	on	a	host	website.	While	there	are	no	definitive	data	
on	blogs	globally,	estimates	suggest	that	numbers	have	risen	significantly	 in	recent	years,	from	35.8	
million	in	2006	to	173	million	in	2011.a 
The	 rise	 of	 blogs	 has	 enabled	 individuals	 to	 communicate	 directly	 with	 very	 large	 numbers	 of	
people,	at	little	or	no	cost.	In	more	recent	years,	blogs	have	been	increasingly	utilized	by	think	tanks,	
governments,	 non-governmental	 organizations,	 academics	 (individuals	 and	 institutions),	 political	
parties	 and	 international	 organizations	 (among	 others)	 to	 disseminate	 information.b	 Part	 of	 the	
expansion	and	diversification	of	blogs	is	due	to	the	desire	to	reach	new	audiences	and		to	provide	users	
with	alternative	ways	of	accessing	materialc	or	of	influencing	people	who	may	be	beyond	the	reach	of	
traditional	political	media.d	The	unregulated	nature	of	blog	publishing	has	raised	concerns	about	an	
increasing	dominance	of	opinion	over	facts	and	analysis,	and	the	potential	for	false	information	to	be	
promulgated	 in	an	 increasingly	“post-truth”	world.e	There	have	been	high-profile	 instances	of	blogs	
being	used	to	present	misinformation,	and	even	of	bogus	blogs	re-posting	analysts’	material	without	
permission.f	 It	 is	 unclear	 	 how	much	 agenda-setting	occurs	 in	 the	 “blogosphere”.	 Equally,	 however,	
there	is	recognition	of	the	increasing	significance	of	research-related	blogs	in	academia	as	well	as	in	
policy	spheres.g	
Research-related	blogs	tend	to	draw	upon	the	findings	of	empirical	research	and,	rather	than	replacing	
other	 publishing	 outlets	 (such	 as	 academic	 journals),	 they	 have	 become	 an	 additional	 form	 of	
dissemination,	potentially	enhancing	the	accessibility	of	research	findings	in	policy	and	public	spheres.	
Such	 articles	 can	 provide	 useful	 and	more	 easily	 digested	 research-related	material	 and,	 although	
concerns	about	 rigour	may	remain,	blogs	 that	seek	 to	summarize	peer-reviewed	empirical	 research	
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are	more	 likely	 to	make	a	solid	contribution	towards	our	understanding	of	migration.	 Indeed,	more	
generally,	 empirical	 research	has	 revealed	 that	 the	perceived	 credibility	 and	 trustworthiness	of	 the	
blogger	have	an	impact	on	readers’	receptiveness	to	information.h
a		Statista,	2017.
b		Farrell,	2012;	Wortham,	2007.
c		Cavanagh,	2009;	Chong,	2010.	
d		Farrell,	2012.	
e		Weinberger,	2011.	
f			Williamson	and	Eisen,	2017.
g		Aldred	et	al.,	2008;	Mewburn	and	Thomson,	2013.
h		Chu	and	Kamal,	2008.
Recent contributions: 2015 and 2016 in focus 
Having reviewed the characteristics of the key producers of migration research and analysis, we now turn to a 
discussion of examples of recent contributions by academia and intergovernmental organizations. 
Academia
The large number of scholarly publications on migration precludes a review of all material published in 2015 
and 2016. We instead examine a sample of contributions from the scholarly community, focusing on seven 
peer-reviewed migration-related journals. Future editions of the World Migration Report will feature other 
journals. For the current edition, we focused on some of the key, long-standing migration journals as well 
as newer entrants, including the African Human Mobility Review, the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 
International Migration, the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, the Journal of Refugee Studies, Mobilities, 
and Population, Space and Place.  Our list includes many, although not all, of the leading migration journals 
in the world.387 The examination comprised two components: analysis of all article titles published by these 
journals in 2015 and 2016 (totalling 538 articles); and editors’ overviews of their journal’s key contributions 
for this two-year period. This exercise allowed for deeper insights into journal contributions, highlighting 
their similarities as well as different interests and areas of focus, including geographically and thematically. 
Each editor’s overview is provided in full in appendix B. Excerpts of journal editors’ overviews are included in 
text boxes throughout the remainder of this chapter.
Contributions from the editors of International Migration and the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
suggest several reasons for the increase in migration-related research. First, “...the sheer quantity of academic 
387	We	have	attempted	to	provide	geographic	diversity	in	the	contributions	obtained	from	the	main	migration	journals.	This	exercise	will	
be	repeated	in	future	editions	of	the	World Migration Report,	for	which	other	journals	will	be	invited	to	provide	input.	Nine	journals	
were	selected	and	their	editors	agreed	to	provide	 input,	but	only	seven	submitted	material.	 International Migration Review	and	
Migraciones Internacionales	did	not	end	up	providing	input.	
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research that is being undertaken [is] in response to the high social relevance of migration issues in the world 
today” (Statham – see appendix B). Second, the launch in 2016 of a process to establish a global compact 
on migration and a global compact on refugees is commanding greater attention from migration researchers; 
such a high-visibility and high-level policy initiative is encouraging – directly or indirectly – more research 
on global migration governance (Duncan – see appendix B). Third, migration “...has become an important 
interpretive lens through which societies and people understand the core changes that they are experiencing 
as a consequence of globalization” (Statham – see appendix B).
African Human Mobility Review
In	recent	years,	the	debate	revolving	around	the	migration–development	nexus	has	spurred	growing	
global	interest	in	human	mobility.	This	is	also	the	case	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	where	researchers	have	
sought	to	describe	trends	and	patterns	of	migration	and	to	suggest	actions	to	harness	its	economic,	social	
and	human	benefits	for	the	development	of	the	continent.	In	this	respect,	evidence-based	research	is	
widely	accepted	to	build	and	expand	the	body	of	knowledge	by	testing	hypotheses,	validating	existing	
theories	and	elaborating	new	ones.	Ultimately,	research	findings	need	to	be	published	and	disseminated	
to	a	larger	and	diverse	audience	comprising	of	academics,	practitioners,	civil	society	and	government	
representatives.	 Publication	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 key	 component	 that	 promotes	not	 only	 the	 visibility	 of	
the	 research,	but	also	 the	credibility	of	 the	empirical	work	conducted	by	 researchers.	 In	particular,	
peer-reviewed	scholarly	journals	are	a	fundamental	tool	for	fostering	intellectual	debate	and	inquiry.	
However,	at	present,	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	peer-reviewed	 journals	of	high	quality	 in	 sub-Saharan	Africa	
addressing,	amongst	others,	the	 issue	of	human	mobility.	Researchers	face	challenges	 in	presenting	
research	findings	in	African	journals	in	this	field,	either	because	such	journals	are	published	irregularly,	
or	simply	because	they	do	not	exist.
Source:			Mulugeta	Dinbabo,	Editor.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
Based on the titles of the 538 articles published in our sample of journals, the word cloud in figure 2 
highlights the main areas of focus recurring in scholarly publications on migration. Under the assumption 
that an article’s title reflects its content, we attempted to use the most frequent terms as cues for highlighting 
salient thematic issues. Not surprisingly, terms such as migration, migrant and mobility are used extensively 
in titles. Interestingly, both immigrant and immigration appear in the top 10, while emigrant and emigration 
did not feature among the 75 terms that form the word cloud.388 This suggests a dominant “receiving country” 
perspective – at least in the articles published in the selected journals. While this is undoubtedly related 
in part to the specific journals we selected for analysis, our sample does include journals with traditional 
migration “origin” perspectives. Furthermore, Europe is the only geographical term in the top 10.389 
388	We	truncated	the	word	cloud	source	list	to	75	terms	since	the	low	weight	of	the	remaining	words	makes	them	illegible.	As	a	reference,	
the	seventy-fifth	term	is	generation	(bottom-right,	below	migrant).	
389	According	 to	 International Migration Report 2015	 (produced	by	 the	United	Nations	Department	 of	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Affairs	 
(UN	DESA),	of	244	million	international	migrants	in	2015,	76	million	lived	in	Europe,	75	million	in	Asia,	and	54	million	in	Northern	
America	(UN	DESA,	2016).
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Moreover, the remaining geographical terms among the 75 that form the word cloud are Africa, Australia, 
Canada, China, England, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea: the large majority are immigration 
– rather than emigration – countries or regions.
Figure	2.	Word	cloud	from	the	titles	of	538	academic	articles	published	in	 
seven	academic	journals	in	2015–2016
Note: 	Created	using	www.wordclouds.com	and	www.wordle.net.
Asian and Pacific Migration Journal
…articles	published	by	APMJ	are	generally	indicative	of	the	migration	scenario	in	the	Asia-Pacific	and	
are	a	reflection	of	the	state	of	research,	policy	discussions,	and	advocacy	issues.	…The	articles	published	
in	2015	and	2016	included	many	articles	on	South	Korea	and	China,	but	overall,	the	last	two	years	point	
to	diversity	in	the	types	of	migrants,	origins	and	destinations	covered.	Articles	on	student	migration,	
for	example,	pertained	to	Chinese	and	Indian	students,	incidentally	the	top	two	groups	of	international	
student	migrants.	Articles	about	unaccompanied	adolescent	Korean	students	in	the	US…,	the	return	
of	Chinese	students,	and	some	focus	on	Japanese	student	migration	have	expanded	the	discussion	on	
the	topic.	Articles	about	Filipino	teachers	in	Indonesia,	Chinese	immigrant	entrepreneurs	in	Singapore	
and	Afghan-native	fertility	differentials	in	Iran	are	some	examples	of	articles	that	reveal	relatively	less	
known	aspects	about	intra-regional	migration	while	the	articles	about	Vietnamese	in	Poland	provide	
an	update	on	the	old	migration	and	characteristics	of	new	Vietnamese	migration	to	Poland…	Overall,	
the	articles	published	in	2015–2016	are	a	combination	of	old	or	persisting	issues	and	new	or	hitherto	
under-researched	questions.		
Source:		Maruja	Asis,	Co-editor.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
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One other very frequently used term is social, which occurs 44 times within the 538 article titles (8%). 
This adjective naturally fits many migration-related nouns: usages include, for instance, social integration, 
social change and social protection. But the most frequent association within our sample is social network, 
which highlights how instrumental networking can be in shaping migrants’ experiences. Examples of issues 
discussed in academic articles on social networks include the social networking experiences of immigrants 
from Turkey to Canada, the social networks and labour-market access among Brazilian migrants in Ireland, 
and the role of social networks for Indian migrants to New Zealand.   
Not surprisingly, given the “…new relevance of refugees in global political, media and popular discourse” 
(Koser – see appendix B), the term refugee was in the top 10 terms in the word cloud. As one would expect, 
analysis shows that the Journal of Refugee Studies alone accounts for 46 per cent of all references to the term 
refugee in article titles within our sample, while the remaining 54 per cent occur across the remaining journals. 
Another noun appearing in the top 10 terms is labour.390 Again, this is not surprising. The search for better 
income and working conditions is one of the most important drivers of migration: of all the international 
migrants in 2015, 72 per cent were of working age, and 71 per cent lived in high-income countries. Between 
2000 and 2015, high-income countries absorbed 81 per cent of the growth in international migrants.391 The 
last word in the top 10 is policy. Analysis within our sample reveals that the terms most frequently associated 
with this word are immigration policy, labour policy and asylum/refugee policy.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
In	2017,	JEMS	will	publish	16	issues,	or	approximately	160	articles	of	9000	words	each	of	original	
research	in	the	field	of	migration	and	ethnic	relations	[…].	Our	reason	for	publishing	so	much	is	that	
we	want	academic	research	to	be	out	in	the	public	domain	so	that	it	has	the	chance	to	inform	public	
understandings.	The	findings	of	original	academic	research	can	give	legitimacy	to	claims	by	lobbyists	
and	politicians,	and	contribute	to	debunking	‘false’	claims,	but	to	do	this	they	need	to	be	publicly	
visible	and	on	record	[…].	
While	five	years	ago,	I	think	it	is	fair	to	say	that	the	journal	was	primarily	‘European’	in	focus,	we	have	
made	concerted	efforts	in	recent	years	to	engage	more	directly	with	scholars	in	North	America	(those	
working	on	the	US	as	well	as	on	Europe),	and	arguably	more	importantly,	encourage	academics	from	
Asia	and	Africa	to	see	JEMS	as	a	forum	for	their	debates.	Again	this	reflects	the	important	changes	in	
the	world	that	are	driven	by	migration.	If	there	have	been	240	million	internal	migrants	within	China	
over	 the	 last	decade,	 surely	 this	needs	 to	be	something	 that	 the	migration	academic	community	
is	 engaging	with?	 In	 a	modest	way,	we	hope	 that	 greater	 exchanges	 across	 continents	may	 take	
us	as	academics	out	of	our	silos	and	comfort	zones	and	thereby	challenge	some	of	 the	accepted	
‘truths’	that	permeate	our	understandings.	Many	understandings	of	migration	and	ethnic	relations	
are	drawn	 from	 the	experiences	of	 South	 to	North	migration	 in	 the	post	war	era	and	written	by	
scholars	from	receiving	countries.
Source:			Paul	Statham,	Editor.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
390	Synonyms	such	as	labour,	work	and	profession	were	aggregated	into	labour.
391	UN	DESA,	2016.
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Relevance of scientific/academic writings for policymakers emerged as an important aspect for some journals. 
Three editors acknowledged that academics and policymakers tend to be disconnected because “…policy 
makers often require their evidence immediately while academic research takes time, and peer review adds 
further to this time, meaning that some research is published after the policy need” (Duncan – see appendix 
B). The time frames applied in the policy and academic environments were referred to as a critical difference: 
“…the production of research-based knowledge is time- and process-intensive, which may not be compatible 
with the sometimes fast-paced and contentious context of policymaking” (Asis – see appendix B). Possible 
solutions could be “…the production of concise policy briefs, the holding of policy dialogues, or collaborating 
with media to produce more accessible and timelier reports” (Asis – see appendix B).
International Migration Journal
[…]	migration	is	a	phenomenon	of	longer-term	trends	whose	patterns	are	often	visible	only	over	time.	
Academic	 researchers	are	 in	a	better	position	 to	understand	 these	 trends	 than	many	policy	makers	
who	are	required	to	deliver	analysis	and	advice	more	quickly.	Although	policy	making	 is	often	done	
with	urgency,	it	is	an	inherently	conservative	business.	Emerging	trends	identified	by	research	can	be	
slow	to	be	recognized	by	policy,	making	it	all	the	more	important	that	the	empirical	research	be	done	
well	and	be	peer-reviewed.
The	past	few	years	have	seen	a	growing	interest	in	the	decision	processes	and	intentions	of	individuals	
leading	to	their	migration;	this	is	in	marked	contrast	to	the	proliferation	of	macro	analyses	of	push	and	
pull	factors	of	classical	migration	theory,	but	serves	as	a	complement,	not	a	substitution.		
Source:		Howard	Duncan,	Editor.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
Intergovernmental organizations 
The contributions of key United Nations (UN) organizations working on migration reflect mandates as well 
as current trends in migration, including some of the shifts we have seen in migration patterns such as the 
increase in children migrating internationally. UN DESA, for example, coordinates the assembly of data, 
including in relation to migration – a process that has highlighted limitations in the capabilities of national 
statistical offices.19 In 2016, its Population Division published the International Migration Report 2015 – a 
biennial publication that presents information on levels and trends in international migration for major 
areas, regions and countries of the world. The Population Division maintains the United Nations Global 
Migration Database, which is the most complete set of statistics on international migrants enumerated in 
countries or areas, and classified by age, sex and country or area of birth or citizenship, as well as a smaller 
dataset with annual data on international migration flows for 45 countries.
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Examples of key global material published in 2015 and 2016 
UN	DESA International Migration Report 2015 2015
United	Nations	Global	Migration	Database Ongoing
Dataset	on	International	Migration	Flows Ongoing
UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015 2016
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014
Asylum Trends 2014
2015
2015
Population	Statistics	Database Ongoing
ILO Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey Concerning the Migrant Workers 
Instruments
2016
ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers 2015
OHCHR Situation of Migrants in Transit 2015
Behind Closed Doors: Protecting and Promoting the Human Rights of 
Migrant Domestic Workers in an Irregular Situation
2015
UNICEF Uprooted: The Growing Crisis of Refugee and Migrant Children 2016
UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016 2016
Note: 	IOM	publications	are	discussed	below.
As a UN agency with a mandate to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees, UNHCR produces 
a wealth of publications and has a dedicated research repository – refworld. Released annually in June, Global 
Trends is one of UNHCR’s flagship publications. It presents and analyses annual trends worldwide in relation to 
refugee and other populations of concern to UNHCR. While not global in focus (primarily due to the nature of 
asylum flows), UNHCR’s annual report Asylum Trends provides statistical data and related analysis on asylum 
seeker applications in 44 industrialized countries. UNHCR is also the key source of global statistics on refugees 
and other populations of concern, as reported in its online Population Statistics Database.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a standard-setting body responsible for coordinating the 
development and supervising the implementation of international labour standards. In 2016, it focused its 
annual in-depth General Survey on migrant workers. Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey Concerning the 
Migrant Workers Instruments examines the application and impacts of ILO’s migrant worker instruments. In 
the context of its efforts to improve the collection and production of labour migration statistics, ILO Global 
Estimates on Migrant Workers provides estimates of the proportion of labour migrant workers among the total 
number of migrants worldwide, with a special focus on migrant domestic workers. 
Part of the United Nations Secretariat, OHCHR is the principal UN office mandated to promote and protect the 
human rights of all persons, including migrants. In addition to supporting UN human rights mechanisms, such as 
treaty bodies and Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OHCHR produces a wealth of relevant materials. 
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At the request of the UN Human Rights Council, OCHCR carried out a study of migrants in transit, subsequently 
publishing the Situation of Migrants in Transit in 2015, which revealed a clear protection gap for this migrant group. 
In 2015, OHCHR also published Behind Closed Doors, which sheds light on the exploitation, abuse and vulnerabilities 
that irregular migrant domestic workers can face and outlines the human rights framework that applies to them.
Although UNICEF’s flagship annual publication – the State of the World’s Children – does not necessarily single 
out migrant children, UNICEF published Uprooted: The Growing Crisis of Refugee and Migrant Children in 2016. 
It presents global data and analysis on the lives and situations of the approximately 50 million children who 
have migrated across borders or have been displaced. 
Within its mandate to assist States in addressing international crimes, UNODC undertakes efforts to combat 
transnational organized crime, including human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and produces a variety of reports 
on these themes. The third Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, published in 2016, provides an overview of patterns 
and flows of trafficking in persons and is based primarily on trafficking cases detected between 2012 and 2014.
IOM published a wide range of research and analysis materials in 2015 and 2016 – most notably in the form 
of standalone studies and reports, many of which stemmed directly from specific projects. For example, under 
the European Union-funded Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy project, research 
reports assessing the evidence base on migration and climate change were published in 2015 and 2016 on the 
six countries involved in the project: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Viet 
Nam. The total number of studies and reports produced largely relates to project cycles, thereby accounting 
in part for the significant increase in 2016 over the previous year (see table 1). Many reports are produced 
locally by IOM missions, particularly if they stem from individual projects.
Table 1 also shows that standalone studies and reports form the bulk of research-related publications, 
although IOM’s support of migration journals – International Migration and Migration Policy Practice – were 
also important contributors on migration research. Additionally, Migration Profiles provide country-specific 
migration overviews (largely funded by the IOM Development Fund) to support, among other things, capacity-
building on migration data, research and analysis in Member States.
Table	1.		IOM	bookstore	publications,	2015	and	2016
Publication type 2015 2016
World	Migration	Reports	(a) 1 0
Global	Migration	Data	Analysis	Centre	(GMDAC)	publications	(b) 1 9
Migration	Research	Series 1 1
Migration	Profiles 8 6
Migration Policy Practice	issues 5 5
Studies	and	reports 35 73
Policy	Briefs 8 12
International Migration issues	(c) 3 9
Other 9 16
Total 71 131
Source: 	 IOM.
Note: 	 (a)	The	World Migration Report 2015	was	produced	in	several	languages;	(b)	GMDAC	was	established	
in	September	2015;	(c)	the	editor	of	International Migration Journal	changed	over	in	2015.
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Key IOM research-related publications produced in 2015 and 2016
World Migration Report 2015 – Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility
Fatal Journeys Volume 2: Identification and Tracing of Dead and Missing Migrants
Assessing the Evidence: Opportunities and Challenges of Migration in Building Resilience Against 
Climate Change	(several	country	reports)
Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A Global Review of the Emerging Evidence Base 
Measuring Well-governed Migration: The 2016 Migration Governance Index	(with	The	Economist	
Intelligence	Unit)
Global	Migration	Data	Analysis	Centre	Data	Briefs	
Migration,	Environment	and	Climate	Change	Policy	Briefs	
Migration	Profiles	(several	country	reports)
Nutrition	Surveillance	reports	(under	the	IOM	Health	Assessment	Programme)
Labour Exploitation, Trafficking and Migrant Health: Multi-country Findings on the Health Risks and 
Consequences of Migrant and Trafficked Workers
Measuring reach
Academia
As the interest in migration has increased, and the amount of migration research and analysis material has 
grown, it would be reasonable to expect that the reach (through expanding readerships, for example) has 
also increased. This appears to have been the case for the journals examined in this chapter, which generally 
saw an average increase in their “impact” in 2015 (+21%) and 2016 (+4%; see figure 3). The recent average 
Impact Factor392 increase suggests that the articles published in these journals are receiving more attention: 
citing a paper reasonably implies that it has been read, and that some if its content was helpful in adding to 
the evidence base and/or generating debates, building knowledge, or informing migration policy and practice. 
392	The	Impact	Factor	is	a	citations–publications	ratio.	For	a	given	year,	it	takes	into	account	citations	and	publications	from	the	preceding	
two	years.	For	more	information,	please	see	the	example	in	appendix	A.
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Figure	3.		Impact	Factor	of	selected	journals
Source:  InCites Journal Citation Reports,	Thomson	Reuters.
Note:  African Human Mobility Review	was	not	indexed	by	InCites	at	the	time	of	writing	(June	2017).	The	impact	
factor	is	the	ratio	of	citations	to	publications.
Publication metrics based on citation counts (including the impact factor) clearly have various limitations and 
downsides.393 First, citations tend to accumulate slowly, given academic publishing timelines and the time it 
takes to compile/release statistics. Second, citations are a matter almost solely within the academic context, 
which is one reason alternative measures (discussed below) have been developed. Third, citations do not 
measure quality of material but are a way of quantifying impact (see the discussion on this point in appendix 
A). While citation metrics have become a priority for academic publishers and scholars, they are likely to be 
less relevant to people outside academia.
Population, Space and Place
In	terms	of	the	total	number	of	published	papers,	migration	is	a	prevalent	focus	of	interest	in	Population, 
Space and Place.	 Papers	 cover	 both	 international	migration	 and	 internal	mobility.	 Some	 researchers	
even	question	the	validity	of	distinguishing	the	two	terms,	given	the	complexity	of	contemporary	human	
mobility,	and	also	given	the	common	drivers	that	underpin	many	human	movements	and	displacements.i 
Arguably	 the	 most	 important	 conceptual	 advance	 has	 been	 the	 recognition	 that	 human	 mobilities	
(including	 many	 kinds	 of	 migration)	 are	 relational	 […].	 It	 is	 relational	 between	 the	 linked	 lives	 of	
people	who	share	a	household	and	who	may	move	together.j	It	is	also	relational	between	movers	and	
non-movers	 (for	 example	 between	 parents	 who	 migrate	 internationally	 for	 work	 and	 their	 children
393	For	a	recent	overview	of	Impact	Factor	limitations,	see	Williams	and	Padula,	2015.	For	a	broader	account	of	Impact	Factor	misuse,	
see	PLoS	Medicine	Editors,	2006.
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often	left	behind	with	their	grandparents),k	or	between	immigrants	arriving	in	a	community	and	non-
movers	 living	 in	the	same	community	and	adjusting	their	 lives	to	the	impact	of	new	arrivals.l	And	it	
is	relational	between	migrants	and	those	with	power	to	enable	and/or	to	block	mobility	(for	example	
those	 allocating	housing	 to	 new	arrivals),	 or	 those	who	 govern	migration	policy	 and	who	establish	
which	people	have	permission	to	stay	and	who	must	return	to	their	place	of	origin.m
Source: 	 Allan	M.	Findlay,	Clara	H.	Mulder	and	Darren	P.	Smith,	Editors.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
i				Hickey	and	Yeoh,	2016;	Hugo,	2016.
j				Van	Bochove	and	Engbersen,	2015.	
k			Murphy,	Zhou	and	Tao,	2016.	
l				Phillips	and	Robinson,	2015.	
m		Lietaert,	Broekaert	and	Derluyn,	2015.
New metrics are being developed for scholarly publications to assess their impact outside of academia. One 
such metric is the Altmetric Attention Score,394 indicating “…how many people have been exposed to and 
engaged with a scholarly output”.395 For any research output, the Attention Score “…provides an indicator 
of the amount of attention that it has received”,396 with some sources having more weight than others. 
For instance, coverage in the news has the highest weight of 8, since “it’s easy to imagine that the average 
newspaper story is more likely to bring attention to the research output than the average tweet”.397 Other 
high-weight sources include blogs (5), Wikipedia (3), policy documents (3) and Twitter (1). Altmetrics are 
relatively new, having commenced in 2012. They have been recognized as “…tools that aim to measure 
the real-time reach and influence of an academic article”.398 Academics found “positive but relatively weak 
correlation with citations”,399 supporting the idea that “citation and altmetrics indicators track related but 
distinct impacts”.400 Mentions in blogs are particularly “able to identify highly cited publications”401 – an 
empirical finding that supports the important weight assigned to blogs within the altmetric algorithm, 
further highlighting the increasing importance of this form of dissemination of scientific material. 
We analysed views/downloads and the Altmetric Attention Score of 512 peer-reviewed articles published in 
2015 and 2016 by six of the seven journals under consideration in this chapter (African Human Mobility Review 
was not publishing these data at the time of writing). The Attention Score was chosen for two main reasons: 
first, it was freely available on all the journal publishers’ websites. Second, the available evidence supports its 
use, especially for tracking recent research output.402 The analysis allowed us to unveil quantitative aspects of 
394	See:	www.altmetric.com
395 www.altmetric.com/about-altmetrics/what-are-altmetrics/.	Accessed	on	9	April	2017.
396 https://help.altmetric.com/support/solutions/articles/6000060969-how-is-the-altmetric-attention-score-calculated-.	Accessed	on	9	April	2017.
397	Ibid.
398	Warren,	Raison	and	Dasgupta,	2017.
399	Costas,	Zahedi	and	Wouters,	2015;	Thelwall	et	al.,	2013.
400	Priem,	Piwowar	and	Hemminger,	2012.
401	Costas,	Zahedi	and	Wouters,	2015.
402	Just	like	classic	citation	metrics,	altmetrics	offer	benefits	and	disadvantages.	See	Bornmann,	2014	for	a	deeper	discussion.
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academic publications on migration such as how many were mentioned, viewed and/or downloaded. Figure 4 
shows the Attention Score distribution of the 512 sampled articles. At a first glance, it appears that the largest 
share of scholarly articles received little or no attention: 129 (25%) articles scored zero, meaning that they 
were not mentioned online by any source. More than half (289 or 56%) had a score of 2 or lower, meaning that 
they attracted, at most, the equivalent of a couple of tweets. Only 14 articles (3%) scored higher than 20 – 
roughly the equivalent of one mention in the news and one in a blog plus 5 tweets.
Figure	4.		Distribution	of	Altmetric	Attention	Score	for	512	articles	from	2015	and	2016,	 
for	selected	journals
Source:  www.altmetric.com
Note:  African Human Mobility Review	was	not	publishing	altmetric	data	at	the	time	of	writing	(April	2017).
Mobilities
[…]	 borders	 have	 become	 a	 highly	 politically	 charged	 contemporary	 topic	 that	 call	 into	 question	
conventional	 analyses	 of	migration	 through	 re-bordering.	 The	 political	 debates	 over	 the	 reception	of	
refugees	from	Syria	and	Afghanistan	within	Europe;	the	popular	vote	 in	favour	of	the	UK	to	 leave	the	
European	Union	–	‘Brexit’;	and	the	proposed	building	of	a	wall	between	the	USA	and	Mexico	all	testify	to
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new	physical	and	symbolic	processes	of	re-bordering.	It	has	been	recognised	that	borders	are	‘not	merely	
empirical	phenomena,	but	are	used	and	constructed	and	opened	and	closed	depending	on	who	crosses	
them	and	on	how	contentious	they	become	in	political	debates’.n
Source: 	 Kevin	Hannam,	Mimi	Sheller	and	David	Tyfield,	Editors.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
n		Scuzzarello	and	Kinnvall,	2013.	Rebordering	France	and	Denmark	Narratives	and	Practices	of	Border-Construction	in	 
				Two	European	Countries.	Mobilities.
Concerning article views and downloads, not all journals provide such data on their website. At the time of writing, 
two journals (Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and Mobilities) were providing views only, one (Asian and 
Pacific Migration Journal) provided only downloads, and one (Journal of Refugee Studies) provided views and 
downloads. Three journals (African Human Mobility Review, International Migration and Population, Space and 
Place) were not showing any data on article views or downloads. To overcome this lack of standardization, we 
aggregated views and downloads. Figure 5 shows the distribution of views/downloads of 353 articles from the 
four available sources, grouped by hundreds. The skewed shape of the distribution – similar to the Attention 
Score – highlights a relatively low level of reach. Only 28 articles (8%) were viewed/downloaded more than 1,000 
times. The views/downloads data indicate that most academic writings have fairly limited readership.
Figure	5.		Distribution	of	numbers	of	views	and	downloads	of	353	articles	from	2015	and	2016,	 
for	selected	journals
Source: 	 Journal	publishers’	websites.
Note:  African Human Mobility Review, Population, Space and Place	and	International Migration	were	
not	publishing	data	on	views	or	downloads	at	the	time	of	writing	(April	2017).
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In summary, our quantitative analysis shows that migration as a topic is receiving increasing attention: the 
number of publications and citations are a sign of heightened interest, at least within the academic community. 
Measures of views/downloads and altmetrics suggest that there is room for improving the reach and readership 
of scholarly production on migration. One of the main obstacles to this is the fact that academic publications 
tend to be behind paywalls, significantly limiting access to material beyond academia. Journal subscribers, for 
example, are often academic institutions and the cost of downloading single articles for non-subscribers can 
be prohibitive. Open access for academic publications enables free downloads but usually requires publisher 
fees to be paid by the author or their institution. More open-access journals (such as Comparative Migration 
Studies and Anti-Trafficking Review) have, however, been publishing on migration.403 In addition, academic 
language and writing style tend to be more technical than in other areas of publishing, and the topics tend 
to be narrower. Dissemination of findings, however, through both traditional and newer forms of media, offer 
opportunities for academic research on migration to inform public and policy discourses. The potential reach 
of blogs on migration, for example, is discussed further below.
Journal of Refugee Studies
Refugees	are	encountering	new	challenges:	an	increasing	proportion	is	in	protracted	situations	without	
any	realistic	prospect	of	a	durable	solution,	and	more	are	relocating	to	urban	settings	where	it	is	harder	
to	protect	and	assist	them.	While	refugees	have	always	suffered	discrimination,	this	is	perhaps	more	
systematic	today	than	ever	before,	with	more	restrictions	on	refugees;	a	number	of	 leaders	 for	 the	
first	 time	 suggesting	 an	 explicit	 link	 between	 refugee	 flows	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 violent	 extremism	 and	
terrorism;	and	a	rising	 incidence	of	xenophobic	attacks	on	refugees.	More	positively,	 the	2016	New	
York	Declaration	 for	 Refugees	 and	Migrants	 potentially	 paves	 the	way	 for	 significant	 reform	of	 the	
international	refugee	regime	and	response.	As	a	result,	the	Journal of Refugee Studies	 is	flourishing,	
attracting	record	highs	of	quality	submissions	from	a	widening	range	of	disciplines	and	from	all	over	
the	world,	and	doubling	its	impact	factor	over	the	last	two	years	[2015	and	2016].
Source: 	 Khalid	Koser,	Editor.	The	full	submission	is	in	appendix	B.
IOM 
In recent years, the IOM online bookstore has been upgraded and improved. Launched in 2009 as a means of 
facilitating greater access to IOM publications, the online bookstore is now able to track and support analysis of 
data on the number of downloads of IOM publications. These data provide insights into accessibility and reach 
of IOM publications, supplementing readers’ surveys of specific outputs. As of the end of 2016, the bookstore 
contained over 1,370 electronic publications in 27 different languages, most of which could be accessed free 
of charge. While download data do not allow for an assessment of the quality of publications (such as can be 
done through reader surveys or peer review, for example), they do provide some insights into the individual 
publications that have high download rates, as well as the themes and geographic nature of the research-related 
403	Open	access	involves	making	published	material	available	for	free,	not	on	a	fee/subscription	basis.
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publications that are produced and accessed globally. In 2016, the cumulative number of downloads from the 
IOM bookstore exceeded 2.38 million, relating to publications that had been produced over many years. An 
examination of research-related publications that were each downloaded more than 1,000 times shows that 
some themes were more prominent than others, with cross-cutting publications featuring heavily – including, 
for example, country migration profiles that traverse multiple thematic issues. Interest in migration law and 
governance (as well as in migration and the environment) increased in 2016 (see figure 6).
Figure	6.	Proportion	of	IOM	research-related	downloads	in	2015	and	2016,	by	theme
Source: 	 IOM.
Note: 	 “IM”	means	irregular	migration.	Only	publications	downloaded	more	than	1,000	times	in	a	year	have	been	included	(downloads	 
in	2015	have	been	prorated	as	data	for	the	entire	year	are	not	available).	Downloads	could	be	classified	by	more	than	one	
theme.	n=1,743,167	downloads.
Global publications featured more heavily than regional or national publications (see figure 7), which is largely 
a reflection of the wide reach of the World Migration Report (WMR). The report, which is published every 
two years, is the principal IOM research-related report, and both current and past editions tend to be widely 
downloaded. There is a clear appetite for the WMR, and download data provide useful insights into how readers 
have responded to WMR material. It is interesting to note, for example, that the WMR 2010 background paper 
on irregular migration and mixed flows was downloaded several thousand times in 2016, reflecting the salience 
of the issue, given the peak migration flows to Europe in 2015–2016.
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Figure	7.	Proportion	of	IOM	research-related	downloads	in	2015	and	2016,	by	geographic	category
Source: 	 IOM.
Note: 	 Only	publications	downloaded	more	than	1,000	times	in	a	year	have	been	included	(downloads	for	2015	have	been	prorated	
as	data	for	the	entire	year	are	not	available).	Categories	are	discrete.	n=1,743,167	downloads.
Blogs
As part of the broader tendency towards greater interest in migration and migration-related research, there 
has been a concomitant rise in the number of blogs that feature articles on migration. It is well beyond the 
scope of this chapter to examine in detail the changes in blog publishing specifically on migration, however, 
examples of widely read migration articles are provided in the text box below. They show that some blog 
articles can reach large audiences and, because of this, are likely to be influential in informing discussions 
on migration.404 It is also important to acknowledge that some argue that blogs tend to be written on “hot” 
or controversial migration topics, such as irregular or mass migration, refugees and asylum seekers, while less 
controversial topics are often neglected.405
404	Aldred	et	al.,	2008.
405	Ozimek,	2012.
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Examples of migration-related articles published on blogs
Four	maps	that	will	change	how	you	see	migration	in	Europe,	by	Alex	Gray,	published	by	the	World	
Economic	Forum’s	Agenda	blog	on	16	August	2016	–	905,126 views.
Countries	where	 you	 can	buy	 citizenship,	 by	 Joe	Myers,	 published	by	 the	World	 Economic	 Forum’s	
Agenda	blog	on	28	July	2016	–	176,065 views.
Unintended	consequences:	How	migrant	smugglers	are	exploiting	the	international	protection	system,	
by	Marie	McAuliffe	and	Khalid	Koser,	published	by	the	Asia	and	the	Pacific	Policy	Society’s	Policy	Forum	
on	 15	 February	 2015	 –	over 100,000 reads.	 The	majority	 of	 readers	were	 in	 Canada,	 India,	 Japan,	
Malaysia,	the	Philippines,	Saudi	Arabia	and	the	United	States	of	America.	
The	challenge	of	Syrian	refugees,	by	John	Hewson,	published	by	the	Asia	and	the	Pacific	Policy	Society’s	
Policy	Forum	on	11	September	2015	–	over 18,000 reads.	The	majority	of	readers	were	in	Australia,	
China,	India,	Ireland	and	the	United	States	of	America.	
One	 step	 forward	 for	 Central	 America:	 The	 Plan	 for	 the	Alliance	 for	 Prosperity,	 by	Manuel	Orozco,	
published	by	the	Inter-American	Dialogue’s	blog	on	16	March	2016	–	662 views.		
Note:		The	number	of	reads	or	views	and	related	analytics	were	provided	by	the	relevant	blog	editor	in	late	February	2017.
Conclusions
This chapter has provided an overview of the key written contributions of some of the main producers of 
migration research and analysis to our collective understanding of migration. We found that there has been 
a significant increase in the interest in migration as a topic over time, including by some of the major 
producers of research and analysis, reflecting the growing salience of the topic globally. We also found that 
different types of migration-related output have different strengths and weaknesses, which are important 
to understand when reading and utilizing such material, particularly in informing policymaking. Academic 
research and analysis, for example, may involve greater rigour than other forms; however, the long lead times 
involved can diminish their usefulness for policymakers, who often need material more quickly than academic 
publishing regimes can accommodate. Conversely, the merits of grey literature, especially when compared 
with academic peer-reviewed research, include shorter production times, greater access to unpublished 
research and data, and the ability to draw on expertise in academic and policy spheres.406 Grey literature 
also tends to be freely accessible. On the other hand, it is sometimes of inconsistent (and poor) quality and 
review standards, with irregular publication schedules and a lack of standard bibliographical identifiers.407 
406	Pappas	and	Williams,	2011.
407	Banks,	2012;	Pappas	and	Williams,	2011;	Schöpfel,	2011;	Rucinski,	2016.	
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It has also been criticized as being used to set agendas or legitimize policy.408 As with potential merits, 
however, these drawbacks do not necessarily apply to all such publications. 
There is a case to be made for playing to the strengths of the different types of material on migration. Some of 
the highest quality blogs on migration, for example, are based on carefully elaborated and conducted studies 
and insightful analysis drawing on years of research. The fact that it is becoming more common for senior 
migration academics to maintain their own blog and/or write blog articles for other publishers indicates some 
recognition in the academic community of the utility of this form of communication and dissemination. This 
is also reflected by the growing use of altmetrics, which measure a journal article’s reach in non-academic 
publishing, including via blogs. At the same time, it is often difficult to assess whether blogs and other forms 
of grey literature, including substantial research reports, make influential contributions to our collective 
understanding of migration or whether they are another agenda-setting tool more suited to advocacy. In 
the academic environment, the number of citations provide an indicator of the value – or lack thereof – of 
an individual article; impact factors provide a similar tool for assessing scientific journals over time. Similar 
systematic assessments are not available for grey literature, and its variability and diversity are recognized as 
weaknesses as well as strengths. Technology is available, however, to assist publishers of online grey literature 
in assessing the level of interest in a series or even an individual article, report or study. 
The information garnered for this chapter (including that from blog editors) has shown that, somewhat 
surprisingly, some online migration-related research and analysis has had extraordinary reach. The fact that 
some material can be so widely viewed, read or downloaded confirms the need for the quality of published 
material on migration to be further strengthened. There is no good reason, for example, why material outside 
academia cannot be peer-reviewed; in the quest for a more robust evidence base to inform migration policy and 
practice, tools for improving the overall quality of published research and analysis are important. Similarly, 
there is no apparent reason why measuring reach via views/downloads/altmetrics could not be embraced 
by more publishers of migration research and analysis, especially in the non-academic sphere.  At the same 
time, it is desirable that academic publishing try to embrace the best features of grey literature –  namely 
accessibility and speed. Open access is one such solution, and the use of other communication strategies, 
such as blogs, can certainly enhance accessibility. Efforts are also being made to shorten publication times, 
with an increasing number of high-quality journals being able to provide peer review in two or three weeks. 
However, this means adding tight deadlines to an already voluntary, unpaid, highly skilled workforce of 
academic reviewers. 
As we have seen, both white and grey literature are complementary and useful sources of information on 
migration. We have highlighted some of their strengths and weaknesses, and have suggested a few initial 
actions that could help expand their reach to achieve a more balanced discourse on migration. We underline 
that the analysis in the current chapter relates to contributions from a subset of academic journals and 
intergovernmental organizations. Although we think that the picture that emerges provides a fair account 
of recent research and analysis on migration, it does not purport to be exhaustive. We expect to extend the 
breadth of this analysis in future editions of the World Migration Report, including these and other sources in 
order to provide a more complete description of the empirical contributions to the migration discourse over 
time.
408	Boswell,	2008;	Sageman,	2014.
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Finally, we encourage policymakers, practitioners, researchers and others to explore and exploit the wealth of 
written material on migration with a critical eye. We also underscore the importance of activities and initiatives 
that bridge the gap between the research and policy spheres by bringing migration scholars, researchers, 
practitioners and policymakers together, including through workshops, conferences, briefing sessions, and 
related consultations. The opportunity to listen and share knowledge on migration can support new lines of 
thinking and help craft more effective policy responses.
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5 GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: EXISTING ARCHITECTURE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS409
Introduction
In recent decades, there have been incremental and substantial efforts to improve the global governance of 
migration, building on the norms and institutions developed over the course of the last century. In the 2016 
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (New York Declaration) – the negotiated outcome of the most 
high-profile plenary meeting to take place on human movements at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
(GA) – States committed to set in motion a process of intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of 
a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration. In an area in which global governance has lagged other 
transnational issues, this development is particularly noteworthy. It reflects the extent to which confidence 
in multilateral approaches has been built by efforts to strengthen international cooperation through informal 
dialogues and initiatives that allowed States to consult and share information. Yet, as at other times in history, 
it is also emblematic of the need for global cooperation in the face of underlying political, demographic, 
environmental and socioeconomic drivers of migration.
This chapter describes key aspects of the existing architecture relevant to the global governance of migration and 
reviews recent developments. It focuses on movements of people across international borders and on governance 
at the global level – that is, governance relevant to, or open to participation by, all UN Member States. In this 
context, governance encompasses the following substantive rules and norms, processes for decision-making, and 
mechanisms for implementation and monitoring: 
1. Binding laws and norms, non-binding normative frameworks, and agreements among States to cooperate on 
various aspects of migration;
2. Institutional actors and institutional frameworks and mechanisms; and 
3. Processes such as dialogues and initiatives that have taken place at the global level or that relate to 
governance at the global level.410
The next section begins with a discussion of the benefits of governing migration at the global level and identifies 
some of the main barriers inhibiting greater progress to this end, followed by an overview of key norms and 
institutions. This provides the context for the discussion in the penultimate section, which highlights three major 
themes: (1) key dialogues and initiatives instrumental to building momentum and confidence towards greater 
action at the global level, with particular focus on the 2016 UN High-level Meeting on Addressing Large Movements 
of Refugees and Migrants (2016 UN High-level Meeting) and the negotiations over the global compacts on 
refugees and migration; (2) initiatives specifically aimed at building normative frameworks to enhance protection 
of migrants, such as the Nansen Initiative on disaster-induced cross-border displacement and the Migrants in 
409	Susan	Martin,	Donald	G.	Herzberg	Professor	Emerita	of	International	Migration,	Georgetown	University	and	Sanjula	Weerasinghe,	
non-resident	Fellow,	Institute	for	the	Study	of	International	Migration.
410	See	Appendix	A	for	a	definition	of	global	governance	and	definitions	of	other	key	terms	used	in	this	chapter.	
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Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative; and (3) the integration of international migration into global-level responses 
on other salient issues, such as sustainable development and climate change. The conclusion brings these strands 
together to discuss steps that may be taken to further advance the global governance of migration.
Benefits and barriers to global migration governance
There are advantages to enhancing the global governance of migration. Managing movements of people across 
international borders cannot be achieved through unilateral State action alone; rather, the development and 
implementation of migration policy benefits from international cooperation in addressing the complex drivers and 
processes of migration. By definition, international migration involves at least two countries – origin and destination – 
and increasingly implicates numerous other countries that serve as transit points, competitors for talent, collaborators 
in combating organized crime and movement of terrorists, and participants in the global financial system that moves 
remittances. Moreover, migration also involves non-State actors that intersect with governments and each other 
in managing movements of people. Some of these have formal, sanctioned roles (e.g. multinational corporations, 
labour recruitment agencies, humanitarian aid organizations and trade unions) whereas others are engaged in illicit 
activities (e.g. migrant smuggling and human trafficking). Furthermore, international migration intersects with other 
transnational issues, including development, trade, security, environmental change, conflict resolution, disaster risk 
reduction, human rights and humanitarian action. But, unlike these other areas, efforts to develop global governance 
systems to respond to existing and emerging challenges have lagged in the migration area.
In the face of global cooperation and coordination problems, a more effective system of global migration governance 
has the potential to improve collective responses and create opportunities for mutual benefits. Such a system can 
bring States together to discuss issues of mutual concern; identify common goals and strategies; create the space 
for learning and understanding; and allow States to coordinate and cooperate, including in the development and 
implementation of systems, processes and initiatives. Global norms, including principles, rules and guidance, 
whether legally binding or not, establish benchmarks against which State behaviour can be measured. Even 
when they are not widely ratified or adhered to, global norms can affect State behaviour. Ultimately, the benefits 
stemming from the global governance of migration should also be judged by the extent to which such a system 
enhances the realization of rights and the well-being of migrants. In this sense, the system for global migration 
governance and any improvements to it should necessarily be grounded in a recognition and acceptance that 
migrants, like everyone else, are entitled to inalienable rights.411
In his final report as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration (SRSG), Sir 
Peter Sutherland cautioned that global migration governance cannot be achieved by fiat:
Progress is likely to hinge on the involvement of those directly affected and those 
responsible for policy implementation, while reaching agreement on common minimum 
standards, principles and approaches that should apply across the board. The latter 
provides predictability for inter-State cooperation, based on clearly articulated mutual 
expectations and responsibilities, and for migrants, whose rights must be protected 
wherever they happen to move in the world.412
411	On	grounding	claims	about	“better”	global	migration	governance,	see,	for	example,	Betts,	2011;	Martin,	2014	and	2015;	and	Betts	
and	Kainz,	2017;	See	also,	Koser,	2010.	
412	SRSG,	2017.
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Efforts to improve global governance of migration are not new. The post-World War I and II eras saw significant 
progress in establishing international norms, rules, procedures and institutions in the area of labour migration 
and refugee movements, as part of the broader establishment of the modern international system dealing with a 
range of economic, social and political issues.413 At the same time, however, the global governance of migration 
remains fragmented, with robust international law in some areas, significant gaps in others, and inadequate 
decision-making processes and mechanisms for implementation of policies. The legal and institutional frameworks 
are strongest and oldest for refugees, with a widely ratified UN convention and a clear lead agency, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). International treaties on human trafficking and migrant smuggling are 
also relatively widely ratified. By contrast, the various instruments to protect migrant workers have received 
less support. While migrant workers, and indeed all migrants, are covered under core international human rights 
instruments, normative gaps also remain, especially with regard to access to territory and stay for migrants in 
highly vulnerable situations, including those who do not qualify for protection as refugees.414 
A number of factors have impeded progress in establishing a more coherent system of global migration 
governance. The first is concern articulated by a number of States about the effect on their sovereignty. 
Migration is understood to affect sovereignty directly by its impact on the integrity of borders, economic growth, 
social relationships, demography, cultural values and – in rare cases – political stability. These impacts are felt 
not only by countries of destination, but also by origin and transit countries. Immigration, for example, is a 
pathway in many States towards citizenship, which determines who will be making decisions about the identity 
and future of the country. Large-scale or specific manifestations of emigration (such as of highly skilled or 
leadership groups) can have a detrimental effect on a country’s stability. Concerns about loss of sovereignty in 
the context of international cooperation are significant, but often misconstrue the nature of global governance 
systems. Recognition of the sovereign rights of States to manage migration is likely to be a core feature of any 
system of global migration governance. Even when States agree to the free movement of people across their 
borders, they retain the right to reinstate border controls when they believe national interests dictate such 
action, as occurred in some European Union Member States in 2015. States understandably prefer to operate on 
a “mutual interest” basis, rather than relinquish aspects of sovereignty to other countries that may have vastly 
different interests at stake. 
Second, migration is often a contested issue in domestic politics. Publics are divided as to whether migration 
is a problem or an opportunity.415 Interest groups tend to take more consistent stances in favour of, or opposed 
to, enlarging or contracting immigration, but they may cancel each other out in public immigration debates. 
Moreover, even among those who see migration as an opportunity, there are concerns that governments are 
increasingly unable to manage it well in the context of deepening globalization.416 
Third, and related, effective international cooperation requires States to consider the interests of other countries, 
which is difficult when States are conflicted about their own interests with regard to migration. When States are 
unclear about what they want to achieve through their own migration policies, it is difficult for them to engage 
constructively with others in international forums. Many States are, at one and the same time, countries of 
origin, transit and destination. Their interests may differ significantly, depending on the topic under discussion 
or the agreements being negotiated. Finding consensus is all the more difficult because there is little agreement 
413	For	a	detailed	account	of	these	historical	developments,	see,	for	example,	Martin,	2014.
414	This	is	not	to	say	that	significant	implementation	and	enforcement	gaps	do	not	exist	in	practice	under	existing	frameworks.	
415	See,	for	example,	German	Marshall	Fund	of	the	United	States,	2014.
416	Ibid.
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as to whether all parties to any accord would, on the whole, benefit from specific migration policies. Even 
though the economic research literature suggests that migration can generate significant economic benefits,417 
economics is not the only – or sometimes even the most important – factor in considering the effects of 
population movements. Social, fiscal, cultural, religious and other impacts may be as salient to governments 
when weighing how to manage flows of people or enter into agreements with other States.
Fourth, there is a natural asymmetry in the process of building a global migration governance system. Most 
destination countries tend to be global or regional hegemons in relationship to the countries of origin from 
which people migrate. This is equally true for South–South and South–North migration. Destination countries 
are generally wealthier and are often also strategically and militarily dominant. In negotiations, the destinations 
can have disproportionate power to define the terms by which their visas will be allocated. Even among 
countries with similar economies and political systems, agreement on policies is often elusive. The European 
Union has been working on such issues for decades and has still not achieved the level of policy coherence it 
has sought. Similarly, as early as 1992, the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community stated that 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) shall “develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination 
of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the Region 
generally among Member States”.418 The 2005 SADC Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons, adopted 
to fulfil this commitment, is yet to come into force.419
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, migration is fundamentally about people, in contrast to the global 
regimes to address movement of capital and goods. For the system of global migration governance to benefit 
States, migrants and societies, the very people to be regulated have to be engaged in developing and improving 
relevant frameworks, institutions and processes. However, incorporating migrants into such a system is 
exceedingly difficult, particularly since it is not always clear who can represent migrants’ interests in any given 
context. Some progress has been made at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) through 
the establishment of a civil society component, which includes representatives of migrant and diaspora-led 
organizations. As the GFMD is a consultative rather than a decision-making process, however, whether these 
organizations would indeed represent the interests of the vast array of different types of migrants is an open 
question. 
Given these barriers, progress in establishing international norms, procedures and rules of decision-making has 
been slow, focused mostly on building confidence among States and between States and other partners. Two 
decades ago, the UN Secretary General (SG) asked States if they wanted the UN to convene an international 
conference to discuss greater cooperation in migration management. The opposition to such a discussion at a 
global level was strong. The SG concluded: 
The disparate experiences of countries or subregions with regard to international 
migration suggest that, if practical solutions are to be found, they are likely to arise from 
the consideration of the particular situation of groups of countries sharing similar positions 
or concerns with the global international migration system. In the light of this, it may be 
expedient to pursue regional or subregional approaches whenever possible.420 
417	World	Bank,	2006.
418	Article	5(2)(d),	SADC,	1992.	
419	SADC,	2005.	
420	UN	SG,	1997.
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In fact, the proliferation of regional and cross-regional consultative processes was already under way, having 
begun in the mid-1980s and expanded subsequently. Some of these processes included like-minded countries 
experiencing similar challenges as origin or destination countries. Others were composed of both origin and 
destination countries. The opposition to global meetings on migration has since dissipated, as evident in the 
2006 and 2013 High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development (HLD) and the 2016 UN 
High-level Meeting. As many of their supporters believed they would, regional consultative mechanisms have 
provided constructive input to the emerging global consultative arrangements discussed further below. 
Norms and institutions
The normative and institutional architecture for the global governance of migration has developed, evolved and 
proliferated over time, particularly during the last century, and now embodies a relatively detailed – albeit fragmented – 
set of norms, rules and institutions that regulate the behaviour of States and other actors. This section provides an 
overview of key aspects of the legal/normative architecture and the institutional architecture.
Overview of legal and normative architecture 
Stemming from a State’s authority over its territory and population, international law recognizes a significant 
role for unilateral State action in regulating migration. States possess broad powers in this field, which include 
authority to determine admission, residence, expulsion and naturalization laws and policies. Yet this authority 
is also constrained by substantive and procedural norms relating to the exercise of State power. States have 
entered into treaties and agreements, and agreed to customary international law that restrict their authority to 
regulate migration, as an exercise of their sovereignty and in pursuance of their interests and duties.421 Thus, 
in essence, under international law, States have expressly or implicitly consented to limits on their power to 
regulate migration.
This has meant that the laws and norms relevant to migration governance are found in customary international 
law and diverse instruments, including multilateral treaties, bilateral agreements and domestic laws. Some 
of these instruments relate to specific facets of migration, although, given its multidimensional nature, 
migration governance naturally intersects with and is influenced by laws and norms in many other areas. While 
acknowledging these practical implications, this subsection focuses principally on global-level treaties relevant 
to international movements associated with persecution and torture, smuggling and trafficking, labour and 
services, and family unity, as well as modes of movement.422 
International human rights law permeates and is applicable to each of these themes. In the area of human 
rights, through deliberations and practice, States have undertaken significant obligations towards individuals 
and groups, including migrants. International human rights law imposes duties on States to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and seven other core human rights treaties articulate civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
that are inherent to all human beings in light of the recognition and acceptance of the fundamental importance 
421	See	Appendix	A	for	a	definition	of	customary	international	law.	More	generally,	see	for	example,	Aleinikoff,	2002.
422	The	subsection	does	not	delve	into	implementation	and	enforcement	gaps,	although	these	are	significant	and	arguably	impede	the	
global	governance	of	migration	in	ways	that	affect	the	interests	of	migrants	as	well	as	those	of	States.	
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of safeguarding human dignity.423 Since human rights inhere due to a person’s status as a human being and 
not because of citizenship, the vast majority of human rights are guaranteed to migrants and citizens alike, 
regardless of immigration status or other characteristics. 
While all human rights are applicable to State action on migration, the principle of non-discrimination is among 
the fundamental rights that impose obligations on States.424 This principle does not mean all distinctions 
between citizens and migrants are prohibited. For differential treatment to be permissible, in general, it must be 
“reasonable and objective” and the overall aim must be “to achieve a purpose which is legitimate” under human 
rights law.425 With respect to freedom of movement, Article 12 of the ICCPR articulates the contours of the right. 
Persons lawfully within State territory have the right to liberty of movement within the territory and freedom 
to choose their residence. Everyone is also free to leave any country, including their own, and no one can be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter their own country. However, States are permitted to impose restrictions 
that are based in law and consistent with the other rights in the ICCPR, if the restrictions are necessary to 
protect national security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. 
Persecution, torture and war
The most elaborate, well-established and widely adopted global laws and norms relate to movements associated 
with persecution, particularly to persons who can satisfy the legal definition of a refugee. The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Refugee Convention) establish a framework of surrogate 
protection for any person who “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.426 In its 
preamble, the Refugee Convention explicitly recognizes the international scope and nature of refugee problems 
and the need for international cooperation in achieving solutions. 
Even though the UDHR recognizes the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries, 
under the Refugee Convention, States do not have a corresponding obligation to admit asylum seekers, since 
international law does not articulate a general right to enter a State of which one is not a citizen.427 The 
principal duty relates to non-refoulement, an obligation against the forcible return to territories where life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of the traits noted above.428 However, refoulement is permitted under 
the Convention if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person presents a danger to the security of the 
country or to its community because of a final conviction for a particularly serious crime. Article 31 explicitly 
requires States to refrain from imposing penalties on refugees, recognizing that seeking asylum can breach 
immigration rules. Once asylum seekers are recognized as refugees, States are obligated to grant a range of 
rights and benefits; some rights are automatic, while other entitlements accrue, for example, as a function of 
the nature and duration of the attachment to the host State.429 
423	See	Appendix	B	for	ratifications	relating	to	the	treaties	discussed	in	this	chapter.
424	See,	for	example,	Article	2(1),	ICCPR;	Article	2(2),	ICESCR.
425	UNHRC,	1989.
426	Article	1A(2),	Refugee	Convention.
427	Article	14,	UDHR.
428	Article	33(1),	Refugee	Convention.
429	Hathaway,	2005.
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Burgeoning State practices directed at deterring, preventing and punishing irregular entry call into question 
the robustness of the Refugee Convention in fulfilling its original objective to provide international protection. 
Even though international human rights law has expanded the interpretation of the Convention definition of a 
refugee and thereby the breadth of persons who may fall within the definition, its circumscribed nature – the 
need to show persecution based on one of five grounds – means that it is poorly equipped to protect people 
who cross international borders in the context of war or natural disasters, absent these factors. Regional 
instruments have sought to fill some of the gaps by expanding the refugee definition to cover persons who 
cross borders in the context of wars and civil unrest, and there have been recent efforts to address normative 
gaps associated with cross-border movements in the context of disasters and environmental change (on the 
latter, see the next section). 
Victims of torture who cross international borders – whether or not they qualify as refugees – can also seek 
protection on the basis of human rights treaties and customary international law. The 1984 Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) prohibits the return of 
persons to torture, while the ICCPR prohibits return to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Unlike the 
Refugee Convention, the CAT contains an express and absolute prohibition against refoulement of a person to 
a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be subject to torture.430 The 
prohibition is implied in the ICCPR.431
Trafficking and smuggling
The other thematic areas in which a relatively large number of States have converged on the need for an 
international approach and agreed to global laws and norms relate to human trafficking and migrant smuggling. 
The 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (the 
so-called “Palermo Protocol”) to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC) defines 
“trafficking in persons” as comprising three key elements: an act; a means or method; and a purpose or 
motivation.432 This means trafficking in persons, as defined, can apply to both internal and international 
movements, even though the Protocol’s scope is limited to offences that are transnational in nature and where 
trafficking involves an “organized criminal group”.433 Among the Protocol’s objectives are protection and 
assistance of victims of trafficking with full respect for human rights,434 and the Protocol explicitly articulates 
ways of achieving this,435 although these have been criticized for insufficiently addressing the interests and 
needs of victims.436 States are required to consider laws or other measures that would allow victims to remain 
temporarily or permanently on their territory;437 however, subject to the State’s international protection 
obligations such as those stemming from refugee or human rights law, victims can be repatriated.438 
430	Article	3(1),	CAT.
431	Article	7,	ICCPR;	UNHRC,	1992.
432	See	Appendix	A	for	definition	of	trafficking	in	persons.
433	See	Appendix	A	for	definition	of	organized	criminal	group.
434	Article	2(b),	Palermo	Protocol.
435	Article	6,	Palermo	Protocol.
436	See,	for	example,	Gallagher,	2010.
437	Article	7,	Palermo	Protocol.
438	Article	8	and	14,	Palermo	Protocol.
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Smuggling, on the other hand, a key means through which irregular migration takes place, is generally 
viewed as a commercial transaction rather than a situation of vulnerability, although contemporary research is 
generating greater insights into its complexity.439 The commercial lens is arguably due in part to the definition 
in the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling Protocol) to UNCTOC, 
which characterizes “smuggling of migrants” as a transaction between the smuggler and a migrant that entails 
a benefit to the smuggler.440 Unlike trafficking, smuggling requires the crossing of an international border and 
the unauthorized entry of a migrant into a State in which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. 
The Protocol’s purpose is to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants and to promote cooperation among 
States’ parties towards these ends, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.441 Importantly, this means 
that the smuggler can be subject to criminal prosecution for smuggling, but not the smuggled migrant.
Labour and services 
In contrast to movements associated with persecution, torture, trafficking and smuggling, there is 
less convergence and cooperation at the global level on laws and norms for migrant workers. To regulate 
international movements related to labour and services, States have primarily adopted bilateral agreements 
and multilateral agreements at regional and subregional levels, including under broader frameworks for free 
movement. Nonetheless, a number of relevant laws exist at the global level: the 1990 Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW); the 1949 Migration for 
Employment Convention (Revised) (ILO Convention No. 97); and the 1975 Convention Concerning Migrations 
in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO 
Convention No. 143). Although individually these instruments are not widely ratified, about 86 States have 
ratified at least one of the three; together, they “comprise an international charter on labour migration, 
providing a comprehensive framework covering most issues of treatment of migrant workers and members of 
their families.”442 
The ICRMW seeks to secure for migrant workers the rights guaranteed by the UDHR and core human rights 
treaties. The ICRMW relates to the whole labour migration process, including prevention of abuses; it covers 
migrants in both regular and irregular situations and includes substantive and procedural safeguards. The two 
binding ILO conventions, which are supported by non-binding recommendations, also relate to the protection 
of migrant workers throughout the labour migration process. Among the key themes covered by ILO Convention 
No. 97 are the conditions governing the orderly recruitment of migrant workers, as well as equal treatment 
with nationals for lawfully resident migrants in respect of working conditions, trade union membership and 
enjoyment of benefits including collective bargaining, social security and employment taxes.443 ILO Convention 
No. 143 supplements ILO Convention No. 97; for example, it includes provisions specifically on migrants in 
irregular situations. In addition, the ILO’s eight fundamental rights conventions  – recognized as fundamental 
to the rights of human beings at work as well as ILO instruments of general applicability, such as the 2011 
Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (ILO Convention No. 189) – are relevant to migrant 
workers. 
439	See,	for	example,	McAuliffe	and	Laczko,	2016.
440	Article	3,	Smuggling	Protocol.	See	Appendix	A	for	definition	of	smuggling	of	migrants.	
441	Article	2,	Smuggling	Protocol.
442	Cholewinski,	2012.		
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The 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a key instrument in international trade law further 
liberalizing the trade in services, contains provisions indirectly supporting the temporary movement of persons 
between trading partners, thus facilitating international mobility at the global level. GATS applies to all 
measures by 164 WTO Members affecting trade in services, except where services are supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority (on a non-commercial basis).444 GATS contains rules and a framework for countries 
to make specific commitments to open particular service sectors to foreign suppliers. GATS establishes four 
possible modes through which services can be traded between WTO Members. Under Mode 4, WTO Members can 
commit to permit the presence of natural persons from other WTO Members for purposes of supplying services. 
GATS commitments are subject to national immigration provisions and accordingly, GATS does not require WTO 
Members to confer rights to live in their territories. GATS commitments are enforceable in the WTO.445 
Family unity 
There are no global treaties specifically on international movements related to family unity. Indeed, the term 
“family unity” is not expressed as such in international instruments; it is generally used to describe rights 
that respect, protect and support the family, including its ability to be together.446 Similarly, while the family 
is regarded as the fundamental unit of society, a single internationally accepted definition does not exist. The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has interpreted the term, as contained in the ICCPR, in broad 
terms as embodying “all interpersonal relations that are held to constitute a family in the society concerned.”447 
Protection of family unity is underscored by universal rights, including Articles 12 and 16 of the UDHR, Articles 
17 and 23 of the ICCPR, and Article 10 of the ICESCR, as well as provisions in the 1989 Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and the ICRMW. These rights interact with, and impose constraints on, State authority to regulate 
on migration, particularly in situations where a State seeks to deport a non-citizen member of a family residing 
within their territory or to deny entry to a non-citizen seeking to join family members residing in the territory.
Modes of movement
State interests have also converged at the global level to regulate modes of movements. Customary international 
law and key global treaties are relevant to, and impose obligations on States, and in some instances on other 
actors, in the context of movements by sea and air. These treaties and customary international law are particularly 
relevant in an environment and context where States, through bilateral agreements and other mechanisms, 
increasingly seek to prevent and deter movements. Arguably, lack of clarity under international law on certain 
critical issues has also created the space for such arrangements. Key treaties on maritime movements and 
international transport by air are:
• 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS);
• 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR);
• 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); and 
• 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the “Chicago Convention”), in particular Annex 9. 
444	Article	1,	GATS.
445	For	more	on	GATS	and	movement	of	persons,	see,	for	example,	WTO,	n.d.	
446	See,	for	example,	Jastram,	2003.	
447	Kälin	and	Künzli,	2009,	drawing	on	UNHRC,	1988	and	1990.	
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Movements across land or “green” borders, the other key mode of entry for migrants, tend to be controlled 
unilaterally or via bilateral agreements. 
Overview of institutional architecture 
This subsection highlights the roles of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the three international organizations with the most robust normative 
and/or operational mandates related to the global governance of migration. It also touches upon the roles 
and missions of the Global Migration Group (GMG) and the SRSG, while acknowledging that a host of other 
institutional actors play important direct and indirect roles.
Since its founding in 1951, IOM has adapted significantly, expanding from a regional organization with primarily 
logistical responsibilities to a global one with a much broader set of objectives, especially in humanitarian 
engagement. Established through a State-led process outside the UN system and under a different name and 
without the underpinnings of a convention, IOM joined the UN as a related organization in September 2016.448 
IOM’s Constitution does not exhaustively define or limit the populations able to benefit from IOM’s efforts and 
services in pursuance of its purposes and functions.449 This has allowed IOM to be entrepreneurial and flexible 
in responding to evolving political and humanitarian needs.450 Since 2001, IOM has convened an annual 
International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) as a key global forum that brings together relevant stakeholders to 
discuss emerging and complex migration governance themes. IOM’s Migration Governance Framework, adopted 
in 2015, is particularly relevant to the themes of this chapter. The framework identifies essential elements 
for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration (and mobility) of people through planned and 
well-managed migration policies. It articulates three principles: (1) adherence to international standards and 
fulfilment of migrants’ rights; (2) formulation of policy using evidence and a whole-of-government approach; 
and (3) engagement with partners to address migration and related issues; and three objectives: (1) advance the 
socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society; (2) effectively address the mobility dimensions of crises; and 
(3) ensure that migration takes place in a safe, orderly and dignified manner.451
Established as a temporary regionally focused organization tasked to provide legal protection, over time in the 
context of evolving political and mobility landscapes and humanitarian exigencies, UNHCR’s responsibilities 
and operations have adapted and expanded significantly. It is the primary global institution responsible for 
protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons.452 Under the Refugee Convention, 
States undertake to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, particularly to facilitate UNHCR’s 
specific duty to supervise the Convention’s application.453 In this sense, UNHCR is the “guardian” of the 
Refugee Convention and promotes and monitors implementation and compliance. UNHCR’s mandate and 
functions are set out in its 1950 Statute; its core mandate is to provide international protection and seek 
448	Initially	established	as	the	Provisional	Intergovernmental	Committee	for	the	Movement	of	Migrants	from	Europe	(PICMME)	and	later	
the	Intergovernmental	Committee	for	European	Migration	(ICEM)	and	the	Intergovernmental	Committee	for	Migration	(ICM),	the	
current	name	was	adopted	in	1989.
449	Article	1(1),	IOM,	2017.	
450	Bradley,	2017.
451	IOM,	2015.	
452	The	UN	Relief	and	Works	Agency	(UNRWA)	provides	assistance	and	protection	to	Palestinian	refugees	in	Jordan,	Lebanon,	Syrian	
Arab	Republic,	the	Gaza	Strip	and	the	West	Bank,	including	East	Jerusalem.	See,	for	example,	UNRWA,	n.d.	
453	Article	35,	Refugee	Convention.	
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permanent solutions for refugees.454 The Statute also provides for UNHCR’s mandate and activities to evolve, 
based on instructions and policy directives from the GA and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).455 
UNHCR also convenes agenda-setting global consultations, hosts the annual High Commissioner’s Dialogue on 
key protection challenges and publishes Guidelines on International Protection to clarify the application of 
the Convention. Its Executive Committee, which is comprised of 101 Member States,456 is “the only specialized 
multilateral forum at the global level responsible for contributing to the development of international 
standards relating to refugee protection.”457 
The ILO’s operational role is much narrower than either of the other two organizations, but it continues to play 
an important normative function. In addition to its conventions, the ILO’s non-binding Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration, adopted in 2006, and developed in the context of the ILO’s general commitment to decent 
work, represents consensus on the part of the three sets of actors that make up the ILO’s governing structure: 
governments, employers and trade unions. Its aim is to assist States “in implementing more effective policies 
on labour migration, including on rights, employment and protection of migrant workers.”458 Operationally, 
the ILO supports programmes to enhance social protection of migrants, such as the negotiation of agreements 
that allow portability of benefits; prevent human trafficking; improve migrant labour recruitment practices; 
enhance skills recognition of migrants; support reintegration of migrants; and protect domestic workers. In 
contrast to UNHCR and IOM, migration is one among many priorities within the ILO.459 
Beyond these three key UN agencies, a whole host of other institutional actors and mechanisms are relevant 
to the governance of migration at the global level.460 In recognition of the complexity of the institutional 
landscape, the GMG was established to promote greater cooperation and coordination. It is comprised of 
22 entities that meet regularly at heads of agency and working levels.461 In its terms of reference, the GMG 
identifies establishing comprehensive and coherent institutional responses to international migration and 
working to ensure full respect for rights of international migrants, including protection to vulnerable migrants, 
among its key priorities.462 
A final important actor is the SRSG on International Migration. The office, established in 2006 in the lead-
up to the UNHLD, supports and advises the Secretary-General in promoting and advocating the UN agenda 
on international migration and provides policy advice and coordinates the engagement of UN entities on 
454	UNGA,	1950.
455	See	in	particular	UNGA,	1950.	The	Statute	and	GA	and	ECOSOC	resolutions	identify	persons	who	may	qualify	as	refugees	and	fall	
within	UNHCR’s	mandate	as	well	as	other	“persons	of	concern”	who	may	fall	within	UNHCR’s	competence.	See	also,	UNHCR,	2013.
456	UNHCR,	n.d.	
457	Loescher,	2014.
458	ILO,	2006.
459	Labour	migration	is	one	of	more	than	40	issues	listed	on	the	ILO’s	homepage	under	“topics”;	see,	for	example,	ILO,	n.d.a.	It	is	one	of	
10	areas	in	which	the	budget	is	organized;	see,	for	example,	ILO,	n.d.b.	
460	Among	 them	 are	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights	 (OHCHR)	 and	 the	 population	 division	 within	 the	 UN	
Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs	(UN	DESA).	The	OHCHR	has	a	mandate	to	promote	and	protect	the	enjoyment	and	full	
realization	of	human	rights	of	all	people,	including	migrants.	The	office	also	supports	the	Special	Procedures	of	the	Human	Rights	
Council,	 including	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Human	Rights	of	Migrants	and	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	Trafficking	in	Persons	
Especially	Women	and	Children.	Among	other	aspects,	UN	DESA	prepares	global	migrant	stock	estimates	and	supports	dialogues	and	
meetings	on	international	migration	within	the	UN.
461	Members	are:	FAO,	IFAD,	the	ILO,	IOM,	OHCHR,	UN	Regional	Commissions,	UNEP,	UNICEF,	UNCTAD,	UN	DESA,	UNDP,	UNESCO,	UN	
Women,	UNHCR,	UNIDO,	UNITAR,	UNODC,	UNFPA,	UNU,	World	Bank,	WFP	and	WHO.	Some	notable	organizations	are	not	members,	
including	WTO,	ICAO	and	WMO.	See	GMG,	n.d.a.	
462	GMG,	n.d.b.
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migration-related issues. The office has led efforts to foster international cooperation, including initiatives 
on specific issues such as migrants affected by crises and will coordinate the work to implement the New York 
Declaration (see next section). Louise Arbour succeeded Sir Peter Sutherland as SRSG in 2017.
Efforts to improve global governance (2001–2016)
During the twenty-first century, there have been recurrent efforts to improve global migration governance 
through formal UN mechanisms as well as through informal State-led mechanisms. This section briefly examines 
three sets of such activities: (1) dialogues and consultative processes to build confidence and consensus among 
States; (2) mini-multilateral normative initiatives to enhance protection of migrants; and (3) efforts to ensure 
that migrants are included in decision-making on other, related global issues. 
Dialogue and consultation
The last two decades have seen a marked increase in global-level dialogues and consultative mechanisms on 
international migration, as awareness has grown of its multidimensional and transnational nature and of 
the need for multilateral cooperation on various aspects of the issue. Table 1 highlights key dialogues and 
consultations held at the global level since 2001, organized by States or the UN, and presents an overview 
of major outputs or outcomes. These dialogues and initiatives are not without criticisms at the substantive 
and procedural levels.463 Nonetheless, the growing salience and priority of governing migration at the global 
level is reflected in the fact that past reluctance and disagreements have shifted somewhat towards increased 
cooperation with greater recognition of the benefits to be gained from global discussions and action. 
According to a recent analysis of nine global dialogues and initiatives, the following broad thematic clusters 
have featured in all of them: (1) minimizing the negative aspects of migration by addressing drivers and 
consequences of displacement and irregular migration; (2) acknowledging and strengthening the positive 
effects of migration for countries of origin and destination, as well as for migrants; and (3) protecting 
migrants’ rights and ensuring their well-being.464 While the dialogues and initiatives have approached these 
broad themes from different angles and with varying degrees of emphasis, there has been convergence on the 
importance of making progress with regard to a number of subthemes across the dialogues and initiatives. The 
main subthemes where tensions are apparent include recommendations related to opening more legal avenues 
for migration, considering low-skilled labour migration outside temporary channels, and the rights of migrant 
workers, especially as articulated in the ICMWC.465
463	See,	for	example,	Newland,	2005.	
464	Bauloz,	2017.	The	paper	examined	the	Berne	 Initiative,	annual	meetings	of	 IOM’s	 IDM,	the	so-called	“Doyle	Report”,	 the	Global	
Commission	on	International	Migration	(GCIM),	the	GMG,	the	2006	HLD,	GFMDs,	the	2013	HLD	and	the	2016	UN	High-level	Meeting.	
See	discussion	of	some	of	these	in	the	table	below.	
465	Ibid.	
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Table	1.		Selected	dialogues	and	consultations	at	the	global	level	during	the	twenty-first	century466
Year Dialogue or Initiative Key Outcome
2001–2004	 Berne	Initiative,	launched	by	
Switzerland	and	State-owned.
International	Agenda	for	Migration	Management 
including:	(1)	common	understandings	outlining	
fundamental	shared	assumptions	and	principles	
underlying	migration	management;	and	(2)	effective	
practices	on	a	range	of	migration	issues	that	draw	on	
actual	and	practical	experiences	of	States.
2003–2005	 Global	Commission	on	
International	Migration,	 
co-chaired	by	Switzerland	and	
Sweden,	with	over	30	States	as	
part	of	a	core	group.a 
Migration	in	an	Interconnected	World:	New	Directions	
for	Action,	laying	out	a	framework	for	the	formulation	
of	coherent	responses	to	the	issue	of	international	
migration	at	national,	regional	and	global	levels.b
2006 UN	High-level	Dialogue	on	
International	Migration	and	
Development.
Resolution	(A/RES/61/208)	on	International	Migration	
and	Development	adopted	by	the	General	Assembly	
by	consensus	in	December	2006.	The	Summary	of	the	 
High-level	Dialogue	by	the	President	of	the	General	
Assembly	(A/61/515)	noted	support	for	continuing	
the	global	dialogue	on	international	migration	and	
development.
2007–present	 Global	Forum	on	Migration	and	
Development.	
State-led	process	that	allows	for	consultation,	
dialogue	and	cooperation	on	international	migration	
issues	with	growing	and	extensive	government	
participation.	Civil	society	discussions	have	preceded	
State	discussions	with	common	space	for	interaction.
2013 UN	High-level	Dialogue	on	
International	Migration	and	
Development.	
Negotiated	Declaration	adopted	unanimously	by	
General	Assembly	(A/RES/68/4),	which	recognized	
and	reaffirmed	the	need	for	international	cooperation	
and	action	in	managing	migration	and	protecting	the	
rights	of	migrants.
2016 UN	High-level	Meeting	on	
Addressing	Large	Scale	
Movements	of	Refugees	and	
Migrants.
First	summit	at	the	Heads	of	State	and	Government	
level	on	large	movements	of	refugees	and	migrants.	
Resulted	in	the	New	York	Declaration	adopted	
unanimously	by	all	193	UN	Member	States.	
a		 The	GCIM	was	established	following	recommendations	stemming	from	the	so-called	“Doyle	Report”.	See,	for	example,	GCIM,	n.d.;	
see	also	Doyle,	2004.
b	 The	GMG,	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter,	was	established	as	a	response	to	this	recommendation.	
466	Even	 earlier,	 at	 the	 1994	 International	 Conference	 on	 Population	 and	 Development	 (ICPD)	 in	 Cairo,	 179	 States	 adopted	 a	 20-year	 
Programme	of	Action	that	was	intended	to	“serve	as	a	comprehensive	guide	to	people	centered	development	action.”	It	contained	a	whole	
chapter	on	international	migration	and	arguably	launched	further	dialogue	on	migration.	See,	for	example,	UNFPA,	2014.	Summaries	of	the	
dialogues	and	initiatives	highlighted	in	this	table	have	been	drawn	from	relevant	websites.	More	generally,	see	for	example,	Newland,	2011.
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The 2016 UN High-level Meeting deserves special attention. The summit came in the aftermath of several major 
refugee and migration crises affecting many parts of the world. The large-scale movements of people from and 
through the Middle East and North Africa into Europe brought particular attention to the issue, but significant 
movements of Central Americans through Mexico into the United States and people from Bangladesh and Myanmar 
into other Southeast Asian countries also raised its global visibility. 
The SG’s report for the 2016 UN High-level Meeting focused on both refugees and migrants, highlighting trends, causes 
of large movements, and needs both en route and upon arrival. It called for “new global commitments to address large 
movements of refugees and migrants, commencing with recommendations to ensure at all times the human rights, safety 
and dignity of refugees and migrants”.467 The report also elaborated the need to address the causes of movements and 
protect those who are compelled to move, and to prevent discrimination and counter xenophobia against refugees and 
migrants.468 The New York Declaration recognized that although there are separate legal frameworks governing refugees and 
migrants, both have the “same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms [and] [t]hey also face many common 
challenges and have similar vulnerabilities, including in the context of large movements.”469 In this context, the New 
York Declaration endorsed a set of commitments that apply to both refugees and migrants, as well as separate sets of 
commitments for refugees and for migrants. The Declaration acknowledged that States have “a shared responsibility to 
manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner” and 
to do so through international cooperation, while recognizing that there are varying capacities and resources to respond.470 
With regard to refugees, the SG’s report called for “[a] more predictable and equitable way of responding to large 
movements of refugees … through the adoption of a global compact on responsibility-sharing for refugees, and [by 
setting out] elements of a comprehensive response plan for refugees”.471 It called on Member States to adopt a compact 
that would “commit to sharing responsibility for hosting refugees more fairly” and to “take immediate steps … to 
ensure … the impact of [refugee] flight is not borne disproportionately by countries and regions on the basis of their 
proximity to countries of origin alone.”472 Responsibility-sharing could manifest itself through, among other things, 
“financial and in-kind support, technical assistance, legal or policy measures, personnel and resettlement places or 
other pathways for admission of refugees, and to endeavour to make contributions proportionate to the global needs 
of refugees and to the diverse capacities of each Member State”.473 In the New York Declaration, States committed to 
a “more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while 
taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.”474 And, despite the 
fears of many advocates for refugees, the declaration strongly endorsed the existing normative framework for refugee 
protection. These statements were a significant achievement in themselves, as “[t]he 19 September summit was the 
first time ever that the UN General Assembly had expressed a collective commitment to sharing responsibility for 
refugees.”475 The New York Declaration gave UNHCR principal responsibility for drafting the compact on refugees, which 
is to be included in the High Commissioner’s annual report to the GA in 2018.476
467	UNSG,	2016.
468	Ibid.
469	UNGA,	2016.	
470	Ibid.	
471	UNSG,	2016.	The	work	on	refugees	was	informed	by	several	other	high-level	meetings	in	2016	that	sought	greater	cooperation	in	
responding	to	crises,	 including	the	Supporting	Syria	and	the	Region	Conference,	held	in	London	in	February	2016;	the	High-level	
Meeting	on	Global	Responsibility	Sharing	through	Pathways	for	Admission	of	Syrian	Refugees,	held	in	Geneva	in	March	2016;	and	
the	World	Humanitarian	Summit,	held	in	Istanbul	in	May	2016.
472	UNSG,	2016.	
473	Ibid.	
474	UNGA,	2016.	
475	Ferris,	2017.
476	UNGA,	2016.
139WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018
On migration, the SG’s report called for “strengthening global governance of migration through the development 
of a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration, in a process to be initiated now and realized in 
the coming years.”477 Instead of proposing language for the compact, the SG asked for “a State-led process to 
elaborate a comprehensive international cooperation framework on migrants and human mobility … and to hold 
an intergovernmental conference on international migration in 2018 to adopt the global compact”.478 The New York 
Declaration confirmed this approach and indeed, responsibility for drafting the migration compact rests firmly 
with States. The process for developing the migration compact is led by the President of the UNGA, who named 
the governments of Mexico and Switzerland as co-facilitators. The UN Secretariat and IOM are jointly servicing the 
negotiations, the former providing capacity and support and the latter extending technical and policy expertise.479 
The global compact on migration is to set out “a range of principles, commitments and understandings among 
Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions.”480 Annex II of the New York Declaration 
lists a non-exhaustive set of 24 issues to be addressed in the compact. They range from the very general (for 
example, cooperation at the national, regional and international levels on all aspects of migration) to the very 
specific (for example, promotion of faster, cheaper and safer transfers of remittances through legal channels). 
In his final report as SRSG, Sir Peter Sutherland recommended an agenda for action that highlights five policy priorities 
for the global compact: (1) managing crisis-related movement and protecting migrants in vulnerable situations; 
(2) building opportunities for labour and skills mobility; (3) ensuring orderly migration, including return; (4) fostering 
migrant inclusion and development benefits; and (5) strengthening governance capacities. Others have emphasized 
that the global compact should primarily reinforce the human rights framework for the protection of migrants.481 
A further major outcome of the 2016 UN High-level Meeting related to institutional arrangements for global migration 
governance. The New York Declaration endorsed IOM’s entry into the UN, “which will assist and protect migrants 
more comprehensively, help States to address migration issues and promote better coherence between migration and 
related policy domains.”482 Member States expressed their wish that IOM’s admission as a related organization would 
not change its mission or mode of operation.483 Director General, William Lacy Swing, made this point at the signing 
of the agreement between IOM and the UN during the 2016 UN High-level Meeting:
We will continue to keep our Member States fully and regularly informed. We will continue 
to insist on being cost-effective with our business model: where 97 per cent of our 10,000 
people are overseas, and out of a budget of 1.5 billion we will use less than 50 million to 
run the organization. We will also [sic] to continue to offer quick delivery – the same sort 
of openness that allowed us to come to consensus on this agreement.484
From a policy and UN coordination perspective, however, as a member of the UN family of agencies, IOM should 
be better positioned to bring greater attention, coherence and more effective responses to migration issues 
within the overall UN system and among its Member States.
477	UNSG,	2016.
478	Ibid.
479	UNGA,	2017a.	
480	UNGA,	2016.	
481	Guild	and	Grant,	2017.
482	UNGA,	2016.
483	According	to	the	UN,	“The	term	‘related	organization’	has	to	be	understood	as	a	default	expression,	describing	organizations	whose	
cooperation	agreement	with	the	United	Nations	has	many	points	in	common	with	that	of	Specialized	Agencies”.	See,	for	example,	
United	Nations	System	Chief	Executives	Board	for	Coordination,	n.d.	
484	IOM,	n.d.
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Mini-multilateralism in filling normative protection gaps
The New York Declaration called for a State-led, consultative process to improve protection and assistance for 
migrants in vulnerable situations and to give favourable consideration to implementing the recommendations of 
the Nansen Initiative on cross-border movements in the context of natural disasters and climate change, and the 
MICIC Initiative. These two initiatives represent what are called mini-multilateral approaches to norm-building 
to fill gaps in binding international law, particularly ones that are unlikely to be filled by new conventions or 
treaties.485 Sir Peter Sutherland, the former SRSG on international migration, argued strongly that such “willing 
coalitions of States, working with other stakeholders, can begin to tackle … priorities and gradually broaden the 
consensus on what a functioning international architecture for migration should look like in 2018 and beyond.”486
Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in 
the Context of Disasters and Climate Change
The	State-led	Nansen	 Initiative	was	 launched	by	Norway	and	Switzerland	 in	 light	of	broad	consensus	
surrounding	the	need	to	address	the	normative	gap	for	the	protection	of	people	displaced	across	borders	
in	the	context	of	disasters,	including	those	related	to	climate	change.	Focused	on	the	protection	of	people,	
but	with	a	wider	scope,	including	the	need	to	address	issues	of	international	cooperation	and	solidarity,	
the	Nansen	Initiative’s	aim	was	to	develop	a	more	coherent	and	consistent	approach	at	the	international	
level	and	help	the	international	community	develop	an	effective	normative	framework.a
As	a	State-led,	bottom-up,	intergovernmental	consultative	process,	the	Initiative	built	a	global	evidence	
base	 and	 consensus	on	 the	needs	of	 such	people,	 and	 in	October	 2015	 launched	 an	Agenda	 for	 the	
Protection	of	Cross-Border	Displaced	Persons	in	the	Context	of	Disasters	and	Climate	Change,	which	was	
endorsed	by	109	government	delegations.	
To	assist	States	and	other	stakeholders	to	improve	preparedness	and	responses	to	address	cross-border	
displacement,	 the	Protection	Agenda	 conceptualizes	 a	 comprehensive	 approach	–	 a	 toolbox	 that	not	
only	focuses	on	protecting	those	who	cross	borders,	but	also	presents	measures	to	manage	risks	in	the	
country	of	origin.	The	Agenda	compiles	a	broad	set	of	effective	practices	and	highlights	three	priority	
areas	for	action	at	the	national,	(sub)regional	and	international	levels:
(a)	 Collecting	data	and	enhancing	knowledge	on	cross-border	displacement;
(b)	 Enhancing	the	use	of	humanitarian	protection	measures	for	those	who	cross	borders	in	the	context	 
	 of	disasters	and	climate	change;	and
(c)	 Strengthening	the	management	of	disaster	displacement	risk	in	the	country	of	origin	by:
	 (i)		 Integrating	human	mobility	within	disaster	risk	reduction	and	climate	change	adaptation	 
	 	 strategies	and	other	relevant	development	processes;	
	 (ii)		Facilitating	migration	with	dignity	as	a	potentially	positive	way	to	cope	with	the	effects	 
	 	 of	natural	hazards	and	climate	change;	
485	Naim,	2009.
486	SRSG,	2017.
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(iii)		Improving	the	use	of	planned	relocation	as	a	preventative	or	responsive	measure	to	disaster	
risk	and	displacement;	and	
(iv)		Ensuring	the	needs	of	persons	displaced	internally	in	disaster	situations	are	specifically	addressed	in	
relevant	laws	and	policies	on	disaster	risk	management	and	internal	displacement.	
For	 more	 on	 the	 Nansen	 Initiative,	 including	 its	 Protection	 Agenda,	 see:	 www.nanseninitiative.org/.	 
For	more	on	the	successor	to	the	Nansen	Initiative,	the	Platform	on	Disaster	Displacement	(PDD),	see:	
http://disasterdisplacement.org/.
a			Kälin,	2012.
MICIC Initiative Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or 
Natural Disaster
The	 MICIC	 Initiative	 has	 also	 been	 praised	 as	 an	 important	 effort	 at	 mini-multilateralism.	 Launched	
at	 the	 2014	GFMD	 in	 Sweden	by	 its	 co-chairs	 the	United	 States	 and	 the	 Philippines,	 the	 Initiative	was	
a	 response	 to	 a	 series	 of	 calls	 to	 action,	 including	 at	 the	 2013	 HLD	 where	 former	 Secretary-General	 
Ban	Ki-moon	noted	the	need	to	address	the	plight	of	migrants	caught	in	situations	of	conflict	or	natural	
disaster.	These	calls	stemmed	from	recognition	–	evidenced	most	acutely	during	the	2011	Libyan	crisis,	when	
over	800,000	migrants	fled	the	country	in	a	matter	of	months	–	that	migrants	can	fall	through	the	cracks	of	
preparedness	and	response	efforts	in	the	context	of	crises	and	that	this	is	an	issue	of	global	concern.b 
Following	 its	 launch,	 a	 committed	working	 group	 –	 comprised	 of	 the	 co-chairs,	 the	 governments	 of	
Australia,	Bangladesh,	Costa	Rica	and	Ethiopia,	the	European	Commission,	IOM	(which	also	served	as	the	
secretariat),	UNHCR,	the	Office	of	the	SRSG,	the	International	Centre	for	Migration	Policy	Development	
(ICMPD)	and	Georgetown	University’s	Institute	for	the	Study	of	International	Migration	(ISIM)	–	undertook	
a	broad	and	inclusive	evidence-gathering	and	consultative	process.	The	MICIC	Initiative’s	main	outcome,	
the	 non-binding	 and	 voluntary	 Guidelines	 to	 Protect	 Migrants	 in	 Countries	 Experiencing	 Conflict	 or	
Natural	Disaster,	launched	at	the	UN	in	New	York	and	Geneva	in	June	2016,	provides	practical	guidance	
to	States,	 international	organizations,	private	sector	actors	and	civil	 society	on	better	ways	 to	protect	
migrants	prior	to,	during,	and	in	the	aftermath	of	conflicts	or	natural	disasters.	The	document	entails	10	
fundamental	and	cross-cutting	precepts	(Principles);	15	targeted	suggestions	organized	by	theme	and	by	
phase	(Guidelines);	and	a	non-exhaustive	selection	of	illustrative	practices	(Practices).
The	MICIC	Initiative	and	its	Guidelines	have	been	regarded	as	a	useful	model,	both	in	terms	of	process	
and	outcome,	for	tackling	issues	of	concern	to	the	global	community	of	States.	Like	the	Nansen	Initiative,	
the	salience	and	relevance	of	the	MICIC	Initiative	for	addressing	the	needs	and	protection	of	migrants	has	
been	recognized	in	the	2016	New	York	Declaration.	
For	more	on	the	MICIC	Initiative,	see:	https://micicinitiative.iom.int/.
b			For	more	on	the	impacts	of	crises	on	non-citizens,	see,	for	example,	Weerasinghe	et	al.,	2015.	
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There are a number of reasons to be optimistic about mini-multilateralism as a way to fill persistent gaps in 
protection. Martin, observing these processes from the inside, concluded that informal, non-binding, State-led 
processes for reform are seen by States as pragmatic approaches to norm-filling.487 The ad hoc nature of these 
processes allows them to address emerging issues and concerns more effectively than more formal mechanisms 
that are often tied to specific mandates. Because States are leading these efforts, there is a built-in constituency 
for ensuring their implementation. Moreover, these processes have been highly inclusive in terms of regional 
scope and participation. The resulting recommendations have been vetted with multiple stakeholders, although 
responsibility for issuing them ultimately rested with the State leads. These processes will only work, however, 
if States are willing to implement policies consistent with the recommended principles and guidelines. As 
Martin concluded: “Enhancing protection of those displaced by conflict, natural disasters and other crises will 
require sustained attention. In the long term … they will only be as effective as the willingness of States and 
other stakeholders to implement the recommendations and offer protection on a non-discriminatory basis to 
all who flee life-threatening situations.”488 Betts and Kainz also caution that mini-multilateralism, because it 
may generate overlapping initiatives on similar issues, “exemplifies a trend towards fragmentation in global 
migration governance” that could impede efforts to develop a more universal system.489
Negotiations on new approaches to protect migrants in vulnerable situations, as proposed in the New York 
Declaration, will be a greater test of mini-multilateralism than the Nansen or MICIC Initiatives, largely because 
vulnerability is an amorphous concept that potentially encompasses a very large number of people. How vulnerable 
situations are defined will be indicative of the commitment of States to protect persons who are not covered under 
existing laws and frameworks. Vulnerable migrants may include persons who do not qualify for protection under 
refugee frameworks, but who face a range of life-threatening situations in their home countries, such as communal, 
electoral, gang, cartel and terrorist violence; nuclear accidents; epidemics and pandemics; and disasters, to name a 
few.490 They can also include migrants with personal crises, including those stranded in a transit country en route to 
a final destination. Vulnerability can also stem from inherent or experienced characteristics, such as “women at risk, 
children, especially those who are unaccompanied or separated from their families, members of ethnic and religious 
minorities, victims of violence, older persons, persons with disabilities, persons who are discriminated against on 
any basis, indigenous peoples, victims of human trafficking, and victims of exploitation and abuse in the context of 
the smuggling of migrants.”491 By contrast, the Nansen and MICIC Initiatives addressed more specific populations in 
need of protection – disaster displaced and non-citizens in countries experiencing crisis, respectively.
GMG Principles and Guidelines on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants 
in Vulnerable Situations within Large and/or Mixed Movements
Since	2016,	the	GMG	Working	Group	on	Human	Rights	and	Gender	Equality,	has	been	leading	efforts	
to	develop	a	set	of	principles	and	guidelines,	supported	by	practical	guidance,	on	the	human	rights	
protection	of	migrants	in	vulnerable	situations	within	large	and/or	mixed	movements.	The	framework,	
which	has	been	developed	through	a	multi-stakeholder,	expert	process,	seeks	to	provide	guidance	to
487	Martin,	2016.	
488	Ibid.
489	Betts	and	Kainz,	2017.
490	For	more	on	diverse	humanitarian	crises	and	 their	 impacts	on	populations	 that	may	not	qualify	 for	 refugee	protection,	 see,	 for	
example,	Martin,	Weerasinghe	and	Taylor,	2014.
491	UNGA,	2016.
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States	and	other	stakeholders	on	how	to	implement	obligations	and	duties	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil	
the	 rights	 of	 persons	 in	 vulnerable	 situations	within	 large	 and/or	mixed	movements	 who	might	 not	
fulfil	the	conditions	of	the	refugee	definition.	The	precarious	nature	of	large	and/or	mixed	movements	
places	some	migrants	in	particular	situations	of	vulnerability	and	they	are	therefore,	in	need	of	specific	
protection	interventions.
For	more	on	the	Principles	and	Guidelines	on	the	Human	Rights	Protection	of	Migrants	 in	Vulnerable	
Situations,	see:	www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/Draftsforcomments.aspx.
Migration and other areas of global governance 
This section discusses the ways in which States, usually within the UN framework, have committed to integrate 
migration and human mobility more generally, often for the first time, into other global governance areas. Four 
major global meetings merit attention, as they highlight the ways in which migration governance intersects 
with governance of other transnational issues, including development, climate change, disaster risk reduction 
and urbanization. Although it is too soon to tell if significant progress will be made in implementing the 
commitments made with regard to migration, getting migration into these agendas has been one of the most 
significant achievements of the past two years.
Migration and development
With the incorporation of migration into the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, States rectified the 
failure to acknowledge the linkages between migration and development in its predecessor, the Millennium 
Development Goals. The Agenda, adopted at the GA in September 2015, comprises 17 goals and 169 targets to 
end poverty, protect the planet, and promote peace and prosperity.492 The inclusive Agenda, which promises 
to “leave no one behind”, incorporates migration, mobility and migrants in its introduction, its sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) and targets, and in the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda – the outcome agreement of 
the latest international conference on financing for development. Migration is no longer seen as a consequence 
of lack of development; the Introduction and various goals and targets recognize the multidimensional reality 
of migration and its ability to contribute to inclusive growth. The 17 SDGs comprise concrete measures to 
implement the sustainable development agenda. At least 10 of the 169 targets include references directly 
related to migration, mobility or migrants.493 Goal 10 “to reduce inequality within and among countries” calls on 
countries under target 10.7 to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, 
including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.494 
Migration and climate change 
Human mobility has featured in global outcome declarations on climate change since 2010, when the Conference 
of the Parties (COP) to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Cancun 
492	See,	for	example,	UN	Sustainable	Development	Knowledge	Platform,	n.d.
493	UN	DESA,	2015.	
494	See,	for	example,	UN	Sustainable	Development	Goals,	n.d.a.;	UN	DESA,	2015.	
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Adaptation Framework. The Framework called on all countries to take “measures to enhance understanding, 
coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned 
relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels”.495 Subsequent UNFCCC action has 
focused mostly on displacement, with passing reference to migration and none to relocation.496 In 2012, the COP 
noted the need for greater understanding of “how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, 
displacement and human mobility”.497 The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, composed 
of UNHCR, IOM and other agencies, recommended at COP 21 in Paris in 2015 that the COP establish a facility 
that would “serve as a forum for sharing experience and enhancing capacities to plan and implement climate 
adaptation measures that avoid displacement, facilitate voluntary migration, and encourage participatory and 
dignified planned relocation.”498 The Paris Agreement instead committed to the establishment of “a task force … 
to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related 
to the adverse impacts of climate change”.499 The task force’s terms of reference specify that it will consider 
approaches at the international level, recognizing that some significant cross-border movements will also occur. 
It is charged with identifying legal, policy and institutional challenges, good practices and lessons learned in 
developing its recommendations, which are to be delivered at the COP in 2018.500 
Migration and disaster risk reduction 
Another global document and the outcome of stakeholder consultations and intergovernmental negotiations – 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR), adopted by 187 country delegations in 
2015 at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and subsequently endorsed by the UNGA – 
also contains several explicit references to human mobility. The Framework seeks to substantially reduce disaster 
risk and losses through the prevention of new, and the reduction of existing, disaster risk. In its preamble, the 
SFDRR acknowledges that displacement is one of the devastating effects of disasters and that migrants are a 
relevant stakeholder. The multiple references to different forms of mobility throughout the SFDRR reflect the 
fact that both displaced persons and migrants are encompassed with the SFDRR’s global targets. The Framework 
encourages “the adoption of policies and programmes addressing disaster-induced human mobility to strengthen 
the resilience of affected people and that of host communities”.501 It states that “[m]igrants contribute to the 
resilience of communities and societies and their knowledge, skills and capacities can be useful in the design 
and implementation of disaster risk reduction”.502 In addition, the Sendai Framework also makes references 
to evacuations and relocations.503 On the latter, for example, the Framework calls on States to develop public 
policies to relocate “human settlements in disaster risk-prone zones”.504 
495	UNFCCC,	2011.
496	IOM,	UNHCR	and	the	World	Bank	–	through	its	Knowledge	Partnership	on	Migration	and	Development	(KNOMAD)		–	have	taken	up	
migration	and	planned	relocation	as	important	issues.	Research	is	showing	that	these	mechanisms	can	have	a	positive	impact	in	
building	resilience	and	reducing	vulnerability	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change	when	there	are	safe	and	legal	avenues	through	which	
people	can	migrate	or	relocate	and	the	rights	and	future	well-being	of	those	who	move	are	protected.	For	more,	see	Martin	and	
Bergmann,	2017.	
497	UNFCCC,	2012.
498	Advisory	Group	on	Climate	Change	and	Human	Mobility,	2015.	
499	UNFCCC,	2015.	
500	UNFCCC,	n.d.
501	UNGA,	2015.
502	Ibid.	
503	On	evacuations,	see,	for	example,	paras.	33(h)	and	33(m).	
504	UNGA,	2015.	For	more	on	Planned	Relocations,	see,	for	example,	Brookings	Institution,	Georgetown	University	and	UNHCR,	2015	
and	Georgetown	University,	IOM	and	UNHCR,	2017.	
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Migration and urbanization 
The 2016 UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development focused on “the important challenges of 
how cities, towns, and villages can be planned and managed, in order to fulfil their role as drivers of sustainable 
development, and how they can shape the implementation of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement on climate 
change.”505 As internal and international migration are major contributors to the growth and dynamism of cities, 
inclusion of migration into the outcome document was important. In the New Urban Agenda, in line with the 
New York Declaration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, States committed to “ensuring safe, 
orderly and regular migration through planned and well-managed migration policies”.506 A particular focus was 
the role of local authorities. Involving local actors in the formulation of policies, especially for integration of 
migrants, is an important but often neglected component of migration governance.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the existing architecture and contemporary deliberations and reflections regarding 
global migration governance. At some future time, there may be a paradigm shift that opens broad, new, as 
yet unnamed opportunities for international cooperation that would more closely mirror the trade and capital 
regimes – migration’s counterparts in globalization – and result in less fragmentation. At present, what we 
have is a slow, albeit accelerating process of change, in which States are building confidence in the process, 
exhibiting greater willingness to engage in multilateral action, and establishing mechanisms for enhancing 
international cooperation in diverse aspects of migration. 
In many ways, the progress attained to date in improving global migration governance is remarkable. In an era of 
increasing nationalism, in which publics and politicians alike rail against globalization, States have been willing to 
cooperate in formulating strategies and approaches to address one of the great transnational issues on the global 
agenda. Despite great reluctance only a decade ago to engage with migration in the context of the UN, States are 
now willing to negotiate UN resolutions, declarations and global compacts, to hold summits and shepherd the entry 
of IOM into the UN system as its migration agency. 
The progress made to date has built on the regional processes, dialogues and consultative mechanisms that began 
in the mid-1980s and continue until today. These initiatives were important confidence-building exercises that 
enabled States to discuss common interests and concerns, identify options and effective practices, understand each 
other’s perspectives and needs, and collaborate in training and technical assistance activities. In more concrete 
ways, they paved the way for the GFMD in showing that informal consultative processes could be sustained over 
time and provide benefits to participants. 
Admittedly, global governance in the migration area still lags the systems in place to manage the international 
flow of capital and goods. Migration governance more generally also lacks the strong normative bases that guide 
responses to refugees and UNHCR’s activities. Yet, even here, there has been progress in gaining universal recognition 
that the rights and safety of migrants must be at the centre of any actions taken to manage movements of people 
across international borders. Significantly, States affirmed in the New York Declaration that they “will fully protect 
the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status; all are rights holders” and that their “response 
will demonstrate full respect for international law and international human rights law and, where applicable, 
505	United	Nations	Sustainable	Development	Goals,	n.d.b.	
506	UNGA,	2017b.
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international refugee law and international humanitarian law.”507 Equally salient, the Declaration emphasized the 
benefits, not just the costs of international migration, and the important contributions that migrants make to 
their countries of origin and destination.
The challenge ahead is to move from what are now largely consultation and ad hoc efforts to greater joint action 
that ultimately mitigates the level of fragmentation in the system. Notwithstanding the progress to date, there is 
no assurance – as States weigh the practical advantages and, in some cases, the political costs of strengthening 
global migration governance – that they will forge a more coherent system that enables them to make and 
implement mutually beneficial decisions on the movement of people across international borders. Yet, without 
such agreement, States are unlikely to find solutions to global-level cooperation and coordination problems or to 
benefit from common opportunities. As this chapter has pointed out, attempting unilaterally to solve the complex 
challenges that migration presents is likely to fail. A challenge for proponents of international cooperation is 
to identify the issues and thematic areas most amenable to global, rather than national or regional, responses. 
When is global governance an effective response for migrants and societies, as well as States? How can global-level 
cooperation and coordination create mutual benefits? The global compacts on migration and on refugees provide 
the opportunity to move ahead in strengthening the norms, principles, rules and decision-making processes that 
will allow for more effective international cooperation in responding to what is a defining issue of our times. 
Whether States seize that opportunity is still to be known.
Providing continued institutional support to address these issues and implement the outcomes of the global 
compacts will be a challenge. The entry of IOM into the UN system is promising, but by no means sufficient. A 
principal obstacle to IOM assuming this role as the global leader on migration is its financing mechanism. Its 
“projectized” funding model has meant that IOM has necessarily had to focus on its operational programmes, with 
few resources available for policy-related work. Improving global migration governance, however, requires a stream 
of funds untied to operations that will allow IOM to enhance its role in protecting the rights and safety of migrants 
and in assisting States and other entities to develop and implement policies that contribute to safe, orderly and 
regular movements of people worldwide. A further impediment in the view of critics is the non-normative basis for 
IOM’s activities.508 In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has recommended 
that IOM take on responsibility for ensuring implementation of the ICRMW, much as UNHCR has responsibility 
for the Refugee Convention.509 In earlier work, one of the co-authors of this chapter has recommended that IOM 
Member States amend its Constitution to make explicit that an important role of the organization is to protect the 
rights of migrants under international law.510
Coordination among the various institutions with mandates, programmes and interest in migration issues will be 
another important challenge. The GMG potentially can serve an important role in this regard, but it is neither 
staffed nor funded to meet the challenges ahead. Many of the members of the GMG have a narrow focus, and few 
resources (sometimes only one or two staff) devoted to migration, while some have little or no field presence. As 
the Chair rotates among members, it is difficult for them to provide effective leadership across the broad migration 
spectrum when they assume this position. In 2014, the organizations chairing the GMG took on annual, rather 
507	UNGA,	2016.
508	See,	for	example,	Guild	and	Grant,	2017.
509	See,	for	example,	UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Human	Rights	of	Migrant,	2013:	“IOM	would	need	to	be	given	a	legal	protection	
mandate	and	guided	by	the	core	international	human	treaties,	including	the	International	Convention	on	the	Protection	of	the	Rights	
of	All	Migrant	Workers	and	Members	of	Their	Families,	and	the	principles	enshrined	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	would	need	
to	be	integrated	into	its	Constitution.”
510	Martin,	2014.
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than the previous semi-annual responsibility for the group, enabling more time for accomplishing goals; however, 
this applied even more pressure on the organizations with marginal roles or interest in migration. On the positive 
side, GMG has engaged in stock-taking exercises related to, for example, crisis-related migration and rescue at sea. 
These have identified areas of strengths and weaknesses within UN agencies to tackle these problems and provided 
recommendations to the heads of agencies on priorities for improvement. However, moving from stock-taking to 
coordinated action will require a new level of engagement by the GMG, such as in monitoring implementation of 
its recommendations. Strengthening the SRSG’s office will also be a challenge. The staffing of the office has been 
very limited and largely reliant on external sources of funding from private foundations and donor governments.511 
The principal State-led global initiative on international migration, the GFMD, which has entered its eleventh year 
of operation, may also need to grapple with a range of complexities. The GFMD was created as an ad hoc, State-
led, non-binding venue for discussion and consultation outside the UN. During this first decade, it has largely 
played a confidence-building role in enabling government officials responsible for migration to get to know and 
learn from each other. Whether it will continue to succeed, however, depends largely on its agenda in the years 
ahead. The outgoing SRSG recommended that the GFMD focus its attention on implementation of the various 
international commitments made in recent summits, particularly the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and 
the 2016 UN-High level Meeting. Other commentators have recommended that the GFMD strengthen its working 
groups, capacity to engage more actively between annual meetings, and interactions with civil society and the 
private sector.512 The formation of the GFMD Business Mechanism and the continuing and active participation of 
civil society in GFMD meetings are signs of progress and should be nurtured. 
International migration is an important global issue that requires a more effective system of global governance. 
States have demonstrated willingness during the past decade, since the first HLD and establishment of the GFMD, 
to explore ways to enhance their cooperation both within and outside of the UN. At the same time, international 
organizations charged with helping States manage the movement of people and protect their rights have also 
shown greater willingness to cooperate among themselves and with States. The entry of IOM into the UN family is 
but the latest manifestation. Nonetheless, barriers to global migration governance abound and will grow if States 
turn inward and xenophobia is not addressed. Countering these forces will be difficult but not impossible.513 The 
step-by-step process of consultation, cooperation and confidence-building that has taken place to date has shown 
that progress can occur, albeit in incremental ways. It remains the most promising path towards global migration 
governance.
511	Significant	 resources	 to	 date	have	 come	 from	 the	MacArthur	 Foundation,	which	 recently	 eliminated	 its	 funding	 programme	on	
international	migration.	
512	Martin,	2014.	
513	The	New	York	Declaration	condemned	xenophobia	(“We	strongly	condemn	acts	and	manifestations	of	racism,	racial	discrimination,	
xenophobia	and	related	intolerance	against	refugees	and	migrants,	and	the	stereotypes	often	applied	to	them,	including	on	the	basis	
of	religion	or	belief.”)	and	welcomed	the	Secretary-General’s	global	campaign	to	counter	xenophobia:	UNGA,	2016.
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6 MOBILITY, MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL  CONNECTIVITY514 
Introduction
In an age of information overload and online connectivity, there is a sense that we are more closely linked globally 
than ever before. Routine activities in everyday lives are testament to a modern-day transnationalism. For 
example, e-mails written by people displaced by conflict can reach relatives in safer lands in real time, providing 
news of escapes and reassurance. Hard-earned money transferred back to family thousands of kilometres away buys 
much-needed food and supports access to education for the next generation. These types of everyday activities 
– sending e-mails, wiring cash, video-conferencing on smartphones, and downloading apps – have become an 
integral part of many people’s lives in recent years, dramatically increasing our access to information, places, 
capital, goods, people and ideas. More is available at our fingertips than ever before. Yet the degree of access 
and interconnectedness between and within communities and people varies significantly.
At the same time, current public and political discourses abound with talk of an increase in anti-globalization 
sentiment, of communities and people feeling left behind and of some societies finding it increasingly difficult 
to reconcile global advancement, human development and public expectations. This has become particularly 
pointed and highly relevant to emigration and immigration processes – how they are analysed, how they are 
discussed and debated, and how they are responded to – within a broader context of global trends that have 
altered fundamental aspects of daily life in many parts of the world. Alongside recent changes in the overall 
tone of the discussion on globalization, there exists a rich and diverse body of work on the topic, its meaning, 
its impacts, its benefits and its costs.515
What is globalization?
Globalization	 is	 a	 set	 of	 processes	 resulting	 in	 the	 growing	 breadth,	 intensity,	 speed	 and	 impact	 of	
worldwide	interconnectedness	as	a	result	of:
• the	stretching	of	social,	political	and	economic	activities	across	political	frontiers,	regions	and	continents;
• the	intensification	or	increased	magnitude	of	flows	of	trade,	investment,	finance,	migration,	culture	
and	so	on;
• the	speeding	up	of	global	interactions	and	processes;	and
• the	deepening	 impacts	of	 global	 interactions,	 such	 that	 the	effects	of	distant	events	 can	become	
highly	significant	elsewhere,	blurring	the	boundaries	between	domestic	matters	and	global	affairs.
Source:	Held	et	al.,	1999.
514	The	authors	of	this	chapter	are	Marie	McAuliffe,	Head,	Migration	Policy	Research	Division,	IOM;	Alexandra	M.	Goossens,	Graduate	
Institute	of	International	and	Development	Studies,	Geneva;	and	Anita	Sengupta,	Director,	Asia	in	Global	Affairs	and	Senior	Fellow	
and	Coordinator,	Calcutta	Research	Group.
515	Lechner	and	Boli,	2015;	Steger,	Battersby	and	Siracusa,	2014.
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Migration processes are profoundly affected by globalization, which, after all, fundamentally involves 
interactions that span multiple geographic places, transcending nation States. These interactions involve ideas, 
capital, goods, services and information, as well as people who virtually and actually connect with others across 
boundaries. The links between international migration and complex processes of greater interconnectedness 
are of growing importance for several reasons. Firstly, a better understanding of the linkages provides some 
insight into the broader global dynamics affecting populations likely to move, including those at risk of 
displacement and/or irregular migration. Secondly, it can help us appreciate the role and limits of policies 
in influencing and shaping migration trends and patterns. Thirdly, greater interconnectedness can present 
considerable challenges to better managing unsafe, irregular migration. Fourthly, the recent advances in 
transportation and telecommunications technology have heralded massive change already, which appears to 
be part of a longer-term trend that is unlikely to change course. Examinations of transnational connectivity, 
mobility and migration are relevant now and will remain so well into the future. 
In this chapter, we examine one specific aspect of globalization: transnational connectivity, which we define 
as both physical and virtual connectivity between people. We focus specifically on changes to transportation 
and telecommunications technology over time, and on international migration rather than internal migration. 
The second section provides a brief overview of the key advances in transportation and telecommunications 
technology globally. The third section discusses how transnational connectivity is affecting migration processes. 
The fourth and final section briefly discusses the implications for migration governance. 
The evolution of transportation and telecommunications 
technologies
The significant increase in international mobility has been spurred by increased transportation links and 
the rapid growth in telecommunications technology. The transport revolution (from sail to steam and the 
development of railroad), starting in the nineteenth century, dramatically increased the intensity and 
velocity of international flows of people516 and, in the latter half of that century, emigration became a mass 
phenomenon. 
By the mid-1960s, rapid technological changes in aviation, such as the development of the jet engine, 
resulted in the boom of air transportation. These advances allowed aircrafts to reach far-off destinations and 
at much lower cost, thus leading to greater changes in cross-border movements of people and goods.517 With 
the availability of air transport, long-distance and real-time telecommunications, globalization has allowed 
transnational communities to flourish. The falling costs of ocean freight, transatlantic telephone calls, air 
transport and satellite charges have resulted in a “death of distance”.518 Recent data show a continuing 
downward trend of travel costs (see figure 1) and an increase in international tourist arrivals (see figure 
2). While tourist arrivals are only one facet of international mobility, the data show that the volume of 
movements around the world is increasing and shows no signs of abating.
516	Lucassen,	Lucassen	and	Manning,	2010.
517	Hoovestal,	2013.
518	Cairncross,	1997.
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Figure	1.		Unit	cost	and	price	of	air	travel,	adjusted	for	inflation
Source: 	IATA/Tourism	Economics	Air	Passenger	Forecasts	(2014);	available	from	www.iata.org/pax-forecast.
Note: 	 RTK	=	revenue	tonne	kilometres. 
ATK	=	available	tonne	kilometres.
Figure	2.		International	tourist	arrivals	(millions),	1995–2016
Source: 	UNTWO,	2017.
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Importantly, it does not follow that geography and space constraints have vanished. They remain of 
fundamental importance with regard to mobility, including the movements of people that are variously 
circumscribed, such as the cross-border movements of people fleeing armed conflict, disasters or those embarking 
on perilous sea journeys in search of better lives elsewhere. This is demonstrated, for example, by the number of 
foreign-born residents globally, which shows that people who move to another country are much more likely 
to remain within their immediate region than move further afield (as discussed in chapter 3 on the regional 
dimensions of migration). Furthermore, geographic proximity has long been acknowledged as a central factor 
underpinning migration patterns and processes, as far back as Ravenstein’s “laws of migration”.519 Advances in 
technology, however, mean that more people than ever before can overcome the issue of distance. The volume 
of cross-border movements being managed by many countries around the world is continuing to increase. 
In the United States, it is estimated that up to 390 million cross-border movements occurred in 2016,520 which 
was up from 225 million in 1980.521 In Australia, 14.5 million cross-border movements were recorded in 1996–97, 
compared to 31.6 million in 2011–12.522 The current estimate is that, by 2020, Australia will experience 50 million 
movements per year across its borders.523 In Japan, estimates of selected cross-border movements524 indicate an 
increase from 7.2 million in 1985 to about 36 million in 2015.525
In recent decades, advances in telecommunication technologies have also been pronounced, particularly 
in the last decade (see text box on key telecommunications advances), although not uniformly. Access to 
mobile telephones appears to have increased dramatically, as can be seen in figure 3. Global Internet usage 
has also grown rapidly, although it is unevenly distributed. There is a digital gender gap with higher Internet 
access rates for men than for women in all regions of the world; globally, men’s access rate is 51 per cent 
and women’s is 44.9 per cent.526 Indeed, increased user rates alone do not necessarily reflect an even take-
up of new technologies. Differential access by class, gender and ethnicity are factors in technological 
engagement.527 Furthermore, there is a digital divide between developed and developing countries, with 
81 per cent of individuals using the Internet in developed countries, compared to 40 per cent in developing 
countries and only 15.6 per cent in the least developed countries.528 The number of mobile broadband 
subscriptions in developing countries, however, is growing at a fast rate. In Myanmar, for instance, there was 
a dramatic increase of 4 million new mobile phone subscribers in the third quarter of 2016, following a recent 
liberalization of the national telecommunications network.529
519	Ravenstein,	1885.
520	US	Customs	and	Border	Protection,	2017.
521	White	House,	1998.
522	ABS,	2007;	Australian	DIBP,	2012.
523	Australian	DIBP,	2012.
524	In	the	context	of	Japan,	selected	cross-border	movements	include	the	number	of	foreign	nationals	entering	Japan	and	the	number	
of	Japanese	departing	Japan.	These	figures	have	been	summed	up	to	provide	global	estimates	of	selected	cross-border	movements.	
525	Statistics	Bureau,	2016.
526	ITU,	2016.
527	Panagakos	and	Horst,	2006.
528	ITU,	2016.
529	Ericsson,	2016.
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Mobile	apps,	social	networks	and	
mobile	operating	systems	that	did	not	
exist	in	2006	include:	
WhatsApp,	Uber,	Airbnb,	Android,	
Instagram,	Snapchat,	Tumblr,	WeChat	
and	Facebook	Messenger
Key telecommunications advances
1876			 Telephone
1890s		 First	radio	wave	experiments
1920s		 First	television	transmissions
1930s		 Invention	of	the	modern	computer
1960s		 E-mail	entering	use
1980s		 Cellphone	and	GPS	available	for	public	use
1993			 Internet	is	shared	in	the	public	domain
1994			 Start	of	blogs	and	social	networks
2001			 Start	of	3G	smart	phones
2004			 Facebook	is	launched
2006			 Twitter	is	launched
2007			 Cloud	computing	–	first	iPhone	is	launched
2010			 First	iPad	and	rapid	growth	of	tablet	usage
2017			 197	billion	mobile	applications	(Apps)	downloads	worldwide,	estimated	to	grow	to	352.9	billion		
	 in	2021.		Approximately	70,000	new	blogs	created	each	day,	nearly	one	every	second.
This summary of key dates is based on several sources including The Library of Congress, Statista and The Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Figure	3.		Global	Internet	and	mobile	telephone	access
Source: 	Adapted	from	data	extracted	from	World	Bank	World	Development	Indicators	on	21	October	2015	
(see:	 www.data.worldbank.org).	 A	 similar	 version	 of	 this	 graph	 was	 published	 by	 the	 Brookings	
Institution	on	25	February	2014	(see:	www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2014/snapshot-6-
rorschach-tests-international-order).
Note: 	 By	2016,	the	mobile	phone	subscription	penetration	rate	was	over	100%,	which	means	there	are	
now	more	subscriptions	globally	than	people	(Ericsson,	2016).
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Globally, it appears that the number of smartphone530 subscriptions has now surpassed those for basic mobile 
phones, accounting for 55 per cent of all mobile subscriptions.531 With the increase in smartphones and broadband 
connectivity, access to social media is growing – to the point that smartphones are now often the platform for 
people’s first experience with the Internet. It is important, however, not to overestimate the impact of newer 
communications technologies. Although the Internet is considered a global communications medium, access is 
still limited in many locations. Accurately measuring the Internet’s level of influence is difficult.532 While there 
are considerable cross-country and cross-regional variations, we can also see that, in recent years, even the least 
developed countries have experienced great leaps in connectivity. In Afghanistan, for instance, according to 
estimates, mobile telephone subscriptions increased from 1.2 million people (4.8%) in 2005 to almost 20 million 
people (61.6%) in 2015.533 
Some communities and people face the anomaly of virtual connectivity and physical immobility. Brownkey 
Abdullahi, a blogger and activist in the Dadaab refugee camp, shared her perspective on the limits of globalization 
(see text box below). While Brownkey Abdullahi is virtually connected globally, she remains physically isolated. 
The world is not as globalized as you think
As	someone	who	was	born	and	raised	in	the	world’s	oldest	and	largest	refugee	camp,	I’m	here	to	tell	you	
the	world	isn’t	as	globalized	as	you	think.
Opened	in	1992	and	originally	 intended	to	provide	temporary	sanctuary	for	90,000	people,	Dadaab	is	
the	world’s	largest	and	oldest	refugee	camp.	Today,	almost	half	a	million	people	call	it	home.	Like	many	
people	in	the	camp,	I	was	born	here,	and	it	is	the	only	place	I	have	ever	known.	I	have	never	left	Kenya,	
the	country	where	I	was	born,	raised	and	educated,	but	have	no	right	to	citizenship.
Thanks	to	radio	stations	and	spotty	internet	access,	we	can	still	connect	with	the	world	we	are	not	able	
to	experience	first-hand.	We	stay	in	the	loop	with	global	developments,	and	thanks	to	social	media	I	can	
now	meet	(if	only	virtually)	people	from	other	countries	through	a	temperamental	internet	connection	
on	my	mobile	phone.
These	are	but	small	tastes	of	the	benefits	of	globalization	that	many	people	take	for	granted,	but	they	
have	made	an	enormous	difference.	For	several	years	now	I	have	been	campaigning	in	my	camp	against	
gender-based	violence	and	female	genital	mutilation.	What	little	internet	access	we	have	has	allowed	me	
to	share	that	message	with	a	larger	international	audience	through	my	blog.
Source:		 Abridged	excerpt	of	an	article	by	Brownkey	Abdullahi	published	by	the	World	Economic	Forum	on	6	July	2016	 
(Abdullahi,	2016).
530	Smartphones,	 using	 third-generation	 (3G)	 technology	 (and	 beyond),	 are	 mobile	 phones	 that	 have	 an	 integrated	 computer,	 an	
operating	system,	Internet	access	and	the	ability	to	run	“Apps”.	Basic	mobile	phones,	using	second-generation	(2G)	technology,	did	
not	have	Internet	access.	
531	Ericsson,	2016.
532	Rabogoshvili,	2012.
533	ITU/World	Bank,	2017.
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Transnational connectivity and migration actors
Even though innovations in transport and telecommunications technology have increased interconnectivity and 
facilitated movement, they have not always resulted in more migration, although they may alter the underlying 
migration processes. This section explores how increased interconnectivity is affecting migration processes and 
different migration actors.
Current estimates of international migrants over time show that migration is increasing, although the proportion 
remains small, rising from 2.2 per cent in 1970 to 3.3 per cent in 2015, within the context of a substantial 
increase in the world’s population. According to UN DESA estimates, in 2015, 244 million people were living in a 
country other than their country of birth – almost 100 million more than in 1990 (153 million), and over three 
times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million). Migration patterns have not been uniform, however, with two 
thirds of all international migrants currently residing in high-income countries.534 
An examination of some major works on migration (such as The Age of Migration;535 Global Migration Governance;536 
Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics;537 and The Routledge International Handbook of Migration 
Studies538) shows that, while they all acknowledge the increase in transnational connectivity, there is not much 
discussion on the role played by connectivity’s most rapidly changing aspect: telecommunications. In this 
section, therefore, we examine how transnational connectivity is shaping migration processes. In doing so, we 
focus on three main sets of migration actors – migrants, non-State actors and States – with particular reference 
to geography (origin, transit journeys and destination). Our discussion provides examples of how transnational 
connectivity can affect these different migration actors.
Transnational connectivity and migrants
In countries of origin, migrants and their communities are experiencing increasing connectivity in a multitude 
of ways, including in the form of social contact, remittance flows and the migrants’ return to their country 
of origin, such as for significant holidays and events. The impacts can be many and varied, depending on the 
circumstances of the origin country (economic, social and political) as well as the situations of the migrants 
themselves. Recent research, for example, focusing on the economic determinants and impacts of migration 
identified a “positive effect of broadband on migration flows between 1995 and 2009 […] by improving the flow 
of information about the host, which affects migration decisions from the origin”.539 This needs to be viewed 
in a broader (structural) context, however, as increased information through greater connectivity may not 
necessarily result in decisions to migrate and, therefore, higher levels of migration.  
534	UN	DESA,	2015.
535	Castles,	de	Haas	and	Miller,	2014.
536	Betts,	2011.
537	Acosta	Arcarazo	and	Wiesbrock,	2015.
538	Gold	and	Nawyn,	2013.
539	Unver,	 2015.	 The	 study	was	based	on	flows	 to	OECD	 countries:	 “The	main	host	 countries	 here	 are	Austria,	 Belgium,	 the	Czech	
Republic,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Hungary,	 Italy,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	Norway,	Poland,	Spain,	Sweden	and	the	
UK.	The	selection	of	both	OECD	and	non-OECD	origin	countries	[is]	based	on	the	magnitude	of	the	flows,	examining	those	with	a	
minimum	number	of	100	people”	(Unver,	2015).
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There is a substantial body of research and analysis on the determinants of migration that has identified 
multiple factors underpinning migration patterns and processes, including those related to economics 
and trade, social and cultural links, demography and demographic change, safety and protection, as well 
as geography and proximity.540 One line of research on the links between “maturity” of migration and 
human development, for example, shows that, at a certain point, higher incomes enabling increased 
emigration can then become a stabilizing influence and reduce outward migration. In other words, as 
GDP per capita increases, emigration initially increases and then decreases. This phenomenon, depicted in 
figure 4,541 has been referred to by some authors as the “mobility transition” or the “migration hump”.542 
The complex processes of migration and development need to be viewed in the context of broader globalization 
dynamics, as highlighted by Held et al.,543 including the acceleration of transitions enabled by much greater 
connectivity.
Figure	4.		Mobility	transition
Source: 	Adapted	from	Clemens,	2014:7–8.
Note: 	 Clemens	found	that	overall	higher	economic	development	(higher	incomes)	is	associated	with	
reduced	emigration.	Refer	to	Clemens	(2014)	for	further	discussion	of	data	analysis.
540	See,	 for	example,	writings	on	cumulative	causation	 (Massey,	1990),	neoclassical	economics	 (Todaro,	1989),	world	system	theory	
(Portes	and	Walton,	1981),	social	capital	theory	(Massey,	1987),	new	economics	of	labour	migration	(Stark	and	Bloom,	1985),	and	
social	network	theory	(Boyd,	1989).
541	Clemens,	2014.
542	Zelinsky,	1971;	Clemens,	2014.
543	Held	et	al.,	1999.
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Increased telecommunications between migrants and their families and communities – depending on the 
migration and development interactions within the origin country – can affect (but may not necessarily 
increase) the migration of family members left behind. Greater social and financial contact can have a 
stabilizing effect on many families and communities that otherwise might be under pressure to also 
migrate. In Sri Lanka, for example, remittance inflows have steadily increased over the last 30 years, 
rising from 1.9 per cent of GDP (USD 60 million) in 1979 to 8.7 per cent in 2015 (USD 7 billion).544 
They play a significant and stabilizing role in helping households meet their basic needs and increase their 
ability to cope with adverse shocks (such as in the aftermath of the 2004 Asian tsunami), but they also 
enable them to purchase land, releasing households from indebtedness, promoting small-scale enterprise 
development, and increasing investment in education and health.545 
The enhanced and extended connectivity for the transfer of capital, similar to the flow of information, can 
support or stabilize populations. Importantly, some people in origin countries have been more vulnerable 
to exploitative money transfer practices, due to their geographic isolation from formal and reliable banking 
systems. Mobile money technology, however, has seen the geographic barriers to better money transfer 
services dissipate and the costs of remitting decrease.546
Mobile money has become a significant phenomenon in recent years, largely due to “the convergence of 
advanced mobile communication technologies and the ability to use it for data services in mobile money 
transfer”.547 In their recent review of mobile money and technology trends, MIT researchers Shrier, Canale and 
Pentland drew on a range of data to find that:
Of the 2.5 billion people as of 2012 that did not have a financial account, 1.7 billion had a mobile 
phone. As of 2012 there were more mobile money accounts than traditional bank accounts in 
Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania and Uganda.548
Telecommunications technology has also proved to be an important factor enabling migrants to access 
information in real time while in transit countries.549 The large-scale movement of people to Europe from 
Turkey in 2015, for example, highlighted in a very visible manner the application of smartphone technology 
in the migration of refugees and other migrants and the operations of smugglers550 (see the text box on 
the “appification” of migration). Real-time connectivity enables information to be sourced and verified, 
particularly where migrants are likely to undertake unsafe journeys or rely on smugglers.551
544	World	Bank,	2017.
545	Sri	Lanka	Ministry	of	Foreign	Employment	Promotion	and	Welfare,	2013.
546	Shrier,	Canale	and	Pentland,	2016.
547	Tobbin	and	Kuwornu,	2011.
548	Shrier,	Canale	and	Pentland,	2016.
549	Kuschminder	and	Koser,	2017;	McAuliffe,	2013.
550	McAuliffe	and	Koser,	2015;	Zijlstra	and	van	Liempt,	2017.
551	Triandafyllidou	and	Maroukis,	2012.
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The “appification” of migration: lessons from the 2015 Mediterranean maritime 
migration flows
The	world	has	changed	fundamentally	in	the	almost	70	years	since	the	largest	refugee	crisis	in	Europe	following	
the	aftermath	of	World	War	II	when	the	Refugees	Convention	was	being	developed	and	refugee	movements	
beyond	war-torn	Europe	were	regulated	by	states	(including	under	the	United	Nations).	The	UN	coordinated	
repatriation,	 returns	 and	 resettlement	 of	 refugees	 to	 third	 countries.	 In	 today’s	 terms,	movements	were	
slow,	highly	regulated	and	very	selective.	Information	for	refugees	was	largely	the	monopoly	of	states	and	
opportunities	for	migrating	to	other	regions	were	limited	to	formal	channels.	Things	are	very	different	now.
Some	 70	 years	 on	 conflict	 and	 persecution	may	 still	 be	 occurring	 at	 frustrating	 and	 tragic	 levels	 but	
the	 context	 has	 changed.	 The	 ‘appification’	 of	 migration	 has	 taken	 off,	 making	 migration	 processes	
fundamentally	different	in	specific	but	important	ways.	Firstly,	mobile	phone	technology	has	become	the	
norm,	linking	migrants	to	family,	friends,	humanitarian	organisations	and	smugglers,	but	equally	linking	
smugglers	to	agents,	corrupt	officials,	and	their	networks	of	fellow	smugglers	in	dispersed	locations.a The	
telecommunications	revolution	is	enabling	the	creation	of	unregulated	migration	pathways	that	are	fast	
and	affordable	for	an	increasing	number	of	people.	There	are	many	apps	available	for	people	travelling	
to	and	through	Europe.	For	example,	InfoAid	has	been	set	up	by	a	Hungarian	couple	to	provide	real-time	
advice	on	how	to	cross	borders.	Other	apps	help	refugees	integrate,	such	as	Refugermany	and	Arriving in 
Berlin.	Connectivity	is	supporting	movements	to	safer	regions	for	many	but	pathways	are	often	extremely	
dangerous	and	at	times	deadly.	
Secondly,	and	for	the	first	time	in	decades,	large	numbers	of	refugees	and	other	migrants	in	transit	and	
host	 countries	 such	 as	 Turkey	 are	 not	 sitting	 and	waiting	 for	 resettlement	 or	 return.	 They	 are	 taking	
matters	into	their	own	hands,	principally	because	they	can.	Information,	advice	and	money	can	be	shared	
quickly,	 and	 the	 constraints	 of	 geography	more	 easily	 overcome.	 The	massive	 and	 sudden	 growth	 in	
movements	through	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	route	to	Greece	in	2015	was	aided	by	strong	connectivity.
Telecommunications	helped	shape	the	size,	composition,	speed	and	geography	of	the	European	flows.	
Real-time	coverage	of	movements	and	operations	enable	migrants	–	refugees,	asylum-seekers	and	others	–	 
to	 access	useful	 information	on	where,	when	and	how	 to	 travel.	 The	 strong	preference	 for	Germany	
over	other	European	countries	is	not	by	chance.	It	has	been	realised	by	migrants	themselves	as	sharing	
of	 information	 increases.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 limited	 access	 to	 visas,	 unregulated	 asylum	pathways	 risk	
becoming	a	funnel	for	refugees	and	non-refugees	alike.b
a			Khalaf,	2016.
b			McAuliffe	and	Koser,	2015.
Source:		 Abridged	excerpt	of	an	article	that	first	appeared	in	ANU’s	Policy	Forum	in	January	2016	(McAuliffe,	2016).
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In destination countries, the use of modern information and communication technologies (ICT) enables more 
and more migrants to “maintain remote relations typical of relations of proximity and to activate them on 
a daily basis”.552 By compressing time and distance, telephone calls, voice and video chats, social media and 
e-mails enable migrants to stay connected with families and relatives, and to know what happens to them 
wherever they are, across national boundaries. For example, a recent study explored how young Koreans 
from transnational families in Canada choose and use different mobile platforms in different contexts.553 The 
study found that they use global platforms (especially Facebook) to widen their peer networks in Canada, 
while using the Korean-based mobile platform of Kakao Talk to maintain their ties with the Republic of Korea 
and/or ethnic communities in Canada. Social connectivity is also important for displaced persons, including 
refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is currently undertaking a project to 
improve refugee well-being through enhanced Internet and mobile connectivity (see text box below).
Connectivity for refugees 
UNHCR	carried	out	a	global	assessment	of	refugees’	access	to,	and	use	of,	the	internet	and	mobile	phones	
where	available,	to	help	inform	the	development	of	a	new	UNHCR	Global	Strategy	for	Connectivity	for	Refugees.
One	 of	 the	 key	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 is	 that	 while	 7	 per	 cent	 of	 refugee	 communities	 lack	 the	
requisite	digital	infrastructure	for	internet	access	and	mobile	communications,	most	refugees	in	urban	
areas	live	in	place	that	have	2G	or	3G	mobile	coverage.	For	those	in	rural	areas,	however,	the	situation	 
is	far	worse,	with	20	per	cent	living	in	areas	with	no	connectivity.
Source:		Abridged	excerpt	from	UNHCR,	2017,	accessed	on	5	April	2017.
552	Diminescu,	2008.
553	Yoon,	2016.
160 Mobility, migration and transnational connectivity
While connectivity may benefit migrants by enabling them to stay connected with families and relatives, 
greater transnational connectivity – via mobile phones, especially – has also been found to amplify the 
pressure and demands on migrants in destination countries to send money home.554 These findings support 
long-standing evidence suggesting that migrants can face considerable pressure to remit.555 In his study, 
Hunter found that pressures to remit were amplified by the use of mobile telephony.556
Transnational connectivity and non-State actors
Just as we have seen significant changes in the day-to-day lives of migrants and their communities brought about 
by advances in technology and greater interconnectedness, non-State actors involved in supporting, facilitating 
or reporting on migration and mobility have been profoundly affected in a variety of ways. Broadly defined, 
non-State actors are groups, organizations or individuals that are not part of State structures yet may exert 
influence on national and international processes and systems. Examples of non-State actors include: migration 
agents; migrant smugglers and human traffickers; employers; civil society, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and philanthropists; and international organizations.557 Non-State actors are increasingly operating 
transnationally and their businesses and activities are much less confined by geography than ever before. As 
geography becomes less of an issue, migration processes are inevitably affected. This section provides examples 
of specific non-State actors and how they engage in migration processes.
Migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks are using ICT (especially smartphone technology) to organize 
international travel, connect with clients and (in some cases) extract ransoms from family back home.558 
Smugglers also use social media to connect with new clients and advertise their services. Facebook and other 
social media platforms provide information on smuggling services, including to certain destinations, which is 
changing the way in which irregular migration is occurring and smugglers operating.559 Increased connectivity 
enables people to check smugglers, as it also extends the ability of migrants to transmit information to make 
others aware of smugglers to avoid.560 
The use of ICT has also become a dominant force in the emergence of the “mobility industry”, which is operating 
in response to increasing demands by the relatively wealthy wanting to temporarily or permanently migrate to 
lower-cost countries with good health care and other services.561 The innovative use of blogging, social media 
platforms and other interactive online practices have tapped into and expanded a growing market – for example, 
for US citizens seeking to move to Mexico; in 2015  there were estimated to be around 1 million US citizens residing 
in Mexico.562 Similar mobility and migration facilitators abound in various locations, including South-East Asia, 
Southern and Eastern Europe, and North Africa, typically offering a range of relocation services that include 
migration but extend well beyond this aspect into housing, study/education, health-care services and employment. 
554	Hunter,	2015.
555	Carling,	2008;	Vargas-Silva,	2016.
556	Hunter,	2015.
557	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	migrants	(who	are	technically	non-State	actors)	are	discussed	in	the	previous	section.
558	McAuliffe	and	Laczko,	2016.
559	Brunwasser,	2015.
560	Triandafyllidou	and	Maroukis,	2012.
561	Bantman-Masum,	2015.
562	UN	DESA,	2015;	US	Department	of	State,	2017.
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In terms of the migration industry, migration-related agents and brokers have proliferated as opportunities 
for transnational labour recruitment have expanded. Even at a most basic administrative level, Internet-based 
visa application processes, for example, have become much more common over time, allowing for reduced 
visa counter services at embassies, and an expansion in Internet-based brokers and agents who can facilitate 
migration through virtual means. Figure 5 shows the various layers involved in transnational recruitment 
practices, which are widely acknowledged as having increased in scale, complexity and speed, raising a raft of 
challenges for regulators.563
Figure	5.		Transnational	labour	migration	brokers
Employer	in	destination	country
(large	and	small	companies,	public	
sector	or	households)
Staffing/employment	agencies
Placement	agencies
Informal	social	networks
La
bo
ur
	b
ro
ke
rs
Worker	in	
sending	
country
Licensed	and	unlicensed	subagents
Source: 	Pittman,	2013.
It is not uncommon to find fraudulent practices among unscrupulous private recruitment agencies offering 
non-existent jobs; misrepresenting conditions of work and wages; falsifying contracts; or confiscating 
documents. This puts increasing pressure on policymakers and governments to examine and regulate private 
recruitment practices. In some cases, however, digital technology advances enhance transparency and support 
better recruitment practices. The Filipino-based LBS Recruitment Solutions Corporation, for instance, is using 
online media and emerging social media applications to deal directly with employers and workers. The changes 
have had a positive impact and, in 2014, results showed that the company’s supply chain of applicants had 
improved, advertising costs had decreased, and no recruitment violations or money claim cases had been 
reported.564 
563	Pittman,	2013.
564	IOM,	2014.
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Other non-State actors are responding to migration in innovative ways through the use of technology. IOM, 
for instance, is developing a mobile phone application (MigApp) that aims to provide migrants with access to 
reliable and practical information on the migration process and on available services in destination countries – 
providing, for instance, updated information regarding visa and travel regulations, as well as a platform for 
interaction with legitimate service providers.565 
Other recent initiatives have involved the emergence of philanthropists, NGOs and other individuals supporting 
migrants undertaking unsafe, irregular maritime journeys by providing humanitarian assistance en route. The 
use of drone technology to detect migrant vessels in distress and target humanitarian relief is an example 
of the application of newly accessible technology that was barely conceivable a decade ago.566 The Migrant 
Offshore Aid Station, for example, is a registered foundation based in Malta that aims to save lives by 
assisting migrants who find themselves in distress on unsafe vessels. In 2016, it launched a mission involving 
two drones to patrol Mediterranean waters using day- and night-sensitive optics to send back high-resolution 
images. 
Real-time connectivity is also being used in conflict and displacement situations where mass movements are 
taking place and tracking becomes important for a range of reasons, including population assessments to 
guide humanitarian service delivery, as discussed in the text box below. Biometrics technology is considered 
by several aid agencies to be highly efficient. UNHCR, for example, is using biometrics to register people in 
refugee camps and to monitor food and aid distribution to refugees to ensure that the amounts provided 
match the number of refugees. However, this needs to be balanced with concerns about the monitoring and 
surveillance of people and the authorities’ usage of data against migrants. Technologies, such as biometrics, 
iris scans or fingerprints, used by States to monitor human mobility, are political tools that can violate 
privacy.567
Biometrics in developing countries 
If	you	follow	the	news	of	 large-scale	biometrics	programmes,	one	fact	becomes	immediately	obvious.	  
A	surprisingly	large	percentage	of	these	initiatives	are	in	developing	nations.	At	least,	it’s	a	surprise	until	
you	 start	 looking	more	closely	at	 the	context	 in	which	 these	programmes	are	being	 implemented.	 In	
many	cases,	the	situation	is	ripe	for	such	solutions	because	of	both	need	and	opportunity.	
“Food	and	non-food	aid	provision,	and	food	distribution,	was	one	of	the	original	use	cases,”	says	[Justin]	
Hughes,	a	procurement	and	supply	chain	expert	for	PA	Consulting	Group	who	has	led	the	company’s	work	
with	the	United	Nations….	“It’s	also	a	population	fixing	tool	for	when	you’ve	got	mass	migration,	when	
you’ve	got	refugees	streaming	across	a	border.	It	provides	the	ability	to	create	a	database	that	doesn’t	
necessarily	identify	an	individual...”	
565	IOM,	2017a.
566	Bryant,	2015.
567	Dijstelbloem,	2017.
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It	isn’t	just	a	case	of	biometric	systems	being	more	efficient	than	paper-based	ones	–	sometimes	there’s	
little	alternative.	“When	people	flee	a	disaster	zone	or	a	conflict	zone,	they	don’t	take	papers	with	them,	
and	they	don’t	have	the	opportunity	to	bring	any	other	form	of	documentation	with	them,”	says	Hughes.	
“Or	 they	may	have	discarded	their	papers	 intentionally,	 if	 they	 felt	 that	carrying	a	passport	 identifying	
them	as	part	of	a	particular	group	may	have	increased	a	risk.	So	for	a	number	of	different	reasons,	people	
will	often	not	appear	with	what	we	would	recognise	as	a	traditional	paper-based	or	card-based	form	of	
identification.	With	biometrics,	you’re	carrying	your	identity	card	with	you	on	your	fingers	or	on	your	irises,	
so	that’s	been	the	main	advantage,	and	the	fact	that	there	is	this	level	of	technological	rigour	around	it.”
Source:		Abridged	excerpt	of	Mansfield-Devine	(2015),	Biometrics	in	developing	countries,	Biometric Technology Today.
State actors and broader implications for managing migration
While the growing convergence between the processes of globalization, social transformation and migration 
has been recognized,568 it is difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the various ways in which 
States’ migration policies and regulatory processes have been affected by the increase in transnational 
connectivity. The impact of increased connectivity on States is likely to be uneven, fragmented, diverse and 
dependent on a country’s global migration status as country of origin, transit and/or destination. 
This section provides examples of how States have (re)acted in relation to changes in migration processes 
underpinned by transnational connectivity. As access to international movement has increased, States have 
sought to implement a range of strategies to manage this increase in scale, pace and diversity, and some 
States have sought to maximize the benefits of migration. Immigration and border management policies 
and practices have evolved rapidly to account for perceptions of risk associated with the movement of 
large numbers of people, such as those associated with migrant smuggling, human trafficking and irregular 
migration flows. Furthermore, as greater interconnectedness affects various aspects of migration, States have 
used technology to manage or facilitate migration more efficiently. Technological advances therefore affect 
the management of migrant populations in various ways. 
ICT potentially provides powerful tools for enhancing the quality of life of people, especially those living in 
remote locations. An emerging practice between States and the private sector involves using the potential ICT 
and transnational connectivity offer to lessen migration pressure in rural or remote areas, such as outlined 
in the text box on the Digital Island project in Cox’s Bazar.
568	Castles,	de	Haas	and	Miller,	2014.
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Emerging practice: public–private partnerships to improve connectivity in rural/
remote areas to lessen migration pressure – Moheshkhali GiGA Digital Island project 
in Cox’s Bazar 
In	 February	 2016,	 Korea	 Telecom	 Corporation,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 telecommunication	 service	  
providers	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea,	 signed	 a	 tripartite	 memorandum	 of	 understanding	 with	 the	
Government	of	Bangladesh	and	 IOM	for	a	pilot	project	to	enhance	government	services	 in	hard-to-
reach	 areas	 through	 better	 online	 connectivity.	 Reflecting	 a	 renewed	 emphasis	 on	 private–public	
partnerships	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 technology	 in	 development,	 the	 parties	 have	 come	 together	
to	pilot	a	 service	provision	model	utilizing	a	high-speed	 Internet	connection	on	Moheshkhali	 Island	
–	a	 remote	part	of	Bangladesh’s	Cox’s	Bazar	 region,	 	 one	of	 the	poorest	 areas	 in	 the	 country,	with	
limited	and	low-quality	access	to	services.	The	initiative	is	aligned	with	the	Digital	Bangladesh	national	
development	strategy	(which	is	part	of	the	government’s	“Vision	2021”	initiative).
(…)	 In	 practice,	 the	 project	will	 deliver	 social	 services,	 such	 as	 education	 and	health	 care,	 relying	 on	
e-tools,	such	as	online	content	and	remote	teaching,	m-Health	tools	for	diagnostics	and	e-consultations	
with	specialists.	Rural	Bangladeshis	may,	as	a	result,	feel	less	of	a	need	to	travel	several	hours	to	visit	a	
doctor,	and	children	may	receive	school	lessons	at	home	or	at	community	centers.	In	addition,	through	
facilitating	market	access	through	e-commerce	platforms,	rural	Bangladeshis	may	also	feel	more	confident	
about	their	sources	of	income	and	feel	less	pressure	to	migrate	for	better	earnings.
Source:		Abridged	excerpt	of	IOM,	ILO	and	UNDP,	2016.
For countries of origin, another way of supporting migrant populations lies in regulating overseas employment 
recruitment processes. In the Philippines, for instance, within the Department of Labor and Employment, the 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration provides in real time, through their website, an updated 
list of overseas job openings as well as brokers’ contact information, and the number of vacancies available. 
Furthermore, there is a mandatory deployment process, which includes pre-departure orientation seminars 
and the issuance of an Overseas Filipino Worker identification card. This process aims to provide Filipino 
migrant workers with information regarding their destination country and resources available to them at 
embassies or consulates, as well as financial management information (about remittances and the use of banks 
and ATM cards). Similarly, in order to tackle some of the challenges posed by private recruitment practices 
and to create a smoother and more transparent migration process, the Government of Nepal inaugurated in 
2014 a “labour village” in Kathmandu – a complex that houses under one roof all the foreign-employment-
related services, including country-specific offices that advertise jobs, NGOs and social welfare organizations, 
government agencies (such as the Foreign Employment Promotion Board), recruiting agencies, pre-departure 
orientation and skills training providers, a health centre and a guest house.569 The Government is providing 
569	Nepal	Ministry	of	Labour	and	Employment,	2014.
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migrants with online services for banking and insurance and is looking into developing innovative services, 
including mobile and digital technology, so that households receive remittances faster, more cheaply and 
closer to their residence.570
States also make use of increased connectivity and technological advances to manage migrant populations 
through enhanced border management. Increasingly sophisticated technology relying on real-time 
connectivity is being applied to border management to support the emergence of “virtual borders” by 
destination countries. Australia, for example, has progressively enhanced its virtual border since the 
introduction of the universal visa regime in 1975.571  With the aid of real-time transnational connectivity, 
visa integrity, security and other checks of passengers travelling by air to Australia occur well before people 
board planes in origin countries. This multi-layered, geographically dispersed border processing model 
requires considerable technology involving multiple IT systems with increasing capacity to detect identity 
and other fraud.572 
Similar advances have been made in other parts of the world, with border processing systems, such as 
detection of false documents via X-ray and fingerprint scanning, e-passport scanning, automated e-gates 
and biometric visas, becoming increasingly sophisticated, particularly since 11 September 2001.573 For 
example, in 2013, the European Union launched the Smart Border initiative, which aims at expanding and 
harmonizing automated border-crossing via the use of e-gates and real-time entry and exit information-
sharing across the region. The information will be linked to fingerprint records and watch lists held by 
police and made available to border control and immigration authorities. Technology has also supported 
cooperation with airlines, such as through the development of agreements about the physical return of 
people refused entry at borders upon arrival, a key component of which is financial penalties imposed on 
airlines that incorrectly board passengers without conducting agreed checks.574 The extension of borders 
well beyond the physical border through the increasing use of technology to facilitate real-time checking 
has caused some commentators to raise concerns about the “relocation” of sovereignty through the 
extraterritorial application of norms575 and about the human rights impact of the indiscriminate sharing 
of personal data.576
Important developments in managing and supporting migrant populations have emerged to enhance 
integration processes. Some State authorities have been using telecommunications technologies to better 
promote the integration of migrants in their communities. In the Netherlands and Sweden, for example, ICT 
with visual and audio learning methods are being used. Migrants have been able to develop their language 
proficiency faster, with ICT applications being used in the classroom to address the specific needs of each 
person and, outside of the classroom, providing opportunities for independent learning.577 Germany recently 
launched a smartphone app called “Ankommen” [Arrive] to help migrants and asylum seekers integrate 
by offering a basic German language course, information on the asylum application process and on how 
570	Nepal	Ministry	of	Labour	and	Employment,	2015.
571	ANAO,	2006.
572	Ibid.
573	Jeandesboz,	2008.
574	Taylor,	2008.
575	Gammeltoft-Hansen,	2008;	Godenau	and	Lopez-Sala,	2016.
576	Valkenburg	and	van	der	Ploeg,	2015.
577	Driessen	et	al.,	2011.
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to find jobs or training, as well as information on German values and social customs. The app – available 
in several languages – was jointly developed by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the Federal 
Employment Agency, the Goethe Institute, and Bayerischer Rundfunk (a public radio and TV broadcaster). 
Furthermore, thanks to the technological advances of the digital age, local governments can avail of a new 
array of tools for better understanding the needs of – and engaging with – the populations they serve. Web 
portals or mobile applications in different languages are to improve access to public services.578 For instance, 
New York City has developed an interactive online self-service called NYC311 that is available in 50 languages. 
This web platform enables all residents to submit service requests, file formal complaints and access public 
information anonymously and confidentially.  
Greater transnational connectivity also provides States with tools for providing consular services and 
assistance to migrants. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, for example, IOM Guatemala 
developed a mobile application to provide such services. Among its various features, the mobile app enables 
direct contact between migrants and Guatemalan consular agents, while also providing real-time data 
registration and reporting. Migrants will be able to use this tool to contact national authorities when natural 
hazards, such as earthquakes or hurricanes, strike. Additionally, it seeks to enhance visibility of diaspora 
communities by establishing a digital mechanism for posting content and promote special activities.579 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive account of the multiplicity of 
State impacts and responses to migration and mobility stemming from and utilizing greater transnational 
connectivity, it has highlighted the diversity of those impacts and approaches, as well as the many ways 
technology is utilized in migration processes. In the context of empirical research showing how the 
globalization of migration has been skewed towards major destination countries,580 the emerging paradox 
between the extent of State control and populist expectations takes on heightened importance. Over time, there 
has been a significant increase in State regulation in a variety of areas of economic and social life, resulting 
in higher expectations of State control. A historical perspective on the emerging regulation-expectation 
paradox is provided in the text box below.
The regulation-expectation paradox 
As	 the	 capacity	 of	 modern	 nation	 States	 has	 grown—economically,	 socially	 and	 technologically— 
so	 too	 has	 the	 ability	 of	 States	 to	 regulate	 societies.	 Governance	 has	 increased	 while	 becoming	
increasingly	 sophisticated	 and	 complex.	 Areas	 that	 had	 long	 been	 regulated	 by	 nation	 States	 (and	
kingdoms,	empires,	tribes,	etc.,	before	them),	such	as	taxation	of	citizens	and	residents,	along	with	the	
regulation	of	aspects	of	business	and	social	protection,	expanded	to	cover	areas	previously	unregulated,	
such	 as	 telecommunications,	 media	 and	 broadcasting,	 environmental	 protection/conservation,	  
public	health,	among	many	others.	As	part	of	this	expansion	of	regulation	and	increasingly	sophisticated	
578	Mattoo	et	al.,	2015.
579	IOM,	2017b.
580	Czaika	and	de	Haas,	2014.
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governance,	 international	migration—immigration	and	(in	some	countries)	emigration—has	become	
increasingly	 regulated,	 with	 regulation	 involving	 the	 formulation	 of	 new	 legal-policy	 frameworks	
as	 well	 as	 the	 growing	 complexity	 of	 those	 frameworks.	 In	 Australia,	 for	 example,	 the	 original	 
Migration Act	 1958	 was	 35	 pages	 long	 and	 provided	 significant	 discretion	 to	 delegated	 decision	
makers.	By	2005,	the	Migration Act	1958	had	expanded	to	744	pages	with	the	additional	Regulations	
comprising	 nine	 volumes	 totalling	 an	 additional	 1,993	 pages,c	 and	 clearly	 containing	much	 greater	
details	of	the	rules	that	applied	to	the	administration	of	migration.		
It	is	important,	however,	to	recognise	that	the	growth	in	regulation—both	the	number	of	issues	being	
regulated	and	the	 increasing	complexity	of	 those	regulations—is	not	specific	to	migration	alone.	As	
shown	below,	 the	number	of	 pages	of	 primary	 legislation	 in	Australia	has	 increased	 significantly	 in	
recent	decades,	and	most	particularly	 since	 the	1970s.	This	 is	mirrored,	 for	example,	by	 regulatory	
increases	in	other	countries	such	as	the	United	States	(see	below).
							Number	of	pages	of	federal	legislation	 																							Number	of	pages	of	federal	regulations 
																							passed	in	Australia,	1901–2006	 	 																												added	to	the	United	States	federal 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																						register,	1936–2010
                    
Source:		Berg,	2008.	 	 																																																							Source:	 Crews,	2012.
An	 important	 consequence	 of	 increasing	 regulation—both	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 sophistication	 as	 well	
as	 its	 overall	 coverage—is	 the	 impact	 on	 perceptions	 of	 State	 control.	 The	 more	 States	 regulate	
aspects	of	 social	 and	economic	 life,	 the	more	 they	 strengthen	 the	perception	 that	phenomena	can	
be	 regulated	 and	 controlled,	 even	 those	 occurring	 transnationally	 and	 beyond	 the	 direct	 control	
of	 national	 or	 sub-national	 regulators.	 This	 ‘regulation-expectation’	 paradox	 poses	 considerable	
challenges	 for	 States,	 not	 least	 of	 which	 involves	 explaining	 to	 citizens	 and	 societies	 the	 impact	
of	 globalization	on	 a	 range	of	 aspects	 of	 daily	 life,	 including	migration.	And	 yet	 in	many	 countries,	
there	 remains	 the	populist	discourse	 that	 immigration	can	be	 ‘controlled’	when	 the	 reality	brought	
about	by	increasing	interconnectedness	means	that	migration	‘management’	 is	far	more	applicable.	
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Against	 this	 broader	 backdrop	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 migration	 regulation,	 recent	 developments	 in	
transnational	 connectivity	 take	 on	 heightened	 relevance	 with	 potentially	 profound	 implications,	
including	for	the	deepening	of	the	regulation-expectation	paradox.
c			Kelly,	2005.
Source:		Abridged	excerpt	of	a	book	chapter	on	regulating	international	migration	(McAuliffe	and	Goossens,	2017).
Conclusions
Globalization processes are altering aspects of daily life in the modern era. Recent advances in transportation 
and telecommunications technology have heralded massive changes in how we access information and interact 
globally in real time. Increasing transnational connectivity is shaping how people move internationally in 
ways that were not previously possible. While access to such technology remains uneven across the world, the 
continuing extension of advanced telecommunications means that greater numbers of people are connected 
online. This chapter has examined what this increasing transnational connectivity means for mobility and 
migration and how related processes are being shaped. 
We have seen that transnational connectivity has uneven and varied impacts on migrants and States, in terms 
of shaping migration processes. However, it is perhaps clearer than ever before that non-State actors are playing 
an increasing role in migration through the application of advanced telecommunications and other technology 
(such as drones). While the expansion of non-State actors in international migration processes has distinct 
benefits, such as in the field of humanitarian assistance for migrants, it also has some potentially negative 
effects, such as facilitating the expansion of human trafficking networks transnationally. 
The complex interactions between greater interconnectedness and international migration processes are of 
growing importance. While the drivers of migration may remain largely unchanged, the circumstances in which 
people are considering and making decisions about their migration options have changed considerably, and it is 
in this context that we highlight the following implications for policy.
• Continued investments need to be made in developing technologies that can be used by migrants to 
avoid dangerous and possibly deadly migration pathways as well as abuse and exploitation. Innovative 
ways of using technology, social media and apps (such as the mobile phone application, MigApp, by 
IOM to provide migrants with access to reliable and practical information on migration processes and on 
services in destination countries) can support and facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration.
• Such technologies need to be rolled out and made available on a more even basis. The recent 
improvements in global connectivity, even in some of the more remote and least developed countries, 
needs to be further supported so that new technologies and applications (such as those related to 
mobile money) can assist communities worldwide and reduce the risk of uneven implementation. 
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• While States have invested in technology based on real-time connectivity to enhance their ability 
to monitor borders and detect and prevent irregular entry into their territory, similar investments 
in analytical capability are needed for a better understanding of the incremental shifts in 
migration processes, including in relation to how migrants think about and assess their migration 
options.
• As globalization and transnational connectivity deepen, further research on the impact on human 
rights of the indiscriminate sharing of personal data is necessary to support more effective 
policy responses, including on global governance of migration. 
• Finally, greater recognition of the role of technology in migration management will be central in the 
development of global responses, such as the 2018 global compact on migration. Although greater 
connectivity and the ability to move information, money and ideas in real time may pose challenges, 
especially in curbing illicit and unsafe migration activities, it is likely that some of the most effective 
responses can also be found in emerging technology.
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7 UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION JOURNEYS  FROM MIGRANTS’ PERSPECTIVES581 
Introduction
Today, just as happens every day, many thousands of people throughout the world will be setting off on journeys in 
the hope of being able to forge safe and meaningful lives in a new country. Some will be carrying passports containing 
visas issued by the country to which they are heading, many having gone through visa application processes to secure 
the right to start a new phase of their lives in another country. These people will most likely be able to choose many 
aspects of this new phase: their new job or vocation; the city in which they intend to live; the mode of travel they will 
take; the timing and length of their journey; with whom they go; and how long they intend to stay. They should be 
considered the luckier ones, and more likely than not, they will be citizens of developed countries.
Today, just as happens every day, many others will be setting off on journeys they know will be long and dangerous – 
so much so that they may allow themselves the realization that they may be abused, exploited or even die en route. 
These people will most likely be facing considerable uncertainty about the journey ahead and, if they do make it to 
their destination, what awaits them in their new country. Many will not have visas in their passports and some won’t 
even have a passport or travel document. They may know in general terms how to get to various places along the way; 
on whom they can rely to help them; how much different legs of the journey might cost; and the modes of travel 
they will need to take. Equally, many things will remain unclear. These are not the luckier ones, and more likely than 
not, they will be from developing countries and fragile States, some having had their lives up-ended by civil conflict, 
persecution or various other forms of disaster.
While our introductory remarks are squarely rooted in the realities of the day, migration is a constant in human 
history and has long been related to livelihoods, culture and disastrous events, as well as exile. Central to any 
discussion on migration are the people who migrate – who they are, how they migrate, and why they migrate – 
which is often deeply connected to the circumstances in which they find themselves and the degree of choice they have in 
contemplating and undertaking migration. There is increasing recognition of the importance in better understanding how 
migrants contemplate migration options (including not migrating) and undertake migration journeys. This recognition is 
in part fuelled by the increasing visibility of dangerous and sometimes deadly migration journeys. IOM’s Missing Migrants 
project, for example, has found that more than 46,000 migrants have died during migration journeys since 2000.582 
Concerns for migrants’ safety and rights has grown at the international level, as demonstrated by the September 2016 New 
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which has a significant focus on these two issues.583 The Declaration includes 
a commitment to adopt a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018, which in and of itself is an 
indicator of the heightened concerns regarding unsafe, disorderly and irregular migration. One of the key points to note is 
that the Declaration and commitment to agree upon such a compact have in part been in reaction to the mass migration 
to and through Europe in 2015, during which migrants (including refugees) demonstrated significant determination in 
reaching particular destinations such as Germany, Sweden and Austria.
581	Marie	McAuliffe,	Head,	Migration	Research	Division,	 IOM;	Adrian	Kitimbo,	Research	consultant,	 IOM	and	Research	Associate,	Gordon	
Institute	of	Business	Science,	University	of	Pretoria;	Alexandra	M.	Goossens,	Graduate	Institute	of	International	and	Development	Studies,	
Geneva;	and	AKM	Ahsan	Ullah,	Associate	Professor	and	Deputy	Dean,	Faculty	of	Arts	and	Social	Sciences	(Graduate	Studies	and	Research),	
University	of	Brunei	Darussalam.
582	IOM,	2017.
583	UNGA,	2016.
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This chapter discusses the importance of understanding migration from migrants’ perspectives, principally by listening 
to and learning from migrants through rigorous research. While all migrants make decisions before and during their 
journeys – some decisions being of greater consequence than others, and even involving life and death scenarios – this 
chapter focuses more on people who have fewer means and more restricted choices. The contemplations of those with 
significant degrees of freedom, such as the millionaire Chinese manufacturer migrating to Australia in retirement, is less 
of a focus, partly because those with wider choices are less likely to find themselves in situations of vulnerability. The 
chapter discusses migration journeys and how migrants consider migration before and during such travel, acknowledging 
that there is a great diversity of experiences, but that nevertheless, some important aspects can be drawn from current 
migration research and practice. The next section provides a brief examination of migrants’ “self-agency” (i.e. migrants’ 
abilities to make and act upon independent decisions and choices) and the “continuum of agency” that explains variations 
in choice when it comes to migrating. Section three then discusses key and emerging issues in migration research that are 
signalling shifts in how contemplations of migration and migration journeys have been changing for migrants themselves 
in recent years: (mis)information; preference for visas; risk and reward; and pressures to migrate. In the following section, 
we summarize some of the recent advances in research methods and technology that are making migrant-centric research 
more feasible globally. The conclusion then discusses implications for research and policy initiatives, including those 
related to the global compact on migration. Overall, we argue that better understandings of migrants’ choices about 
migration and migration journeys are of fundamental importance to more effective policymaking on migration.
Considerations of self-agency in migration
There has been considerable research and enquiry into the reasons underpinning migration, both internal and international, 
over many decades, stretching back in the modern era as far as the 1880s.584 Ongoing examination of migration drivers and 
factors principally involves attempts to explain migration patterns as well as the structures and processes that influence 
and shape the movement of people from one place to another (both within a State and between States). Underpinning 
all major migration theories, a central consideration is the extent to which people are able to exercise free will, or self-
agency.585 All general migration theories involve a consideration of migrant agency (or a lack thereof) to varying degrees, 
and there is recognition that greater emphasis on migrants’ roles, decision-making and behaviour before and during 
migration is increasingly important in helping to explain how migration occurs. In other words, the extent of migrants’ 
self-agency is becoming a crucial aspect in any attempt to make sense of migration patterns, processes and consequences.586
Historically, and particularly in the aftermath of World War II, a binary construct explaining migration in terms 
of people’s agency – forced migration versus voluntary migration – tended to dominate policy as well as research. 
Subsequently, and particularly over the last two decades, there has been widespread recognition that a continuum 
of agency exists, rather than a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy.587 Faist, for example, argues that such a continuum 
should be thought about in terms of “degrees of freedom, as ranging from high to low”,588 with de Haas suggesting 
that “the ‘voluntary’/’forced’ migration dichotomy is simplistic because it assumes that one category of migrants 
enjoys total freedom and the other category has no choice or agency at all”.589 In this context, how migrants 
contemplate and undertake migration, including those who may have extremely limited ability to choose where to 
go and how to get there, has emerged as a critical issue in migration research and policy:
584	Ravenstein,	1885	and	1889.
585	See	 for	 example	writings	 on	 cumulative	 causation	 (Massey,	 1990),	 neoclassical	 economics	 (Todaro,	 1989),	world	 system	 theory	
(Portes	and	Walton,	1981),	social	capital	theory	(Massey,	1987),	new	economics	of	labour	migration	(Stark	and	Bloom,	1985),	and	
social	network	theory	(Boyd,	1989).
586	McAuliffe	and	Jayasuriya,	2016;	Triandafyllidou,	2017.
587	de	Haas,	2011;	Faist,	2000;	Massey	et	al.,	1998.
588	Faist,	2000.
589	de	Haas,	2011.
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Different forced migrants, however they are categorised, have different areas of choice, different 
alternatives, available to them, depending not just on external constraining factors but also on such 
factors as their sex, age, wealth, connections, networks etc. This means that we have to understand 
the point of view and experiences of the people making the decision to move … We have to see 
them as agents, however limited, in a physical sense, their room for manoeuvre may be.590
In the context of labour migration, there has been a considerable focus on agency and structure, and how people 
contemplating migration navigate through a range of “intervening obstacles”.591 While the popular view remains that 
so-called “economic migrants” are active in their pursuit of migration and exercise a considerable degree of agency, this 
is too simplistic. Research and analysis in more recent decades, for example, has found wide variation in the ability 
of labour migrants to make choices, depending on the constraints and options they face; these include conditions of 
bonded labour, as well as labour migration that involves people trading off their rights in pressurized environments.592 
The extent to which labour migrants are able to exercise agency and choose aspects of their migration can be heavily 
circumscribed, although in most circumstances some choice remains, including as to whether to migrate – the main 
point of concern in most studies on migrants’ agency – where to migrate, how to migrate, and whether or when to return 
home.593 There is a related increasing appreciation of the need to better understand, by asking migrants themselves, how 
they contemplate migration before and during their migration journeys. This is particularly important if we are to better 
understand the dynamic and changing nature of migration patterns and processes.
Migration and the lottery of birth
Examining the overall quality of life by country, and the ability to migrate in terms of visa access, reveals that access to 
regular migration options is in some ways related to the “lottery of birth”. It appears, for instance, that some nationality 
groups are much less likely to have access to visas. Table 1 summarizes global indices of human development, fragility 
and visa access of selected countries.594 The Visa Restrictions Index, a global ranking of countries according to the travel 
freedom of their citizens,595 for example, reveals that an individual’s ability to enter a country with relative ease is in 
many respects determined by nationality. Visa access also broadly reflects a country’s status and relations within the 
international community and indicates how stable, safe and prosperous it is in relation to other countries. The data 
also show two other aspects: that there are some significant differences between highly ranked human development 
countries and others; and that mid-ranked development countries can be significant source, transit and destination 
countries simultaneously. Nationals from countries with very high levels of human development can travel visa free to 
around 85 per cent of all other countries worldwide.596 These countries are also significant and preferred destination 
countries.597 Toward the bottom of the table, however, the visa restrictions in place for these countries indicate that 
regular migration pathways are problematic for citizens. Irregular pathways are likely to be the most realistic (if not the 
only) option open to potential migrants from these countries.
590	Turton,	2003.
591	Lee,	1966.
592	Ruhs,	2013.
593	Khalaf	and	Alkobaisi,	1999;	Ullah,	2010.
594	The	 Human	 Development	 Index	 is	 a	 composite	 index	 measuring	 average	 achievement	 in	 three	 basic	 dimensions	 of	 human	
development:	life	expectancy,	education	and	a	decent	standard	of	living.	The	Visa	Restrictions	Index	measures	visa	restrictions	in	
place	in	218	countries	and	indicates	the	capacity	of	individuals	to	travel	to	other	countries	with	relative	ease.	The	higher	the	rank,	
the	more	countries	an	individual	can	enter	visa	free.	The	Fragile	States	Index,	produced	by	the	Fund	for	Peace,	is	an	annual	ranking	of	
178	nations	based	on	their	levels	of	stability	and	the	pressures	they	face.	It	includes	social,	economic,	political	and	military	indicators.	
595	Henley	&	Partners,	2017.	
596	Ibid.
597	Esipova,	Ray	and	Pugliese,	2017;	Keogh,	2013;	McAuliffe	and	Jayasuriya,	2016;	UN	DESA,	2016.
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Table	1.		Human	development,	fragility	and	visa	rankings,	selected	countries
Country  
(in	HDI	rank	order)
Human Development 
Index 2016
Fragile States Index 
2016
Visa Restrictions 
Index 2017
Rank Rank Rank
Ve
ry
	H
ig
h	
H
um
an
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Norway 1 177 4
Australia 2 172 7
Switzerland 2 174 6
Germany 4 165 1
Denmark 5 175 3
Singapore 5 161 4
Canada 10 169 6
United	States 10 159 3
Sweden 14 171 2
United	Kingdom 16 162 4
France 21 158 4
Italy 26 148 3
Greece 29 130 6
H
ig
h	
H
um
an
	
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Malaysia 59 115 13
Iran	(Islamic	Republic	of) 69 47 95
Turkey 71 79 52
Sri	Lanka 73 43 95
Lebanon 76 40 96
Mexico 77 107 26
Thailand 87 74 67
Tunisia 97 88 73
Libya 102 25 99
M
ed
iu
m
	H
um
an
	
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Egypt 111 38 88
Indonesia 113 86 79
Iraq 121 11 103
Morocco 123 89 78
India 131 70 87
Bangladesh 139 36 95
Pakistan 147 14 102
Lo
w
	H
um
an
	
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Syrian	Arab	Republic 149 6 101
Haiti 163 10 86
Sudan 165 4 97
Yemen 168 4 98
Afghanistan 169 9 104
Ethiopia 174 24 96
Eritrea 179 18 98
Somalia n/a 1 100
A	number	1	ranking	
means:
Very	high	human	
development
Most	fragile	country
Most	mobile	passport	
citizenship
The	lowest	ranking	
means:
Low	human	
development
Least	fragile	country
Least	mobile	passport	
citizenship
Source: 	 UNDP,	2016;	FFP,	2016;	Henley	&	Partners,	2017.
Note: 	 Somalia	is	not	included	in	the	HDI.	According	to	UNDP,	to	include	a	country	in	the	HDI	requires	recent,	reliable	and	
comparable	data	for	all	three	dimensions	of	the	Index.	For	a	country	to	be	included,	statistics	should	ideally	be	
available	from	the	national	statistical	authority	through	relevant	international	data	agencies.	
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While the contexts in which migration takes place impact on how people migrate, it is also worth acknowledging 
the enduring facet of human nature that makes us prone to seeking “better lives” including through migration. 
A stark manifestation of this quest for a better life can be seen when examining migration patterns by country 
income levels. Two thirds of all international migrants, for example, currently reside in high-income countries.598
Migrant-centric approaches: What can (potential) migrants tell us
In trying to better understand how migrants think about and decide upon migration, research findings are 
able to support or refute some of the popular assumptions made about migrants’ behaviour and anticipated 
behaviour.599 While some policymakers have access to a wider range of information and data than ever before, 
it is apparent that there still exists a level of presumption and a lack of knowledge about potential and 
actual migrant decision-making and experiences. For example, it is generally assumed that the huge number 
of people who make extremely dangerous sea journeys every year would be much reduced if they had access 
to information about the risks involved in the journeys, including those of death. However, while better 
information has been shown to have some impact on decision-making, it is only one part of the picture.600 
Better understandings of why some people choose to take highly risky journeys, even in the knowledge of the 
risks to their lives, are important to develop deeper knowledge about migration from migrants’ perspectives 
(see below concerning the specific issue of risk and risk-taking). One of the major advantages of research 
that focuses on migrant decision-making and experiences is precisely that it is migrant-centric, not policy-
centric. Rather than replacing evaluative research on policy settings, asking potential and actual migrants 
how they think about migration and the journeys they may take or are taking can provide important insights 
into the changing dynamics in origin and transit settings. Feeding this knowledge into sustainable responses 
that are more effective at protecting migrants both before and during their journeys is a top priority. Such 
information can also be used to develop different conceptual frameworks that more accurately account for 
migrants’ views.601
How potential and actual migrants contemplate migration journeys at various stages is of keen interest to 
migration researchers as well as policymakers. The existing evidence on this topic points to a number of important 
considerations. First, there have long been acknowledged distinctions between the desire to migrate, the 
intention to migrate and actual migration behaviour.602 While research on migrants’ aspirations and intentions 
can contribute to our understanding of possible future migration trends, a desire or intention to migrate does 
not necessarily (or often) translate into actual migration. A recent example of this is reflected in the latest 
results of the Gallup Survey on Migration Intentions, which illustrate the significant differences between 
aspirations, intentions and realization. Conducted annually since 2005, the latest survey results indicate that 
an estimated 710 million adults (14% of the world’s adult population) would like to migrate to another country 
if they had the opportunity. The figures reduce dramatically, however, when it comes to migration plans 
(66 million) and to actual preparations (23 million, or 0.4% of the world’s adult population).603 
598	UN	DESA,	2016.
599	Hernández-Carretero	and	Carling,	2012.
600	RMMS,	2014;	Alpes	and	Sorensen,	2015.
601	McAuliffe	and	Jayasuriya,	2016;	Triandafyllidou,	2017.
602	Stark,	1981;	Carling,	2002.
603	Esipova,	Ray	and	Pugliese,	2017.
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Second, how migrants think about and undertake migration occurs in dynamic and sometimes fast-paced 
environments, so that people may need to respond to changes in circumstances quickly. This dynamism is being 
supported by increased transnational connectivity via more sophisticated and accessible telecommunications 
technology (as discussed in chapter 6). The dynamic nature of migration settings requires that we continue to 
invest in researching migrants’ views and experiences, rather than see it as a “one-off” exercise. 
Third, there has been less of a focus on people who do not want to migrate, partly because remaining at home 
is often considered the norm. However, there are indications that pressures on people and communities to 
migrate internationally may be increasing in some circumstances.604 The longer-term development of “cultures 
of migration” may pose problems for an increasing number of communities in the future that would prefer to 
remain at home, but are less able to do so.605
Figure	1.		Top	desired	destination	countries	of	potential	migrants,	2010–2015
Source: 	 Gallup	Survey	on	Migration	Intentions	(2017),	IOM	GMDAC.
The	 Gallup	 Survey	 (2017)	 shows	 that	 some	 destination	 countries	 are	 strongly	 preferred	 over	 others,	  
most	particularly	the	United	States.	This	appears	to	be	regardless	of	the	likelihood	or	ability	of	respondents	
to	migrate	to	these	countries.	These	survey	data	need	to	be	treated	with	caution,	for	the	survey	results	 
also	indicate	that	far	fewer	people	are	planning	migration	compared	with	those	desiring	or	intending	to	
migrate.	This	is	also	reflected	in	many	other	studies,	which	have	shown	that	only	very	small	proportions	of	
604	Bylander,	2014.
605	Mescoli,	2013;	Ball,	Butt	and	Beazley,	2017;	Mbaye,	2017.
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those	 who	 may	 want	 to	 migrate,	 actually	 do	 so.a	 More	 often	 than	 not,	 explanations	 of	 preferred	 
destinations	focus	on	economic	issues:	wealthy	countries	with	higher	wages	tend	to	be	popular	destination	
countries	in	studies	such	as	this.	However,	for	some	groups,	other	factors	can	be	more	important;	and	
perceptions	of	a	country’s	multiculturalism/tolerance,	the	extent	to	which	the	rule	of	law	applies,	and	
how	safe	it	is,	can	feature	more	prominently	than	income-generation	and	opportunities	for	work.b
a		Jayasuriya,	McAuliffe	and	Iqbal,	2016;	McAuliffe	and	Jayasuriya,	2016.
b		McAuliffe	and	Jayasuriya,	2016.	
Central to any discussion on migrants’ perspectives is the role of information and how it interplays with migration 
processes, especially in light of the increasing use of social media and telecommunication technologies. This aspect 
is discussed in the next section, before we examine the remaining key and emerging issues heralded by migrant-
centric research. We include examples of recent empirical research to illustrate how migration considerations are 
changing in some communities. 
(Mis)information
Information is central to migrants’ contemplations and perceptions of migration, whether considering their options, 
choosing a destination, or determining the safest and most financially feasible routes. Information is also central 
to considerations of returning home. The quality and validity of information available plays a crucial role for a 
journey to be successful, however this is defined. Extensive research shows that the source of information is a very 
important aspect for migrants when deciding whether they can trust it or not and how much weight to give it.606 
Information can come from social connections such as families, friends and other networks, both at home and in 
destination countries; and research over several decades confirms that information provided by those close to the 
migrant (in social, not geographic terms) is most valued.607 Several recent studies confirm this understanding, finding 
that information from close social connections is considered by migrants, before and during journeys, as the most 
important source, because it is information they can trust.608 
Conversely, as social connections are more trusted than official sources, it may happen that valid information, 
such as government information about migration policies, may not be perceived as accurate by migrants and is 
less likely to shape migration decisions. Moreover, in some cases, distrust in the government or corrupt practices 
of government officials may impact on how information is perceived. This is particularly relevant to information 
campaigns (including deterrent messaging) by destination countries aimed at potential irregular migrants. Some 
research has found that information campaigns are generally ineffective and that asylum seekers do not know much 
about (European) destination countries.609 However, it also appears that migrants seem to recognize that not all 
governments are the same, and that some are much more likely to provide accurate information on migration than 
606	Wall,	Campbell	and	Janbek,	2015.
607	Pickering	et	al.,	2016;	Komito	and	Bates,	2011.	
608	Kuschminder	and	Koser,	2016;	Maroufof,	2017;	Hagen-Zanker	and	Mallett,	2016.
609	Gilbert	and	Koser,	2006;	UK	Home	Office,	2004.
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others in specific circumstances. Research conducted in Indonesia in late 2014, for example, found that 39 per cent of 
Afghan respondents indicated that “their most trusted source of information to inform them of their onward journey 
to Australia was the Australian Government”.610 
The transmission of information is also evolving and recent dramatic advances in telecommunication technologies 
have transformed the nature of information exchange. Social media and real-time telecommunications applications 
(such as Facebook, Skype, Viber, WhatsApp and other instant messaging applications) are providing new ways of 
sharing information on the potential risks and rewards of making journeys. This appears to be influencing migration 
decision processes and having an impact on migration patterns, as exemplified by the large-scale movements of 
people to Europe in 2015 (see discussion in chapter 6 on Mobility, migration and transnational connectivity). A study 
undertaken by a German non-profit organization, for example, looked at how Syrian and Iraqi refugees navigated 
information sources before, during and after their journeys to Germany.611 Above all, the interviewees trusted social 
connections such as family and friends. The findings, however, also indicate that increasing reliance is being placed 
on information from less well-known networks via social media, especially when preparing for a planned transit.612
Further, social media provide a platform for contact between people seeking to migrate and those advertising 
migration services, both lawful and unlawful (e.g. travel services and recruitment agencies, as well as smugglers 
selling fraudulent identity documents and visas). Although many are aware that the information provided may not 
be accurate, prospective migrants may use social media to locate smugglers.613 In a survey undertaken in 2016, the 
European Commission asked 21 European States how social media and other relevant online platforms are used by 
migrants and by the smugglers themselves to recruit their customers. From the results, it appears that there are 
groups, on Facebook for instance, where migrants and asylum seekers “search for travelling companions and ask for 
advice on dangers, risks and reliable smugglers.” There are also more informative groups disseminating information 
on routes, destinations, asylum practices, political situations, legislation and welfare benefits. States further mention 
YouTube videos in which people give advice and detailed instructions in several languages on how to migrate, seek 
asylum and proceed in practice.614 
A strong preference for visas
Where possible, migrants will choose to migrate through regular pathways on visas.615 As highlighted in our opening 
remarks, there are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling without a visa. From a migrant’s 
perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact on the 
migrant as well as his/her family, including those who may remain in the origin country. First, visas denote authority 
to enter a country and so offer a form of legitimacy when arriving in and travelling through a country. A valid visa 
provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people 
at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused by those offering illicit 
migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, and having to operate largely outside of regulated systems. 
610	Pickering	et	al.,	2016.
611	MiCT,	2016.
612	Ibid.
613	Frouws	et	al.,	2016.
614	EC/EMN,	2016.
615	Please	note	that	while	“regular”	migration	does	not	necessarily	require	visas,	the	discussion	refers	to	visas	because	these	are	often	
a	requirement,	most	especially	for	migrants	from	developing	countries.	In	addition,	the	term	“visa”	is	much	more	widely	understood	
than	“regular”	by	migrants	and	the	general	public.
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Second, travelling on visas is undoubtedly much easier logistically, as the availability of travel options is far greater. 
In some cases, it can mean the difference between a journey being feasible or not, most especially in relation to 
air travel, which tends to be heavily monitored and controlled at departure, transit and entry points. Third, visas 
provide a greater level of certainty and confidence in the journey, which is much more likely to take place as planned, 
including in relation to costs. Travelling on visas is more likely to be safer, more certain and more easily able to 
accommodate greater choice, such as length of journey, travel mode and with whom to travel (if anyone). 
It is unsurprising then that there is often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. Access to visas within decision-
making contexts, therefore, features heavily in the minds of potential migrants and has been shown to be a key factor 
when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin. In recent research on online job search 
and migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people 
conducted online job searches.616 Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential 
migrants’ contemplations of migration, as well as their eventual migration. This can be seen, for example, in the 
changes that occur after visa restrictions are removed for specific groups, including by citizenship.617 While there is 
a myriad of examples, such changes have been prominent when visa liberalization has occurred in key destination 
countries or regions, such as in the United States in the 1960s and within the EU as Schengen arrangements expanded 
over time, taking in an increasing number of countries.618 
Knowledge of the availability of visas is found to be relevant in a range of different settings, including those where the 
underlying reasons for wanting to migrate may be due to a multitude of circumstances and factors. In Sri Lanka, for 
example, the use of labour migration pathways to States within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been found to 
be associated with underlying protection needs. In the absence of accessible protection options, people have sought 
to migrate using the options that are available to them, and in this case, that has meant migrating as labour migrants. 
The findings of this study are reported in the text box below.
Labour migration as an alternative for asylum seekers facing protection issues 
This	 study	 represents	 possibly	 the	 first	 longitudinal	 study	 on	migration	 intentions,	 actual	migration,	 and	
immobility	undertaken	in	a	post-conflict	country.	It	is	clear	that	using	labour	migration	as	an	escape	route	does	
not	apply	to	people	living	inside	areas	severely	affected	by	conflict	relative	to	those	outside	areas	severely	
affected	by	conflict.	Results	suggest	that	those	facing	persecution	…	do	actively	consider,	and	in	some	cases	
use,	labour	migration	as	an	escape	strategy.	That	labour	migration,	as	opposed	to	seeking	asylum,	is	considered	
an	escape	strategy	is	not	strange	in	an	environment	of	restricted	asylum	seeking	optionsc	and	where	resources	
needed	for	labour	migration	are	estimated	at	twenty	times	less	than	those	needed	to	seek	asylum.d 
From	 a	 policy	 perspective,	 this	 paper	 demonstrates	 that	 people	 needing	 to	 escape	 persecution,	 and	
seeking	other	forms	of	protection	may,	if	presented	with	the	option,	migrate	to	countries	for	work	through	
regular	pathways,	rather	than	to	other	countries	for	asylum	via	irregular	pathways.	These	are	not	refugees	
616	Sinclair	and	Mamertino,	2016.
617	Czaika	and	de	Haas,	2016.
618	Ortega	and	Peri,	2013.
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who	enter	 the	 labour	market,e	but	people	who	could	be	 refugees,	and	 instead	choose	 regular	 labour	
migration	pathways	in	a	destination	country	(usually	the	Middle	East)	that	may	not	be	their	preferred	
choice.	Hence,	a	possible	option	is	to	explore	the	feasibility	of	encouraging	low-skilled	labour	migration	
for	potential	asylum	seekers	–	and	even	refugees	waiting	 in	UN	camps	–	to	Middle	Eastern	countries.	
An	alternative	strategy	could	be	 for	developed	countries	 to	assist	vulnerable	people	 to	 improve	 their	
vocational	skills	and	work	with	key	destination	countries	to	improve	recognition	rates,	which	could	guide	
them	into	regular	migration	pathways.	However,	it	is	noted	that	it	is	unlikely	that	developed	countries	
would	recruit	low-skilled	workers	on	any	significant	scale,	especially	if	labour-intensive	and	low-paying	
service	industries,	such	as	cleaning,	are	already	filled	by	irregular	migrants.f
c		Jayasuriya,	McAuliffe	and	Iqbal,	2016.
d		Van	Hear,	2014.
e		Salt,	1992.
f		Ibid.	
Excerpt	of	Jayasuriya,	2016.	
Unsurprisingly, the preference for visas and regular pathways extends to other aspects of migration, including 
migration status after arrival as well as how people engage in return migration. Georgian migrants in Greece, for 
instance, would often rather try to obtain a residence permit than apply for asylum or stay irregularly.619 Recent 
research on assisted voluntary return also found that one of the main factors involved in the decision-making 
of return migrants was their preference to be law-abiding.620 While this was by no means the only factor, that 
people would prefer to remain within the law of the country they are in, including during return migration 
decision-making, not only makes intuitive sense, it is also practical from migrants’ perspectives. Remaining 
within the law may have implications for return to origin as well as for any future international migration plans 
that may eventuate.
Risk and reward
Most people may have preferences for law-abiding behaviour, including for authorized, visa-related travel, but 
what happens when regular pathways and authorized entry are not available? We can see from table 1 that 
for some people, there can be little hope of securing a visa to travel to most countries. Afghans, for example, 
currently rank last on the Henley visa index, meaning that access to regular migration pathways to preferred 
destinations is severely restricted. In the absence of accessible regular migration options to many countries, 
people are more restricted in their ability to migrate internationally, with remaining at home; migrating to 
less desirable, but accessible countries; and irregular migration options (to preferred destinations) being more 
feasible. This may result in “involuntary immobility”,621 whereby people who would prefer to migrate are not 
619	Maroufof,	2017.
620	Koser	and	Kuschminder,	2015.
621	See	Carling’s	discussion	of	involuntary	immobility	(Carling,	2002).
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able to do so, or in people resorting to high-risk journeys through irregular migration. For some people, there 
may be variations in between these extremes, such as migrating to countries that may not necessarily be 
preferred, but are at least accessible. This appears to be a stark reality for many; while the United States may 
be the most preferred destination country in the world, most people who migrate internationally do not get 
to the United States, but instead pursue other options. This is supported by current data on international 
migrants, for example, which show that in some regions, intraregional migration far outstrips outmigration 
from the region. This is most notable within Africa, where migration within the region accounts for the vast 
majority of current migration and is partly related to regional free movement agreements (see discussion in 
chapter 3).
Notwithstanding information campaigns, media reporting and information from family, friends and other 
migrants, in some circumstances potential migrants continue to contemplate high-risk irregular migration 
journeys. Recent survey research undertaken by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat in Ethiopia found 
that despite a very high proportion of potential migrants (92%) being aware of the risks associated with 
irregular travel to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, 42 per cent indicated that the benefits of migration were worth 
the risks faced during the journey and upon arrival in transit and destination countries.622 Tolerance of 
different types of abuse and/or physical hardship during migration was found to have ranged from between 
1 per cent (sexual abuse) to 44 per cent (degrading treatment and verbal abuse).623 Another recent study 
involving interviews with around 500 people in Europe who had crossed the Mediterranean found that many 
of them were not oblivious to the risks posed by these irregular migration journeys, and that they chose to 
embark on the sea crossing despite being cognizant of the real dangers.624 There has also been research into the 
psychological mechanisms people utilize when contemplating and undertaking high-risk irregular maritime 
migration. Carling and Hernández-Carretero, for example, examined how potential migrants in Senegal related 
to the risks of maritime migration to the Spanish archipelago.625 They found that in the face of high-
risk journeys, people adopted several psychological mechanisms, including forms of avoidance, discrediting 
negative information and engaging in harm minimization. The ability to reach a desired destination via 
irregular maritime migration, which would otherwise be out of reach, appears to invoke resignation to the 
“pain” of such migration, as well as some psychological strategies to lessen the pain. Abuse, exploitation and 
trauma during migration journeys, however, remain an under-researched, and perhaps not well understood, 
facet of irregular migration. What we know of the extreme conditions some migrants face is often from 
investigative journalists, non-governmental organizations or international organizations, who have the ability 
to relay migrants’ stories quickly from migration routes that may be difficult for others to access. Information 
on experiences and exploitation can help us better understand the difficult choices migrants are making 
and the changes that are occurring in migration corridors – see, for example, the text box on the Darién 
Gap corridor taken from an investigative journalism article published in Outside magazine. Importantly, the 
context in which people make migration decisions and the opportunity for a better life (however defined) can 
be a considerable incentive, despite the risks involved.
622	RMMS,	2014.
623	Ibid.
624	Crawley	et	al.,	2016.
625	Carling	and	Hernández-Carretero,	2011.
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Darién Gap: A terrifying journey through the world’s most dangerous jungle  
The	Darién	Gap	is	a	lawless	wilderness	on	the	border	of	Colombia	and	Panama,	teeming	with	everything	
from	deadly	snakes	to	antigovernment	guerrillas.	The	region	also	sees	a	flow	of	migrants	from	Cuba,	
Africa	and	Asia,	whose	desperation	sends	them	on	perilous	journeys	to	the	U.S.	
…
As	traditional	pathways	to	the	U.S.	become	more	difficult,	Cubans,	Somalis,	Syrians,	Bangladeshis,	Nepalis,	
and	many	more	have	been	heading	to	South	American	countries	and	traveling	north,	moving	overland	
up	the	Central	American	isthmus.	The	worst	part	of	this	journey	is	through	the	Gap.	The	entire	expanse,	a	
roadless	maze	that	travelers	usually	negotiate	on	foot	and	in	boats,	is	dominated	by	narco	traffickers	and	…	 
guerrillas	who’ve	been	waging	war	on	the	government	of	Colombia	since	1964.	Hundreds	of	migrants	
enter	each	year;	many	never	emerge,	killed	or	abandoned	by	coyotes	(migrant	smugglers)	on	ghost	
trails.
…
A	 pudgy	 Bangladeshi	 man	 named	Momir,	 his	 face	 ghoulishly	 pale	 from	 fever,	 rejects	 the	 coyote’s	
order	to	get	out	of	the	boat	when	it	runs	aground.	Arafat	shows	us	a	large	gash	on	the	bottom	of	his	
foot	and	refuses	to	walk	any	farther.	The	men	are	weak	from	days	of	traveling	 in	muggy,	90-degree	
temperatures,	 subsisting	on	crackers	and	gulping	 river	water.	And	 they	are	scared.	…	 Jafar	 starts	 to	
cry,	 triggering	 an	 outburst	 of	 desperate	 pleas	 from	 the	men.	 They	 flash	 scars	 on	 their	 wrists	 and	
stomachs;	one	is	missing	part	of	a	finger.	…	It’s	easy	to	understand	why	any	sane	person	would	leave	
such	grim	prospects	behind.	Harder	to	grasp	is	how	these	men	ended	up	on	the	southern	edge	of	the	
Darién	Gap,	half	a	world	away	from	home,	without	the	faintest	idea	of	the	grueling	trials	ahead.	Their	
willpower	 is	 amazing,	 but	 the	Gap’s	 shadowy	 depths	 have	 swallowed	 travelers	 far	more	 prepared.	
Another	 [motel	manager]	Montero	 video	 showed	a	 group	of	Nepalis	 hunched	over	paper	plates	…	
Authorities	had	caught	them	and	brought	them	to	Montero’s	for	a	meal	before	deportation.	“Of	course,	
I	never	called	customs	on	any	of	the	ones	who	stayed	here,	because	I	don’t	agree	that	those	looking	for	
a	better	life	should	be	sent	back,”	Montero	said.	“Their	motivation	is	incredible.”
Excerpt:	Jason	Motlagh,	published	19	July	2016	by	Outside	magazine.
Besides, there is now clear recognition of the increasing pressure being placed on the international protection 
system, which provides asylum seekers with a lawful, but nevertheless irregular migration option for many people 
who are unable to access visa-related travel. From migrants’ perspectives, irregular asylum migration can sometimes 
be the only option available and is one that is being increasingly exploited by migrant smugglers, many of whom are 
driven by profits at the expense of migrants’ well-being.626 Particular corridors have become extremely dangerous 
as smuggling and trafficking networks have expanded to take advantage of people with very few options. The 
international protection system risks becoming a “funnel” for people who may not have protection needs under 
the Refugee Convention, but may nevertheless be extremely vulnerable at home and during migration journeys:
626	Carling,	2016;	McAuliffe	and	Koser,	2015.
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I hope that, after enduring the risks and hardships of this journey, the boys study there 
and have a better future – because we knew that they had no future in Kabul. We are 
happy that they safely made this journey. Only God knows about their future. I would like 
to go and join them in Germany. Younger siblings too would like to join them in Germany. 
Afghanistan is not a safe anymore and everyone wants to live in a safer place. We are 
happy with this decision now. If, God forbid, something happens to us in Kabul, then 
two of our family are safe and alive in Germany.
Mother of two migrants
from Kabul627
Along with the risks and how people contemplate dangerous journeys, the potential rewards need to be 
acknowledged. For some communities, the rewards can be long term, allowing the next generation and their 
children access to better education, health services and living standards, while at the same time supporting 
family members and communities in origin countries. For other groups, including those that may have been 
marginalized economically, socially or politically in their home countries, international migration has become a 
survival strategy whereby family and community members engage in migration to access resources and safety, 
often along kinship or ethnic lines.628 
Pressures to migrate
Even where regular pathways via visas are available, the existing evidence is pointing to increasing pressures on 
some families and communities to migrate internationally, including people who may prefer to remain at home.629 
Notwithstanding the benefits of international migration, this points to a potentially negative consequence for some 
communities related to the longer-term development of “cultures of migration” – described, for example, as a culture 
in which “non-migrants observe migrants to whom they are socially connected and seek to emulate their migratory 
behaviour”.630 The development of such cultures has been found to impact on how potential migrants think about 
their futures: “Young people who grow up and come of age increasingly expect to migrate internationally in the 
course of their lives”.631 And yet, more recent research is highlighting that over time there can be emerging pressures 
on people who want to remain at home, but are finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Overall, this appears to be 
affecting young people across a variety of settings – for instance, facing increased pressure from family members to 
move overseas and provide remittances back to extended families.632 In research undertaken in 2016 on Afghans who 
migrated to Europe in 2015, remarks by migrants’ families who remained at home highlight the issue:
After the insurgents killed our brother, and set our house on fire, the decision was made to 
send our brother away … All the family decided together that we would send our brother 
to Europe so that he can help out the whole family financially once he makes it to Europe.
Brother of migrant
from Takhar633
627	Afghanistan	Analysts	Network,	2016.
628	Monsutti,	2005.
629	Ball,	Butt	and	Beazley,	2017.
630	Kandel	and	Massey,	2002.
631	Ibid.
632	Heidbrink,	2017.
633	Afghanistan	Analysts	Network,	2016.
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In West Africa some families rely heavily on remittances sent from children and spouses, and the pressure to 
migrate on behalf of the entire family can be significant:
The Anne family relied on other sons to help financially…Now, it is up to Arouna Anne, 
the last male in the family, to make a better life for his parents and the children his dead 
brothers left behind. He is just 14 years old. … Arouna hasn’t seen his parents for six 
months. He sends a bit of money to them from time to time. It’s not enough. “I am the 
only remaining son now,” he said. “I have to support the family.” Arouna knows well the 
dangers of the trip to Europe. One of his friends from home also tried the trip not long 
ago and died in Libya.634
Similar findings are evident in quite different settings, although peer pressure is also playing a role. For 
example, in a 2016 study of migrant adolescent girls from Ethiopia and Eritrea to Sudan, researchers found 
that the situation of families had a significant impact on the girls’ and young women’s decisions to migrate. 
They were more likely to migrate when coming from families that had experienced some kind of crisis, 
such as the absence of one or both parents. Although constrained by a lack of opportunities and options 
and by limiting gender norms (see text box on gender dimensions), their “desire to do ‘something’ about 
their situation points to the agency of the girls who by deciding to leave take control of their lives”.635 The 
research also found that migrant girls from Ethiopia and Eritrea felt pressured by the community “culture 
of migration”, in which migration is becoming a competition and those who decide to stay behind or who 
cannot move are stigmatized. This peer pressure defining those who have migrated as the “successful ones” 
also affects migration decision-making processes.636 
The	 number	 of	 children	 migrating	 around	 the	 world	 has	 risen	 significantly	 in	 recent	 years.	 The	
challenges	and	vulnerabilities	 that	migrant	children	 face	during	migration	 journeys	can	be	extreme,	
raising	 a	 plethora	 of	 issues	 in	 formulating	 effective	 responses.	 Appendix	 A	 includes	 discussion	 on	
migrant	 children	 journeys,	 with	 case	 studies	 on	 Afghan	 unaccompanied	minors	 and	 children	 from	
Central	America	transiting	through	Mexico.
Additional findings on the development of long-term labour migration corridors point to an increasing reliance on 
remittances as key components of household incomes, which in turn locks people into specific migration patterns. 
While the positive benefits of improved household income and related social changes can be clear, some are feeling 
the impact of significant pressure to migrate and a sense that options to stay at home are no longer as viable as 
they once were. The case of the Nepalese migrant workers highlights aspects of this phenomenon. Over the last ten 
years, the massive outmigration from Nepal for foreign employment, mostly to the Gulf and Malaysia, has changed 
the livelihoods and social structure of rural Nepal. Within this context, migration by Nepalese men has become 
a ubiquitous phenomenon, and although studies have found that decisions to migrate are generally taken at the 
634	Searcey	and	Barry,	2017.
635	Grabska,	Del	Franco	and	de	Regt,	2016.
636	Ibid.
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household level, there is increasing pressure to migrate. Research found that migration decisions have increased 
in social significance and a “culture” of migration has increasingly emerged.637 The study on left-behind women in 
Nepal shows that male migration on a large scale has also had profound impacts on women and families who have 
remained, including in relation to their agency. In terms of family well-being, migration has clearly improved the 
well-being of households through increased income, improved food security, land and livestock leasing, and greater 
access to girls’ education. It has also resulted in increased workloads for women, but not necessarily by their own 
agency with respect to household decisions. Major decisions still tended to be made by migrant men through 
mobile phone communication, although there was a clear increment in women’s authority to make decisions.
Gender dimensions: decisions, feminization and gender roles 
Migration-related	 decision-making	 processes	 can	 have	 strong	 gender	 dimensions.	 In	 traditional	
societies,	 for	 example,	 patriarchy	 affects	 a	 range	 of	 social	 and	 familial	 interactions,	 including	 on	
migration.	 In	 some	 societies,	 female	 participation	 in	 decision-making	 is	 still	 rare.	 Family	 traditions,	
status,	 cultural	 practices	 and	 religious	beliefs	 play	 roles	 in	who	make	decisions	within	 families.	 For	
example,	 in	 the	Philippines,	migration	decisions	of	young	single	women	are	usually	 structured	with	
respect	to	potential	benefits	for	the	household	as	a	whole.	This	means	women’s	decision	to	migrate	
may	be	based	on	household	needs	rather	than	on	their	own	individual	advancement.g	In	Afghanistan,	
there	tends	to	be	a	strong	“masculinity”	aspect	to	migration,	especially	irregular	migration	of	young	
men	and	boys,	which	is	seen	as	a	“rite	of	passage”	to	adulthood.h
A	central	aspect	of	migration–gender	relationships	is	the	change	in	the	gender	composition	of	international	
migrants	 –	 the	 so-called	 “feminization”	 of	 migration.i	 	Women	 comprise	 roughly	 half	 of	 the	 world’s	
international	migrant	population;	however,	the	proportion	varies	considerably	by	region,	and	there	are	
countries	(such	as	Indonesia,	the	Philippines,	Sri	Lanka	and	Thailand)	where	the	majority	of	emigrants	
are	female.j	There	has	also	been	a	qualitative	change	in	that	today,	female	migrants	are	more	likely	to	
move	independently	rather	than	as	dependants,k	including	from	the	countries	mentioned	above.	This	has	
also	meant	that	women	are	more	involved	in	sending	remittances	and	supporting	their	families	from	
abroad,	which	in	turn	is	altering	social	and	familial	dynamics	and	decision-making.	Recent	empirical	
research	undertaken	in	Java	highlights	the	changing	nature	of	international	migration:
Men and women’s (im)mobilities are deeply intertwined with their roles and positions 
in the household ... The case studies illustrate a range of outcomes of gendered 
decision-making, even in the highly patriarchal Javanese context. We highlight how 
the decision-making process surrounding labour migration access is a function of 
changes in gender and intergenerational dynamics within the household ‘in flux’. 
Gender intersects with prevailing ideologies and migration systems (over time) to 
enable previously immobilised households and individuals to access labour migration. 
Relatedly the migration experience of individuals can have a relational effect on other 
household members’ imagined or actual migrations and futures, such as in Gendered
637	Adhikari	and	Hobley,	2015.
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migration within households ‘in flux’. Zaitun’s household where her daughter-in-law’s 
migration has a bearing on other members’ mobility. Similarly, Khalid’s unpleasant illegal 
migration journey laid the foundation of support for Riana’s mobility through formal 
channels.l 
g		Chant	and	Radcliffe,	1992;	Oishi,	2002.
h		Monsutti,	2007.
i		Castles	and	Miller,	2003;	Pfeiffer	et	al.,	2007.
j		United	Nations,	2006;	Martin,	2007.
k		Ullah,	2013.
l		Khoo,	Platt	and	Yeoh,	2017.
Advances in research technologies
Over the last few decades, the world has seen an exponential growth in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). Innovations such as the Internet, social media and mobile devices have changed not 
only the way people communicate, but also how information is produced and disseminated. The impact 
of these technological advances has been far-reaching, touching all facets of human life and all fields of 
study, including migration. Technology is increasingly changing migration research and data collection 
methods in ways that have elicited both considerable support and raised concerns. While traditional research 
methods such as face-to-face interviews and paper-based surveys undoubtedly continue to be highly relevant, 
technological advancements have opened up new research avenues, providing further opportunities to 
enhance our understanding of migrants’ views and movements. 
Online research tools, software and hardware devices
Internet tools such as web-based surveys and online interviews have expanded the ability to conduct 
migration-related research in places that are difficult to reach. They have made it possible for researchers not 
only to expand greatly their geographic reach, but also to access specific groups quickly and efficiently.638 The 
Internet has also enhanced inclusion in the research process, allowing for the participation of migrants whose 
voices and circumstances would otherwise not be heard. 
For researchers whose work focuses on sensitive subjects such as smuggling or irregular migration, 
Internet-based research methods have proven to be indispensable. Irregular migrants, for example, may hesitate 
to participate in studies that use traditional research methods such as face-to-face interviews out of fear that 
their identities may be exposed, as “research into irregular migration inevitably deals with sensitive issues”.639 By 
using tools such as web-based surveys, researchers can increasingly provide greater anonymity for respondents.640 
There is growing recognition that these types of surveys, when applied to sensitive subjects, are able to elicit 
638	Oiarzabal	and	Reips,	2012.	
639	Düvell,	Triandafyllidou	and	Vollmer,	2008.	
640	Reips	and	Buffardi,	2012.
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more honest and personal answers from participants.641 A 2013 study on irregular migrants in Australia, for 
example, used tablet computers with self-completion surveys translated into multiple languages.642 By giving 
migrants more control – granting them the ability to switch to their preferred language while completing the 
surveys – the research successfully generated what could be reasonably considered honest and candid responses 
from the survey participants.643 Online methods are demonstratively less intrusive and can empower migrants 
in their role as research subjects. These methods have also been shown to reduce both social anxiety and 
desirability effects, thereby producing more truthful answers in research results.644 
Furthermore, longitudinal studies, which are key in understanding migrants’ decision-making, have been 
enhanced by technologies such as GPS capabilities. For example, where consent is granted, the GPS capability of 
personal devices has made it easier for researchers to track migrant journeys.645 New and emerging software and 
hardware tools also mean that data can be collected relatively cheaply, as well as faster, and can be stored for 
longer periods of time.646 These ICTs provide researchers with the ability to maintain participant engagement as 
well as improve data retention for studies that stretch on for long periods of time.647
Social media and big data
Social media technologies are emerging as formidable tools in social science research. With the rise of sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter, with Facebook alone boasting more than 1.9 billion users worldwide as of May 
2017,648 social media sites have become useful repositories of information on migrants. Importantly, these sites 
enable researchers to access a much broader community of migrants by providing powerful search capabilities for 
potential study participants. Social media sites can be particularly useful when conducting research on diaspora 
communities, which are increasingly using these platforms for all kinds of network activity.649 Reips and Buffardi 
expressly argue that “social media can provide migration researchers with a unique insight into migrants’ 
thoughts and behaviours that are occurring naturally in their social networks”.650 Moreover, sources of big data651 
such as social media and Internet search patterns can provide geocoded data that can be helpful in locating 
people, including migrants. The Syrian Humanitarian Tracker, a mapping system that uses machine-mining 
techniques and crowdsourced photo, video and text reports,652 has proven to be one of the most successful 
big data tools since the Syrian conflict started. It has been used not just by researchers to follow trends in 
the conflict, including migrants’ movements, but also by internally displaced persons, refugees and migrants 
themselves in search of safe travel routes and to steer clear of human traffickers.653 
641	Kays,	Keith	and	Broughal,	2013.
642	McAuliffe,	2013.
643	Ibid.
644	Joinson,	1999.
645	Taylor,	2015.
646	Banati,	2017.
647	Farabee	et	al.,	2016.	
648	Fiegerman,	2017.	
649	Crush	et	al.,	2012.
650	Reips	and	Buffardi,	2012.
651	“Big	data	is	the	practice	of	using	collected	data	to	create	algorithms,	models,	and	analytics	to	better	understand	human	behavior”	
(Kuang,	2017).	
652	See	Syrian	Tracker,	www.humanitariantracker.org/syria-tracker.	
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Challenges and opportunities
The benefits that new technologies bring to migration research are undeniable. However, these new research 
tools and methods have also been criticized on methodological and ethical grounds. Some contend that research 
conducted online, for example, often fails to consider the significance of the interactions between subject and 
scholar.654 The failure to recognize subtle cues such as tone of voice and facial expressions during online interviews 
can hinder researchers from fully comprehending the views of the study participants.655 Additionally, the fact 
that Internet access is not universal raises the spectre of research bias, as the so-called “digital divide” excludes 
people who do not have access to these technologies.656 However, the increasing use of highly portable tablet 
technology enables researchers to work in remote locations, as well as with respondents who may need support 
when completing surveys. Another concern associated with methods such as web-based surveys is verifying that 
those completing them are the intended participants. However, advances in online surveys now provide the ability 
to automatically verify survey responses,657 with the use of database technology allowing for the corroboration of 
the identity and age information provided by the participants.658
Issues surrounding privacy, data protection and confidentiality, especially in studies that use big data sources such 
as social media, continue to pose risks and challenges for both study participants and researchers.659 “Stalking” on 
social media, for example, where a researcher may not inform or get the required consent of those being observed, 
raises ethical concerns. Researchers are also increasingly finding it difficult to differentiate between personal 
and public data, as the line between the two is no longer clear-cut. Consequently, there is a growing body of 
work on how social science researchers can better conduct studies using new technologies without compromising 
themselves or their research subjects.660 While the use of new research technologies evidently comes with pitfalls, 
ICTs have also generated enormous advantages for social science research. As migration researchers increasingly 
embrace these technologies, it is imperative to ensure not only that the appropriate methods are used, but also 
that ethical challenges – which can be amplified in the digital age – are addressed. 
Implications for policy and research
Human migration is an age-old phenomenon, with migration decision-making processes occurring before, during 
and after migration continuing to be shaped by broader economic, social and cultural conditions. While the inherent 
nature of decision-making may not have changed substantially over time, the conditions within which it takes place 
are evolving. Increasing transnational connectivity and telecommunications advances in particular, means that we are 
more able than at any other time in history to see, read and hear about how people live their lives in far-off locations. 
We are now afforded a greater sense of our shared humanity that extends beyond culture, creed or wealth, just as we 
are more able to see and (virtually) experience the personal costs of war, famine and abject poverty. Our increasing 
global connectivity is also extending into supporting interactions, including the sharing of (mis)information, the 
transfer of money, and the exchange of ideas and knowledge, with interactions now able to occur in real time. This 
has implications for many aspects of our daily lives, including how we think about migration and mobility. 
654	Ignacio,	2013.	
655	Ibid.
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In this chapter, we have examined how migrants think about migration journeys in different settings, drawing 
on emerging findings from a significant body of work on the topic. We are seeing more research being done 
in origin and transit countries, most especially in relation to irregular migration. One of the most interesting 
aspects and emerging tensions concerns the consideration of migrants as actors with (expanding) agency within 
research domains, including the traditional categories of “forced” migrants, such as refugees. This builds on the 
recognition in recent decades of the move away from the binary forced-voluntary construct towards a continuum 
of migrant agency. The ways in which migrants are accessing and utilizing information from a range of sources 
continues to be of interest, and research is showing that it is an area that is evolving rapidly, including the 
consumption of social media as well as the changing nature of contact with people who facilitate migration 
journeys, such as recruitment agents and migrant smugglers. The issue of increasing transnational connectivity 
and migrants’ communication patterns is discussed in chapter 6.
Within the context of the 2018 global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, a more nuanced 
understanding of potential and actual migrants’ perspectives and considerations allows for deeper reflection 
of sustainable policy responses that are more able to incorporate population support and stabilization, and 
enhanced human security during journeys, as well as expanding visa-related travel options. In this context, 
we find the following points to be relevant for research and policy: 
• Researchers need to take more notice of migrants’ agency, understanding how people contemplate 
migration vis-à-vis policy categories and place less emphasis on the policy categories that are central 
to regulated systems. Rather than citizenship, skills or other attributes to meet visa requirements, for 
example, the ability to pay for illicit migration services and enact strategies to manage risky journeys 
appear to be increasingly more significant in determining who moves and where, raising broader issues 
for the regulation and management of migration and support for populations in home and host countries. 
• Reconciling aspirations to migrate as well as increasing pressures to migrate in some communities 
with the need for States to manage regulated entry and stay of migrants continues to be 
challenging. Further investment in the formulation of innovative and practical ideas on how 
regular pathways can be enhanced without inadvertently creating overwhelming increases in 
“demand” for migration is a priority. Understanding how migrants contemplate migration and 
migration journeys is central to the development of effective approaches. 
• The dynamic nature of migration settings, supported by increased transnational connectivity via 
more sophisticated and accessible telecommunications technology, requires that we continue to 
invest in understanding migrants’ views and experiences by undertaking longitudinal surveys 
rather than seeing surveys as an occasional, “one-off” exercise.
• As the pressures on people and communities to migrate internationally may be increasing in some 
circumstances, the longer-term development of much stronger “cultures of migration” may pose 
problems for an increasing number of communities in the future who would prefer to remain at home, 
but are less able to do so. It is important, therefore, to better understand the factors that are 
involved in preferences to not migrate (including in conflict and other perilous environments). This 
will assist in being able to better support people who would prefer to remain in their communities. 
• Harnessing the opportunities as well as managing the risks that new research technologies 
continue to present will remain a critical aspect in fostering effective and ethical research into 
migration. Big data analysis, for example, provides a new way of analysing migration dynamics, but 
this must not be at the expense of compromising migrants’ privacy and confidentiality.
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8 MEDIA REPORTING OF MIGRANTS AND MIGRATION661
Introduction
Most people reading this will have met migrants in their neighbourhoods, workplaces or social circles, or they 
themselves will be migrants. Moreover, many people have encountered the subject of migration in the media. 
Ranging from films and newspapers to tweets, that coverage may have portrayed migration in one way or 
another, or simply raised it as a topical issue. To a large extent, our perceptions, attitudes or beliefs about 
migration are based on both direct experiences and those channelled through the lens of the media, although 
the precise mixture likely depends on our individual situations. Many people, including researchers, journalists, 
politicians and members of the public, present and debate particular viewpoints about migration while ignoring 
others. Sometimes, this deliberately encourages us to think in particular ways. Other times, it is unintentional 
or related to the fact that media content is often produced quickly and tends to be of limited length.
In this chapter, we aim to address four key questions: 
• What do media around the world say about migration and migrants? 
• What impacts does this coverage have on what members of the public, policymakers and migrants themselves 
think and do? 
• How does the practice of journalism itself contribute to coverage?
• What implications arise from recent experiences of media and migration for future research and practice?
In addressing these questions, we acknowledge how media and migration are contested terms that take different 
– and changing – forms in different times and places. This chapter recognizes that, while much media research 
tends to focus on traditional news reporting, usually in high-income democracies typically thought of as 
destination countries for migrants, this is only part of the picture. This chapter also considers newer ways 
of communicating through websites and social media that offer different ways of identifying, generating and 
sharing content with others.662 Some of this content may be familiar news, but other types may be closer to 
entertainment and art. Modern media are extraordinarily varied in their content and forms. The chapter also 
points out that media coverage of migration reflects differences in how countries’ media systems operate. 
The degree of press freedom is an important variable here, but even relatively “free” media may be more or 
less objective or partisan in their approaches. While we are limited in terms of space as well as the scope of 
research, wherever possible we have tried to reflect the variety – if not the volume – of media interest in 
migration, particularly from different geographic perspectives. We examine research published in English, but 
have included (where possible) studies that considered media content in its original language. 
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Background and context
Arguably, humans have always communicated about migration in whichever ways were available to them: even 
petroglyphs in Azerbaijan, some 10,000 years old, depict humans on the move.663 Fleeing persecution, travelling to 
improve one’s economic situation, talking about homelands, foreigners and exile: these kinds of ideas and stories appear 
throughout history.664 But what makes migration – and, particularly, media coverage of the issue – so important now?
One reason might be rising levels of anti-immigration rhetoric and recent gains by anti-immigration political parties in 
many countries. Across Europe, for example, some voters have moved away from mainstream parties towards “challenger 
parties” on the basis of their migration policies, especially those who are more politically right-wing.665 Negative, even 
hostile, coverage of migration has accompanied similar rises in anti-immigration parties and political rhetoric.666
Political debates often scapegoat migrants by reducing the complex causes, impacts and types of migration 
into easily repeated stories or phrases.667 But laying blame solely on the media alone for negative attitudes 
towards migration would oversimplify as well. Other factors, including demographic change, actual or imagined 
socioeconomic impacts, and wider policies (such as economic austerity) are also likely to play some part.668 
Changing contexts also influence patterns in coverage. Two important factors include the degree to which media 
are free, and the ways that media now operate in a digital world. A free media environment is “where coverage 
of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and 
the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures”.669 Freedom of the media is widely considered a 
necessity for democracy.670 This is because media can inform voters about current events, scrutinize institutions 
or hold public servants to account without excessive interference from the very institutions or officials being 
criticized. Levels of media freedom greatly differ around the world. In 2017, 13 per cent of the world’s population 
lived in countries with a free press, while nearly half (45%) of people lived in countries without a free press.671 
Even in countries with high levels of media freedom, the news often reflects the language and topics that 
governments and other powerful groups prefer.672 This is because reporters often depend on government officials 
for information, especially about political issues. Media also operate in different ways around the world.673 They 
can be highly professionalized and commercial (the “liberal” model), as seen in Anglo-American traditions. Or 
media can be extensions of political parties (a “polarized pluralist” approach often seen in Southern European 
countries). A third approach sees media as professional and autonomous yet representing and connecting 
viewpoints from many distinct social groups including trade unions, voluntary associations and parties (the 
“democratic corporatist” model seen in Northern European countries). The third model is generally more open to 
multiple points of view, whereas both the liberal and polarized pluralist systems tend to reflect official political 
debate, although to different degrees and for different reasons.
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Meanwhile, media coverage differs between democratic and autocratic regimes. Most research focuses on media 
systems and coverage in democracies. In autocracies, however, media coverage of migration and other issues may 
tend to reflect State interests.674 For example, some argue that lower visibility of migration in Russian and Chinese 
media coverage of Russian Federation–China border relations might indicate declining levels of emphasis among 
national and regional elites.675
The rise of the Internet, and the subsequent prevalence of social media as sources of (or distractions from) news, has 
also changed the media landscape in several ways. Some argue that digital transformations are threatening traditional 
newspapers by allowing users to find all kinds of content – news, advertising, sports coverage and lifestyle issues – 
when and where they want.676 As a result, there is less need to buy full packages of content bundled into individual 
papers or subscriptions. Meanwhile, more people get their news from social media: one study showed that nearly half 
(46%) of US citizens did so.677 Higher rates, focusing solely on social media use rather than all online sites, were seen 
in Brazil (70%), Portugal (66%), Ireland (52%) and Canada (48%). However, the two worlds are not entirely separate, 
as in the case of blogging: research into the relationship between blogs and traditional media tends to find that they 
influence each other, sometimes sparking follow-up while other times reacting to content.678
Social media also connect people in new ways that enable action – sometimes very rapidly. For example, people have used 
social media to mobilize support for protest movements during the Arab Spring.679 Non-governmental organizations, as 
well as local communities, also use social media to rally support for individual migrants facing the threat of deportation.680
But changes in media also introduce whole new sets of challenges. “Digital divides” – or inequalities in access 
to, and use of, information and communication technologies681 – risk reinforcing gaps, as well as creating new 
ones. Also, social media may contribute to “echo chambers” or “bubbles”, whereby users only encounter news 
passed along – and approved – by like-minded friends.682 These media effects reinforce political polarization, 
challenging efforts to promote consensus or compromise, especially on migration policy.
Media coverage around the world
Immigration sentiment
How positive or negative is media coverage about migration? Much of the research evidence shows media associating 
bad news683 with migrants around the world. During 2013–2014, unfavorable print and online coverage of migration 
in six countries with very high human development levels (such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom) was more than twice as visible as favourable content.684 This gap was 
particularly pronounced in Australia and the United Kingdom, while less so in Canada and Switzerland. Meanwhile, 
media content in sampled countries with lower levels of human development (such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
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Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam) also showed significantly more unfavourable content than 
favourable. Among these countries, Malaysian and Thai media were the most likely to have negative content. 
Furthermore, media in both sets of countries were most negative towards irregular migration.685
More detailed studies of particular national media often confirm this general trend. For example, Danish and, 
to a more moderate extent, Dutch newspapers published more negative than positive content about migration 
between 2003 and 2010.686 Similar analysis of migrants in German news (print and broadcast television) between 
1998 and 2005 showed that these media tended to portray these groups negatively, too.687
But there are reasons to be cautious about this narrative of negativity. First, negativity is not unique to 
migration coverage, as journalists generally tend to emphasize problems across most topics. Second, there are 
exceptions to the bad news trend. There has been some movement towards more positive – or at least more 
neutral – coverage of migration issues across several destination and origin countries that does not seem 
to be attributable to any particular event.688 Media in specific countries, such as Switzerland and Viet Nam, 
also demonstrated noticeable increases in positive content, even if the overall media landscape appears to 
be more polarized.689 Newspapers in New Zealand have also shown “more nuanced and sympathetic reporting 
after 2000”.690 Furthermore, as explored in greater detail later, changes in traditional media (as well as the 
proliferation of social media outside of conventional journalism) provide opportunities for migrants to produce 
and promote their own content highlighting positive aspects of migration. 
Framing migration: competing issues, different approaches
Migration coverage is not only positive or negative, but also presents a variety of different issues, narratives and 
viewpoints. For the purpose of this chapter, these techniques can be broadly thought of as different ways to frame 
migration, although we recognize that the framing concept is itself not always well defined.691 Identifying how 
matters are framed is important because, as explored later, media frames affect how people think about migration.
Traditional media in the United States and Europe often cast migration as an issue of “law and order” or 
security.692 For example, this link became more visible in Italian media from the 1970s to the 1990s.693 British 
media also have depicted immigrants as “illegal”,694 and asylum seekers and refugees as “bogus” or linked 
to terrorist threats.695 Meanwhile, from 1999 to 2014, English-language newspapers in Malaysia and Thailand 
also tended to refer to immigrants as “illegal” – a pattern particularly strong in the Malaysian case.696 Recent 
research argues that economic aspects, which emphasize the costs and fiscal impacts of migrants in destination 
countries, are significant – equalling if not exceeding concern about crime.697 Generally, these aspects of legal 
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status, criminality and economic impacts mix and interrelate in media content about immigration, as found in 
Spanish newspaper coverage of Latin American migrants.698 
Another approach involves dividing migrants from the “native” population, portraying them as threats to 
national identity, culture or cohesiveness. The Latino Threat Narrative, documented in US media,699 portrays 
immigrants from Latin America as incapable of successful integration.700 Local media in Guangzhou, China, also 
tend to portray African immigrants as threats to public safety and “racial purity” – a narrative that spills into 
online domains, too.701 Meanwhile, media also increasingly link populist rhetoric against Islam with broader 
questions about culture and immigration, as seen in public debate in Norway related to the July 2011 white 
supremacist terror attacks in Utøya and Oslo.702 
Media coverage can also remove migrants metaphorically from the population altogether through dehumanizing 
language. A notable example of this involves metaphors casting migration as a form of natural disaster (often a 
flood) or migrants as animals, especially insects (“swarms”). This practice is relatively widespread, appearing in 
national media such as the United Kingdom,703 Australia,704 South Africa,705 the United States706 and countries in 
the Middle East hosting Syrian refugees (see the text box ‘How media in host and non-host countries depict Syrian 
refugees’).707,708 Both economic and sociocultural threats also apply to coverage of “illegal” or “irregular” migration.709
How media in host and non-host countries depict Syrian refugees
Media	in	countries	experiencing	forced	migration	flows	might	be	expected	to	cover	the	issue	differently	
from	the	media	 in	countries	 further	 removed	 from	the	conflict.	One	studya	 compared	Western	and	
Arab	online	media	coverage	of	Syrian	refugees	since	March	2011	to	see	whether	either	group	used	
more	“water”	or	“pressure”	metaphors	–	such	as	waves	of	refugees	putting	a	strain	on	services.	
Arab,	 host-country	 media	 in	 the	 study	 (which	 included	 Lebanese,	 Jordanian,	 Egyptian	 and	 Turkish	
news)	tended	to	use	more	metaphors	when	referring	to	Syrian	refugees	than	non-host	country	media	
(comprising	 US,	 British,	 Saudi	 Arabian	 and	 United	 Arab	 Emirates	 sources).	 These	 choices	 matter	
because	they	tend	to	portray	Syrians	as	an	indistinguishable	group,	as	well	as	emphasizing	the	burdens	
refugees	place	on	host	societies.	Documenting	the	visibility	of	metaphors	and	what	they	communicate	
is	an	important	part	of	understanding	the	global	significance	of	media	coverage.
a		Abid,	Manan	and	Rahman,	2017.
698	Igartua,	Cheng	and	Muñiz,	2005.
699	Chavez,	2013.
700	In	the	United	States	of	America,	the	kind	of	narrative	that	divides	people	by	race	is	not	new,	as	Flores	(2003)	shows	in	media	coverage	
about	deportation	campaigns	affecting	Mexicans	and	Mexican–Americans	in	the	1920s	and	1930s.
701	Lan,	2016.
702	Wiggen,	2012.
703	Gabrielatos	and	Baker,	2008.
704	Pickering,	2000.
705	Banda	and	Mawadza,	2015.
706	Santa	Ana,	1999.
707	Abid,	Manan	and	Rahman,	2017.
708	However,	 not	 all	 uses	 of	 metaphors	 in	 the	 context	 of	 migration	 are	 negative,	 as	 Salahshour	 (2016)	 explores	 in	 the	 case	 of	 
New	Zealand:	they	can	also	communicate	positive,	economic	aspects.
709	Thorbjornsrud,	2015.
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In contrast to narratives of threat, division and inhuman qualities, other studies demonstrate an explicitly 
humanitarian frame that “portrays immigrants as victims of an unfair system”.710 Several cases demonstrate 
this way of covering immigration in Western European media, including those in Belgium,711 France712 and the 
Netherlands.713 Interestingly, this kind of frame actually dominated press coverage in the Republic of Korea over 
the 1990–2008 period, which reported that “immigrants have mostly been portrayed as vulnerable victims”.714 
It also appears in coverage about emigration, too (see the text box ‘Emigration in Bangladeshi and Romanian media’). 
Usually, however, this frame appears with the other approaches mentioned above. For example, Malaysian press outlets 
cast asylum seekers and refugees as both threats and victims, depending on the publications’ ideological leanings.715
Emigration in Romanian and Bangladeshi media
While	 many	 media	 studies	 focus	 on	 immigration	 into	 traditionally	 “destination”	 countries,	 other	
research	 also	 looks	 at	 how	 “sending”	 countries’	media	 cover	 emigration	 issues.	One	 study	 focused	
on	Romanian	broadsheet	newspapers’	 portrayal	of	 emigrants	 and	 their	 economic	 remittances	back	
to	Romania	during	2011–2012.b	 	These	newspapers	 tended	 to	view	 remittances	as	positive	 sources	
of	development	for	Romania	–	although	other,	less	frequent	opinions	raised	questions	about	possible	
losses	of	skills	and	disruption	to	families.	
Another	study	looked	at	the	media	in	Bangladesh,	among	other	developing	countries.c		Although	the	
media	commented	on	opportunities	abroad	for	Bangladeshi	workers,	they	also	mentioned	concerns	
about	exploitation	and	mistreatment,	especially	affecting	female	workers.	These	findings	demonstrate	
how	emigration,	as	one	of	many	types	of	mobility,	also	receives	different	kinds	of	coverage.
b		Mădroane,	2016.
c		McAuliffe	and	Weeks,	2015.
Accounting for different scales and media
These trends also have geographic dimensions. Journalists working in regional and local press, for example, 
may cover immigration differently because of their specific networks and connections to the location, as 
demonstrated in the contrasting cases of coverage about asylum seekers in Yorkshire and Wales in the United 
Kingdom.716 Meanwhile, analysis of Spanish regional newspaper coverage in Castilla and Leon revealed that, while 
local papers could be just as negative towards immigrants, they “tend to be more community service oriented in 
contrast with ‘bad is good’ news” found in national tabloids.717 This echoed earlier studies in the Netherlands, 
710	Thorbjornsrud,	2015.
711	Van	Gorp,	2005.
712	Benson,	2013.
713	Bos	et	al.,	2016.
714	Park,	2014.
715	Don	and	Lee,	2014.
716	Finney	and	Robinson,	2008.
717	Cheng	et	al.,	2014.
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where regional newspapers tended to emphasize human interest frames regardless of local residents’ opinions on 
asylum.718 This pattern coincides with divergent perceptions: citizens may perceive immigration as a significant 
problem nationally while viewing diversity positively or neutrally in their local areas.719 However, national 
debates can also catalyse local conflict and negative perceptions.720 
Other research, comparing local and national newspapers in Canada and the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2012, 
questions how much these scales actually matter: in those countries, locally felt factors such as unemployment 
and the actual numbers of migrants did not cause any substantial change in framing.721 This debate illustrates how 
media content and effects are often specific to a particular context, making it hard to draw general conclusions.
Scale also moves upwards, as seen in international media coverage of other nations’ migration policies. Observing 
from a distance can change the tone of coverage or the prominence of a given issue. For example, in February 
2014, Australian media reported on “riots” occurring in detention centres in Papua New Guinea, operated on 
behalf of Australia. Although international media used these events “to question the legality of the Australian 
government’s actions”722 and raise awareness of asylum seekers’ plights in detention, they still portrayed 
these migrants as being somehow different. Later in this chapter, we explore factors specific to the practice of 
journalism that may help explain the form and content of migration coverage.
Advances in data collection and analysis also facilitate research into online media. Although these techniques are 
still developing, they are already giving glimpses into the ways that public discussion about migration happens 
outside of traditional newspapers (see the text box ‘Alan Kurdi and images that spread across 20 million screens’). 
For example, a study of Twitter data revealed peaks and troughs of public attention to immigration – and particular 
individuals trying to lead the public discussion – as the United States Senate debated immigration reform in 
2013.723 Blogs and online forums may also provide anonymous opportunities for even stronger, more dehumanizing 
language directed at migrants than might be used in conventional outlets.724 However, they can also expose 
people to more diverse viewpoints, as seen in the Republic of Korea online communities that tend to contain more 
nuanced depictions of migrants than do mainstream online media.725 Meanwhile, social media forums continue to 
link male asylum seekers and refugees from Middle Eastern countries with terrorism and sexual deviancy, fuelling 
perceptions “they do not conform to received visual expectations of what a ‘refugee’ looks like”.726
Alan Kurdi and images that spread across 20 million screens
In	September	2015,	images	of	the	drowned	Syrian	toddler	Alan	Kurdi	(mistakenly	reported	as	“Aylan”)	flashed	
across	upwards	of	20	million	screens	around	the	world,	largely	thanks	to	social	media.	Research	into	its	impacts	
showed	that	tweets	using	the	word	refugee	not	only	spiked	immediately	afterwards,	but	also	spread	rapidly	
from	a	limited	geographical	area,	to	wider	Middle	Eastern	audiences	and	to	the	rest	of	the	world.d  
718	d’Haenens	and	de	Lange,	2001.
719	Blinder	and	Allen,	2016a.
720	Hopkins,	2010.
721	Lawlor,	2015.
722	Laney	et	al.,	2016.
723	Chung	and	Zeng,	2016.
724	Musolff,	2015.
725	Yi	and	Jung,	2015.
726	Rettberg	and	Gajjala,	2016.
198 Media reporting of migrants and migration
While	 various	 countries	 (including	 Canada,	 Germany	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom)	 announced	 steps	
to	 increase	 support	 for	 refugees	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	 the	picture’s	publication,	 there	are	
debates	about	how,	and	to	what	extent,	this	image	has	moved	public	debate	in	Europe	about	refugees.e 
But	there	is	no	doubt	it	marked	an	important	moment	in	wider	migration	narratives,	with	the	image	
coming	to	symbolize	the	closed	border	of	the	European	Union	and	the	risks	desperate	people	will	take	
to	cross	it.	 It	also	raises	questions	about	the	responsibility	of	social	networks	as	platforms	for	many	
kinds	of	content,	not	all	of	which	readers	or	viewers	will	agree	with	or	find	appropriate.
d		Vis	and	Goriunova,	2015.
e		Vollmer	and	Karakayali,	2017.
Media content also includes many topics and genres. For example, research into Spanish prime-time fictional television 
programmes (such as sitcoms, series or feature films) found that immigrant characters were not only underrepresented 
compared to the actual foreign population, they were also portrayed as having less education, intelligence and stable 
employment, as well as being more violent727 – a finding echoed in studies of US broadcast media.728 
Media coverage about athletes who happen to have migrant backgrounds also provide opportunities to highlight – as well 
as reframe or even set aside – questions about national identity and integration.729 Examples include  reporting about 
the French national football team,730 and UK newspaper coverage of British Olympians with migrant backgrounds.731 
Also, Slovenian broadcast coverage of naturalized Olympic athletes (many of whom were African) used terms such as 
“imported” and “untrue”, having the rhetorical effect of emphasizing differences between them and viewers.732 
Migrant-led media and journalism
In the midst of reporting that emphasizes migrants’ differences in relation to the host or native population, it is 
important to explore how migrants themselves access, produce and share media content. Newsrooms that are now 
catering to different migrant audiences – as well as digital technologies that disrupt and circumvent traditional 
media altogether – produce new opportunities and challenges for covering immigration. Research comparing 
Spanish- and English-language media in the United States, for example, shows that the former cover immigration 
issues more positively than the latter – with potential effects on what their audiences subsequently think.733 
“Immigrant journalism” does not take a single approach. Instead, it varies in style, formality, motivation and 
degree of ties to the home country.734 Chinese media in Canada and the United States,735 Venezuelan journalists in 
727	Igartua,	Barrios	and	Ortega,	2012.
728	Mastro	and	Behm-Morawitz,	2005.
729	Maguire,	2013.
730	Garcia-Arjona,	2012.
731	Allen	and	Blinder,	2012.
732	Ličen	and	Billings,	2013.
733	Abrajano	and	Singh,	2009.
734	Shumow,	2014.
735	Zhou,	Chen	and	Cai,	2006.
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Florida,736 or historically Black newspapers’ coverage of West Indian immigrants to the United States in the early 
twentieth century737 all demonstrate how migrants can relate to – and communicate with – host countries in 
different ways. For example, refugees use Twitter and Facebook to directly communicate their own experiences, 
indicating that: “a seeming shift towards a self-staged testimony appears to offer a potential autonomous 
self-management of social media presence by the refugees themselves”.738 This technique can extend to other 
media and geographic regions. As argued later, however, the extent to which these messages and ways of 
producing coverage are effective depends on the purpose at hand.
Impacts of media coverage on public perceptions, policymaking and migrants
Media coverage, in all its forms, relates to the wider world. Media provide important sources of information that 
affect how people act, what people think, how policymakers prioritize agendas, and how migrants make decisions.
Media coverage and public opinion about migration
“The press”, we are reminded, “is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”739 The 
previous section showed how media coverage of migration varies around the world – and not just within 
traditional newspapers, but in other media, too. But what impacts do these various portrayals and approaches 
have on what people think, on policy developments and on migrants themselves?
In the early twentieth century, Walter Lippmann suggested that what we think about an issue is based on 
the “pictures in our heads” that we either create ourselves, through direct experience, or receive from other 
sources.740 Whether explicitly or not, this idea has formed the basis of much research into how media influence 
what people think: does changing pictures similarly change perceptions and opinions?741
One aspect of these perceptions involves how many migrants there are in the country. People regularly overestimate 
minority groups’ actual numbers.742 This can occur because people perceive immigrants as threatening (and 
exaggerate that threat) or because they receive and use incorrect information. The media often promote these 
feelings and information, especially on symbolic issues such as immigration, where individuals may not have 
direct experience of all types of migration and refugee issues.743 
Changing the information available to people can make a difference in attitudes towards immigration.744 For 
example, survey experiments in Europe and the United States found that accurate information about migrant 
populations influences perceptions. Researchers provided factual information about the number of migrants in 
their respective countries to a random subset of participants. In most countries, people who were given the 
736	Shumow,	2012.
737	Tillery	and	Chresfield,	2012.
738	Rettberg	and	Gajjala,	2016.
739	Cohen,	1963.
740	Lippmann,	1997.
741	There	are	differences	between	perceptions	and	opinions	–	notably,	that	the	latter	indicate	evaluation	of	an	attitude	object	while	the	former	
simply	refer	to	general	awareness	or	to	cognitive	links	between	an	entity	and	associated	characteristics.	For	the	purpose	of	this	chapter,	
these	terms	may	be	used	interchangeably	to	broadly	indicate	the	idea	of	“what	people	think”.	For	more	detail,	see	Fiske	and	Taylor	(2016).
742	Herda,	2010.
743	Vliegenthart	et	al.,	2008.
744	Grigorieff,	Roth	and	Ubfal,	2016.
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accurate information were less likely to say that their country had too many immigrants, compared to those who 
were not given that information.745 This difference was particularly pronounced in Greece, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, but less so in France and the Russian Federation.746 
Another aspect involves understanding more about the nature of migrant populations: why migrants are 
arriving, and where they come from. For example, when the British public thought of migrants as asylum seekers 
or labour migrants, official figures actually showed that students were the largest group at the time – but this 
group is rarely covered in the media.747 Meanwhile, in Finland, a substantial minority (22%) of citizens thought 
that most migrants came not from the Russian Federation (the correct geographic origins of most migrants 
in the country) but from Somalia or other places.748 In this case, Finns who relied on print media were more 
accurate in their perceptions than those who primarily used television sources.
These differences between perceptions and reality are important in shaping public opinion about immigration. 
Also, different ways of portraying reality may impact perceptions (see the text box ‘Are numbers or narratives 
more convincing among migrants?’).  Studies in Europe and the United States have revealed that people tend 
to be more opposed to migration when they think that their country hosts a large population of migrants.749 
These perceptions, rather than the real size of the foreign-born population, are correlated with anti-immigrant 
views.750 Also, citizens who perceive migrants to be from different (and less privileged) groups than the host 
country also tend to be more negative about migration, as confirmed by studies in Finland,751 Spain752 and the 
United States.753 It is safe to say that media coverage plays an important role in providing information about 
the size and nature of migrant populations, which in turn seems likely to have an impact on public opinion.
Are numbers or narratives more convincing among migrants?
Messages	about	migration	and	integration	take	several	forms,	affecting	migrant	and	host	audiences	alike.	
One	studyf	presented	identical	facts	about	the	experiences	of	young	Muslim	women	in	the	Netherlands	
to	Muslims	living	in	Amsterdam	–	some	migrants,	and	some	children	of	migrants	born	in	Amsterdam.	The	
information	appeared	either	as	personal	testimony	involving	a	specific	person,	or	numerical	data	reflecting	the	
situation	of	Muslim	women	as	a	whole.	
Muslims	born	in	Amsterdam	(whom	the	study	called	“second-generation”)	responded	more	strongly	to	the	
narrative	testimony,	becoming	more	open	to	gender	equality,	sexual	minorities’	rights	and	secularism	in	public	
life.	Meanwhile,	those	born	in	Muslim-majority	countries	(whom	the	study	called	“first-generation”)	became	
more	open	to	these	issues	when	presented	with	numerical	information,	though	less	strongly	than	the	second-
generation	participants.	This	pattern	held	even	after	considering	how	comfortable	people	felt	with	numbers.
745	Transatlantic	Trends,	2014.
746	Providing	 information	 about	migrants’	 share	 of	 the	 population	 did	 not	 change	 perceptions	 in	 Poland,	 while	 it	 actually	 slightly	
increased	the	percentage	of	people	in	Sweden	who	said	that	there	were	too	many	immigrants	(Transatlantic	Trends,	2014).	
747	Blinder,	2015.
748	Herda,	2015.
749	Alba,	Rumbaut	and	Marotz,	2005;	Hooghe	and	de	Vroome,	2015.
750	Strabac,	2011.
751	Herda,	2015.
752	Igartua	and	Cheng,	2009.
753	Brader,	Valentino	and	Suhay,	2008.
201WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018
Why	did	this	happen?	One	possibility	the	study	suggests	 is	that	people	raised	in	 largely	 individualistic	
cultures	may	connect	with	personal	stories	of	actual	 individuals,	while	those	raised	in	more	collective	
societies	may	respond	more	to	numbers	reflecting	opinions	or	experiences	of	 larger	groups.	Although	
research	in	other	countries	is	needed	to	confirm	this	finding,	it	does	suggest	that	message	styles	–	as	well	
as	content	–	matter	for	different	audiences.
f		Wojcieszak	et	al.,	2015.
Emotions, particularly negative ones such as anxiety or fear, also influence how strongly media affect people. 
This happens because emotions may cause people to interpret information in ways that match their feelings. 
For example, the combination of feeling anxious and being given negative information about Latinos in the United 
States resulted in greater levels of hostility,754 and in a tendency to seek out further negative information.755 This 
is especially true for people who use the media more often.756 Similar results came from a Spanish study that linked 
crime with migrants of Moroccan – rather than Latin American – origins.757 Anger is also an important emotion 
that impacts how people view immigration, as found among Dutch citizens.758 Less is known about how positive 
emotions such as amusement, enthusiasm or compassion work in shaping perceptions of migration.759 
Media and policymaking
In addition to affecting what the public thinks about migration, media can also influence the agendas of 
policymakers.760 Studies in this area show that media effects on legislators vary, depending on the issue being 
covered and on the chosen media (see the text box ‘The British press and Brexit’).761 In 1990s Belgium, for 
example, newspapers seemed to have a greater effect on policymakers’ attention than broadcast journalism – 
particularly on sensational, symbolic issues.762 Other studies show how the media are less important to 
policymakers and the public on issues felt more directly, such as inflation.763
The British press and Brexit
In	the	years	leading	up	to	the	June	2016	United	Kingdom	European	Union	membership	referendum	(also	known	
as	the	Brexit	referendum),	British	newspapers	 focused	more	on	rising	“net	migration”	 levels,	along	with	the
754	Brader,	Valentino	and	Suhay,	2008.
755	Albertson	and	Gadarian,	2015.
756	Seate	and	Mastro,	2016.
757	Fernandez	et	al.,	2013.
758	Lecheler,	Bos	and	Vliegenthart,	2015.
759	Griskevicius,	Shiota	and	Neufeld,	2010.
760	Baumgartner	and	Jones,	1993.
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perceived	rate	and	size	of	 immigration,	than	on	the	referendum	itself.	During	2013–2014,	there	was	a	 large	
increase	in	the	coverage	of	European	Union	(EU)	migration,	as	well	as	negative	depictions	of	Romanian	migrants,	
in	particular.		Some	commentators	argue	that	an	important	factor	in	the	Brexit	vote	was	how	the	United	Kingdom’s	
influential	Eurosceptic	and	anti-immigration	newspapers	focused	on	EU	migration.g		Indeed,	the	detailed	picture	
of	British	newspaper	coverage	of	migration	arguably	charts	the	rise	in	populist	language	since	2006.	
However,	it	is	difficult	to	conclusively	connect	media	coverage	with	political	outcomes	–	especially	in	
complicated	events	 such	as	Brexit.	 Public	 perceptions	 come	 from	many	 sources,	 and	other	 factors,	
such	as	recent	increases	in	the	United	Kingdom’s	EU	migrant	population,h		must	be	taken	into	account.		
g		Cummings,	2017.
h			Vargas-Silva	and	Markaki,	2016.
The impact of media also depends on how politically advantageous media content (or even the lack of media content: 
see the the text box ‘Choosing not to report on migration: Australian media and policy change’) might be for parties 
and officials.764 An experiment involving Swiss members of parliament showed that negative news coverage on issues 
that a party “owns” elicited a stronger action – although more often among junior members.765 Further evidence from 
the Netherlands and Sweden shows that political parties are more likely to respond to media coverage that fits their 
platforms: “the right framing helps the party attain its policy goals”.766 Also, expanding to other levels of government, 
such as at the city level, may reveal how the media play stronger roles in shaping policy agendas more locally.767 In 
contrast, in China, where central government has greater control over both traditional newspapers and (some) online 
forums, commercial and non-official media do not appear to impact “official” policy discussion very much.768
Choosing not to report on migration: Australian media and policy change
Discussing	what	media	report	about	migration	and	migrants	is	only	half	of	the	story.	The	narratives	that	
are	not	reported	are	often	just	as	 important.	Research	documenting	Australian	media	coverage	and	
policy	developments	relating	to	asylum	looks	at	this	question.i  
In	the	late	1970s,	the	Australian	Government	tried	to	humanize	depictions	of	asylum	seekers.	These	
efforts	 were	 broadly	 ignored	 by	 media	 organizations,	 however,	 which	 preferred	 to	 increase	 the	
prominence	 of	 negative	 portrayals	 and	 their	 proponents.	 This	 unwillingness	 to	 report	 sympathetic	
stories	 arguably	 helped	 push	 policy	 and	 public	 sentiment	 in	more	 negative	 directions	 for	 decades,	
eventually	leading	to	Australia’s	policy	of	offshore	processing	of	asylum	seekers.
i		Doherty,	2015.
764	Thesen,	2013.
765	Helfer,	2016.
766	van	der	Pas,	2014.
767	Scholten,	2013.
768	Luo,	2014.
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Impacts on migration and migrants
Confronted with largely negative media portrayals in host countries, migrants can react in several ways. 
Sometimes, as found among Latin American migrants in the United States, they emphasize themselves as 
hardworking people who are different from “other” criminal migrants: “[…] these immigrants need to show 
that they have the traits of productive citizens […] because this counters the negative images of themselves 
in the media.”769 Meanwhile, media that reflect discrimination against foreigners can cultivate perceptions 
among immigrants that public opinion in the host country is similarly biased. South American immigrants 
in Chile, who typically viewed the Chilean media (which included negative stereotypes about other Latin 
American people), were more likely to think that Chilean society was more discriminatory, even if they 
themselves had not personally experienced this.770 
At a more general level, media in host countries also affect migrants’ perceptions, behaviours and attitudes 
in other ways. Depending on their personal motivations or situations, migrants may selectively use the media 
to learn more about their new place, as seen among Hazara men in Brisbane, Australia.771 They may also turn 
to the media either in home or host countries aimed at migrant audiences like themselves to retain some 
aspects of their national or ethnic identity; a study of Asian women living in the Republic of Korea showed 
how some turned to familiar home country media to remember their native language and keep up with news 
back home.772 Russian-speaking families from the former USSR living in Germany and Israel also used host, 
homeland and international media to help them to integrate into their new societies, as well as a way of 
passing down cultural traditions to their children.773 
Meanwhile, exposure to Western media can change migrants’ perceptions of their home countries, too. For 
example, Chinese students in the United States became more sceptical and critical of their own government 
after reading news coverage about censored issues such as ethnic disputes or poor national economic 
performance.774 Also, online forums and websites catering to diaspora members can provide venues for 
discussion about – and with – countries of origin, as seen on Zimbabwean social media, where participants 
disagree with and contradict one another on issues relating to national identity or historical events.775 
At one level, the stories told by media may be mostly informative, alerting people to realities, events or 
opportunities. In a study of forced migration during civil conflict in Nepal from 1996 to 2006, authors suggest 
(but do not explicitly test) how media reporting on violent clashes and deaths may have raised public awareness 
of threats that subsequently influenced individuals’ decisions to move.776 Meanwhile, decisions of Lebanese 
medical students to move and work abroad are partly due to extensive international marketing via online media.777 
At another level, media can exert an influence in more diffuse ways by shaping expectations and aspirations 
to move. For example, in-depth research among Mexican and Salvadoran women in the United States shows 
how images in the media of a “good” childhood impacted them: “[…] mothers’ decisions to migrate were 
769	Menjivar,	2016.
770	Etchegaray	and	Correa,	2015.
771	Tudsri	and	Hebbani,	2015.
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strongly influenced by ideals of a childhood free from want, ideals they construed as diametrically opposed 
to their own experiences of childhood in their countries of origin”.778 Also, media imagery helped build an 
international image for Badolato – a village in southern Italy – as a hospitable haven for refugees. Migrants 
and asylum seekers draw upon media, as well as other sources, “to imagine connections between places and 
people across borders and opportunities that may carry them forward”.779
Understanding factors that influence media coverage on migration
Why does media reporting on migration vary around the world? This section considers a range of reasons related 
to journalism practice – from economic and social contexts in which media exist, to everyday decisions made by 
individual editors and practitioners. 
Among media in predominately open or partly open contexts, there are financial reasons for particular kinds 
of migration coverage. In these cases, most media are largely commercial enterprises, and their primary 
responsibility is to sell content effectively in order to keep the business functioning.780 As a result, editors need 
to understand the people who are buying their products. 
If news organizations are selling their products to people who are likely to either be broadly opposed to, or in 
favor of immigration, they are likely to reinforce and validate rather than challenge their audiences’ viewpoints. 
Building trust is complicated. It requires audiences to see the media outlet as fair and objective,781 which can 
involve making some efforts to present counter-arguments and alternative voices, even if in cursory ways.
Social and organizational factors specific to journalism also shape media content. One of these relates to 
employment. Creative and media industries increasingly rely on freelance workers via the “gig economy”.782 This 
precarious employment means that journalists may be reluctant to challenge employers on socially controversial 
issues, or to move away from established ways of communicating about immigration that the organization 
perceives to be appropriate for their audiences.
The day-to-day work of choosing, selecting and producing stories also can affect migration coverage. Sometimes, 
the political nature of these choices is implicit or taken for granted rather than explicitly ideological.783 As 
seen across several European countries (including Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the United 
Kingdom), several factors interact to produce migration news. These include decisions about the intrinsic value 
of the news item – a decision that is often related to the agendas of policymakers, routines in selecting 
what eventually gets published, the editorial position of the outlet, and how much journalists trust different 
sources.784 Also, “getting the story” in the first place often involves understanding how these sources may use 
off-the-record information to advance their own agendas.785 
Journalists’ own backgrounds can also influence how they choose to cover migration, within the constraints 
778	Horton,	2008.
779	Nikunen,	2016.
780	Croteau	and	Hoynes,	2006.
781	Tsfati	and	Cappella,	2003.
782	Markova	and	McKay,	2011.
783	Schudson,	2011.
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(real or perceived) imposed by editors, organizations and audiences.786 For example, research among German 
journalists working in print and broadcast media787 revealed how having a migrant background sometimes brings 
benefits: it can provide valuable access to key groups, or signal expertise in a particular situation. In other 
cases, however, it can lead to either “tokenism”, when staff may feel they are hired solely for their perceived 
advantages, or outright exclusion, with them being treated as less competent. Some news organizations try 
to address these problems via diversity training, whereby journalists aim to foster intercultural understanding 
through intensive engagement. Although these kinds of programmes may confer benefits for individual 
practitioners – wider interpersonal networks, for example – they may be less effective at challenging deeper, 
more institutional biases in migration coverage.788 
Conclusion: implications and future research
We have considered the different ways that media around the world cover migration; how these portrayals 
affect what people (including migrants and policymakers) think and do; and why this coverage takes the 
forms it does. Addressing these questions raises further issues – for where we are right now, as well as for 
the future.
Given the media’s largely negative coverage of migration – and the extent of its influence – raises the 
question of how media should talk about such a complicated, diverse issue. One perspective argues that the 
ability to try to convince others of our own views and beliefs is a fundamental characteristic of democratic 
societies: “[…] freedom of speech and its democratic corollary, a free press, have tacitly expanded our Bill of 
Rights to include the right of persuasion.”789 Therefore, we should acknowledge the media in all of their forms 
as playing important roles in public debate.
However, in a world of media sources that are often allied with particular political and commercial interests, do 
we really make our own decisions about issues, including migration? Or are we pushed towards agreeing with 
conclusions that we might otherwise not have chosen? In a complicated world, individuals cannot be expected 
to make new and informed political choices every time they are asked. Instead, sources such as media provide 
the raw materials that help readers use mental short-cuts to make sense of events that occur in a social and 
political world that extends far beyond any individual’s ability to directly perceive it. As shown earlier, media 
organizations can promote negative perceptions about migrants and migration by using disaster metaphors or 
by emphasizing the costs or threats that migration might bring. There is a strong case for encouraging media 
coverage of migrants that is reasonable, measured and moves away from an assumed position of suspicion, 
though how to practically do this is less clear (see the text box ‘Changing narratives on migration: a commercial 
path?’ for one possibility).790 There are also legitimate reasons for media to discuss different types of migration 
and their impacts, trade-offs and consequences by sometimes acknowledging potential costs and threats.791
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Changing narratives on migration: a commercial path?
One	 response	 to	 anti-migrant	 coverage	 in	 the	 British	 press	 has	 been	 the	 Stop	 Funding	 Hate	
campaign.	By	targeting	companies	that	advertise	with	media	outlets	perceived	to	be	deliberately	
fuelling	 negative	 portrayals	 of	 migrants,	 it	 aims	 to	 create	 change	 through	 an	 economic	 path.	
For	 example,	 the	 campaign	 claims	 to	 have	 succeeded	 in	 persuading	 Lego®	 to	 end	 a	 corporate	
partnership	with	 the	Daily Mail.	However,	critics	of	 this	 tactic	consider	 it	a	worrying	precedent	
for	 liberal	democracy	 if	 large	companies	are	encouraged	 to	use	 their	advertising	budget	 to	put	
pressure	on	editorial	policies	of	news	organizations.j
j		Ponsford,	2016.
As online and social media rapidly multiply and diversify, they also raise the problem of dealing with misleading 
or untrue content. For example, the 2016 US Presidential election – and subsequent policy actions involving 
migration, among other topics – was beset by fake news deliberately generated with little or no concern as to 
whether it would be exposed for its fraudulence. To a certain extent, migration stories of this type are already 
part of the repertoire of coverage, as seen in a discredited German article (and its subsequent retraction) 
reporting on  “attacks” in Frankfurt by migrants792 and the Swan Bake headline in the United Kingdom’s The Sun, 
claiming that asylum seekers were poaching the Queen’s swans and cooking them in British parks.793 However, 
those news items that we see likely represent only the tip of the fake news iceberg. Social media make it easy 
to approach specific audiences with political messages and materials, in ways that can be hard to detect and 
scrutinize. Such microtargeting of persuadable audiences, identified and contacted through their social media 
activity, is a growing phenomenon.794 
The concept of fake news is not new, however. Producing false – or at least questionable – information for 
political ends is a standard propaganda technique. Furthermore, it is not a single object, but rather many 
objects with many purposes – from information that may unintentionally mislead, and material deliberately 
constructed to deceive, to a label we may attribute (rightly or wrongly) to ideas we strongly disagree with.795 
As a result, fake news may be forcing people to reassess their use of media – possibly by moving back towards 
respected and trusted media, or using fact-checking organizations and other sources of research evidence.796 
Yet this possible backlash raises the question of whether the combination of fraudulent news, targeted messaging 
and the sheer speed of on-demand information is eroding our faith in free media as a means of identifying and 
working towards more socially constructive goals. The known existence of fake news offers politicians and others 
an opportunity to use the “fake” label to dismiss accurate reporting that they dislike for political reasons. It is 
also possible that extreme political ideologies can take root in online communities that act as a kind of echo 
chamber, in which participants are only exposed to messages and sentiments from one ideological perspective.
792	Eddy,	2017.
793	Medic,	2004.
794	Bennett,	2016.
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The future of media and migration
It is clear that the media contribute to our thinking about migration, but the extent to which they drive actions 
in any direction depends on many factors that vary in different contexts. Indeed, consensus about the power of 
the media has shifted over the decades.797 
Our overview of what the media say about migration, their impacts and some of the journalistic factors that 
contribute to coverage, presents several implications and areas for future research:
1. More research needs to be done into the role of media in transit and origin countries – and particularly 
migrants’ own use of, and preferences for, different types of media. This is especially important for 
understanding how and to what extent information sources shape perceptions. 
2. Further evidence on whether and how different types of messages and emotions shape public perceptions 
and policy activity on mobility would be valuable both within and beyond the world of research. Applied 
studies can help a range of groups develop communication interventions that are more effective for the 
audiences and topics at hand.
3. There needs to be more attention given to different media systems and how they may (or may not) produce 
different kinds of content regarding migration. 
4. The presence of highly differentiated experiences around the world suggests that greater levels of public 
debate about the appropriate role of media in specific contexts will move forward the conversations already 
happening in policy, civil society and research. 
These conclusions also raise further ethical and policy questions. What should be done about fake news and 
propaganda without overly limiting press freedoms? What is the proper balance between economic, partisan 
and humanitarian motivations in covering migration? In a world where a single image such as Alan Kurdi’s can 
have more influence on public opinion than hundreds of well-researched articles, how should the media balance 
powerful imagery with substantive reporting in an honest but less sensationalistic way?
Questions such as these will be debated differently across varied local, national and international contexts. As 
a result, both producers and consumers of research should recognize that there is no single, universal way to 
sum up the role of the media, or to change media coverage of migration (see the text box ‘What is the United 
Nations doing about migration and media?’ for an example of what is already being done). Not only is migration 
itself a contested, diverse phenomenon that encompasses different types of movement, but media also comprise 
dynamic, multilayered and multisited forms of communication.
What is the United Nations doing about migration and media?
The	 TOGETHER	 initiative	 (www.together.un.org)	 is	 a	 global	 effort	 to	 mobilize	 the	 United	 Nations,	
Member	 States,	 civil	 society,	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 researchers	 in	 community-level	 activities	 that	
promote	solidarity	towards	migrants	and	refugees.	It	uses	a	wide	range	of	media	to	both	showcase	the	
shared	benefits	of	migration	and	acknowledge	 legitimate	concerns	of	host	communities.	TOGETHER	
aims	to	speak	to	–	and	engage	with	–	communities	around	the	world,	particularly	through	migrants’	
own	stories.	Launched	in	2016,	the	initiative	has	hosted	and	supported	many	events	internationally,	
including	film	festivals,	workshops	and	discussion	forums.
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9 MIGRATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM  AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION798
Introduction
Over many decades, research has shown that international migration can generate considerable benefits for all sides 
involved. Yet, around the world, a number of political leaders, reflecting varying degrees of popular sentiment, are 
linking migrants and migration with the rising threat of violent extremism and terrorism. It is always important 
to remember, as emphasized in this chapter, that migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to be the 
victims of violent extremism than the perpetrators; nevertheless, there is a belief in certain political groups in 
North America, Europe and beyond, that large flows of asylum seekers and migrants may be infiltrated by members 
of terrorist groups. 
On occasion, asylum seekers and migrants have indeed perpetrated attacks against host societies. Furthermore, 
this is not an entirely new phenomenon – migrants and diaspora groups have been involved in terrorist attacks 
in the past, for example in France or Spain before the World War I. Looking into the near future, there are 
concerns that returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) may pose a threat to their countries of origin if they 
are not apprehended, but these are mainly nationals of the countries in question.
Without therefore denying the potential of migrants (or refugees) to turn to extreme violence, the risk is that 
isolated contemporary incidents, or distant historical examples, are taken out of context and then projected 
into the future and used as the basis for sweeping generalizations about the threat that large-scale migration 
and asylum flows may pose to national and regional security. This may in turn inform policy choices.
Recognizing that this is a sensitive topic that has attracted significant public and media attention, this chapter 
is intended to put into perspective the relationship between migration and violent extremism. It is necessary to 
analyse the linkages between migration and violent extremism for a number of reasons: First, there have been 
isolated incidents of violent extremism perpetrated by migrants and we need to try to understand why these 
occurred. Second, it is important to bring data and evidence to bear on an often misinformed public debate, 
acknowledging from the outset important research and data gaps. Third, there are linkages between migration 
and violent extremism, but not those that normally attract attention. Finally, looking to the future, the risk 
of radicalization among migrants may grow unless evidence-based policies and interventions to prevent violent 
extremism are developed now.
The remainder of this chapter is structured in three main parts. It starts with a brief overview of definitions and 
data, emphasizing the need for analytical clarity, pointing to a shortage of reliable data, and highlighting the 
challenge of distinguishing causation from correlation. Next, a simple typology of the intersections between 
migration and violent extremism is developed, following the logic of the “migration cycle” from departure to 
settlement and at times return. The chapter ends with a series of preliminary implications for further policy debate.
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Definitions and data
Part of the challenge in responding to concerns about the linkages between migration and violent extremism 
is the inaccurate use of terminology. In the European debate, for example, there is little distinction in public 
discourse between migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Yet these are separate (but sometimes overlapping) 
legal and policy categories, which entail different rights and responsibilities; where intersections occur 
between them and violent extremism, the causes and consequences may differ. Equally, it is likely that 
individual experiences are actually more significant than legal status in explaining why some people may 
become radicalized. This chapter makes clear throughout which category is the focus as different intersections 
are discussed, and to what extent migration experience really is a pertinent factor, based on the limited 
existing research. Almost all the examples discussed here concern cross-border or international migration, 
although there is also limited evidence of radicalization to violent extremist agendas among internal migrants 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
A further distinction needs to be made between migrants, citizens and settled ethnic minorities. Some recent 
violent extremist attacks in Europe have been perpetrated by newly arrived asylum seekers or migrants. 
A sizeable proportion of those who have left European countries to become FTFs, on the other hand, are 
citizens of these countries and descendants of migrants (sometimes referred to as second- or third-generation 
migrants). In most cases, returning FTFs will be citizens of the countries to which they return. This matters, 
as different types of interventions may be appropriate. Attacks perpetrated by recently arrived migrants or 
asylum seekers, for example, may point to the need for better migration management; whereas the departure 
of European citizens with a migration background may be symptomatic of a long-term failure of integration, 
resulting in social exclusion. Different responses are also called for; migrants may be deported, citizens may 
not. (To further complicate this, in some countries there are proposals to strip returning FTFs of citizenship 
of their country of settlement where they have dual citizenship, thereby potentially making them eligible 
for deportation).
Analysis is further hampered because there is no clear definition of what constitutes violent extremism, nor 
is there agreement about what radicalizes people, nor what conditions permit violent extremism to flourish 
(and therefore, what the best intervention strategies are). The United Nations (UN) has no formal definition 
for “violent extremism”, nor has the European Union.799 Some States have developed definitions in their 
own national policies and strategies, and these often differ, for example, on the question of whether violent 
extremism is always political or covers a wider spectrum. The Government of the United States, for instance, 
has adopted a fairly broad definition, holding that violent extremism means “…advocating, engaging in, 
preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or 
political objectives”.800 For some commentators, it is critical to achieve consensus on a definition; in the view 
of others, this risks still further delaying long overdue action on the issue.801 
One specific intersection between migration and terrorism where there is a clear definition is for FTFs, 
defined by the United Nations as “…individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or 
799	Glazzard	and	Zeuthen,	2016.	
800	USAID,	2011.
801	Koser	and	Rosand,	2016.
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nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts 
or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”.802
The drivers of violent extremism are often categorized into “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors are those 
that are “…important in creating the conditions that favor the rise or spread in appeal of violent extremism 
or insurgency”, while pull factors may be financial or psychological and are “…associated with the personal 
rewards which membership in a group or movement, and participation in its activities, may confer”.803 It is 
also widely accepted that “radicalization to violent extremism” is at the same time an individual process as 
well as context-specific. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is neither consensus on how to address the drivers of 
violent extremism, nor how to reduce their impact. Even the terminology – countering violent extremism 
(CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) – is contested. The Global Center on Cooperative Security 
proposes the following definition: “…although emerging from efforts to address terrorism, CVE activities 
represent a range of initiatives designed to identify and prevent threats arising from violent extremism, 
which can include community tensions, regional instability, and conflict”.804
While statistical systems on migrants and migration remain underdeveloped – especially for irregular 
migration, which may be particularly relevant for analysing violent extremism  – they are certainly more 
robust than data on violent extremism. Where such data do exist, they tend to focus more on incidents and 
victims, rather than on perpetrators. According to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI),805 which analyses 
worldwide data on terrorist attacks from the previous year, 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015 
occurred in just five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic.
Data on the intersections between migration and violent extremism are even scarcer. An immediate 
observation – expanded below – is that three of the countries identified in the GTI top-10 countries impacted 
by terrorism are also reported by UNHCR as the three countries worldwide that generated over half of the 
world’s refugees in 2015, namely the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia.806 At the individual level, 
data, for example, on pre-screening of migrants or candidates for refugee resettlement who raise security 
flags are rarely available; nor is there a clear and simple profile of perpetrators of violent extremism, whether 
migrants or not. What is more, information-sharing among domestic and international law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies is far from perfect, and there is a lack of uniformity in the way countries identify and 
catalogue migrants, especially irregular migrants. This chapter does not attempt to offer direct technical 
recommendations, but it does highlight the need for more coordinated and centralized information-sharing.
There is a particular lack of data from non-OECD countries, where the majority of violent extremist attacks 
occur, and where the majority of the world’s refugees and IDPs and at least half the world’s migrants can 
be found. The holes in the various datasets significantly inhibit any systematic analysis of, or reaching 
overarching conclusions on, the linkages between migration and violent extremism.
A final caveat worth mentioning here, in part arising from the definitional and data challenges already 
identified, is the challenge of discerning causation from correlation when examining the intersections between 
migration and violent extremism. Some refugees may be fleeing direct experiences of violent extremism; other 
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migrants may be leaving their homes because of factors related to the emergence of violent extremism, for 
example, lack of opportunities to make a living for themselves and their families. Some migrants and refugees 
may themselves perpetrate acts of violence because of their traumatic migration experience; others partly due 
to conditions in the countries where they arrive, or for reasons not related to either situation. Sometimes the 
perpetrators may in fact be terrorists posing as migrants. Some migrants may actively seek violent extremist 
opportunities, while others may be vulnerable to recruitment to violent extremism.807 
Migration and violent extremism: a typology
It is possible to sketch an approximate fourfold typology of the intersections between violent extremism and 
migration, broadly following the logic of the migration cycle, from departure, through transit, to settlement, 
and sometimes return; specifically: (i) violent extremism as a driver for displacement and migration; (ii) the 
risk of radicalization in refugee, IDP and possibly migrant transit camps and centres; (iii) the risk of terrorist 
infiltration of migration and asylum flows; and (iv) the challenges of integration resulting in social exclusion. 
A final intersection – which concludes the migration cycle, but is not included here for want of data and 
analysis – is the possibility that return and failing or unsustainable reintegration may exacerbate drivers of 
violent extremism for some returnees.808
Violent extremism as a driver for displacement and migration
The very superficial comparison of GTI and UNHCR data above at least hints at some sort of link – whether 
causal or correlative – between the occurrence of violent extremist attacks and refugee flight.
Focusing first on forced migration – and also thus widening the lens from refugees exclusively to include, 
for example, IDPs and others who leave their homes involuntarily – it is important to distinguish between 
those fleeing direct experience or threat of violent extremism and those fleeing its indirect effects. There are 
populations in the world today that can quite clearly be demonstrated to be fleeing because they have been 
targeted by violent extremism and violent extremist groups. One example would be Christian minorities in 
the Levant: The Economist reported that by 2014, over half a million of 1.8 million Syrian Christians had been 
displaced.809 Another example is those displaced in northern Nigeria: there is evidence that displacing people 
from their villages may be a deliberate strategy for Boko Haram, as it was earlier for the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in northern Uganda. Further examples of populations fleeing violent extremism directly affecting 
religious minorities occur in South-East Asia, including from Rakhine State in Myanmar.
Equally, many people are probably displaced by the secondary effects of violent extremism, rather than directly 
being threatened, for example, where violent extremism disrupts labour markets, agricultural production, or 
results from cessation of social welfare provision.810 In Afghanistan there is evidence that some people have 
been displaced internally by the effects of counter-terrorism measures.811 Moving further along the spectrum 
from forced to voluntary migrant, it is also possible to consider people leaving their country not because of 
807	For	a	more	in-depth	look	at	these	causal	chains,	we	refer	the	reader	to	Schmid,	2016.	
808	Koser	and	Kuschminder,	2015.	
809 The Economist,	2014.	
810	Connor,	2016.	
811	Koser,	2013.	
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any direct or indirect effect of violent extremism, but because they no longer see a future in a country where 
there is an environment that allows violent extremism to develop and flourish.812
Violent extremism and displacement in Latin America
Historically,	violent	extremism	in	Latin	America	has	been	characterized	by	sharp	socioeconomic	and	
political	divisions,	a	number	of	which	have	included	armed	insurgent	movements	fighting	to	depose	
seated	governments.	
The	 Revolutionary	 Armed	 Forces	 of	 Colombia	 (FARC),	 for	 example,	 fought	 the	 longest-running	
insurgency	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	until	1	December	2016,	when	a	peace	deal	between	the	rebels	
and	 the	Government	 of	 Colombia	was	 approved	 by	 the	 country’s	 Congress.	 Founded	 in	 1964	 as	 a	
response	to	perpetual	land	disputes	and	growing	inequality,	the	group’s	main	target	was	government	
security	forces.	However,	incidents	of	civilian	kidnappings,	the	bombing	of	social	gatherings,	and	the	
destruction	of	infrastructure	were	also	commonplace.a		At	the	beginning	of	2017,	Colombia	had	over	 
7	million	IDPs	and	340,000	of	its	citizens	living	as	refugees	in	neighbouring	countries,	including	Ecuador,	
the	Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela,	Panama	and	Costa	Rica.b		The	FARC	is	not	the	only	group	whose	
violence	has	caused	mass	displacement	in	Colombia.	The	National	Liberation	Army	(ELN),	considered	
a	 terrorist	 group	 by	 both	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 European	 Union,	 has	 been	 known	 to	 kidnap	
civilians	 for	 ransom	as	well	as	 to	commit	acts	of	violence	against	both	security	 forces	and	civilians.	
In	 other	 Latin	 American	 countries	 such	 as	 Peru,	 violent	 extremism	 has	 been	 driven	 by	 communist	
groups	such	as	the	Shining	Path.	Established	in	the	late	1960s,	the	Shining	Path	unleashed	violence	in	
the	1980s	and	1990s	that	claimed	tens	of	thousands	of	lives	across	the	country	and	forced	hundreds	
of	thousands	of	people	out	of	their	homes.c		While	the	group	has	largely	been	dismantled	and	most	
of	those	who	were	displaced	have	returned	to	their	homes,	a	few	remaining	cells	continue	to	operate	
within	the	country,	and	an	estimated	62,000	people	remain	in	protracted	displacement.d
a			Sullivan	and	Beittel,	2016.
b			UNHCR,	2017.
c   The Economist,	2017.
d			IDMC,	2017.
Radicalization in camps
There have been examples of refugee (and IDP) camps becoming spaces for violent extremism in at least three 
ways. One is where camps may become bases for violent extremist fighters to rest and recuperate.813 Examples 
include the use of Namibian refugee settlements in Angola by the South-West Africa National Liberation Army 
812	Cunningham	and	Koser,	2015.	
813	Zolberg,	Suhrke	and	Aguayo,	1989.
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(SWANLA); Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan by the Taliban; and border camps by Nicaraguan Contras and 
Cambodian Red Khmer. A more recent example was the use of refugees in the Yarmouk camp outside Damascus 
as “human shields” by Daesh fighters.814
A second and related example is where refugee camps may become recruitment grounds for violent extremist 
groups. In 2015 Najat Rochdi, the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Cameroon, publicly expressed his 
worries that the Minawao camp in northern Cameroon risked becoming a “…fertile ground for recruitment by 
Boko Haram”.815 The Kenyan authorities have also expressed similar concerns that Al-Shabaab may be recruiting 
in the Dadaab camp complex in the north of the country. There have also been largely uncorroborated reports 
that Daesh may be recruiting within refugee settlements in Turkey and Lebanon.
Third – and perhaps the most pervasive example of the intersections between refugee camps and violent 
extremism in the still limited literature – is the risk of refugees becoming radicalized to violent extremism.816 
There is certainly evidence of radicalization leading to violence within refugee camps, including in Pakistan 
(at the Jalozai camp for Afghan refugees), Yemen (at the Somali refugee camps in Kharaz), Cameroon (at the 
Minawao camp for Nigerians) and Jordan (at the Zaatari camp for Syrian refugees). Europe has also experienced 
this phenomenon in refugee centres. In September 2016, authorities in Cologne, Germany arrested a 16-year-
old Syrian refugee for planning to carry out a terrorist attack. Arrested at a refugee centre near Cologne, where 
he was living with his parents since having fled the civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2015, authorities 
discovered bomb-making materials (including a battery carrier with wires, sewing needles and a small butane 
gas canister) and evidence of Internet chats with Daesh members. “The court attributed the boy’s radicalization 
to loneliness at the refugee centre and spending most of his time on a cell phone. In addition, he spent a lot of 
time online and with chat contacts … through these contacts he developed an Islamist-jihadist worldview”.817
Existing literature highlights three particular conditions that allow for radicalization to violent extremism 
to take root in refugee camps: poor education, especially where the gap is filled by extremist religious 
indoctrination; a lack of work; and the absence of freedom of movement.818 These three conditions are 
prevalent in many of today’s under-resourced and overcrowded IDP and refugee camps, and the risk increases 
the longer such situations are protracted. Equally, they point towards intervention opportunities that may 
help reduce the risk of radicalization to violent extremist agendas in such settings.
Lessening the risk of refugee radicalization: lessons for the Middle East from past crises
A	 recently	 published	 RAND	 Corporation	 report	 suggested	 that	 reducing	 the	 risk	 of	 radicalization	 among	
refugees	goes	beyond	providing	humanitarian	assistance	and	requires	a	multipronged	approach	that	gives	
refugees	viable	choices	for	their	future.e	There	 is,	however,	no	system	as	yet	to	evaluate	each	situation	in	
sufficient	depth	to	create	such	an	approach.	The	study	demonstrates	that	any	effective	programme	will	require	
the	 collaboration,	 sharing	 of	 information	 and	 alignment	 of	 objectives	 among	 donors,	 non-governmental	
organizations	(NGOs),	the	local	population	and	the	host	government,	as	much	as	with	the	refugees.	
814	Ban,	2015.
815	Larson,	2015.	
816	Lischer,	2006.	
817	Deutsche	Welle,	2017.
818	Martin-Rayo,	2011.
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Addressing	economic	and	financial	needs	is	also	important,	even	if	these	are	not	the	main	drivers	of	
radicalization.	Refugees	seek	means	to	support	 their	 families	and	skills	 that	might	be	useful	 for	 the	
longer	term.	Those	needs	must	be	fulfilled	within	the	country	of	refuge,	where	refugees	may	compete	
with	 local	 people	 for	 both	 jobs	 and	 consumer	 goods.	 This	means	 that	 attempted	 solutions	 should	
engage	local	players	not	usually	directly	involved	in	refugee	issues,	such	as	the	business	community.	
Interviewees	recommended	that	funding	streams	by	donors	need	to	be	flexible	and	 less	“siloed”	to	
accomplish	this	successfully.	Another	common	problem	with	international	relief	funds	is	that	they	are	
available	at	the	start	of	a	crisis,	but	dwindle	over	the	long	term.f	Policymakers	and	stakeholders	can	
increase	their	dialogue	about	long-term	financial	planning	for	refugee	crises.
At	the	same	time,	jobs	and	education	are	only	a	partial	answer.	Psychological	and	security	needs	are	
key	 components.	 Refugees	 have	 experienced	 traumag	 in	 escaping	 their	 country	 of	 origin	 and	often	
face	abuse,	humiliation	and	powerlessness	in	their	place	of	refuge.	This	arena	is	where	militant	groups	
may	 step	 in	 and	 try	 to	 radicalize	 vulnerable	 populations	with	 narratives	 of	 empowerment	 through	
violence.	Providing	 refugees	opportunities	 to	participate	 in	 their	own	governance,	 such	as	 in	 camp	
administration,	can	also	help	mitigate	this	risk.
e			Sude,	Stebbins	and	Weilant,	2015.	
f			Makdisi	and	Prashad,	2016.	
g			Hawilo,	2017.
There has been no significant research yet on the risks or occurrence of violent extremism within transit camps 
for migrants. However, given that conditions there may often resemble those found to heighten risks in refugee 
camps, it seems reasonable to suppose that the risk exists.
The risk of infiltration of asylum and migrant flows
Progressing along the migration cycle: In Europe as well as North America, perhaps the most politicized question 
 – as large numbers of asylum seekers and migrants continue to arrive from Africa and the Middle East, and 
policymakers consider resettling significant numbers of refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, among other 
origin countries – is whether or not there is evidence to support claims that terrorists are systematically 
infiltrating irregular migration flows to perpetrate attacks on foreign soil. 
In April 2016, reports surfaced and have since been corroborated that a man arrested in 2015 at a refugee camp 
in Salzburg was part of the original group of terrorists that carried out the November 2015 attacks in Paris, 
France. According to his own testimony, he was part of a group that included two of the Paris suicide bombers 
(Iraqi brothers who blew themselves up outside the Stade de France) who had travelled from the Syrian Arab 
Republic to Greece in October. Initially this Algerian man, along with a Pakistani man, was arrested in Leros for 
failing a passport check, but both were later released, whereupon they continued their journey to Austria, where 
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they were arrested again.819 According to an investigation by the BBC, “…the two men bought ferry tickets 
to leave Leros to continue their journey through Europe with Syrian refugees”.820 
At the very least, this illustrates a failure to share information adequately across European jurisdictions. As 
more information about those responsible for the Paris attacks has come to light, there appears more evidence 
to suggest that a number of the gunmen and suicide bombers had travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic to 
train and fight alongside Daesh. What remains unclear is whether these attackers returned to Europe as 
part of “sleeper cells”, intentionally positioned by Daesh leadership to coordinate attacks against France, or 
whether they returned to their countries of nationality as FTFs. As the refugee “crisis” was gaining attention 
throughout 2014 and 2015, and terrorist groups grew in notoriety, several smugglers interviewed reported 
having transported Daesh recruits.821 In early 2015, Daesh “threatened at one moment to flood Europe with 
half a million refugees through Libya. It also claimed that 4,000 jihadist fighters would be sent to Europe 
via Turkey”.822 One smuggler attested to having sent at least ten Daesh fighters posing as refugees to Europe, 
and claimed that the fighters, once settled, were awaiting their orders to launch attacks on European soil. 
Two smugglers interviewed in Turkey also reported transporting fighters across the Mediterranean Sea. Such 
reports have increased in frequency.
Without underestimating how vital it is to manage and neutralize any such risk, it is still important to urge 
caution: smugglers are hardly the most reliable source of information and in almost all other contexts are 
routinely described as criminals and liars by politicians and policymakers. It is worth emphasizing that the 
majority of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, as in the United States, were “homegrown”, that is, committed 
by citizens of that country, although many of them had an immigration background (see discussion in the 
next section). It is, of course also important to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of terrorist 
attacks worldwide still occur outside Europe and the United States.823 
Ultimately, there is scant evidence to support assertions that Daesh and other groups are systematically and 
on a large scale exploiting asylum flows to send fighters to Europe. Even if smugglers are to be believed, the 
number of terrorist recruits reported to have been imported to Europe is very small compared to the hundreds 
of thousands of people seeking refuge there. While it is important to try to guard against the risk, for example 
through pre-screening candidates for visas or resettlement, and post-arrival registration and screening, any 
policy response needs to be proportional and should not serve as a pretext for denying access to asylum for 
all those in genuine need of protection and assistance.
Migrants, violent extremism and social exclusion
A fourth intersection between migration and violent extremism takes place after migrants and refugees have 
settled; there is wide acknowledgment that radicalization to violent extremism among settled migrants and 
refugees and their descendants is a symptom of social exclusion. This remains a contested concept, but most 
definitions note that it is a dynamic and multidimensional process driven by unequal power relationships 
interacting across four main dimensions – economic, political, social and cultural – and at different levels 
819	Rose,	2016.	
820	BBC,	2016.	
821	Giglio,	2014.	
822	Schmid,	2016.
823	Institute	for	Economics	and	Peace,	2016.	
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including individual, household, group, community, country and global levels. The overall process results in 
a continuum of inclusion/exclusion conditions characterized by unequal access to resources, capabilities and 
rights, which then leads to inequalities.824
According to research collected by New America, “every jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the 
United States since 9/11 was a citizen or legal resident”.825 An overwhelming majority of Americans charged 
with engaging in terrorist acts (domestically or internationally) during this time period are/were permanent, 
legal residents, and many are the children of first-generation immigrants. Some of the most fatal recent 
terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by second-generation immigrants, including the Orlando nightclub 
attacker, who was a US citizen and the son of Afghan immigrants. In the case of the San Bernardino shooters, 
one was a US citizen and the son of Pakistani immigrants; the other, Tashfeen Malik, was a Pakistani national 
and conditional United States permanent resident who came to the United States on a fiancée visa.826
A September 2016 report from the Cato Institute undertook a comprehensive review of visas used by terrorists 
in the United States to offer a risk analysis. According to the Cato study, Americans have a 0.00003 per cent 
chance of dying in an attack perpetrated by a foreign-born terrorist.827 Specifically, the Cato analysis identifies 
154 foreign-born terrorists in the United States who killed 3,024 people in attacks from 1975 through the end 
of 2015, which – it should be noted – includes the almost 3,000 victims of the 11 September 2001 attacks. 
Of these 154 foreign-born terrorists, 
…ten of them were illegal immigrants, 54 were lawful permanent residents, 19 were 
students, 1 entered on a K-1 fiancé(e) visa, 20 were refugees, 4 were asylum seekers, 
34 were tourists on various visas, and 3 were from Visa Waiver Program countries.  
The visas for 9 terrorists could not be determined. During that period, the chance of 
an American being murdered by a foreign-born terrorist was 1 in 3,609,709 a year.  
The chance of an American being killed in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee 
was 1 in 3.64 billion a year.828 
According to the Migration Policy Institute’s analysis of the 745,000 refugees resettled in the United States of 
America since 9/11 to the end of 2015, only three have been arrested on terrorism charges.829 What is unclear 
however, is whether these individuals were already radicalized to violent extremism when they arrived, 
became radicalized subsequently, or whether they were deliberately sent to the United States by terrorist 
groups. 
824	Rudiger	and	Spencer,	2003;	UN	DESA,	2016.	
825	New	American	Economy,	2017.
826	Friedman,	2017.	
827	Willingham,	Martucci	and	Leung,	2017.	
828	Nowraseth,	2016.	
829	Newland,	2015.	
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Perhaps another indicator of social exclusion is the incidence of FTFs, of whom it has been estimated about 
30,000 are fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, mainly with Daesh.830 According to a report by the 
Soufan Group, at that time the top ten source countries for FTFs in absolute numbers were, in declining order: 
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Jordan, France, Morocco, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and 
Germany.831 While detailed profiles on these individuals are unavailable, it is clear that from some countries, 
like Tunisia, the vast majority are nationals and not migrants or their descendants. In contrast, is appears 
that the majority of foreign fighters from France and Germany do have a migrant background. However, they 
make up a proportion of total FTFs in two countries that combined are the source of a small proportion of 
the total number of FTFs. This suggests that globally, FTFs are not necessarily a major migration problem. It 
is worth noting, according to the Global Coalition, that “the number of Da’esh fighters in Iraq and Syria has 
been reduced to the lowest levels in more than two and half years– around 12,000-15,000, nearly half of the 
high-end estimate of fighters in 2014”.832
Such data – albeit scattered and unsystematic – do nevertheless indicate that, at times, settled migrants 
and refugees, and their descendants, may become radicalized to violent extremism; and not just in OECD 
countries. Something is clearly going wrong for some people, and it is worth considering the explanations. 
Some analysts have focused on structural level drivers to radicalization among migrants and their descendants, 
although these alone are not usually sufficient to explain individual radicalization. In the cases of Belgium 
and France, for example, it has been suggested that the political culture, an overly secular manner of 
governance, has ostracized some minority communities, in particular Muslims of North African lineage. 
According to some analysts:
As with the Francophone finding overall, we’re left with guesswork as to why exactly the 
relationships between French politics, urbanization, youth unemployment, and Sunni 
militancy exist. We suspect that when there are large numbers of unemployed youth, 
some of them are bound to get up to mischief. When they live in large cities, they 
have more opportunities to connect with people espousing radical causes. And when 
those cities are in Francophone countries that adopt the strident French approach to 
secularism, Sunni radicalism is more appealing.833 
In contrast, the Soufan Group report referred to above focuses more on personal rather than (socio)political 
drivers. It is certainly true that some migrants and their descendants experience marginalization and 
disenfranchisement, identified as “push” factors to violent extremism, making some young Muslim people and 
recent converts to Islam more vulnerable to recruitment. 
Current policy responses include promoting “integrated identities” (meaning that, for example, an individual 
can have two or more identities, e.g. religious and national) and providing them with a sense of opportunity – in 
essence, enhancing a person’s belief or perception that they have access to opportunities and can see a future 
for themselves where they can actualize an option open to them. According to Daniel Köhler, Director of the 
830	The	Soufan	Group,	2015.	
831	Ibid.	
832	The	Global	Coalition,	2017.
833	McCants	and	Meserole,	2016.	
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German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies, “…over the last few years, counter-terrorism 
strategy in Germany has focused massively on working with families to prevent radicalisation taking place. 
Preventing radicalisation amongst refugees, however, will require lots and lots of catching up”.834
Radicalization among Central Asia’s migrants 
In	an	effort	to	discover	why	a	sizeable	number	of	terrorist	incidents	are	perpetrated	by	Central	Asians,	
Edward	Lemon	and	John	Heathershaw	undertook	a	rigorous,	but	limited	analysis	and	found	that	violent	
extremist	groups	were	targeting	and	specifically	recruiting	migrants.h		In	their	analysis	of	radicalization	
of	a	relatively	small	number	of	people	from	Central	Asian	countries,	Lemon	and	Heathershaw	draw	on	
the	limited	information	and	data	available,	noting	that:
…we still know very little about this phenomenon and that it remains very rare. Policy 
research on this topic is currently weak and driven by misconceptions, while academic 
research is rare and often out-of-date.
Lemon	and	Heathershaw	offer	observations	on	the	possible	relationships	to	migration,	noting	that	most	
of	 those	 radicalized	have	been	 targeted	by	 jihadist	 groups	 after	 they	have	 left	 their	 home	 countries.	
They	note	that	despite	recent	high-profile	terrorism	incidents	carried	out	by	Central	Asian	militants	–	the	
April	2017	St.	Petersburg	metro	bombing,	the	January	2017	Istanbul	nightclub	attack	and	the	June	2016	
Ataturk	airport	bombing	–	there	is	no	clear	evidence	that	religious,	economic	or	political	root	causes	in	
Central	Asia	are	responsible	for	it	“exporting”	terrorism.	
Lemon	and	Heathershaw	argue	that	while	no	single	factor	explains	why	an	individual	would	decide	to	join	
an	extremist	group,	many	appear	to	have	experienced	isolation	of	some	type,	and	this	may	explain	why	
recruiters	have	targeted	those	at	the	margins	of	societies,	including	people	working	abroad.		What	is	more,	
according	to	their	research	“most	Central	Asian	migrants	are	literate	and	semi-skilled,	but	often	work	in	
jobs	far	below	their	capability	and	find	themselves	exploited	by	their	employers”.i		Many	young	men	from	
Central	Asia	who	have	migrated	for	work	spend	their	late	adolescence	away	from	their	homes;	they	are	
subject	to	daily	economic	hardship,	are	undervalued	in	their	jobs,	suffer	racial	abuse	and	sometimes	State	
harassment.	This	can	make	them	more	vulnerable	to	jihadism,	underscoring	the	need	to	combat	xenophobia	
and	mistreatment	of	migrant	workers,	which	in	and	of	itself	is	important	for	all	societies.	The	possibility	of	
radicalization	does	not	alter	this,	but	highlights	the	rare	and	possibly	extreme	consequences	of	falling	short.
h		Lemon	and	Heathershaw,	2017.	
i			Ibid.
834	Oltermann,	2016.
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While it is too soon to assess whether such interventions will be successful, there have been concerns expressed 
that other policy options may be harmful. Many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have experienced difficult 
situations in their lives and face discrimination. Furthermore, they are also often tainted by false or dubious 
assertions concerning their impact on the economy, social cohesion, ideological beliefs and motivations, and national 
identity. To portray them additionally as a threat to national security and seeing them as potential terrorists only 
adds to their hardship. It may result in the unintended consequence of further alienating them, thus increasing 
their susceptibility to violent extremist narratives and agendas.835 Such concerns have recently been expressed 
about the US 2017 Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.836
A final angle on the links between migrants, violent extremism and social exclusion, concerns the prospective 
challenge of reintegrating returning FTFs. According to the United Nations, FTFs: 
…increase the intensity, duration, and complexity of conflicts and may constitute a serious 
danger to their States of origin, transit, destination, as well as neighboring zones of armed 
conflict in which they are active. The FTF threat is evolving rapidly changing and is unlikely 
to be fully contained in the short term. A significant longer-term risk is posed by FTFs 
returning to their countries of origin or upon their arrival in third countries.837
Scholars, civil society and a handful of policymakers have remarked that the rehabilitation and reintegration 
of FTFs must become a priority; we risk further radicalizing individuals and communities if we rely on 
detention as the sole means to treat returning FTFs. Indeed some may be able to help with preventing further 
violent extremism:
Promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders is a critical 
component of addressing the full lifecycle of violent extremist radicalization and 
recruitment. Amid growing numbers of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and the 
active prosecution of suspected terrorists in general, the need to support their rehabilitation 
and reintegration after imprisonment is paramount in order to minimize recidivism and to 
build trust among local communities and law enforcement.838
Defectors and reintegration
In	the	eastern	Danish	city	of	Aarhus	–	the	second-largest	city	in	the	country	–	the	police,	city	council	and	
local	 NGOs	 engage	 with	 one	 another	 in	 coordinated	 activities	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 at-risk	 youth	 from	
joining	violent	extremist	groups.j		For	the	residents	and	law	enforcement	of	Aarhus,	the	primary	concern	
for	at-risk	youth	has	been	their	interest	in	leaving	the	city	to	fight	alongside	militant	jihadi	groups	abroad,	
835	Cunningham	and	Koser,	2015
836	Amnesty	International,	2017.	
837	UNSC,	2014.
838	Global	Center	on	Cooperative	Security	and	International	Centre	for	Counter	Terrorism	–	The	Hague,	2016.	
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primarily	Daesh	 in	 Iraq	and	the	Syrian	Arab	Republic.	To	prevent	this,	 local	stakeholders	prioritize	social	
integration	 for	marginalized	 and	 vulnerable	 youth.	 For	 Aarhus	 residents	who	 have	 travelled	 abroad	 to	
support	Daesh	and	have	returned	home,	there	is	also	support	offered.k		In	Denmark,	the	national	policy	
states	 that	 returning	 jihadists	whose	 involvement	 in	 terrorism	has	been	established	will	be	prosecuted;	
and	 that	 those	with	 no	 proven	 record	 of	 participation	 in	 terrorist	 activities	 are	 eligible	 for	 assistance.l 
Reportedly,	the	programme	has	reduced	the	number	of	young	people	joining	Daesh	and	other	groups	linked	
to	terrorism,	especially	when	compared	with	the	foreign	fighter	flows	of	other	European	nations.	According	
to	a	piece	by	National	Public	Radio,	which	highlighted	the	unique	approach	of	the	Aarhus	model,	in	2012,	
34	citizens	of	Aarhus	left	Denmark	to	fight	for	Daesh,	of	whom	18	returned	home	and	were	enrolled	in	
the	 rehabilitation	programme,	 six	were	killed	and	an	estimated	10	 remained	as	of	 July	2016.	However,	
by	 2015	when	 foreign	 fighter	 flows	 from	 Europe	 to	 the	 Syrian	 Arab	 Republic	 and	 Iraq	were	 at	 one	 of	
their	highest	levels,	only	one	citizen	from	the	city	left	the	country	to	fight.m		Specifically,	the	programme	
involves	 assisting	with	 school	 enrolment,	 counselling,	 housing	 and	 employment,	 as	well	 as	 conducting	
meetings	with	parents.	Reintegrated	and	deradicalized	defectors	have	played	a	 key	 role	 in	encouraging	
their	 peers	 to	 return	 home,	 while	 demonstrating	 that	 reintegration	within	 Danish	 society	 is	 possible.n 
There	is	growing	recognition	in	both	the	policy	and	academic	fields	that	defectors	can	be	a	powerful	
force	in	preventing	violent	extremism,	as	their	experiences	have	the	potential	to	serve	as	a	deterrent	
to	those	with	aspirations	of	joining	groups	such	as	Daesh.	Stressing	the	significance	of	defectors,	Anne	
Speckhard	and	Ahmet	Yayla	argue	that	
…disillusioned cadres of those who can speak from experience and tell their authentic 
stories about life inside IS may be the most influential tool for preventing and dissuading 
others from joining...o 
Governments	 need	 to	 create	 the	 right	 conditions	 that	 make	 it	 easier	 for	 defectors	 not	 only	 to	
reintegrate,	but	also	to	speak	out	against	extremist	groups.	These	include	the	resettlement	of	former	
jihadists,	providing	them	with	services,	and	ensuring	their	safely	and	security.p	If	we	do	not	allow	for	
the	reintegration	of	low-level	violent	extremists	and	their	sympathizers,	we	risk	making	disillusioned	
individuals	into	hardened	supporters	as	a	result	of	prolonged	incarceration	and	marginalization.
j	 Crouch	and	Henley,	2015.	
k	 Ibid.
l		 Lister,	2015.	
m	 Rosin,	2016.	
n	 Ibid.	
o	 Speckhard	and	Yayla,	2015.	
p	 Neumann,	2015.		
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Implications for policy debates
Starting off by justifying engagement with such a politically sensitive topic, and recognizing the risks 
of inflaming prejudice against migrants, this chapter has tried to provide an analytical framework for 
understanding better the intersections between migration and displacement on the one hand, and violent 
extremism and terrorism on the other. It has acknowledged existing definitional and data deficits, and 
stressed the challenges of establishing any causal link; implying significant reservations on the conclusions 
not just of this chapter, but of current discourse and policy in this area. The chapter has followed the logic of 
the migration cycle to develop a preliminary typology of the intersections between migration, displacement 
and violent extremism. This chapter has also raised concerns about some unintended consequences of certain 
current policy responses in this field.
On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the following seven implications for policy debate may be offered:
• Closer dialogue is required between policymakers responsible for migration and those charged with 
preventing violent extremism; this is a particular challenge as the latter are variously located in security 
and development agencies, with internal as well as external mandates;
• A better analytical framework, based on better definitions, more comprehensive data and empirical 
evidence is required, in order to support more rigorous analysis and inform policy;
• While the evidence on the risk of infiltration by terrorist groups is currently slim, it is necessary to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of migration management and inter-State collaboration, 
including via appropriate pre-screening of candidates for refugee resettlement and migration, enhanced 
intelligence-sharing among governments and the appropriate usage of biometrics; 
• A more integrated approach to tackling the causes of displacement and migration should include 
interventions specifically focused on countering and preventing violent extremism – there is growing 
evidence that preventing violent extremism may be one way to address the drivers of migration;
• Greater efforts may be required to guard against the risk of radicalization across all displacement 
conditions, including in refugee and transit camps, with an emphasis on providing education, access to 
work, and, where possible, greater freedom of movement;
• More effective integration and social inclusion policies are required to reduce social exclusion and the 
risk of radicalization to violent extremist agendas amongst migrants and their descendants;
• It is important not to undermine migration or refugee policy by focusing too much on preventing violent 
extremism agendas, for example by ensuring that PVE interventions respect the rights of migrants and 
refugees.
To conclude on a positive note, it may be possible also to conceive migration as part of a potential solution 
to violent extremism. There is a real risk that focusing on migration and displacement only as a cause or 
consequence of violent extremism will simply exacerbate the threat. This focus may become an excuse to 
restrict the entry of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; to limit their rights; or to force people to return 
to unsafe situations in their home countries. A focus on solutions, in contrast, can show how a rights-based 
approach to migration and displaced persons can be an integral component of the global effort to prevent 
violent extremism.839 
839	Koser,	2015.	
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Well-managed migration can promote mutual understanding; migration also has significant impacts on 
poverty reduction in countries of origin through remittances, reducing the appeal of violent extremism. 
Migration is a symbol of the hard-won principles of openness and globalization that violent extremism seeks 
to overturn and that therefore should be protected. The challenge for policymakers is to promote the positive 
aspects of migration, rather than merely focusing on the low potential risk of importing violent extremists 
when offering opportunities to migrants and protection to refugees.
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Introduction
The 2015 edition of the World Migration Report (WMR) was devoted to a single theme: the relationship between 
migrants and the cities of the world. With more than half of the world’s population now living in urban areas, 
it is not surprising that cities are gaining recognition from those who write policy, conduct research, invest 
or migrate. Nearly all migrants, whether international or internal, are destined for cities, for it is in the city 
that their human capital is most rewarded. The fact that the WMR 2015 was devoted to cities was a clear and 
timely acknowledgement that cities must be better appreciated as the destinations of the world’s migrants, 
and that it is not only national authorities that influence where migrants go and how they fare once they 
arrive. Rather, it is the city that often is the primary draw for migration, and it is the city within which 
the integration of migrants often takes place. How we think of the governance of migration or, indeed, the 
governance of societies more broadly, is changing in recognition of the rapidly growing importance of the 
world’s cities to the workings of societies and their economies. The World Migration Report 2015 covered much 
ground. This chapter of the WMR 2018 is a short update to the 2015 work, and we hope that it stimulates new 
research and causes policy officials at all levels of government to think deeper into the workings of cities and 
their governance roles.
With chapters on migration and urban diversity, the vulnerability and resilience of migrants, migration and 
urban development, and governance through partnerships, the WMR 2015 offered an examination of the 
migrant–city relationship in both the Global North and the Global South, with its emphasis on the well-being 
of migrants and the protection of their rights – now often described as “the right to the city”.841 The report 
noted that migrants are willing partners in local governance and willing contributors to the fortunes of the 
city in which they live and, therefore, that the governance of urban areas ought to include the migrants and 
attend explicitly to their interests. Recommendations were made with a view to the inclusion of migrants in the 
workings of their cities and to the benefits that this form of inclusion will have for the cities themselves. It is, 
the report urged, in the best interests of both migrant and city that cities “put inclusive urban policies in place 
for basic services and socioeconomic inclusion”. Furthermore, “cities that strengthen their economic, political 
and cultural positioning within the global system should draw on the potential opportunities presented by 
migrant populations living in their communities”.
840	Howard	Duncan,	Executive	Head	of	the	Metropolis	Project	and	Secretariat	and	Ioana	Popp,	Migration	Policy	Officer,	IOM.
841	The	New	York-based	organization,	Right	to	the	City,	describes	its	founding	idea	as	“born	out	of	the	power	of	an	idea	of	a	new	kind	
of	urban	politics	 that	asserts	 that	everyone,	particularly	 the	disenfranchised,	not	only	has	a	right	to	the	city,	but	as	 inhabitants,	
have	a	right	to	shape	it,	design	it,	and	operationalize	an	urban	human	rights	agenda”.	See	http://righttothecity.org/about/mission-
history/.	The	origin	of	the	idea	is	attributed	to	the	French	philosopher,	Henri	LeFebvre,	and	it	has	been	taken	up	by	many	others	
and	developed	to	apply	to	migration	and	to	the	development	of	suburbs.	See	also	the	recent	work	by	COMPAS	at	the	University	
of	Oxford:	Global Migration and the Right to the Cities of the Future	(available	from	www.futureofcities.ox.ac.uk/research/global-
migration-and-the-right-to-the-cities-of-the-future/).	
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In this chapter, we will build upon the foundation of the WMR 2015, which was launched at the IOM’s 
conference, Migrants and Cities, held in Geneva in October of that year. We will look at the role of the modern 
city in migration governance, taking advantage of some of the recent research on the evolving nature of cities 
and of their roles in the world. The growth in the influence of cities over social and economic affairs and 
over migration trajectories, both international and internal, demands greater attention from both scholars 
and policymakers. In providing a brief update to, and building upon, the WMR 2015, we will highlight areas 
that we believe deserve further scrutiny by researchers and by members of the policy community, whether 
locally, nationally or internationally. As such, this chapter is selective in its coverage, not pretending to be a 
comprehensive review of the current literature and not duplicating what the WMR 2015 explored. 
The recent international context
Migrants and their relationship to cities have been the focus of an unusually large number of activities in 
the international community over the past two years. The IOM Migrants and Cities Conference convened 
mayors and other officials for wide-ranging discussions intended to raise our collective awareness of how city 
administrations and other local institutions affect migration and its outcomes and to stimulate further work 
in the area.842 
The Third Global Mayoral Forum on migration and development took place in Quezon, the Philippines, in 
September 2016, led by the Joint Migration and Development Initiative, IOM and the United Nations Institute 
for Training and Research (UNITAR).843 Part of that conference included work on how local authorities can 
benefit from and support the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative – another example of how cities are 
featuring in national and international initiatives. The Fifth World Summit of Local and Regional Leaders 
took place in October 2016 in Bogota, Colombia and, for the first time, migration issues were included in 
the agenda of the three-day event. The Summit culminated in a Declaration – the Bogota Commitment – in 
which signatories called for local action towards sustainable urbanization.844  The Global Parliament of Mayors, 
launched shortly ahead of Habitat III to enable political city leaders to jointly advocate for local interests, 
adopted migration as one of its two priorities.
The traditional focal point of the United Nations for urban issues has been UN-Habitat, and the Habitat III 
conference, which took place in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016, gave a very high degree of prominence to 
migration in its New Urban Agenda. The wording on undocumented migrants in the world’s cities – that all 
migrants ought to be accorded the same rights, regardless of their legal status – received much attention. The 
conference participants agreed that: all inhabitants, including migrants, whether living in formal or informal 
settlements, be enabled to lead decent, dignified and rewarding lives and to achieve their full human potential. 
This commitment recognizes the fact that, although migration takes many forms, all migrants are rights 
holders, whether that migrant is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away 
from his or her habitual place of residence; regardless of the person’s legal status; whether the movement is 
voluntary or involuntary; whatever the causes for the movement are; or whatever the length of the stay is.845 
842	The	recommendations	from	this	conference	are	in	IOM,	2015a.
843	The	report	is	available	from	www.globalmayoralforum3.ph/index.php.
844	IOM,	2016.
845	United	Conference	on	Housing	and	Sustainable	Development	(Habitat	III),	2016.
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The Habitat III conversation took advantage of the IOM’s Migration Governance Framework, which has been 
adapted to create an Urban Migration Governance Framework, formally known as the Migration Toolbox for 
Urban Governance.846 
More recently, the United Nations adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which 
launched processes to develop two global compacts to respond to the perceived migration and refugee crises 
in different areas of the world – perhaps most notably as a result of the Syrian civil war. One of the compacts 
will be on refugees and the other will focus on ways to promote safe, orderly and regular migration. Elements 
of these compacts may well include a recognition of the efficacy of, and responsibilities for, cities with respect 
to migration and integration. Furthermore, in February, 2017, the United Nations General Assembly received 
the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration.847 This report (often referred to 
as The Sutherland Report, after its author, Sir Peter Sutherland) offered an extensive analysis of the global 
migration situation and the challenges that it presents, together with recommendations for the international 
community to manage these challenges. The report highlights five areas: crisis-related migration; labour 
migration; orderly migration, including return; inclusion; and migration governance. Recommendation 14 
speaks to the empowerment of cities and local governments in ways that reflect some of the themes of this 
chapter, as well as those of the WMR 2015 and the report of the Migrants and Cities Conference.
An updated image of cities
Urbanization has increased to such an extent throughout most countries of the world that its effects may force a 
re-thinking of many aspects of governance, including the governance of migration. Migration has nearly become 
synonymous with urbanization, given the dominance of the city as the destination of most migrants. Some cities 
are finding it difficult to manage the rapid growth in their populations, while others are trying to find their way 
as their residents leave for cities elsewhere. The urban agenda has been growing in academic circles for a number 
of decades and, with regard to migration, has perhaps been most advanced by such scholars as Saskia Sassen,848 
Manuel Castells,849 and Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Çaglar.850 Sassen alerted us to the global city (as distinct from 
the older concept of the world city) and the impact that it has, well beyond its country’s borders – in particular, as 
a result of the globalization of finance and other industries through information and communication technology 
(ICT), and the consequent weakening of the State, often over-stated but nonetheless real. Global cities and 
the firms that power them can operate beyond the reach of national policy and regulation. Scholars have for 
some time been shifting their concentration from States to local authorities in furthering our understanding of 
migration and other phenomena, noting the increased efficacy of the city in determining migration flows, partly 
due to ICTs and other aspects of globalization.851  Glick Schiller and Çaglar in their recent collection, Locating 
Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants,852 extend this recent approach, some of it building upon the earlier 
insight of Castells, to see cities as spaces of flows rather than as static physical settlements, and with migrants as 
significant agents in the evolution of a city’s character. Hein de Haas and Mathias Czaika recently noted: 
846	IOM,	2015b.
847	UNGA,	2017.
848	Sassen,	1991.
849	Castells,	1996.
850	Glick	Schiller	and	Çaglar,	2010.
851	Skelcher,	Sullivan	and	Jeffares,	2013;	Buch	et	al.,	2013;	Combes,	Démurger	and	Li,	2017.
852	Glick	Schiller	and	Çaglar,	2010.
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Human resources and economic activities have become increasingly concentrated in 
a relatively low number of countries or, more precisely, metropolitan areas within a few 
countries – which reflects processes of urbanization and internal (rural–urban) migration.853 
These developments are not of merely academic interest. They suggest that cities may be more influential and 
capable than even their own officials realize. National governments need to build into their migration and 
integration policy frameworks a robust role for city administrations and other local actors, and cities need to 
acknowledge their degree of influence and note that responsibility for migration and the migrants who live in 
their cities is not that of national jurisdictions alone. 
Cities have become significant determinants of global migration flows and their patterns – because, once again, 
it is the city that most rewards a migrant’s human capital.854 Seto argues: 
Migration to urban centers in mega-deltas is an outcome of many forces: economic 
policies and incentives, local and destination institutions, government policies to develop 
small towns, and the geographic concentration of investments. Massive influx of capital 
to many deltas has transformed the local economic base from a primarily agricultural one 
to a manufacturing and processing economy. This has created uneven spatial economic 
development, which is the underlying driver of migration to cities in the mega-deltas 
regardless of geographic context or size. Going forward to 2060, one critical challenge 
for all the deltas is to increase the labor skill of their workforce and foster technology 
innovation. Continued economic growth in these regions will require substantial 
investments in education and capacity building and the ability of urban centers to absorb 
the migrant labor pool.855
Despite this reality, the migration literature and data collection continue to emphasize countries as sources and 
destinations, the role of national migration and integration policy, national employment statistics, and other 
national-level phenomena. But it is not only national policies or a country’s need for labour that determine 
migration flows. It is city administrations, together with the other local institutions in the private and non-
governmental sectors, that attract economic activity and that promote interest, investment and immigration. 
National policy regimes provide a background within which local activity takes place, but increasingly it is city 
institutions that recruit and retain migrants. We have long heard that it is cities that are responsible for the lion’s 
share of integration, but we hear less of the city’s role in determining migration flows themselves. This lack of 
recognition has resulted in a significant gap in both research and migration policy development – a gap wherein 
those who are arguably the major determinants of migration flows are largely absent from the policy discussions. 
The point of emphasis is not the older point of whether cities are sufficiently equipped to manage the arrival 
and integration of migrants. The fundamental point here is that cities are not part of national migration policy 
development, despite the fact that they are increasingly among the principal determinants of migration.
853	de	Haas	and	Czaika,	2014.
854	Price	and	Benton-Short,	2007.	See	also	Scott	and	Storper,	2003	for	another	classic	treatment.		
855	Seto,	2011.
229WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018
Migration, urbanization and challenges to governance
The World Migration Report 2015 drew our attention to the formation of partnerships within cities for managing 
migration, including for the economic development of the cities themselves. The report argued that migration 
should be seen, not as an unfortunate burden for cities to cope with, but as representing significant potential 
benefits for cities. Many of the partnerships explored in the report were between cities and migrants, with 
migrants seen as major contributors as employees, as entrepreneurs and employers, and as bridges for trade, 
commerce and culture between the city and the migrants’ homelands. But the report also looked at the 
relations between national and local government and saw not only a degree of policy fragmentation but also 
potential for effective partnerships between these levels of government. Given this policy fragmentation, as 
well as the newer approach to cities reported in the academic literature, some countries might benefit from 
a repositioning of authorities, with more responsibility and autonomy given to local governments. This point 
is also alluded to in The Sutherland Report. 
As the principals in the global competition for talent, cities are the main draw, but they are restricted in 
exercising and directing their influence, due to their limited authority over migration policy, tax revenues 
and, hence, programmes to attract, support and retain migrants. There are many different aspects to the 
overall question of local governance of migration and its effects, and we will touch on a few that received 
less attention in the WMR 2015, relating to its call for enhanced national–local policy partnerships. It should 
be recognized that, given this chapter’s focus on governance, we emphasize the institutions of governance 
– whether the formal administrative institutions of local government or the private and civil society sectors. 
What one learns, however, especially from the less formally structured activities of residents (including 
migrants), is that much of what characterizes a city is determined by its residents. This goes beyond the 
scope of their efforts to improve their local economic and social lives; the international connections that 
migrants retain and that other residents forge through business, family affairs, education and culture shape 
the character of a city. It is often through these efforts that innovation is born and replicated – perhaps most 
impressively evident in slums and peri-urban settlements where reliance on formal governance institutions 
may be unrealistic.856
Sanctuary cities
Some cities have simply asserted themselves with regard to some aspects of migration policy by, for example, 
directly promoting their city as a preferred destination for migrants or, along an entirely different line, 
declaring themselves to be a sanctuary city, in open defiance of national law with respect to the treatment 
of those in a country illegally. The Sanctuary City movement is most prominent in the United States of 
America but exists elsewhere, and it demonstrates a city’s displeasure with national immigration law and 
its unwillingness to be part of the enforcement of those laws to which it takes exception. In his 2017 
article, Harald Bauder analysed the concept of the Sanctuary City from the perspective of Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, finding significant differences in how the concept of sanctuary is 
understood and applied in these three countries.857 The relative informality of Sanctuary Cities as a movement 
means that there are differences among them, with more similarities between the Canadian and US cities 
than those in the United Kingdom, which tends to use the term “Cities of Sanctuary”. There, the concept 
856	Rufin,	2016;	Deininger	et	al.,	2010.
857	Bauder,	2017.
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emphasizes communities welcoming and supporting refugees and other migrants in open defiance of national 
immigration law.858
The existence of Sanctuary Cities is, perhaps, a result of the lack of involvement of cities in setting immigration 
policy and determining how such policy is implemented. With the United States of America now proposing 
to financially or otherwise sanction self-declared Sanctuary Cities, it is clear that declaring a city to be a 
Sanctuary City can constitute an act of civil disobedience. These examples of cities exerting a degree of 
autonomy over migration affairs reflect the current lack of involvement of cities in national migration policy 
development and point to the need for local–national partnerships (such as those mentioned in the WMR 
2015) to be developed.859
Slums in the world’s megacities
The discussion of local migration-related governance challenges tends to start from how cities can manage 
population growth – especially growth that brings with it increased diversity. Nowhere is this challenge more 
keenly felt than in the world’s megacities, most of which are in developing countries. In 2016, there were 
over 30 megacities in the world – cities with at least 10 million residents – led by Tokyo with over 38 million 
residents.860 Many of the world’s megacities have large slums – some with over 1 million residents. The world’s 
largest slum – Neza-Chalco-Izta, in Mexico City – has over 4 million residents and is referred to as a “mega-
slum”.861 The governance problems associated with slums are legion and well documented; suffice it to say that, 
in slums, one experiences inadequate, crowded and unsafe housing, a lack of basic infrastructure and public 
utilities, such as safe drinking water, sanitation services, garbage removal, adequate streets and roads, even for 
the passage of emergency vehicles, access to affordable transportation, and more. These conditions lead to risks 
of disease, violence, lack of education and other opportunities for human development, and elevated harms 
from natural disasters. Slum formation has been a central characteristic of rapid urbanization – both from 
internal and international migration – in the Global South and is expected to continue well into the future. 
For cities facing these challenges, continued high levels of migration represent a significant problem. Some 
cities in the Global South have adopted measures to try to curtail rural-to-urban migration simply because they 
are unable to offer the level of services and basic infrastructure required to meet the needs of the newcomers 
whose rate of arrival can far outstrip the rate at which local government can respond. 
Although most rural-to-urban migration takes place within national boundaries, national governments can 
support local authorities in managing this form of migration, perhaps with help from the international 
community. Megacities that grow through the enlargement of slums rather than through increased economic 
prosperity risk severe problems to the point of becoming ungovernable. Finding ways to turn internal rural-to-
urban migration into a net positive for the world’s megacities and other large cities is becoming increasingly 
urgent, especially with few signs that such migration will abate. In other words, it is unlikely that the solution 
will be to slow, let alone stop, the movement of people to the city. But the challenge of upgrading slums 
immediately meets the challenge of doing so inclusively.
858 See https://cityofsanctuary.org/.
859	Chen,	2015.
860	UN	DESA,	2016.
861 See https://borgenproject.org/category/slums/.
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Upgrading slums inclusively
The misery of slums has been a major challenge in the development literature for decades. Here we wish 
to point to a relatively recent shift in perspective – a shift that accompanies the interest in inclusive 
development. The UN-Habitat Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme is an example of the interest 
in inclusive urban development in its desire for empowering “key urban actors, especially slum dwellers 
themselves, to contribute to the incremental eradication of urban poverty at community, city-wide and 
national levels”. Inclusive development in general seeks to involve all stakeholders in development decision-
making processes, with the aim that development goals (such as those expressed through per capita GDP 
growth rates) not be achieved at the expense of the poorest members of a society. Having the residents of 
slums involved in the development process should not only enhance economic outcomes and improve living 
conditions but also enhance the quality of governance in the city. Having the migrant residents of a slum 
engaged in its development can be a powerful means of integrating them into the life of the city; it is a way 
for migrants to take partial responsibility for their own integration, assuming a greater degree of agency as 
opposed to remaining in a condition of vulnerability.
This brings us back to the innovation potential that many now see in slums as their residents develop their 
own solutions to the many challenges of daily life. Because formal governance institutions cannot be relied 
upon to solve all of the many problems in the slums, the residents become the agents of improvement and 
the developers of new ideas for managing the neighbourhood.862 In this, many see hope, but others caution 
against overly romanticizing the slum.
Comments from the Global South at IOM’s Migrants and Cities Conference
Slum	formation	has	been	a	central	characteristic	of	rapid	urbanization	in	the	Global	South	and	is	expected	
to	 continue	well	 into	 the	 future.	Many	of	 the	world’s	megacities	have	 large	 slums,	 some	with	over	 
1	million	 residents.	K.B.	Wiafe,	 the	Mayor	of	Kumasi,	Ghana,	pointed	 to	 the	 creation	of	 slums	as	a	
significant	detrimental	effect	of	migration	to	 the	city;	 those	 living	 in	slums	have	but	poor	access	 to	
electricity	and	potable	water.	He	expressed	the	hope	that	migration	to	Kumasi	could	be	reduced	to	
ease	 the	pressure	on	the	city’s	housing	supply	and	considered	 incentives	 to	offer	people	 to	 remain	
in	their	rural	homes.	Mark	Owen	Woyongo,	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Ghana	echoed	these	comments	
in	 the	 context	 of	 his	 country;	 the	 city	 of	 Accra	 has	 43	 per	 cent	 of	 its	 population	 living	 in	 slums.	
Ambassador	Ndayisaba	of	Burundi	made	similar	points	about	his	capital	city.	Alex	Ross	of	the	World	
Health	Organization	 (WHO)	 noted	 the	 link	 between	 living	 in	 a	 slum	 and	 poor	 health	 as	 a	 result	 of	
crowding,	a	lack	of	drinkable	water,	poor	sanitation	and	poverty.	He	described	WHO’s	approach	towards	
solutions	for	urban	health	as	based	upon	capturing	data	on	health	inequities,	prioritizing	interventions,	
developing	migrant	sensitive	health	systems,	establishing	cultural	competency	and	 linguistic	access,	
looking	at	urban	planning	and	public	health	together,	differentiating	responses	according	to	conditions,	
and	enacting	these	measures	through	partnerships.		
862	Smedley	2013;	Manoj	et	al.,	2016.	The	innovation	potential	of	slums	is	also	highlighted	in	Saunders,	2010.
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Peri-urban slum settlements 
Peri-urban settlements in developing countries have grown with rapid urbanization – through both internal and 
international migration – and are presenting challenges that, while similar to those of urban slums, are markedly 
different, owing to their location not only outside the city limits but often outside the legal jurisdiction of the 
city. Peri-urban slums can be even less formal than urban slums, with even fewer services and resources. As a 
result, living conditions (including sanitary conditions) can be much worse than in urban slums, employment 
is often distant and difficult to access, and the reach of urban planners tends not to extend as far as the peri-
urban settlements, leaving a major gap in governance. Being at or beyond the periphery of a city, peri-urban 
areas can be virtually ungoverned, not only leaving problems unsolved and needs unmet, but also leaving these 
settlements vulnerable to control by organized criminal groups.863 These informal settlements can be found on 
the periphery of cities throughout much of the developing world. Much has been written on this phenomenon 
in South Asia, Africa and Latin America, and this growing body of literature speaks not only of the difficulties 
that migration to peri-urban regions produces but also of the resourcefulness and innovations that can arise 
from these settlements.864 The Mathare Valley Slums in Nairobi, Kenya offer an example of how the residents of 
what is regarded as an illegal and impermanent settlement have responded to the lack of official governance 
over the settlement by creating their own economic and informal governance mechanisms.865 
The growth of peri-urban areas is not only found in developing countries but also on the periphery of cities 
in the Global North in a more recent variant on urban sprawl. The accelerating cost of housing, together with 
migration into Europe, has, for example, led to the establishment of many peri-urban settlements. Academic 
researchers are turning more of their attention to these informal and illegal settlements, which are stressing the 
governance capacities of neighbouring cities such as Lisbon, Athens and Rome.866 
Shrinking cities
At the opposite end of the spectrum of growing cities are cities that are shrinking as a result of a combination 
of outmigration and low fertility levels, leaving them not only with smaller populations and therefore smaller 
tax bases but often with older populations as well. Nearly 1 in 10 cities in the United States is shrinking867 
and this is replicated in many other countries in both the Global North and the Global South as people move 
elsewhere for economic or other advantages. Often, it is the very large cities that are attracting people from 
smaller urban centres – for example, in Japan where many are leaving medium-sized cities for greater fortunes 
in Tokyo.868 In other cases, such as in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, overall national population decline 
is resulting in population decline in some cities. Among developing countries, it is the cities of China and 
India that are experiencing the greatest shrinkages.869 Some cities that experience population decline bounce 
back, as is well-illustrated by the city of London, United Kingdom. Although the city experienced a period 
of decline when its population in 1991 dropped to 6.4 million from nearly 9 million in 1939, its economic 
fortunes then reversed, followed by a population recovery, and it is now projected to become a megacity 
863	Amerasinghe	and	Marshall,	2017;	Shivendra	and	Ramaraju,	2013.
864	Narain,	Anand	and	Banerjee,	2013.
865	Thorn,	Thornton	and	Helfgott,	2015.
866	Raposo,	Crespo	and	Lages,	2017;	Salvati	et	al.,	2014.
867 The Economist,	2015.
868	Takahashi	and	Sugiura,	1996.	
869	The	Robinson	Rojas	Archives,	2008.
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before 2020.870 American cities such as Detroit have become well known for their population decline (figure 1) 
and, in partnership with State of Michigan authorities, are making strong efforts to attract migrants to the 
city to reverse this long-term trend. Modest success has been achieved with many of the new arrivals being 
from Muslim-majority countries; Detroit now boasts the largest Arab-American community in the United 
States.871 The economic and demographic fortunes of cities such as Detroit are highly intertwined, and the 
future of this and other cities that have experienced population decline must be observed for lessons learned. 
Although there is reason for optimism in the experiences of London and New York, which also suffered a 
steep population loss in the 1970s, the harsher reality for many future and currently shrinking cities is that 
historically low fertility rates mean that some of these cities will need to develop strategies to manage the 
effects of permanent population loss.872
Figure	1.		Detroit’s	population,	1840–2012
Source:		 Myler,	2013.
The response of cities to the 2015–2016 mass migration and displacement
More specifically with regard to the role of cities in migrant integration and inclusion, much attention is 
being given to the efforts of civil society organizations that have come to the foreground – for example, 
in the settling and integration of refugees and other migrants who came in exceptionally large numbers to 
870	GLA	Intelligence,	2015.
871	Arab	American	Institute,	2012.
872	Pallagst,	2014. 
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Austria, Germany and Sweden in 2015–2016.873 Their contribution has been widely recognized as both a form 
of emergency response and a vital part of a longer-term solution to the challenge of so many people adjusting 
to their new social and economic contexts. 
The example of Canada, which has resettled approximately 40,000 Syrian refugees since 2015, has caught 
considerable attention, owing to the role of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in not only 
contributing to the early arrival and settlement of Syrians, but also acting as formal refugee sponsors.874 The 
privately sponsored refugee programme in Canada allows locally based civil society organizations to enter 
into an agreement with the Government whereby the private sponsor incurs the costs of settlement and 
integration for the refugees for one year and the Government accordingly provides visas following security 
and medical screening.875 A number of countries have looked to this programme as a possible model for their 
NGO sector to follow. The Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative was launched in response, with the support of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Government of Canada and the Open Society 
Foundation; their objective is to help other countries implement their own version of Canada’s private refugee 
sponsorship programme.876 Although this form of programming is under national government jurisdiction, it 
is important to note that it functions only through local community actors and local government agencies 
who take the initiative in sponsoring the refugees. Characteristically, demand for sponsorships ran higher 
than the available visas and, in fact, outpaced the administrative ability of the national government to 
process applications. This indicates not only a willingness on the part of people to support the settlement 
and integration of refugees in their communities but also a capacity to organize the settlement process as 
this formal government programme demands. 
However, it is the cities in the Middle East and Turkey that have borne the greatest share of the responsibility 
for the caring of the refugees from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and surrounding countries, and it is here 
that the response has been most remarkable. Although many refugees are in camps, whether UNHCR camps or 
others, a large number are urban refugees living in the cities of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Only 8 per cent 
of refugees in Turkey are in camps, with the rest living in Turkish cities. Istanbul alone is home to 539,000 
Syrians, at last count, and the registration process continues.877 National–local government relations have 
proved challenging in this exceptional environment, and Murat Erdogan argues that: “Municipalities should 
be regarded as the primary institutions that determine migration, refugee and cohesion policies rather than 
as institutions that might or might not be consulted in this regard depending on the central government’s 
preference.” He also recommends that the following practices be implemented: 
Another practice that would be as efficient as the previous one is the development 
of mechanisms to gather all relevant public institutions under one roof. It is important 
to create areas for refugees where all services can be offered in one place. […]
In local services, refugees should be involved in the decision-making process. We 
should consider the needs, suggestions and concerns of Syrians, as we are living 
together with them now. Both legal and administrative arrangements may be made in 
873	Glorius	and	Doomernik	(eds),	2016.	See	also	the	Brookings	Institution,	n.d.
874	Government	of	Canada,	2015.
875	Hyndman,	Payne	and	Jimenez,	2017;	Tito	and	Cochand,	2017;	Garcea,	2016.
876	UNHCR,	2016.
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this regard. It is also very important that local governments, especially municipalities, 
work on preventing potential tension between local people and refugees while 
providing services to refugees in this process. The performance of municipalities on 
local harmonization will directly affect the overall harmonization in society. Programs 
involving social inclusion are extremely valuable in terms of developing the capacity to 
cope with social conflicts.878
Governance: beyond policy to urban planning
Since the launch of the World Migration Report 2015, recognition of the power of cities to influence global 
migration flows and their role in the integration of migrants has only grown among academic and other 
researchers.879 The importance of cities to migration is not a temporary matter but a consequence of the 
degree to which the world’s population has urbanized. Many of our attitudes towards cities were shaped 
when societies were considerably more rural than they are now, and this is particularly evident with regard 
to their role in the governance of our societies. Both national and other higher jurisdictions and cities 
need to recognize that the growth in the importance and influence of cities requires shifts in our attitudes 
about governance roles. National and other upper levels of government need to find ways to bring cities to 
the migration and integration policy tables, among others. Given that there are usually numerous cities in 
individual countries, how cities are represented at the policy table will require some serious consideration, 
but associations of municipalities such as the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the National League 
of Cities (US), Eurocities and Africa’s Municipal Development Partnership might be able to play this role at 
national policy tables. Local governments and institutions need to recognize the influence that they have 
– either in reality or potentially – and assume a degree of responsibility and leadership appropriate to their 
circumstances. In other words, cities should be further empowered and should accept this empowerment. 
Jurisdictional change takes time, especially if it requires amendments to a constitution. Granting municipalities 
greater authority over revenue generation, land use determination and infrastructure development (some of 
the standard responsibilities of local governments) will not happen quickly if allocating authorities is a zero 
sum proposition. And offering local governments any form of authority over migration policy would prove yet 
more difficult. As long as local decisions affecting migration, settlement and integration can be over-ridden 
by higher jurisdictions, there is all the more reason to encourage deeper cooperation among governments 
and to find ways to bring local authorities to the policy table of higher-level governments, leaving possible 
formal reassignments of jurisdictional authorities to the longer term. The call for national-level governments 
to bring local authorities to the policy table is for the purposes of more judiciously adjusting the numbers of 
migrants who are admitted yearly, helping societies to better compete for the migrants that they and their 
economies need, and achieving better integration and a greater degree of inclusion for the migrants and their 
families. The development of national migration and integration policies will be enhanced if local partners are 
involved. Much of the discussion of the role played by cities within their own jurisdictions has emphasized 
policy (particularly policy that is inclusive of the migrants and their interests) whose implementation confers 
the benefits of inclusion on the migrants and the benefits of social harmony, an enriched culture, and a more 
vibrant economy on the city and its residents. The calls for better alignment of local with higher-level policy are 
878	Erdogan,	2017.	
879	See,	for	example,	The	Guardian,	2015	and	the	LSE	Cities	centre	website	(https://lsecities.net/).
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reflected in the WMR 2015, but where cities most powerfully come into their own is with planning, and it is the 
interface of planning and migration that requires more attention than it has so far received. Urban planning is 
an aspect of governance often neglected in discussions of managing migration, which tend to consider higher-
level policy; more attention needs to be paid to this highly important but quotidian aspect of governance.
Declaring a policy of, for example, migrant inclusion, openness to migrant entrepreneurs and support for their 
integration is one thing, but it is in planning that concrete implementation begins. Plans embody priorities 
for allocating resources, and they frame decisions made by administrators and elected officials. A policy of 
inclusion may be thwarted by city plans that do not allow migrant-owned business or places of worship 
to be established. The planning process itself can be an act of inclusion by ensuring the representation of 
migrant communities or businesses or religious, cultural and other institutions on planning committees. The 
participation of migrant and minority groups at the planning table will not only be itself an act of inclusion 
but, more importantly, will ensure that the interests and needs of these communities are understood and 
appreciated from a planning perspective. There are many examples to consider, among them the location 
of services, the provision of basic infrastructure including transportation, communications, health care, 
education, social services and access to ICTs. Issues relating to values, rights and politics matter; in the 
everyday lives of migrants, however, it can be the more practical planning issues that take on the greatest 
salience for the inclusion of migrants in a city. Is the migrants’ neighbourhood served well by public transit? 
Can a new ethnic grocery store be opened in the neighbourhood? Can a place of worship be built, with 
sufficient parking spaces? Can a library branch be opened nearby? Can migrant-serving agencies be located 
nearby? These and similar practical matters are the domain of urban planners more than that of elected or 
other policy officials. 
Planning for diversity
With the strong interest in the rights of migrants, the right to the city movement, and inclusive local policy 
development, urban planning has often been neglected in the discussion of migrant integration. To a certain 
extent, planning for the effects of migration is parallel to that of planning for a growing population, where 
top priorities are infrastructure, service provision and economic development. But planning around migration 
must go beyond these fundamentals, owing to the diversity that migration brings to a city’s people. Many 
argue that diversity can be an advantage to a society, and the City of Toronto years ago adopted Diversity 
Our Strength as its motto. Furthermore, many networks devoted to the advantages of managing diversity 
as a strength have emerged, including the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities Programme and Cities of 
Migration, which was created by the Maytree Foundation of Toronto. Planning theory offers what has been 
called “multicultural planning” as a set of principles to guide urban planners in their work to incorporate 
migration and diversity into their planning and plans. Although not often put into practice, the theory 
warrants serious consideration and deserves to be better known in the fields of migration and urban planning. 
In brief, multicultural planning is the planned alteration of the built environment and/or planning processes in 
response to the multi-ethnic composition and orientation of the local population.880 Traditional forms of urban 
planning tend to homogenize the residents, seeking to serve the broad public good. Multicultural planning 
takes the diversity of a population directly into account, noting the distinct interests of its composite groups, 
where they live, work and carry out their lives. In many large cities in North America, for example, migrants 
880	Van	der	Horst	and	Ouwehand,	2011.
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from Asia are settling directly into the suburbs, foregoing the earlier initial stay in an inner-city enclave.881 
The development pressures on suburbs in Los Angeles, Toronto or Vancouver, not only with respect to housing 
but also to business development and other activities with strong implications for land use, require a different 
way of thinking about the suburbs, with a different approach to planning and those involved in the process. 
Minority ethnic retail areas provide a significant challenge for urban planners, given the complexity of the 
uses to which ethnic communities may put these areas, which can go well beyond shopping for goods. Zhixi 
Cecilia Zhuang’s recent work on these districts in Toronto offers strong directions for planners.882 It is in the 
small aspects of daily life, such as shopping and moving about through one’s community and engaging with 
one’s fellow residents, that a city’s degree of inclusiveness is revealed. Planning decisions have a significant 
impact on the quality of these daily life experiences, which is the point of multicultural planning. High-level 
policy statements are meaningless if they are not implemented through urban plans.
Planning for diversity: the example of retail land use by Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang
Municipalities	should	explore	creative	ways	to	support	immigrant	groups	in	expressing	their	cultures	
and	 lifestyles.	 City-wide	 policies,	 such	 as	 official	 plans,	 urban	 design	 guidelines	 and	 cultural	 plans,	
should	explicitly	 recognize	 the	ethno-cultural	diversity	manifested	 in	urban	 landscapes.	 In	addition,	
site-specific	 policies	 should	 be	 developed	 in	 minority	 ethnic	 retail	 areas,	 which	 will	 allow	 ethnic	
communities	 to	work	with	 city	 officials	 to	 incorporate	 cultural	 expressions	 on	 design	 and	 planning	
matters	 including,	 but	 not	 limited	 to,	 streetscapes,	 architectural	 façades,	 storefront	 decorations,	
sidewalk	spaces,	signage,	street	vending,	public	arts	and	community	events.	Possible	policy	outcomes	
could	 be	 secondary	 plans,	 special	 area	 studies,	 strategic	 plans,	 streetscape	 design	 guidelines,	 or	
comprehensive	 community	 improvement	plans	 that	will	 provide	 city	officials	with	explicit	 guidance	
as	 to	 how	 to	maintain	 and	 enhance	 such	 profound	 ethnic	 landscapes.	 City	 officials	 can	 play	 a	 key	
role	in	reflecting	community	needs,	optimizing	various	resources	and	improving	the	physical	business	
environment.	Specifically,	city	planners,	urban	designers	and	economic	development	officers,	as	the	
frontline	professionals,	are	accountable	for	addressing	issues	related	to	neighbourhood	changes	and	
expressions	of	identity,	design	quality	of	public	spaces,	and	economic	development	and	revitalization.a
a		Zhuang,	2015.
Mohammad Qadeer takes a broader look at multicultural planning and offers a set of principles that he 
believes should guide urban planners who want to ensure that their city welcomes diversity and is inclusive.883
881	Hiebert,	2015;	Gold,	2015;	Li,	2008.
882	Zhuang,	2015.
883	Qadeer,	2009;	Qadeer	and	Agrawal,	2011.
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Advice to cities in planning for diversity, as recommended by Mohammad Qadeer
•	 Provide	minority	language	facilities,	translations	and	interpretation,	in	public	consultations.
•	 Include	minority	 representatives	 in	 planning	 committees	 and	 task	 forces,	 as	well	 as	 diversifying	
planning	staff.
•	 Include	ethnic/minority	community	organizations	in	the	planning	decision-making	processes.
•	 Recognize	ethnic	diversity	as	a	planning	goal	in	official/comprehensive	plans.
•	 Include	 city-wide	 policies	 for	 culture-specific	 institutions	 in	 plans	 –	 such	 as	 places	 of	 worship,	  
ethnic	seniors’	homes,	cultural	institutions,	funeral	homes,	fairs	and	parades.
•	 Routinely	analyse	ethnic	and	racial	variables	in	planning	analysis.
•	 Study	ethnic	enclaves	and	neighbourhoods	in	transition.
•	 Establish	policies/design	guidelines	for	sustaining	ethnic	neighbourhoods.
•	 Establish	policies/strategies	for	ethnic	commercial	areas,	malls	and	business	improvement	areas.
•	 Include	culture/religion	as	an	acceptable	reason	for	site-specific	accommodations/minor	variances.
•	 Accommodate	ethnic	signage,	street	names	and	symbols.
•	 Address	ethnic-specific	service	needs.
•	 Address	immigrants’	special	service	needs.
•	 Establish	policies/projects	for	ethnic	heritage	preservation.
•	 Develop	guidelines	for	housing	to	suit	diverse	groups.
•	 Promote	ethnic	community	initiatives	for	housing	and	neighbourhood	development.
•	 Develop	strategies	that	take	into	account	intercultural	needs.
•	 Promote	ethnic	entrepreneurship	for	economic	development.
•	 Promote	ethnic	art	and	cultural	services.
•	 Accommodate	ethnic	sports	(such	as	cricket	and	bocce)	in	playfield	design	and	programming.	
City plans are often developed for 10–25-year periods and, therefore, represent the long-term strategic 
planning of the sort necessitated by demographic change. Although migration trends can sometimes shift 
unexpectedly, often (especially with managed migration systems) they can be predicted to no small extent, 
and this allows for more effective longer-term urban planning. This is particularly useful with regard to 
high-capital-cost infrastructure development such as for transportation, housing, electricity, water and 
sanitation systems, communications, and the location of commercial and retail sectors. Stable and predictable 
immigration trends, together with research findings on settlement patterns for new arrivals to the city, offer 
advantages to planners tasked with mapping out the long-term future of a city. Again, our hope in this 
section is to draw greater attention to the importance of urban planning in the local governance of migration. 
Calls for inclusive local policy have been a step forward in this discussion, but the development of policy 
alone is not enough. For inclusiveness to be achieved, the appropriate policies must be implemented through 
on-the-ground planning. 
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Looking ahead
A Global North bias in the discussion?
These concerns of urban planning and the incorporation of multiculturalism into planning spring largely 
from the experiences of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The 
discussion on migration and cities, including its urban planning aspects, can be deeply slanted towards the 
concerns of fully developed societies and their mature economies. When this happens, these discussions 
may leave out the situations faced by cities in developing countries, whether those cities are modestly sized 
or megacities. Many cities in developing countries face the challenges of slums, which, by their nature, are 
unplanned. Slums are not only places of poverty; they also lack basic services, including drinkable water, 
sanitation, electricity and public transportation. They may include areas unreachable by motor vehicles 
(including ambulances) and may be considered ungovernable and beyond the reach of planning initiatives. 
The principal challenge of slums, however, is substandard housing – a major theme of the Habitat III 
Conference. The New Urban Agenda that emerged from the Habitat III Conference in Quito is exceptionally 
ambitious and comprehensive. Despite its being a non-binding agreement, it offers very useful long-term 
guidance to local and national governments on how to make cities more livable, sustainable and inclusive. 
But, even here, and with the involvement of national governments of developing countries, the question 
remains whether the New Urban Agenda is more realistic for wealthier countries than for those of developing 
nations. One fundamental concern must be with the lack of planners in developing countries; not all cities 
have a planning office, and many do not have even a single planner. In other words, the capacity of the 
world’s cities to implement the New Urban Agenda is not equal, and the wealthier countries are likely to 
perform best in implementing it. 
With regard to the local management of migration effects, it is, once again, the cities in the world’s wealthier 
countries that will fare best as they have a greater resource capacity, including for planning, and they have 
a higher capacity to manage migration flows than countries in the Global South. While we can applaud 
the fact that UN Member States reached agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals, which included 
numerous references to cities and to migration, as well as the fact that they reached agreement on the New 
Urban Agenda, which also includes references to migrants, it is debatable whether universal agreements of 
these sorts are fully appropriate for all societies at the same time. Societies that are currently unable to 
fully implement these goals may still find them useful, over time. But some cities in developing countries 
face problems that are simply different and far more severe than those faced by cities in the world’s richer 
countries, and this will affect their ability to implement the full range of objectives. To which should they 
give priority?
While financial resources are important, we have seen time and again that many 
places are not prepared to use new resources if they were made available, and 
in fact do not use resources that are readily available now. Local capacity is the 
biggest obstacle […]. There is a scarcity of human capacity. India is estimated to 
have some 3,000 trained planners, even though it has 5,000 places with populations 
exceeding 10,000 people. Even if we allocated only one planner per place — an 
absurd proposition, given the size of New Delhi or Mumbai — 40 percent of the 
places would be without a planner. Furthermore, few planners have backgrounds in 
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public finance, and most public finance professionals do not have well-demonstrated 
planning skills, leaving most places with inadequate capital budgeting and difficulty 
maintaining existing infrastructure.884
To these cautionary remarks should be added the fact that fully developed countries can learn from the 
experiences of those less wealthy. As was remarked briefly with regard to slums, there are innovations being 
developed by the less wealthy. Such innovations are of value in their own right but also demonstrate the 
potential of a less formal approach to city management – an approach that leaves more room for residents, 
including migrants, to develop solutions to local problems, ideas for economic advancement, and the means 
to strengthen social cohesion.
Some implications
Each of the areas discussed here, however briefly, warrants further examination by academic, government and 
civil society researchers, as well as by local and national policy officials, and by the international community, 
which is becoming increasingly engaged in these matters. Further discussions on the themes covered in this 
chapter, with emphasis on the following, are warranted:
• Cities as determinants of migration flow patterns and what this means for governance: how national and 
local governments should collaborate on setting immigration levels, on the global competition for talent, 
on best practices for settlement and integration, and on the role of non-governmental actors, including 
the business community and civil society organizations, in managing migration for social and economic 
benefits for the cities of destination.
• The challenges specific to cities of migration in the Global South, including megacities and slums, such 
as coping with very rapid population growth and pressures on infrastructure and basic services, the 
expansion of slums and peri-urban settlements, and the lack of an adequate planning capacity.
• Migration and urban planning, including planning explicitly for diversity: introducing urban planners into 
discussions of the challenges faced by cities in both the Global North and South, with respect to migration – 
discussions designed to elicit best practices in long-term urban planning for migration. 
The emergence of cities as world leaders in determining migration patterns is the result of continuing 
urbanization, now a fully global phenomenon. Cities are the major magnets for the world’s top talent, but 
they are also the destinations for those millions of migrants seeking employment of any form, greater security 
for themselves and their families, and the hope of a better future. It is not only global cities or larger 
cities that attract migrants; indeed, as larger cities become in some ways less livable, due to congestion 
and crowding, some smaller cities will become increasingly sought after as destinations, and these cities, 
perhaps with less experience in managing migration and integration, will benefit from the learned wisdom of 
others. This chapter is a call for enhanced mutual exchanges of knowledge and experience among cities, their 
elected leaders, their policy officials, their planners, and the many institutions within them whose actions 
contribute to the outcomes of the migration processes. Although we recognize that it remains the purview of 
national authorities to manage borders and migration policies, we urge national governments to also enable 
884	Citiscope,	2016.
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cities to take on more responsibilities as the global actors that they have become in international migration. 
Urbanization, long-term history would suggest, is not going to be reversed, making it ever more appropriate 
for cities to be represented at national migration policy tables.  Furthermore, the international community 
can serve as conveners of city officials and institutions to enhance our collective thinking on how to go about 
this complex business.
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Appendices 
Chapter 2
Appendix A. Key migration concepts and definitions
Internally displaced person (IDP) 
The 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as: 
[…] persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order 
to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations 
of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized State border.
For more information on IDPs, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the IDMC documents 
and sources referenced in that section. 
International migrant 
The 1998 United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1, set out the key 
concepts related to the measurement of international migration. The Recommendations define an international 
migrant as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence (p. 9).1 
Per the Recommendations, the country of usual residence is that in which the person has a place to live where he or 
she normally spends the daily period of rest.2 Also, people travelling abroad temporarily for purposes of recreation, 
holiday, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage3 should not be included in the international migrant 
group, as these cases do not imply a change in the country of usual residence.
The Recommendations also distinguish between long-term migrants and short-term migrants. A long-term 
migrant is defined as a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period 
of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of 
usual residence (p. 10).4 Short-term migrants are defined as persons who move to a country other than that of 
their usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year5 – except for those travelling for the 
purposes indicated above, which exclude a change in the country of residence. 
Therefore, an immigrant must not have been a usual resident, and will establish usual residence in the 
country he or she has entered. An emigrant should have been a usual resident of the country from which 
he or she is departing, and should be establishing usual residence in another country. Use of this definition 
1	 UN	DESA,	1998.	
2	 Ibid.	
3	 Ibid.
4	 Ibid.
5	 Ibid.	
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allows for the collection of internationally comparable data on migration. While the UN recommends that 
such a definition be adopted by national data systems, this should not be confused with administrative 
and legal definitions of an international migrant used in each country.6 It should also be noted that core 
concepts and definitions on international migrant embodied in national practices may often differ 
from concepts and definitions recommended by the UN; statistics on international migrant stocks 
presented in this chapter reflect national definitions and not necessarily those recommended by the UN.
Irregular migration
Although there is no universally accepted definition of irregular migration, it can be broadly defined as 
“movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”.7 From 
the perspective of a destination country, irregular migration may imply entry, stay or work in a country without 
the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of a 
sending country, irregularity implies not fulfilling the administrative requirements for leaving the country, or 
leaving such country without a valid passport or travel document.
Migration stocks and flows
Statistics on the size of the migrant population are normally based on stocks (the total number of international 
migrants present in a given country at a specific point in time) and flows (the number of migrants entering or 
leaving a country during a given period – typically one year). The term country used in these definitions may 
also refer to other units (such as territories and areas).8
The main criteria used for categorizing migrant stocks and flows are country of birth and citizenship, which are 
defined below. (Actual or intended duration of stay is a further element required for collection of statistics on 
migration flows.)9
• Citizenship indicates the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her country (State), 
acquired by birth or naturalization, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means according to 
national legislation.
• Country of birth refers to the country of residence (in its current borders, if the information is available) of 
the mother at the time of the birth or, in default, the country (in its current borders, if the information is 
available) in which the birth took place.
6	 IOM,	n.d.h.
7	 Ibid.;	and	IOM,	2017a.	
8	 UN	DESA,	2015b.
9	 IOM,	n.d.h.
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Migrant worker
Article 2(1) of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families defines the term migrant worker as: “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or 
has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”. Article 3 goes on 
to note that the Convention does not apply to a number of groups, including refugees, stateless persons and 
trainees, among others. 
Other global-level, legal definitions of the term migrant worker and related terms can be found in ILO 
Conventions, including the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant 
Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975 (No. 143).
For more information on migrant workers, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the ILO 
documents and sources referenced in that section.   
Refugee
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, read together with its 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, defines persons who fall within the global legal definition of a refugee. Article 1(A)
(2), in particular, states that the term shall apply to any person who: 
[…] owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Other provisions in Article 1 provide further guidance on persons who do not fall within this definition or 
persons who may cease to be refugees. Additionally, UNHCR’s Statute, UN General Assembly Resolutions and 
ECOSOC Resolutions also provide further guidance on persons who may fall within UNHCR’s competence.10 
For more information on refugees and asylum seekers, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer 
to the UNHCR documents and sources referenced in that section. 
Remittances
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) refers to remittances as “household income from foreign economies 
arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement of people to those economies”.11 Following the 
same definition, “remittances include cash and noncash items that flow through formal channels, such as via 
electronic wire, or through informal channels, such as money or goods carried across borders. They largely 
consist of funds and noncash items sent or given by individuals who have migrated to a new economy and 
10	 For	more,	see	UNHCR,	2013.
11	 IMF,	2009.
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become residents there, and the net compensation of border, seasonal, or other short-term workers who are 
employed in an economy in which they are not residents”.12 
Therefore, remittances are normally calculated as the sum of “compensation of employees” and “personal 
transfers”.13 “Compensation of employees”, in relation to remittance calculations, is defined as “the income of 
border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident 
and of residents employed by nonresident entities”;14 this means that salaries earned by resident employees of 
international organizations, embassies and consular offices, and other non-resident businesses are included 
in remittance calculations, although they technically do not (necessarily) imply transfer between resident 
migrants and non-resident households. Such amounts may also be very significant in certain countries 
where non-resident entities are numerous or employ high numbers of people. “Personal transfers” consist 
of all “current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident 
households”, thus including “all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals”.15 Personal 
transfers may thus also provide an overestimate of actual transfers between resident migrants and non-
resident households, which are what is commonly regarded as remittances. At the same time, the upward 
bias caused by counting remittances as the sum of personal transfers and compensation of employees may 
be partly offset by the probable undercounting of migrant remittances sent through informal channels. The 
extent of these biases is, however, very difficult to assess. 
For more information on remittances, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the World Bank 
documents and sources referenced in that section. 
Smuggling of migrants
Article 3(a) of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air defines “smuggling of 
migrants” as: 
[…] the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident. 
Articles 3(b) and (c) provide further clarification: 
(b)  “Illegal entry” shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary 
requirements for legal entry into the receiving State;
(c) “Fraudulent travel or identity document” shall mean any travel or identity document:
(i)  That has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other 
than a person or agency lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity 
document on behalf of a State; or
12	 Ibid.
13	 Alvarez	et	al.,	2015.	
14	 IMF,	2009.
15	 Ibid.
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(ii)  That has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, 
corruption or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or
(iii)  That is being used by a person other than the rightful holder;
Trafficking in persons 
Article 3 of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines 
“trafficking in persons” as:
(a)  […] the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of 
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs; 
(b)  The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth 
in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth 
in subparagraph (a) have been used; 
(c)  The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the 
purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does 
not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; 
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age. 
For more information on human trafficking, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the 
UNODC documents and sources referenced in that section.
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Appendix B. Diaspora
The term diaspora has been extensively discussed and defined in a variety of ways, across several academic 
disciplines, although there is no single agreed-upon definition. In general, it refers to a country’s nationals 
or citizens abroad and their descendants. The term diaspora literally means dispersion (from dia speirein or 
“to scatter across” in Greek). Some scholars agree that the distinguishing characteristic of diasporas from 
other migrant groups is the presence of strong cultural, linguistic, historical, religious and affective ties with 
the country or community of origin, or a sense of shared identity and belonging.16 Defining diasporas on 
the basis of nationality (for example, the Chinese or Indian diasporas) may often hide differences between 
groups, such as religion or ethnicity. Others suggest that the term transnational communities may better 
describe the reality of contemporary migration experiences, whereby migrants may establish and maintain 
connections with people in their home communities or migrants in other countries, thus “belonging to two 
or more societies at the same time”.17 
Defining diaspora for statistical purposes is extremely challenging. The complexity, sensitivity and lack of a 
common definition hinder the compilation of internationally comparable statistics on diaspora populations. 
At the national level, countries may have a statistical definition of diaspora, often reflecting their historical 
and political trajectories; however, emigrants and their descendants may or may not identify as members 
of diaspora, independently of the definition and political approach that their country of origin may utilize 
towards diaspora. Moreover, collection of information on emigrants often relies on data from host countries, 
which may be available for foreign nationals, but less so for their children or descendants. National 
population censuses and household surveys in countries of origin may provide some information on nationals 
living abroad, but issues of frequency (of censuses) and sampling (of surveys) are the main obstacles to a 
timely and comprehensive picture of diaspora groups. Therefore, even for single countries, quantification and 
qualification of diaspora groups – diaspora mappings – are hard to accomplish. IOM has assisted a number 
of countries in their efforts to map their diasporas; see the text box below on IOM’s work. For these reasons, 
generating a reliable estimate of the global stock of diasporas is an almost impossible task, unless the 
definition is narrowed down to groups of emigrants for whom data are available for most countries. This has 
been attempted by the OECD and the World Bank.18
16	 Vertovec	and	Cohen,	1999.
17	 Vertovec,	2005.
18	 See,	 for	example,	OECD,	2012b.	 In	 this	2012	OECD	 report,	diasporas	were	defined	as	 foreign-born	persons	aged	15	or	older	by	
country	of	birth,	and	their	children	born	in	destination	countries.	However,	as	mentioned	in	the	report,	information	on	children	of	
migrants	in	destination	countries	is	often	not	disaggregated	by	a	number	of	characteristics.	Therefore,	information	on	sex	and	age	of	
diasporas	is	not	provided	in	the	report.	Also,	only	groups	residing	in	OECD	countries	are	considered,	and	statistics	refer	to	the	year	
2008.	The	largest	diasporas	in	the	entire	group	of	OECD	countries	were	those	of	Mexico,	with	about	20	million	people	(or	16%	of	the	
total	diaspora	in	OECD	countries	in	that	year),	followed	by	Italy	(with	5.2	million	–	4%	of	the	total),	Germany	(4.1	million	–	3%	of	the	
total),	India	(3.8	million	–	3%	of	the	total),	and	the	United	Kingdom	(2.9	million	–	3%	of	the	total).	An	update	to	this	OECD	report	was	
released	in	2015.
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IOM’s diaspora mapping
Within	IOM,	the	term	diaspora	is	used	interchangeably	with	transnational communities.	Both	terms	refer	
to	migrants	or	descendants	of	migrants,	whose	 identity	and	sense	of	belonging	have	been	shaped	by	
their	migration	experience	and	background.	IOM	uses	the	term	transnational communities	because,	in	
a	world	of	unprecedented	global	mobility,	these	communities	comprise	people	who	are	connected	to	
more	than	a	single	country.	This	allows	for	a	more	comprehensive	approach	and	facilitates	information	
and	data	collection.
To	 provide	 relevant	 information	 on	 diaspora	 populations,	 while	 identifying	 potential	 individuals	 who	
would	be	interested	in	investing	and	contributing	their	skills	in	their	native	countries,	IOM	maps	data	and	
ideas	that	are	ultimately	used	in	formulating	policy	propositions	and	recommendations.	In	many	cases,	
the	determining	 factor	 for	 IOM	to	engage	 transnational	 communities	 in	 its	programming	 is	a	 request	
from	the	government	of	the	diaspora-hosting	country	or	the	country	of	origin.	The	guiding	principle	for	
IOM’s	participation	should	be	that	of	serving	the	interests	of	all	partners:	the	countries	that	transnational	
communities	are	connected	to,	the	diaspora	themselves,	and	the	source	country	communities.	IOM	has	
formulated	a	 comprehensive	approach	based	on	 the	3Es	 for	action:	 to	Enable,	 Engage	and	Empower	
transnational	 communities	 as	 agents	 for	 development,	 with	 each	 stage	 involving	 interventions	 by	
governments	and	other	stakeholders,	supported	by	IOM	through	policy	advice	and	programming.	
Enabling Engaging Empowering
Maximizing	the	potential	of	
transnational	communities
Knowing	and	understanding	
transnational	communities
Facilitating	the	mobilization	of	
skills,	expertise	and	resources	of	
transnational	communities
From	2000	to	2016,	IOM	produced	more	than	100	diaspora	mapping	reports	for	up	to	61	countries	of	
origin	and	75	countries	of	destination,	most	of	which	were	European	or	other	OECD	countries.	More	
than	a	 third	of	 the	mapping	 reports	 relate	 to	migrants	originating	 from	 the	Asia	and	 the	Pacific,	and	
Central	 and	West	Africa	 regions.	 Diaspora	mapping	 focuses	 on	 different	 priorities,	 depending	 on	 the	
context	 in	 which	 the	 diaspora	 engagement	 takes	 place.	 Although	 most	 of	 the	 reports	 focus	 on	 the	
sociodemographic	 and	 economic	 profiles	 of	 diaspora	 communities,	 the	 objectives	 of	 such	mappings	
vary	 from	an	analysis	of	 the	communication	channels	 that	particular	diaspora	communities	utilize,	 to	
the	identification	of	highly	and	semi-skilled	professionals,	among	others.	IOM	is	particularly	involved	in	
supporting	the	active	participation	of	diaspora	professionals	in	their	countries	of	origin	–	for	instance,	in	
the	health	and	education	sectors,	where	specific	development	needs	have	been	identified.
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Appendix C. Irregular migration flows
As discussed in chapter 2, analysing data on the movements of people between countries and regions who are 
using regular visa and migration pathways is inherently difficult, as relatively few countries systematically 
collect and report such information. The difficulties are even more profound when it comes to capturing data 
on irregular migration flows – which, by their very nature tend to be clandestine, given that most (but not all) 
migrants seek to evade the authorities during such migration journeys. Consequently, there are no available 
data on irregular migration flows globally or regionally. In addition, relatively few countries globally have the 
capacity to fully monitor and collect data on irregular migration flows into or out of their territory. (Some notable 
exceptions include the more remote countries of Australia and New Zealand, where the atypical geographical 
isolation makes data collection much more straightforward.)19 Many countries around the world continue to 
invest in border management capabilities and technologies allowing for the capture of data related to irregular 
migration flows. Some commentators question the utility of attempting to quantify irregular migration, citing 
the practical difficulties as well as the underlying rationale for collecting and citing such statistics, which 
can amount to alarmism.20 There are, however, clear benefits to attempting to quantify irregular movements 
from the perspectives of national governments, regional and local governments, humanitarian service providers 
and others. A better understanding of the nature and extent of irregular migration flows would facilitate 
the development of more effective responses and mitigation strategies, particularly for populations at risk of 
displacement or irregular migration.21
Irregular migration flows are commonly considered to mean irregular entry into transit and destination countries, 
although irregular departure has also been a feature of certain regions and countries historically (for example, 
East Germany between 1949 and 1990) and contemporaneously (for example, the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, or North Korea). Some people who undertake irregular migration – departure and/or entry – have 
an express need not to evade authorities, but rather to engage with authorities or others (such as UNHCR) in 
order to seek protection. At certain times and in certain locations, refugees and asylum seekers may make up 
a substantial proportion of people moving irregularly along particular migration corridors. Irregular migration 
may place migrants in dangerous and life-threatening situations, as tragically demonstrated by the estimated 
number of migrant fatalities and disappearances globally recorded by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project (see text 
box on IOM’s MMP in chapter 2).
The little that is known of global irregular migration flows is deduced from estimates of irregular migrant 
stocks (as imprecise as they may be), under the assumption that irregular migrants entered via irregular 
means (that is, without prior permission of authorities). To some extent, this is likely to be true; however, 
many irregular migrants do not engage in unauthorized entry but, instead, take on irregular immigration 
status deliberately or unknowingly after arrival. Against this backdrop, irregular maritime migration flows, 
with their heightened visibility in recent years, may appear to be more significant and perhaps larger in 
scale than they are in practice, compared with other similar flows. This is particularly relevant to irregular 
maritime migration flows to developed countries such as Australia, Greece, Italy, Spain and the United States. 
19	 McAuliffe	and	Koser,	2017.
20	 Castles,	2002;	Clarke,	2000.	
21	 McAuliffe,	2017.	
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That is not to downplay the challenges and difficulties posed by irregular migration flows; however, in the 
absence of other data and information, it is extremely difficult to place these flows, which are often closely 
monitored, in a broader context. This is illustrated in the text box on irregular maritime migration flows.
Irregular maritime migration flows
Unlike	other	forms	of	irregular	migration,	the	numbers	of	irregular	maritime	migrants	moving	from	poor,	
less	developed	and/or	conflict-ridden	countries	to	developed	countries,	such	as	the	flows	heading	for	
Australia,	Europe	and	the	United	States,	are	relatively	well	documented.	One	of	the	reasons	that	this	
movement	is	monitored	so	closely	is	that	it	is	highly	visible.	It	also	tends	to	be	a	focus	of	intense	public	
interest.	Consequently,	highly	regulated	border-management	processes	have	recently	been	developed,	
thereby	 increasing	certain	countries’	capacity	 to	count	and	report	on	 the	scope	of	 irregular	maritime	
flows.	The	U.S.	Coast	Guard,	for	example,	reports	precise	figures	going	back	to	1995.	The	EU’s	Frontex	
has	 increased	 its	 capacity,	 especially	 since	2008,	 to	 report	on	 the	number	of	persons	detected	while	
undertaking	maritime	migration	in	the	Mediterranean	and	North	Atlantic.	These	flows	are	typical	of	the	
focus	on	South–North	movement	and	highlight	the	interest	in	monitoring	irregular	maritime	migration	
to	the	North.
The	 scale	 of	 irregular	 maritime	 migration	 is	 difficult	 to	 quantify	 outside	 of	 the	 main	 South–North	
migration	corridors.	That	said,	even	as	recently	as	10	years	ago,	such	movement	 into	Europe	was	not	
monitored	and	 reported	on	 in	 the	highly	 systematized	way	 it	 is	 today	 through	 Frontex.	Data	 tend	 to	
capture	interdictions/detections,	and	so	clearly	do	not	capture	all	attempts	(successful	or	otherwise).	It	
is	likely	that	there	are	successful	undetected	maritime	ventures	in	all	contexts	but,	arguably,	this	is	less	
likely	in	some	circumstances.	For	example,	it	is	possible	that	failing	to	be	intercepted	off	the	north-west	
coast	of	Australia	by	authorities	may	result	in	irregular	migrants	perishing	in	the	very	harsh	and	isolated	
coastal	regions;	the	need	to	be	detected	by	authorities	is	a	genuine	one.
Based	on	McAuliffe	and	Mence	(2017).
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Appendix D. Human trafficking
Trafficking in persons is defined in Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children.22 Due to the clandestine, invisible and underreported nature of 
human trafficking, however, global estimates of victims of trafficking are limited and extremely challenging 
to collect. The latest available data, which are from 2014, indicate that 17,752 victims of human trafficking 
were detected in 85 countries.23   Between 2012 and 2014, 63,251 victims were detected in 106 countries and 
territories. UNODC notes that the majority of victims detected between 2012 and 2014 (57%) were trafficked 
transnationally, while the rest were trafficked within national borders.24 For the same reasons that there are 
limited data, actual numbers of victims are likely to be much higher than the detected number of victims.25
Of the total victims detected in 2014, women and girls comprised the majority, at 71 per cent of the total. 
Since the UNODC began collecting data on trafficking in persons in 2003, females have constituted the 
majority share of detected victims, although this proportion has decreased from 84 per cent in 2004, in line 
with the increasing recognition that males are also victims. Between 2012 and 2014, one in five detected 
victims were men. The share of children among detected victims has also risen from 13 per cent in 2004 (10% 
girls and 3% boys) to 28 per cent in 2014 (20% girls and 8% boys), down from a peak in 2011 at 34 per cent. 
While detected victims were trafficked for a variety of reasons, including sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced 
marriage, begging and organ removal, sexual exploitation has predominated since 2003. The proportion has changed 
since 2008, however, from 61 per cent to 54 per cent in 2014. During the same period, the share of detected victims 
trafficked for forced labour has also changed from 31 per cent to 38 per cent, although 2011 and 2013 saw higher 
proportions (40% and 39%, respectively). When the total number of detected victims is disaggregated by sex and 
form of exploitation, it becomes apparent that greater proportions of women are subject to sexual exploitation (for 
example, 72% of the total detected female victims in 2014), while greater proportions of males are subject to forced 
labour (for example, 85.7% of the total detected male victims in 2014). UNODC notes that about four out of 10 
detected victims were trafficked for forced labour between 2012 and 2014. Of these victims, 63 per cent were men. 
There is recognition of the need to obtain better data on victims of trafficking. The adoption of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provides fresh impetus to improve the data, with the “number of 
victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation” included as an 
indicator under Goal 16 (Indicator 16.2.2).26 IOM’s operational efforts also provide useful insights.
22	 See	appendix	A	for	definition	of	trafficking in persons.
23	 The	content	 in	 this	 subsection	 is	based	on	and	drawn	 from	UNODC,	2016.	Please	 refer	 to	 this	document	 for	explanatory	notes,	
deeper	analysis,	caveats,	limitations	and	methodologies	associated	with	the	numbers	and	trends	presented	here.	UNODC’s	previous	
Global	Reports	on	Trafficking	in	Persons	are	other	key	sources	of	information.	Another	key	global	source	of	information	on	trafficking	
is	the	United	States	Department	of	State's	Trafficking	Persons	Reports,	available	from	United	States	Department	of	State,	2017.
24	 Given	the	definition,	human	trafficking	may	sometimes	be	inaccurately	understood	to	involve	international	or	internal	migration.	
However,	such	movement	is	unnecessary	for	someone	to	be	classified	as	a	victim.	In	this	context,	the	number	of	detected	victims	
does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	migrant	 victims	 of	 human	 trafficking.	 That	 said,	 many	 cases	 of	 trafficking	 do	 involve	 internal	 or	
international	migration.	
25	 For	 example,	 the	Global	 Slavery	 Index	 estimates	 that,	 in	 2016,	 there	were	 45.8	million	 people	 living	 in	modern	 slavery	 in	 167	
countries,	with	58	per	cent	of	this	population	in	 just	five	countries:	Bangladesh,	China,	 India,	Pakistan	and	Uzbekistan	(see	Walk	
Free	 Foundation,	 2016,	 and	 www.globalslaveryindex.org/findings/).	 In	 2012,	 the	 ILO	 estimated	 that,	 globally,	 there	 were	 20.9	
million	victims	of	forced	labour,	with	9.1	million	(or	44%)	having	moved	internally	or	internationally	(see	ILO,	2016).	While	the	legal	
definitions	of	 forced labour,	slavery	and	 trafficking in persons	are	distinct,	 there	are	overlaps	between	the	definitions	such	 that	
persons	estimated	as	victims	of	forced	labour	or	slavery	can	also	be	victims	of	trafficking.	
26	 UN	DESA,	2017.	
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IOM’s data on assistance to victims of human trafficking
IOM	began	assisting	victims	of	trafficking	in	the	1990s.	IOM’s	global	database,	the	largest	of	its	kind,	contains	
data,	 including	 primary	 data,	 on	 46,000	 identified	 victims	 of	 trafficking,	who	 have	 been:	 (1)	 identified;	 
(2)	assisted;	or	(3)	identified	and	assisted	by	IOM.	These	victims	represent	140	nationalities	and	have	been	
identified	 in	150	countries.	 This	database	continues	 to	 increase	by	approximately	5,000	cases	per	year.	
For	various	 reasons,	however,	not	all	 the	victims	assisted	by	 IOM	are	always	 recorded	 in	 the	database.	
Additionally,	IOM	data	are	only	collected	in	locations	where	IOM	has	counter-trafficking	operations.	
Among	the	victims	of	trafficking	recorded	in	IOM’s	database,	between	2005	and	2015,	the	proportion	
of	male	human	trafficking	victims	has	increased,	the	proportion	of	victims	subject	to	sexual	exploitation	
has	declined,	 and	 the	proportion	 subject	 to	 forced	 labour	has	 grown.	During	 the	 same	period,	 the	
average	 age	of	 victims	was	 26	 years	 (at	 the	time	of	 assistance),	 and	half	 of	 the	 victims	were	 aged	
between	18	and	34	years.	
During	 2015	 to	 2016,	 8,976	 victims	 of	 human	 trafficking	 were	 identified,	 assisted,	 or	 identified	 and	
assisted.	The	average	age	was	29	years,	although	male	victims	were	older,	on	average,	than	females.	Of	
the	total	for	the	period,	approximately	15	per	cent	were	children.
The	graph	below	shows	IOM’s	data	disaggregated	by	sectors	of	exploitation.	Those	found	in	sectors	such	
as	mining,	construction,	and	low-level	crime	are	almost	exclusively	men,	whereas	prostitution,	hospitality	
and	transport	are	dominated	by	women.
Sectors of exploitation of identified, assisted, or identified and assisted victims, 2005–2015 (%)
IOM	also	collects	data	on	indicators	of	the	presence	of	human	trafficking	and	other	exploitative	practices	
along	migration	routes.	The	Human	Trafficking	and	Other	Exploitative	Practices	Prevalence	Indication	Survey	
has	been	conducted	as	part	of	IOM’s	DTM	operations	since	December	2015.	These	data	indicate	that	over	
30	per	cent	of	the	16,000	migrants	 interviewed	along	the	Central	and	Eastern	Mediterranean	migration	
routes	during	2016	experienced	human	trafficking	or	other	exploitative	practices	during	the	journey.
For	more	 information	on	IOM’s	data	and	work	with	victims	of	trafficking,	see	www.iom.int/counter-
trafficking.	IOM’s	primary	data	on	identified	victims	of	human	trafficking	are	available	for	download	at 
www.ctdatacollaborative.org/.
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Appendix A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Regions and  
        Subregions
Please note that this table reflects the UN DESA geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by IOM.
AFRICA
Eastern Africaa Middle Africab Northern Africac Southern Africad Western Africae
Burundi
Comoros
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mozambique
Réunion
Rwanda
Seychelles
Somalia
South Sudan
Uganda
United  
Republic  
of Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Angola
Cameroon
Central African 
Republic
Chad
Congo (the)
Democratic  
Republic of the 
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia
Western Sahara
(territory)
Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cabo Verde
Côte d'Ivoire
Gambia (the)
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Saint Helena
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
a  Eastern Africa has been combined with the Southern Africa subregion in the chapter, although the countries/territories/areas within 
remain the same. 
b  This subregion has been renamed “Central Africa” in the chapter and combined with Western Africa. 
c  This subregion renamed “North Africa”. 
d  This subregion has been combined with Eastern Africa. 
e  This subregion has been renamed “West Africa” and combined with Central Africa (UN DESA Middle Africa) in the chapter. 
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ASIA
Central Asia Eastern Asia South-Eastern Asiaf Southern Asia Western Asiag
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
China
China,	Hong	
Kong	Special	
Administrative	
Region
China,	Macao	
Special	
Administrative	
Region
Democratic	
People's	Republic	
of	Korea
Japan
Mongolia
Republic	of	Korea
Brunei	
Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao	People's	
Democratic	
Republic
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines	(the)
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Viet	Nam
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Iran	(Islamic	
Republic	of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri	Lanka
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Cyprus
Georgia
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
Saudi	Arabia
State	of	Palestine
Syrian	Arab	
Republic
Turkey
United	Arab	
Emirates
Yemen
f		 This	subregion	renamed	“South-East	Asia”.	
g		 This	subregion	renamed	“Middle	East”.	
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EUROPEh
Eastern Europei Northern Europe Southern Europe Western Europe
Belarus
Bulgaria
Czech	Republic
Hungary
Poland
Republic	of	Moldova
Romania
Russian	Federation
Slovakia
Ukraine
Channel	Islands
Denmark
Estonia
Faroe	Islands
Finland
Iceland
Ireland
Isle	of	Man
Latvia
Lithuania
Norway
Sweden
United	Kingdom	of	
Great	Britain	and	
Northern	Ireland
Albania
Andorra
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina
Croatia
Gibraltar
Greece
Holy	See
Italy
Malta
Montenegro
Portugal
San	Marino
Serbia
Slovenia
Spain
The	former	Yugoslav	
Republic	of	Macedonia
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Monaco
Netherlands	(the)
Switzerland
h	 Some	countries	in	this	subregion,	particularly	members	of	the	European	Union,	may	have	been	included	both	in	the	discussion	of	
South-Eastern	 and	Eastern Europe,	 as	well	 as	 the	 subregional	 discussion	on	Northern,	Western,	 and	Southern Europe	within	 the	
chapter. 
i		 Northern,	Western	and	Southern	Europe	are	combined	in	the	chapter,	excluding	the	following	countries	in	Southern	Europe:	Albania,	
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Croatia,	Montenegro,	Serbia	and	the	former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia,	which	have	been	included	in	
South-East Europe	in	the	chapter,	under	the	subregion	South-Eastern	and	Eastern Europe.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Caribbean Central Americaj South America
Anguilla
Antigua	and	Barbuda
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Bonaire,	Sint	Eustatius	and	Saba
British	Virgin	Islands
Cayman	Islands
Cuba
Curaçao			
Dominica
Dominican	Republic
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Haiti
Jamaica
Martinique
Montserrat
Puerto	Rico
Saint	Kitts	and	Nevis
Saint	Lucia
Saint	Vincent	and	the				
Grenadines
Sint	Maarten	(Dutch	part)
Trinidad	and	Tobago
Turks	and	Caicos	Islands
United	States	Virgin	Islands
Belize
Costa	Rica
El	Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Argentina
Bolivia	(Plurinational	State	of)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Falkland	Islands	(Malvinas)
French	Guiana
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela	 
(Bolivarian	Republic	of)
j		 The	subregion	“Central	America”	has	been	combined	with	Mexico	and	the	Caribbean	in	this	chapter.	
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NORTHERN AMERICA
Bermuda
Canada
Greenland
Saint	Pierre	and	Miquelon
United	States	of	America
OCEANIA
Australia  
and New Zealand Melanesia Micronesia Polynesia
Australia
New	Zealand
Fiji
New	Caledonia
Papua	New	Guinea
Solomon	Islands
Vanuatu
Guam
Kiribati
Marshall	Islands
Micronesia	 
(Federated	States	of)
Nauru
Northern	Mariana	
Islands
Palau
American	Samoa
Cook	Islands
French	Polynesia
Niue
Samoa
Tokelau
Tonga
Tuvalu
Wallis	and	Futuna	
Islands
Legend:
Region
Subregioni
Country/territory/areaii,iii
Note:	 For	 methodology	 as	 well	 as	 explanatory	 notes,	 see	 Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision “CD-ROM 
Documentation”	 available	 at	 www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/
MigrationStockDocumentation_2015.pdf.	
i	 Subregions	utilized	within	the	chapter	may	differ	from	those	utilized	by	UN	DESA’s	Statistical	Division	either	by	name,	or	by	countries/
territories/areas	included	within. 
ii		 	“The	names	of	countries	or	areas	refer	to	their	short	form	used	in	day-to-day	operations	of	the	United	Nations	and	not	necessarily	to	
their	official	name	as	used	in	formal	documents.	These	names	are	based	on	the	United	Nations	Terminology	Database	(UNTERM),	which	
can	be	found	at:	https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome	The	designations	employed	and	the	presentation	of	material	at	this	
site	do	not	imply	the	expression	of	any	opinion	whatsoever	on	the	part	of	the	Secretariat	of	the	United	Nations	[or	the	International	
Organization	for	Migration	(IOM)]	concerning	the	legal	status	of	any	country,	territory,	city	or	area	or	of	its	authorities,	or	concerning	the	
delimitation	of	its	frontiers	or	boundaries.”	For	further	information,	see	https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/.
iii	 The	entities	included	in	this	table,	from	which	the	previous	chapter	draws	upon,	include	countries,	as	well	as	territories,	areas	and	
special	administrative	regions.	Please	note	that	this	table	is	not	intended	to	be	fully	comprehensive. 
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Chapter 4
Appendix A. A brief overview of academic publishing 
The scholarly dissemination system rotates around a well-established gravitational centre: publication, with 
some forms of publication (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others 
(and within that, individual academic publishers have different standings). Publishing the results of research in 
academic journals is without any doubt the paramount objective of today’s scholars.1 Journals alone constitute 
about 40 per cent (books 16%) of the revenues of the broader scientific, technical and medical publisher’s 
market, the size of which has been estimated at USD 25.2 billion in 2013.2 Through academic publishing, 
scholars formally share their findings within the scientific community. This exchange enables other researchers 
to learn about the latest advancements, to design new studies for filling current knowledge gaps, to compare 
their findings with the ones of their peers and perhaps to avoid reinventing the wheel. Moreover, publication 
constitutes “...a permanent record of what has been discovered, when and by whom - like a court register 
for science”.3 The world’s first academic journal - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society - appeared as 
early as of 1665, as an expression of the Royal Society’s policy of promoting the progress of science through 
open sharing of results and ideas supported by empirical evidence. Since then, the number of active scholarly 
peer-reviewed English language journals has reached 28,100 in 2014,4 and it has been calculated that the 
global scientific output doubles every nine years.5 Many scholars today are overwhelmed by the mass of 
academic literature, and it is becoming impossible to find the time to read every piece of literature, even on 
the narrowest topic. 
Publications are the core of career advancement for academics, whereas researchers working in applied research 
settings are not necessarily working under the same degree of pressure to publish. Overall, the academic reward 
system is responsible for the very significant increase in the number of publications but, arguably, a quantitative 
increase does not automatically lead to an increase in the average “quality” of published academic research. 
Measuring quality is a complex and debated issue. In terms of the major form of output (journal articles), we 
can say that an article’s quality is evaluated mainly qualitatively before publication, and mainly quantitatively 
after publication. The type of qualitative evaluation that occurs before publication in academic journals is 
called “peer-review”. The term “peer” refers to the fact that the people performing reviews of the submitted 
article are meant to be of equal (or greater) expertise on a topic. Peer review in academia is almost always 
unpaid. Peer review of journal articles “...has traditionally been seen as part of the professional obligations of 
the researcher”,6 and a large scale-survey amongst 40,000 research papers authors found that most of them 
considered peer review as “...essential to the communication of scholarly research”. Ninety-one per cent of 
the respondents stated that “...the review process improved the quality of the last paper they published”, and 
86 per cent declared that “...they enjoy reviewing and will continue to review”.7 The most tangible incentive for 
reviewing is perhaps earning recognition: journals usually publish a yearly “reviewers thanksgiving” document 
1	 Other	means	of	scholarly	communication	include	books,	conference	presentations,	seminars,	e-mail	lists	and	so	forth.
2	 Ware	and	Mabe,	2015.	
3	 Sense	About	Science,	2005.
4	 Ware	and	Mabe,	2015.
5	 Van	Noorden,	2014.
6	 Ware	and	Mabe,	2015.
7	 Mulligan,	Hall	and	Raphael,	2013.	
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in which they list the names of people who served as reviewers.8  Being on those lists can improve a researcher’s 
CV, especially if s/he plans to seek funding/job in that specific field. Reviewers thoroughly examine the 
methods, results and conclusions before submitting their recommendation (accept/revise/reject) to the 
journal’s editor. The review process iterates until the editor is satisfied with the manuscript, which can finally 
enter the production pipeline (copy-editing, typesetting, online publication and possibly printing). Overall, 
the peer-review process lasts from a few weeks to several months, with considerable variance among disciplines 
and journals. After publication, abstracts are free of charge, while access to the full text may require access 
through academic libraries (that typically pay subscriptions to the publishers), or require pay-per-view fees. 
The “open access” publishing model grants free full-text access to anyone, courtesy of the author’s institution 
having paid publication fees to the publisher. 
The peer-review process examines a piece of writing before publication using mainly a qualitative approach, 
while a quantitative approach dominates the assessment of material after publication. Citation – the act of 
quoting – is the single unit at the base of bibliometrics (the statistical analysis of written publications). 
Crudely put, the more the citations, the higher the impact, the better the supposed quality of a paper/
article/book. Basic citation metrics for any publication can be obtained using Google Scholar, the most used 
search engine by academics worldwide. For instance, a search for “migration” in Google Scholar returned 3.8 
million results and the following first page:9
Figure	1.	 Example	of	Google	Scholar	search	results
8	 See	for	instance	http://iovs.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2277067.
9	 Search	results	may	vary	depending	on	user	settings	(e.g.	whether	logged	in	to	Google	or	not)	and	geographic	ISP	location.
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You can see at a glance (Fig.1, bottom-left) that the book “The age of migration: International population 
movements in the modern world” has been cited - as of January 2017 - by more than 8,000 other publications. 
By clicking on “Cited by 8219” you can see all the citing publications since the first edition (1993). If you click 
on the author’s name (S. Castles) you will see the author’s citation indices.
Building on raw citation counts, various so-called “impact metrics” can be calculated at the publication level, 
author level, journal level and so forth. For instance, a journal’s Impact Factor (the citations/publications 
ratio) is widely used as a proxy for the relative importance of a journal, while the h-index10 provides a measure 
of a single author’s impact (though it can be also calculated for a department, institution or country). The 
citations/publications ratio most commonly involves examination of a two-year publishing cycle over three 
years. For example, for Journal X’s 2015 impact factor, 122 citations of articles published in 2013 and 2014 are 
divided by the total number of articles published in 2013 and 2014 (166), so that the 2015 impact factor for 
Journal X is 0.735 (or 122 citations divided by 166 articles).
The debate on the usefulness of impact metrics is still open, the aim being finding the right balance between 
research funders’ needs of measuring the impact of their spending, and academics’ desires for fair evaluation 
systems of their work (and consequent funding). Recently, alternative impact metrics (altmetrics) have been 
developed, taking into account, for instance, number of mentions in news articles and blogs, Twitter, Facebook 
and so forth.
The pressure to achieve within an academic reward system that values publication in peer-reviewed journals 
is acknowledged as having some serious downsides,11 including in relation to quality. The “publish or perish” 
culture has been found to stifle research innovation,12 lower research publication standards,13 encourage 
peer-review fraud14 and negatively affect the ability of researchers to work on applied research tailored to 
policymakers.15 At the same time, academics are under pressure to undertake innovative research, publish in 
the top journals and present evidence to policy audiences and ultimately influence policy.16 
10	 The	h-index	is	the	number	of	publications	that	have	at	least	h	citations.	For	instance,	Author	X	has	written	4	publications:	A	(cited	
by	27	others),	B	(cited	by	14	others),	C	(cited	by	2	others),	and	D	(not	yet	cited).	Author	X’s	h-index	is	2	at	present.	In	the	future,	the	
h-index	may	be	3,	if	publication	C	will	be	cited	at	least	1	more	time.	
11	 Smith,	2006.	
12	 Foster,	Rzhetsky	and	Evans,	2015.
13	 Colquhoun,	2011.	
14	 Prosser	Scully,	2015
15	 Cherney	et	al.,	2012.	
16	 Ibid.
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Chapter 4
Appendix B. Contributions from academic journals17
African Human Mobility Review18 
Chief Editor: Mulugeta F. Dinbabo
In recent years, the debate revolving around the migration-development nexus has spurred, growing global 
interest on human mobility. This is also the case of sub-Saharan Africa, where researchers have sought to 
describe trends and patterns of migration and to suggest actions to harness its economic, social and human 
benefits for the development of the continent. In this respect, evidence-based research is widely accepted to 
build and expand the body of knowledge by testing hypothesis, validating existing theories and elaborating 
new ones. Ultimately, research findings need to be published and disseminated to a larger and diverse audience 
comprising of academics, practitioners, civil society and government representatives. Publication is, therefore, 
a key component that promotes not only the visibility of the research, but also the credibility of the empirical 
work conducted by researchers. In particular, peer-reviewed scholarly journals are a fundamental tool for 
fostering intellectual debate and inquiry. However, at present, there is a lack of peer-reviewed journals of 
high quality in Sub-Saharan Africa addressing, amongst others, the issue of human mobility. Researchers face 
challenges in presenting research findings in African journals in this field, either because such journals are 
published irregularly, or simply because they do not exist. 
African Human Mobility Review (AHMR) is an interdisciplinary journal created to encourage and facilitate the 
study of all aspects (i.e. socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of human mobility in sub-
Saharan Africa. Established in 2014, AHMR aims at being one of the leading scholarly journals in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the field of international/domestic migration, ethnic group relations and refugee movements. The 
main purpose of AHMR includes building the capacity of young African researchers who have an additional 
opportunity to publish and disseminate their work; publishing and disseminating research outputs on the 
socio-demographic, economic, political, psychological, historical, legislative and religious aspects of human 
migration and refugee movements from and within sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, AHMR helps in identifying 
best practices and in suggesting guidelines for correct implementation of migration policies in Africa. It 
also promotes SIHMA’s vision and mission. In general, AHMR actively contributes to SIHMA’s overall goal of 
disseminating research that fosters understanding of human mobility and informs policies that ensure the rights 
and dignity of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Africa. 
At the moment, AHMR publishes three issues per year in January, May, and November. The journal also publishes 
occasional special issues. In the past two years, a number of articles were received by the editorial office, 
of which, after the critical peer review process, only 25 were published in six issues. Scholarly manuscripts 
that advance the body of knowledge are encouraged and considered for publication. AHMR publishes original 
theoretical and applied contributions, including topics such as migration and development, migration and 
human rights, migration of unaccompanied minors, mobility and employment and xenophobia, integration and 
social cohesion. 
17	 The	contributions	in	this	appendix	have	been	submitted	by	each	journal’s	respective	chief	editor(s),	and	have	not	been	edited.		
18	 Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editor’s	contribution	can	be	found	at:	http://sihma.org.za/online-journal/.	
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AHMR online publication has increased accessibility of information for practitioners, researchers, students, 
academicians and policy makers. As part of the strategy to ensure evidence-based policy making, AHMR 
regularly interacts with relevant government departments, civil society and academic/research institutions in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The feedback obtained from readers and partners clearly indicated that AHMR’s electronic 
publications enhanced the internet search ability. It also increases the sources of relevant information and 
decreases the costs for both publisher and users of the journal. So far, AHMR has received very positive feedback 
from authors and Board Members, as well as from readers in the form of views and downloads. This is one of 
the evidence that AHMR is receiving greater attention in the field across Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of 
the world due to its exclusive online and free of charge distribution. The journal has, in fact, the advantage of 
being accessible to a larger audience and this allows for immediate feedback and engagement with the readers. 
Worldwide, open-access scholarly journals have arisen as an alternative to traditional subscription journals. 
They make their articles freely available to everyone while providing services common to all scholarly journals, 
such as the peer-review process, production, and distribution. On the other hand, there is a resistance of 
many scholars to publish in an online medium resulting from the lack of credibility of online publications. For 
example, many authors in academic settings place importance upon the acceptance by a peer-reviewed journal. 
This is connected to credibility problems that arise in decisions of advancement at universities where online 
journal publications carry less weight than print journals (Collins & Berge, 1994). To overcome this problem, a 
few printed copies of AHMR are published each year and distributed across South African universities.
Between 2014 and 2016, AHMR published a Special Issue on international migration, development and 
xenophobia. Professor Shimelis Gulema from the Stony Brook University in the United States, acted as the 
Guest Editor of the Special Issue. Papers in this collection included: Violent xenophobic episodes in South Africa: 
2008 and 2015; Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: what must the African Union Do?; Violent conflict and forced 
displacement in the Horn of Africa: Government and Donor Policies and Programs in Search of Durable Solutions 
and Development-induced displacement and its impacts on the livelihoods of poor urban households in Bahir 
Dar, North Western Ethiopia. 
The Special Issue is a novel undertaking by AHMR. The idea germinated in the wake of an unprecedented wave 
of attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, a development that was unusual, if not unique. It brings 
together studies on a range of issues, all tied to the general theme of the special issue and each demonstrating 
the interconnections between poverty and underdevelopment, conflict, displacement, migration and xenophobia. 
A deeper exploration of issues of displacement, xenophobia, conflict, and migration, as indicated in the four 
contributions, serves to underscore larger, often global, processes including globalization and transnationalism 
but also inequality within and between countries and regions.  In addition, the papers offer a critique of 
existing assumptions, interpretations and practices, as in the case of the term xenophobia; call for a rethinking 
in a way that enables a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, and suggest measures to tackle existing 
challenges, including displacement and xenophobia, among others.
Other AHMR publications included eminent authors like: Simon Bekker, Emeritus Professor of Sociology in 
the Sociology and Social Anthropology Department, University of Stellenbosch and Laurence Piper, Professor 
of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, who has published extensively on xenophobia, 
Zulu nationalism, the Inkatha Freedom Party and electoral politics in South Africa. Professor Jonathan Crush, 
Director of the Southern African Research Centre at Queen’s University in Canada, who has been appointed as 
the Guest Editor for the Special Issue on Migration & Entrepreneurship. 
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Even though AHMR has been successful for the past few years in terms of achieving its objectives, there are some 
challenges, for example low representation of researchers from non-English speaking regions and from smaller 
academic communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
To summarize: 
AHMR is one of the few peer-reviewed scholarly journals in the field of migration in sub-Saharan Africa and 
is popularly used by researchers in the field. It covers a variety of continental level issues and topics in field 
of human mobility. AHMR articles have been cited in decisions by the South African Supreme Court and Court 
of Justice, and dispute panels. AHMR also publishes student-written work and pieces on recent developments 
in migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. AHMR leads discussion and debate at the Institute for Social 
Development, University of the Western Cape by hosting speakers on Postgraduate level course, i.e. Migration 
and Development.  AHMR recent Symposium topics have included: Migration and Xenophobia in South Africa; 
Migration and Returns and the Impact of Migration on Development in South Africa. So far, AHMR undertaken a 
number of activities and achieved tremendous results. AHMR continue to publish high-quality research outputs 
that will advance, encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of human mobility in sub-Saharan Africa.
Asian and Pacific Migration Journal19 
Chief Editors: Graziano Battistella and Maruja M.B. Asis 
The Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (APMJ) celebrated its 25th year in 2016. When it was launched 
in 1992, large-scale temporary labor migration in the region was entering its second decade and was not 
showing any signs of a slowdown.   Back in 1992, academic journals dedicated to migration were very few, 
and in particular, APMJ was about the only one specifically focused on migration-related phenomena in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The journal was introduced to disseminate research on migration in, to and from the 
region, and to encourage the development of migration scholarship that promotes understanding of the 
region’s realities and perspectives. In his review of the articles published in APMJ the last 25 years, Jerrold 
Huguet commented on the role of the journal as a chronicler of what is happening in the area of migration 
(mostly international migration, but also including some articles about internal migration, especially in China) 
in the region.  Although APMJ aims to cover the whole region, the contributions that had been published 
do not sufficiently encompass the different sub-regions.  Earlier reviews by Asis, Piper and Raghuram (2010) 
and Asis and Piper (2008) had remarked on the uneven regional coverage of published articles—mostly about 
East and Southeast Asia, not much on South and West Asia, and hardly any about Central Asia—and remained 
unchanged in the more recent review by Huguet (2016). In terms of discipline, there has been a trend towards 
more disciplines being represented by contributors. Economists, demographers and sociologists are now joined 
by contributors coming from anthropology, psychology, political science, and a few from social work.  The shift 
has been accompanied by a rise in articles based on qualitative research. 
Having been associated with APMJ since 1997 (initially as associate editor and later as co-editor), I agree 
with the view that the articles published by APMJ are generally indicative of the migration scenario in the 
Asia-Pacific and are a reflection of the state of research, policy discussions, and advocacy issues. Considering 
not just the published articles but the universe of submissions received by APMJ, those which do not make 
the grade for external review are disconnected from the existing literature and thus lacking in theoretical 
19	 Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editors’	contribution	can	be	found	at:	http://journals.sagepub.com/home/amj.	
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framing and analysis.  We receive a good number of submissions about migration from other sub-regions, 
but unfortunately, they tend to be statistical exercises and are still wedded to the push-pull framework of 
analysis.   The slew of submissions about South Korea and China in recent years significantly increased the 
representation of East Asian articles in APMJ, reflecting the main issues of interest to these countries.  Articles 
on multiculturalism and marriage migration in South Korea have received the most attention, which in turn, 
indicate the flurry of research (and funding support) on these issues in South Korea. Most articles on China 
deal with internal migration, although in the last few years, return migration and student migration have 
surfaced (as further noted below). 
The articles published in 2015 and 2016 included many articles on South Korea and China, but overall, the 
last two years point to diversity in the types of migrants, origins and destinations covered. Articles on 
student migration, for example, pertained to Chinese and Indian students, incidentally the top two groups of 
international student migrants. Articles about unaccompanied adolescent Korean students in the US (which 
depart from the astronaut family migration observed earlier, with mothers accompanying their children while 
husbands are left back home), the return of Chinese students, and some focus on Japanese student migration 
have expanded the discussion on the topic.  Articles about Filipino teachers in Indonesia, Chinese immigrant 
entrepreneurs in Singapore and Afghan-native fertility differentials in Iran are some examples of articles 
which reveal relatively less known aspects about intra-regional migration while the articles about Vietnamese 
in Poland provide an update on the old migration and characteristics of new Vietnamese migration to Poland. 
Children affected by international migration were the topics of several articles. The adaptation of multicultural 
children in South Korea is a welcome development, expanding the lens beyond marriage migrants (mostly 
women).  A special section dedicated to probing the notion of Third Culture Kids drew attention to children 
who are migrating with their families to Asia.  This theme is a relatively new topic in a region where research 
on children has been mostly about those “left behind.” Overall, the articles published in 2015-2016 are a 
combination of old or persisting issues and new or hitherto under-researched questions.  
Gaps and challenges facing APMJ
Although APMJ aims to disseminate research-based information to a wide audience, as an academic journal, its 
primary audience is largely the academic community. At the same time, the knowledge products disseminated 
by APMJ rest largely on the contributions of the academic community as knowledge producers. The journal 
relies on contributions by researchers whose work is subjected to the review process undertaken voluntarily 
by peer reviewers. The review process is an important mechanism in fostering dialogue between authors and 
reviewers. However, since it is a double-blind process, the exchange and dialogue between the two parties does 
not allow for debate and discussion promoted by face-to-face discussion. Nonetheless, the feedback provided 
by reviewers helps improve the papers, which is in generating evidence-based knowledge about migration. 
Beyond the academic community, it is difficult to gauge the impact of APMJ on policymaking. Various 
factors contribute to this condition. For one, the production of research-based knowledge is time- and 
process-intensive, which may not be compatible with the sometimes fast-paced and contentious context of 
policymaking.  Policymakers tend to be sensitive to the opinions and views of their superiors, constituents, 
and the general public (and the media too), and research findings which run counter to public opinion will 
may not find their way in informing and influencing policymaking.  The time entailed by data gathering and 
analysis can be outpaced by unfolding events.  For example, in the first half of 2015, several Asian countries 
(Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) were confronted by the Rohingya refugee crisis. The 
plight of the Rohingyas, adrift at sea on rickety boats, and with no country willing to welcome them posed 
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a challenge to the ASEAN region. Media reports provided a running commentary on the developments of the 
crisis and the subsequent conferences organized to discuss immediate and temporary solutions. There were no 
contributions touching on the Rohingya issue in 2015 and 2016.
It is not only “at the moment” developments which APMJ missed out on in 2015-2016. Over the long term, 
the issue of unauthorized migration, which is very significant in the region, has not received much attention 
from researchers. The issue has been conflated and confused with human trafficking, which has instead gotten 
enormous research, policy and advocacy attention. (Interestingly, the Rohingya crisis of 2015 was also framed 
as irregular migration in some reports.) This is an example of how funding-driven research can dominate the 
research agenda and publication outputs.
The translation of research findings into policy implications that will be actually considered by policymakers 
is not automatic and is beyond the work of journals like APMJ. This will require other interventions, such 
as the production of concise policy briefs, the holding of policy dialogues, or collaborating with media to 
produce more accessible and timelier reports.  More fundamentally, most government agencies in the region 
need to develop a culture of data appreciation and their value to policymaking (some exceptions are Australia, 
New Zealand and South Korea, which invest in migration research and data). 
The production of knowledge and access to a variety of knowledge products had been affected by developments 
in ICT and social media.  Online journals and open access journals on migration have also increased in number. 
In reflecting about APMJ’s experiences since 1992, founding editor Graziano Battistella (2016) acknowledged 
how these developments have impacted on the work and operations of journals like APMJ. Up until 2014, 
APMJ was produced by SMC. However, technological developments and strategies adopted by major publishing 
companies have made it difficult for independent publishers to thrive in an increasingly competitive milieu. 
The marketing and distribution aspects were particularly challenging. In 2015, APMJ took up the offer to 
partner with SAGE Publications, with SAGE taking care charge of the production and marketing aspects of the 
journal and SMC remaining primarily responsible for content. Despite the many challenges of producing an 
academic journal, the scrutiny provided by the peer review process continues to be strength of journals like 
APMJ. In the years to come, with the continuing support and participation of the academic community, APMJ 
hopes not just to chronicle migration in Asia and the Pacific but also to contribute significantly to scholarship, 
policymaking and advocacy in the region.
International Migration20
Chief Editor: Howard Duncan
The journal, International Migration, owned by the International Organization for Migration, publishes empirical 
research to advance scholarship and support the world’s migration policy community. This is challenging because 
policy makers often require their evidence immediately while academic research takes time, and peer review 
adds further to this time, meaning that some research is published after the policy need. Crises aside, however, 
migration is a phenomenon of longer-term trends whose patterns are often visible only over time. Academic 
researchers are in a better position to understand these trends than many policy makers who are required to 
deliver analysis and advice more quickly. Although policy making is often done with urgency, it is an inherently 
conservative business. Emerging trends identified by research can be slow to be recognized by policy, making it 
20	 Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editor’s	contribution	can	be	found	at:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2435.
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all the more important that the empirical research be done well and be peer-reviewed. The journal aims to offer 
new insights for scholars and policy makers alike and to support what is ultimately a collective endeavour to 
enhance the outcomes of migration for all.
Over the past two years, International Migration has published on a wide range of themes, breaking new ground 
and further articulating paths trodden before. In this short section, we will describe points made on selected 
themes over the course of 2015 and 2016, that is, since the publication of the IOM’s World Migration Report 
2015. For those wishing more details, we suggest going to the journal’s website. The broad themes that we will 
cover are: migration patterns, migration and development, migration governance, and data and methodology.
Migration patterns
As a migration journal, International Migration receives many articles that analyze migration patterns, going 
beyond the statistical compilations found on national and other statistical agency websites. Our authors look 
behind the data to uncover causes underlying the trends. The past few years have seen a growing interest 
in the decision processes and intentions of individuals leading to their migration; this is in marked contrast 
to the proliferation of macro analyses of push and pull factors of classical migration theory, but serves as a 
complement, not a substitution. Mendoza (2015) offered insights into emigration patterns from Mexico City 
by comparing households with and without emigrants; her logistic regression models reveal the importance of 
social networks in motivating departures. 
In looking at contemporary Kosovo, a fledgling country suffering from high levels of departures, Ivlevs and 
King noted the lack of confidence in the future of the country and its economy amongst especially those 
Albanian Kosovars with higher levels of education. Emigration aspirations have returned to levels not seen since 
before independence, a trend that may itself fuel an even greater demand to leave this struggling country. 
Cohen, Duberley and Ravishankar considered how Indian scientists employ international mobility as a career 
enhancer, a strategy that allows them gain valuable international experience while preserving cultural ties to 
India as well as their ability to return to India in a more advanced position. This helps us to understand better 
the phenomenon of multiple migration to which the late Graeme Hugo drew our attention. Weeks and Weeks 
examined the role of transnationalism in contemporary emigration from Latin America to the United States, 
going beyond the lure of better-paying jobs that support remittances to the supportive roles increasingly played 
by their homeland governments in protecting their rights while abroad and encouraging their return. Staying 
within Latin America, Silva and Massey detailed the role of violence in motivating migration out of Colombia. 
Not as straightforward as one might be tempted to imagine, violence tends to lead to emigration predominantly 
for those with higher levels of education and stronger social networks abroad. While violence can bring about a 
decision to leave, it is social capital networks that determine destinations.
Bylander took us to Cambodia to explore how actual and anticipated environmental distress motivates decisions 
to emigrate. Gerver brought the perspective of moral philosophy to voluntary repatriation, offering a careful 
normative analysis of the tension between facilitating repatriation to restore rights and ensuring that the 
repatriation is in fact voluntary. In a look at mass emigration from Lithuania, the first Soviet state to declare 
independence in 1990, Klusener et al used census and registration data to document that it is characteristics 
such as employment status, education, and prior migration experience that influence decisions to leave. The 
“new mobility” of which we often speak is revealed not only by highly skilled economic migrants moving from 
one laboratory or corporate headquarters to another but, also, by some asylum seekers who, as persons with 
full human interests, may seek more than safety. Lukić took us to Serbia to show the workings of contemporary 
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transit asylum migration. Also looking at asylum seekers’ decisions regarding destinations were McAuliffe and 
Jayasuriya, who asked 35,000 potential asylum seekers whether and why they preferred some destination 
countries over others and found Australia to be widely preferred.
We have long-surmised that higher levels of human capital increase one’s mobility, and Rodríguez-Gutiérrez and 
Canal-Domínguez showed us how foreign language skills affect people’s motivations to migrate as well as their 
choice of destination. Also looking at the motivations to move were Ozcurumez and Aker who compared the 
motives of Turks who moved to Germany with those who moved to Canada. It was more than the money, they 
discovered.
Another area of increasing attention is return migration, an ever-present but previously neglected subject owing 
to the traditional assumption that migration was largely one-way and either permanent or very long-term. But 
we now recognize that among their effects, globalization and transnationalism have yielded the “new mobility” 
which makes it easier and less costly for migrants to return home after even a relatively short period at their 
destination. For many migrants, especially the more highly-skilled, their migration intentions are for shorter 
rather than permanent stays. For some, time spent working abroad is intended to offer better fortunes at home. 
Those workers returning to their homelands, perhaps with higher skill levels than when they left, can however 
find a less-than-smooth transition to the labour market. Barcevičius (2016) explored how returning high-skilled 
Lithuanians fare back home and whether they intend to stay for long. 
The relationship between migration and development
With the international community’s focus on the relationship between migration and development and its 
concern over rising anti-immigration politics, demonstrating the benefits of migration has become a mainstream 
theme. Even the flight of refugees and asylum seekers from danger can fall into this category as shown by Vecchio 
who looked at how asylum seekers in Hong Kong take advantage of its status as a global city. Living there, even 
as an undocumented migrant, offers the advantages of global interconnections that support economic activity 
across borders, resulting in asylum seekers making net contributions to Hong Kong’s already vibrant economy.
Over the past decade, much has been made of the development benefits of remittances with calls for reducing the 
costs of sending them and suggestions for how their benefits can be enhanced. But Jawaid and Raza offered some 
prudent cautions, noting that, while remittances are generally of considerable value to homeland economies, 
under some circumstances they are seen to increase voluntary unemployment and reduce economic growth. 
Busetta, Cetorelli, and Stranges examined remitting behaviours among migrants to Italy, finding a surprising 
degree of invariance over time. The European Union has long supported the management of migration for 
development purposes. Keijzer, Héraud and Frankenhaeuser found, however, that migration policies of individual 
member states do not always reflect the EU’s position on the relationship between migration and development, 
that some member states still regard migration primarily as a domestic problem to manage unilaterally. Resende-
Santos explored the perspective of a small, low income island society and demonstrates the signal importance 
of migration and the Cape Verdean diaspora for its economy. Akçay and Demirtaş broke new ground in looking 
at the impact of remittances on energy consumption, in a case study that further articulates the details of how 
remittances are actually used. 
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Migration governance
With the pronounced entry of the international community into the global migration discussion and especially 
with the launch of the process to establish a Global Compact on migration and a Global Compact for refugees, 
the governance of migration has taken centre stage and is beginning to command the attention of academic 
researchers. Emerging squarely from the discussions is the fact that governance has become a multi-sectoral affair, 
with not only governments at all levels participating but doing so alongside many other actors including NGOs, 
the business community and other employers, the education sector, and arguably, the migrant smuggling and 
trafficking industries. In 2015, we devoted two special sections to the role of NGOs, one explicitly on democratic 
governance and the other on the play of interests regarding those with and those without legal authorization 
to be in our countries and to receive the services and entitlements of the state. Rother collected four articles 
that examine the concept of democracy through some of the challenges that contemporary migration presents 
to it. These challenges include the expanding concept of citizenship, the particularities of democratization of 
some of the Arab states since the 2011 uprisings, the growing awareness of the precarious nature of residence 
and work for many of the world’s migrants, and a careful look at migration governance within the ASEAN group 
of states. Throughout these articles, we find the central role that civil society plays in the debates together 
with expressions of how these roles are a force for further democratization. Bearup examined the role of NGOs 
in the area of the reintegration of trafficked persons, focusing on Cambodia, and offering less-than-encouraging 
findings.
The second collection of articles, edited by Castañeda and Yarris, looked at assessments of the deservingness 
of different groups of migrants by state authorities. As the discussion of migration hardens in many societies, 
so too do the distinctions between those with and without documented authorizations to reside, work, attend 
school, and receive health and social services; and we see a similar hardening of distinctions even among those 
with legal authorization according to whether they are economic migrants or refugees. These articles considered 
the Roma in Germany, Karen refugees in California, unauthorized migrants in Israel, and day labourers in the 
United States. We see challenges to the exercise and the principles of democracy as well as the role that civil 
society plays regarding the interests of vulnerable migrants.
For many national administrations, the ultimate but often elusive goal is managed migration, with the numbers 
of arrivals per year and their human capital characteristics matching labour market needs and the capacity of a 
society to welcome and integrate them. Emilsson looked at the effect of Sweden’s 2008 labour-migration policy 
change wherein most state control was abandoned and an employer-led selection was introduced. The UK has 
been eyeing reduced net migration targets for a number of years now, and Cangiano explained the surprising 
level of difficulty encountered in managing migration to these sorts of target. Hofmann, Carboni, Mitchneck, 
and Kuznetsov explored how economic and socio-political objectives vie for dominance in attempts by Russia, 
now with one of the world’s largest migration stocks, to manage the inflows of people from some former Soviet 
states. 
Australia and Canada have commanded attention for many years owing to their points-based systems for 
managing the selection of skilled worker permanent residents. Picot, Hou and Qiu looked at the recent income 
performance of those selected to come to Canada through its celebrated points system, which favours high 
human capital. Although they found that those selected in this way fare better than others, they also found 
that a good amount of patience is required by both the migrants and those who administer the policy. Australia 
has long been Canada’s main competitor in the selection system contest, with both countries continually 
refining their systems for ever greater advantage. Islam and Parasnis offered the results of their study into 
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which of the immigrants’ human capital characteristics are currently best rewarded in the Australian labour 
market. The American model of immigration policy making with sole central government authority over the 
entry of immigrants without direct subnational input has not served subnational US interests well, according 
to Thangasamy. This model has been inefficient in meeting labour and population needs in the US states. 
His article considered the problem of sole central government immigrant entry policy making in the US and 
examined alternative models from Canada and Australia for adoption in the US context.
The world would be a simpler place if all migration were regular and for the circulation of the world’s talent. 
But such is far from the case. The complexities of managing asylum-seeking have risen to the top of the agenda. 
One way of attempting to manage asylum-seeking has been through agreements with countries of origin on 
returns, both voluntary and forced. Janmyr looked at the effectiveness of Norway’s agreements with Iraq and 
Ethiopia and found them wanting. As complex as asylum policy is, so too are the economics of providing asylum. 
Surijakumaran and Tamura did us a service by offering explanations of the econometrics of asylum provision 
in ways that the rest of us can hope to understand. The new mobility is revealed not only by highly skilled 
economic migrants moving from one laboratory or corporate headquarters to another but, as well, by some 
asylum seekers who, as persons with full human interests, often seek more than safety. Lukić took us to Serbia 
to show the workings of contemporary transit asylum migration. 
Managing migration is also not only about managing entry; managing exit is the pre-occupation of many states, 
especially of developing societies. Concerned about the number of women leaving for employment as domestic 
workers in countries not well-known for protecting their interests and concerned about the well-being of their 
children left behind, Sri Lanka introduced measures to restrict this type of emigration. Although the numbers 
of emigres has declined, Weeraratne described how many have chosen to skirt the new regulations by using 
irregular means of migrating and thereby subjecting themselves to greater vulnerabilities in their countries of 
destination.
And it is not only governments at national and local level that are involved. Supra-national governance was the 
target in Šalamon’s look at the asylum systems of the Western Balkan states that are unable to achieve what 
the European Union expects with regard to such basic matters as identifying and registering asylum seekers and 
carrying out refugee status determination. Also with regard to supra-national governance, Gülzau, Mau, and 
Zaun compared the visa policies of the members of such regional authorities as the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, and 
others, finding, perhaps unsurprisingly, no small degree of divergence. And Recchi looked at what he calls the 
“citizenship gap” in the EU, comparing, indeed contrasting, the life chances of immigrants and nationals that 
persist regardless of integration policy.
Data and methodology
One expects methodological advances in an academic journal and International Migration is no exception. Caselli 
showed us how one Italian think tank has dealt with the elusive matter of defining and measuring immigrant 
integration. In August 2015, we offered five articles on data collection and analysis, articles that confront 
the “appalling state of migration data” and lead the way to a better state of affairs through innovations in 
collection, estimations, analysis, and practical applications.
Gold et al offered a remarkable innovation in ascertaining refugee populations, one that was borrowed from a 
way of estimating wildlife populations. The capture-recapture approach to estimating populations was applied 
to refugees in smaller geographical locales, and they demonstrated how this method can be used by local 
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authorities to allocate resources to refugees. Makaryan, noting the many alternative methods for estimating 
migrant populations, considered the special problems in so doing in developing countries, specifically 15 states 
of the former Soviet Union. She noted the variety of definition of ‘migrant’ used and the attendant ambiguities 
that this lends the data, the failure of censuses to capture temporary migrants, and the provisional value of 
household surveys in measuring migration. Moses responded to the state of migration data by launching EMIG 
1.2: A global time series of annual emigration flows, an open-source database that is in its early stages of 
development but yet already offers significant potential to enhance our understanding of emigration should 
the global migration community participate in further developing the database. Analyses of the data to date 
confirm that not only are migration rates lower now than they were early in the twentieth century, they have 
been falling since 1994, something that took many of us by surprise. Bailey and Lau turned our attention to 
Hong Kong which has undergone a major shift in migration since the re-unification with China which has led to 
a highly dynamic two-way flow of workers, students, and settlers. They proposed a new method for categorizing 
and measuring flows as well as new institutional mechanisms to co-ordinate data collection with policy making. 
With the increased attention being given to Turkey as a result of the refugee crisis in that region, we welcomed 
Tolay taking us through the development of a new field of scholarship that looks at migration to Turkey, noting 
its academic strengths and relative weaknesses and pointing to directions that future research in the area ought 
to take. 
Throughout the two years that we are covering here, International Migration published on many other topics 
including immigrant integration where, for example, Fokkema and de Haas gave us the results of an extensive 
study on the determinants of socio-cultural integration, at the political participation of immigrants, the 
role of entrepreneurship in integration, the role that cities are playing, what some academics refer to as the 
securitization of migration, transnationalism, student migration, among others. This brief section of the WMR 
2018 hopes only to indicate some of the areas on which we published. But this is no substitute for reading the 
articles themselves.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies21 
Chief Editor: Paul Statham
The Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies is known to most academics and practitioners simply as “JEMS”. 
JEMS entered her 43rd year of publication in 2017 and so is one of the longest standing international academic 
journals as well as one of the leading and highest ranking ones. Like the study of migration, the journal has 
transformed and expanded massively, especially over the last 20 years, as issues of migration have moved from 
the relative margins to the core of politics and global societal change. This is not to say that migration and 
ethnic relations are more important today than before, but issues about movement, mobility, and the increasing 
cultural and ethnic diversity this brings are now seen as important challenges to states, legal systems and how 
people live with one another. Migration as a topic has become an important interpretive lens through which 
societies and people understand the core changes that they are experiencing as a consequence of globalization. 
This can be ‘for good’, for example, in public mobilizations to support refugees and people displaced from their 
homes by international conflicts, or ‘for bad’ in the reactionary populist politics that attempts to justify anti-
immigration policies by stigmatising ‘groups’ on religious, ethnic or racial grounds, such as ‘Muslim bans’ and 
‘Building Walls’. Here is not the place to explore these important topics, but JEMS is a forum where academics 
21	 Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editor’s	contribution	can	be	found	at:	http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjms20/current.	
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do precisely that. As the editor of JEMS, I see the journal as the space where academics and those practitioners 
who have a foothold in the academic world can put out their original research findings on the crucial issues 
about migration in the world to their peers, in order to advance knowledge by stimulating scrutiny, responses 
and debate. Although JEMS is primarily a forum for publishing original academic research and inquiry, we make 
great efforts to publicise our articles and their core points to broader audiences, not least through social media 
(twitter and facebook). In this way, the cutting-edge research on migration of the day has the chance to be 
picked up, resonate and inform other public forums for policy, NGO, and media debates.
In 2017, JEMS will publish 16 issues, or approximately 160 articles of 9000 words each of original research in 
the field of migration and ethnic relations. Each published article has undergone double-blind peer review, 
which basically means that reviewers don’t know the authors and vice versa. We have an acceptance rate of 
about 20% that remains pretty much constant. This gives an idea of the industrial-scale of academic production 
and reviewing (all undertaken voluntarily by academics) that we manage as an academic editorial team working 
with colleagues at the publisher Taylor and Francis. It also gives an idea of the sheer quantity of academic 
research that is being undertaken in response to the high social relevance of migration issues in the world 
today. Our reason for publishing so much is that we want academic research to be out in the public domain 
so that it has the chance to inform public understandings. The findings of original academic research can give 
legitimacy to claims by lobbyists and politicians, and contribute to debunking ‘false’ claims, but to do this they 
need to be publicly visible and on record. At JEMS we think the best way to serve the academic community is 
to make research visible. Our reviewing standards are thorough and our publication threshold is relatively high 
compared to many journals, but at JEMS we aim to be ‘quick’, so that published findings address contemporary 
debates. Accepted articles are published online within a month and usually are in print within six months. So 
our prodigious volume is a result of our policy of ‘getting high quality academic research on migration out into 
the public domain quickly’, so that it has a chance to influence how we see the world. Given the current state of 
the world, there is no sign of academic curiosity waning on migration, at least when judged by the burgeoning 
number of submissions we receive. In the last three years the amount of submissions has risen by about a 
third. Our agreement with the publisher is that we try to publish as much research per annum that crosses our 
threshold – building up a backlog serves no one. 
JEMS is perhaps the broadest of the international academic journals in the field when judged by its topical, 
geographical and disciplinary coverage. We are disciplinary ‘pluralists’ within the social sciences, drawing research 
from sociology, political science, development studies, human geography, anthropology and demography. Simply 
put, our main criterion is ‘high quality’ that is judged by peer assessment with our editorial team playing a 
hands-on ‘gatekeeper’ role. We aim to publish high quality research on migration and ethnic relations that can 
come in any shape or form. We are happy to include research on important niche topics, such as ethnographies 
on rural migrants in remote parts of the world, as well as controversial but highly resonant articles, such as 
an article on religious fundamental Islam in Europe, a six country empirically-based comparison published in 
2015 that over two years has been downloaded more than 13000 times. We are pleased to embrace systematic 
research based on empirical analysis of large data-sets and small ‘n’ qualitative studies, as well as studies that 
apply a combination of approaches and methods. Finally, we are comfortable with contributions that advance 
theoretical understanding as well as those that target specific policy domains.  
While five years ago, I think it is fair to say that the journal was primarily ‘European’ in focus, we have made 
concerted efforts in recent years to engage more directly with scholars in North America (those working on 
the US as well as on Europe), and arguably more importantly, encourage academics from Asia and Africa to see 
JEMS as a forum for their debates. Again this reflects the important changes in the world that are driven by 
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migration. If there have been 240 Million internal migrants within China over the last decade, surely this needs 
to be something that the migration academic community is engaging with? In a modest way, we hope that 
greater exchanges across continents may take us as academics out of our silos and comfort zones and thereby 
challenge some of the accepted ‘truths’ that permeate our understandings. Many understandings of migration 
and ethnic relations are drawn from the experiences of South to North migration in the post war era and written 
by scholars from receiving countries. In an era of globalization processes, of which migration is both a driver 
and outcome, it is important to join up the processes that link different world regions, but also to acknowledge 
that ‘one size may not fit all’ and that some perspectives that aspired to be of ‘general’ application may actually 
be bound by context and time. Is it really the case that discussions about ‘multiculturalism’, citizenship and 
(“super”) diversity in Singapore and Hong Kong should take their cue from knowledge generated about Canada 
or European countries? Or are they distinct, and if so, how and why?         
In JEMS we publish stand-alone articles of original research and then each year a number of Special Issues that 
are ‘guest edited’ by academics who bring together a number of colleagues to produce a relatively integrated 
collection over a specific key theme or topic on migration. The guest editors manage the first round of review 
and we on the editorial team review the collection with the aid of an external review. Special Issue proposals 
are selected from responses to a competitive call that runs twice a year. Those published and in the pipeline 
from 2015 onwards reflect the broad range of topics and disciplines that characterise the journal. We have 
contributions that address migration, mobility and cultural diversity with regard to: the transformation of Asia-
Pacific cities; the global economic crisis and recession; superdiverse cities as places where migrants mobilize; 
EU and European migration governance; Gulf ‘subjectivities’ as migrants; comparative research on Muslims and 
Islam in liberal democracies; ageing as a migrant; high skilled migration between the global North and South; 
the IOM as an organization; international academic mobility; new perspectives on the ‘migration industries’; 
aspirations to migrate; undocumented and unaccompanied children; diaspora policies and mobilization; Asian 
cultures of education; sustainable development and gender; explaining attitudes to immigration; highly skilled 
migration to the Gulf; care and medical migration; transnational migrations between Europe and Thailand; 
migration ‘brokerage’; strategic citizenship; global smuggling; and circular and return migration to Afghanistan. 
A final feature of JEMS is that we hold a day-long Conference each year where a keynote and other leading 
figures from across the disciplines are invited to present their research. The Conference is free and open to attend 
and hosted by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR) at the University of Sussex which serves as the 
mothership for JEMS and is the institutional location of the core in-house academic members of the editorial 
team: Paul Statham (me), James Hampshire, Laura Morosanu, and Sarah Scuzzarello. The idea of the Conference 
is to serve as a reminder that academic engagement does not only take place via email and electronically, but 
sometimes requires a physical space where people can meet and critically exchange. More than 200 people have 
attended the last two conferences, including students and practitioners, and our keynotes over the last years 
have been Rogers Brubaker, Richard Alba, Irene Bloemraad and Roger Waldinger.
You can find out more about our annual conference at www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/seminars/conferences and 
JEMS on Facebook at www.facebook.com/scmrjems and on Twitter @scmrjems as well as the journal website 
www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20.
330 Appendices
Journal of Refugee Studies22 
Chief Editor: Khalid Koser
This year is the 30th anniversary of the Journal of Refugee Studies; and its core focus has never been more 
relevant. There are more refugees today than at any time since the Journal began: according to the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees there were 21.3 million refugees at the end of 2016, including 
5.2 million Palestinians. While the world’s attention over the last few years has been on refugee flows to 
Europe in particular from Syria, in fact this is a global crisis: 53 percent of the world’s refugees came from 
three countries, Syria (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), and Somalia (1.1. million); and some 85 
percent of the world’s refugees are settled in poorer countries. Even the majority of Syrian refugees are not 
in Europe, but in neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. 
Refugees are also encountering new challenges: an increasing proportion is in protracted situations without 
any realistic prospect of a durable solution, and more are relocating to urban settings where it is harder to 
protect and assist them. While refugees have always suffered discrimination, this is perhaps more systematic 
today than ever before, with more restrictions on refugees, a number of leaders for the first time suggesting 
an explicit link between refugee flows and the risk of violent extremism and terrorism; and a rising incidence 
of xenophobic attacks on refugees. More positively, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
potentially paves the way for significant reform of the international refugee regime and response.
As a result, the Journal of Refugee Studies is flourishing, attracting record highs of quality submissions from 
a widening range of disciplines and from all over the world, and doubling its impact factor over the last two 
years. But part of this success is not just the new relevance of refugees in global political, media and popular 
discourse, but also that the Journal has begun to diversify away from a sharp focus on refugees in recent 
years, to include a wider set of ‘forced migrants’.
A growing proportion of submissions and published articles do not focus exclusively or explicitly on refugees (in 
contrast to migrants, there is a clear legal definition of a ‘refugee’ in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, stipulating individual experience or risk of persecution by the State and departure from the home 
country). Submissions from mainly Europe-based scholars over the last few years, for example, have increasingly been 
concerned with asylum seekers – that is individuals claiming to be refugees but who in many cases are found not to 
satisfy the quite strict criteria defining a refugee. Some of these asylum seekers receive some form of ‘complementary 
protection’, acknowledging that they are not refugees, but that it may still be unsafe for them to return home. Others 
are rejected outright, and may be subject to deportation; and on the whole these are people moving for largely 
economic reasons, but pretending to be fleeing persecution as a means to access industrialized countries. 
In contrast, many US-based scholars have submitted articles on refugees permanently resettled to the US – 
until the recent and it is to be hoped temporary ban on refugee resettlement the US has resettled by far the 
highest number of refugees worldwide. Yet arguably resettled refugees have more in common with citizens 
than with other refugees: while they may certainly endure life-long trauma as a result of their experiences, 
most have a pathway to citizenship in rich countries, and enjoy the full rights of citizens; and many go on to 
be very successful. A study of resettled refugees would likely be as pertinent for a journal on citizenship or 
entrepreneurship as for a journal on refugees. 
22	 Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editor’s	contribution	can	be	found	at:	https://academic.oup.com/jrs.	
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Similarly articles on the experiences of people after they repatriate to their homes having once been refugees are 
not strictly about refugees. In other ways too, the people included in articles published by the Journal of Refugee 
Studies may not be defined as refugees; for example there has been significant attention to internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) – forced from their homes but not living outside their country; as well as to people who have fled 
their countries, but mainly as a result of the effects of environmental change, not conflict or persecution.
Although there have been some vigorous debates in the pages of the Journal of Refugee Studies about the risk of 
‘mission creep’, especially regarding coverage of IDPs, most scholars would today accept that asylum seekers, IDPs, 
and resettled and returning refugees comfortably fall within the broad scope of ‘refugee studies’, and tend to be a 
better fit here than for example in journals on migration. There are at the same time populations and experiences 
for whom this is a harder call. For example most articles on the victims of human trafficking are submitted to and 
published by migration journals (as well as various disciplinary journals), yet many have been forced from their 
homes and moved involuntarily, just like refugees, and perhaps have assistance and protection needs akin to those 
of refugees. What is more, at least some refugees (and IDPs) may also become victims of trafficking.
The diversification of populations included in the Journal of Refugee Studies reflects three new realities in 
particular. The first is that the reasons that people flee their homes and countries today are not always 
the same as they were when the 1951 Convention was drafted. Many people flee to get out of harm’s way 
rather than because of a direct individual threat; many flee persecution by non-State actors (like Da’esh); 
many cannot make it out of their own countries but still need the support of the international community. 
The second is that the distinctions between people moving for economic reasons (migrants) and political 
reasons (refugees), on which the international legal, normative and institutional framework is still based, are 
no longer easily discernible or necessarily relevant. Most people move for mixed motivations: the underlying 
cause for a refugee to flee may be political, for example conflict or persecution, but the precipitant factor 
may be economic, for example losing a job, or social for example losing access to education or healthcare. 
Third, increasingly people moving for largely different reasons often move together in ‘mixed migration’: 
asylum flows to Europe often combine people fleeing persecution (refugees), people moving in response to 
the effects of environmental change (who might receive ‘complementary protection’), and economic migrants 
taking advantage of the asylum system.
These realities impact as much on migration as refugee journals. The challenge for the editors of these journals 
is to maintain their core focus and audience, while also adapting to changing circumstances and as far as 
possible avoiding overlap or competition. This new initiative by IOM’s World Migration Report to include short 
contributions from various of these journals provides a unique forum to compare notes, and forward our joint 
agenda to promote critical scholarship and informed policy and practice on migration and refugees.
Mobilities23 
Chief Editors: Kevin Hannam, Mimi Sheller and David Tyfield 
The concept of mobilities has been developed, particularly in the journal Mobilities but also elsewhere in the 
humanities and social sciences to theorise and analyse the diverse connections between different forms and 
practices of mobility. One constituent element of mobility is, of course, migration. The journal Mobilities differs 
23	 	Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editors’	contribution	can	be	found	at:	http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rmob20/current.	
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from mainstream journals of migration in that it aims to provide a platform for studies of the large-scale 
movements of people, objects, capital, and information across the world, as well as more local processes of daily 
transportation, movement through public and private space and the travel of material objects in everyday life. 
It highlights how, for example, new transportation and digital infrastructures and innovations in social and 
cultural practices pose important challenges for co-ordinating and governing mobilities and for mobility rights 
and questions of access. Thus it promotes critical thinking about mobility practices and their inequalities as 
well as developing new theorisations of multiple forms of mobility which may be embodied, representational 
and/or infrastructural (on the latter see Burrell, 2016). 
In this short review we wish to highlight some of the key developments in terms of mobilities research in 
relation to migration practices over the past two years as published in the journal Mobilities. To begin with we 
note some of the special issues related to reconceptualising migration that have been published in the journal 
Mobilities to exemplify the diversity of approaches needed to take the study of migration forward. Next, we 
focus on recent analyses of empirical data relating to different forms of mobile migration in terms of crossing 
borders, physically and metaphorically. Finally, we look ahead and conclude by reflecting briefly upon the 
current processes of geopolitical re-bordering that may lead to increased inequalities and immobilities. 
Theorising Mobilities and Migration Practices
In their special issue of the Mobilities journal Paul Basu and Simon Coleman (2008), highlighted the connections 
between migration and materiality. They argued that “while much scholarly work exists on both migration 
and material culture, there is remarkably little literature explicitly concerned with how these areas of study 
converge” p. 313. They theorise the reframing of migration into some areas of concern that have been of long-
standing importance within anthropology (the gift, temporality, translation), which have not necessarily been 
those raised most frequently in relation to migration studies. Focussing on the inter-relations between love, 
sexuality and migration in terms of theorising multiple mobilities, Nicola Mai and Russell King (2009, p. 295), 
meanwhile, attempted to map figuratively and empirically some of the key issues that are “informed by a variety 
of emotional, affective and sexual liaisons, attachments and expectations, which can be powerful and necessary 
motivations for mobility and for the risks taken in crossing boundaries.” They argued for both a ‘sexual turn’ and 
an ‘emotional turn’ in mobility studies to better understand the nuances of contemporary migration practices. 
Similarly, in their introduction to the special issue on Mobilities and Forced Migration, Nick Gill, Javier Caletrio 
and Victoria Mason, (2011, p. 301) noted that, “[w]hether precipitated by political or environmental factors, 
human displacement can be more fully understood by attending to the ways in which a set of bodily, material, 
imagined and virtual mobilities and immobilities interact to produce population movement.”
Crossing borders
In the recent collated special issue of Mobilities entitled Crossing Borders published in 2016, we brought together 
a number of papers that critically analysed migration practices from a mobilities perspective. Paolo Boccagni, 
Jean-Michel Lafleur and Peggy Levitt (2016), “propose that processes such as circulation, portability, and 
contact, viewed through a transnational optic, help to nuance recent research on political transnationalism.” 
Hence, they argue that: 
As the boundaries of politics shift, we need new ways to conceptualize, study, and 
evaluate political processes that cross, intersect, and challenge national borders. It is 
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not just the migration of bodies that causes individuals, communities, and nations to 
define themselves as transnationally constituted. The circulation of people is intimately 
connected to the circulation of political ideas, practices, and projects. Therefore, we need 
strategies for understanding politics in motion: how political participation and institutions 
change and are changed by the concomitant circulation not only of political beings, but 
ideas, values, skills, and projects as well. We need ways of conceptualizing the spaces 
and places in which this circulation takes shape and ways to evalwuate its impact on 
political institutions and arrangements. (Boccagni, Lafleur and Levitt, 2016, p.445). 
In one example of this kind of in depth analysis of mobility, Philipp Schröder and Manja Stephan-Emmrich 
(2016, p. 420) present “in-depth case studies which explore how Central Asians engage in ‘business-making’, 
‘evolve’ their Muslim piety, transgress rural–urban boundaries and experience ethnic marginalization in 
between ‘home’ and cities in Russia, China or Egypt.” They emphasise how mobility practices such as migration 
can become ‘institutionalised’ as a learnt behaviour across Central Asia in a variety of contexts. 
Marcu’s (2016) research into EU mobilities, meanwhile, focuses on how migrants from Eastern Europe learn about 
mobility practices as relatively new citizens of Europe by engaging with borders. She analyses the experiences of 
Eastern Europeans engaged in labour mobility in Spain, in order to understand how EU enlargement has influenced 
the mobilities of these citizens and the ways in which they interpret cross-border practices. Importantly, she 
analyses whether borders can be seen as an “instrument for learning mobility or as an obstacle to current human 
mobility” (p. 344). For these migrants, she argues, “the border between the former and the current country of 
residence is not situated around their lives, but has moved to the centre of their lifeworld” (p. 354). 
Szewczyk (2016) further argues that aspirant Polish migrants have sought a variety of different strategies 
including obtaining British citizenship and British passports, in order to enhance their motility and potential 
ability to migrate outside of Europe. She highlights the possibility of a go-stop-go mobility, a stepped approach 
to (global) citizenship, which she argues, “is a key feature of the new elite cohort of young European graduates, 
who use their European citizenship to obtain an alternative citizenship that acts as a passport literally and 
metaphorically to mobility beyond Europe” (p. 362). 
Conclusions
Whilst the previous examples demonstrate how mobility and migration can be learnt and institutionalised 
through processes of de-bordering, borders have become a highly politically charged contemporary topic that 
call into question conventional analyses of migration through re-bordering. The political debates over the 
reception of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan within Europe; the popular vote in favour of the UK to leave 
the European Union – ‘Brexit’; and the proposed building of a wall between the USA and Mexico all testify 
to new physical and symbolic processes of re-bordering. It has been recognised that borders are “not merely 
empirical phenomena, but are used and constructed and opened and closed depending on who crosses them 
and on how contentious they become in political debates” (Scuzzarello and Kinnvall, 2013, p. 93). 
Since September 2015 the mobility of refugees and/or migrants has entered centre stage in terms of the 
geopolitics between Western Europe and Eastern Europe with Central Europe being re-imagined as a space 
of transit for those seeking a new life away from the fragility of becoming human in Syria, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. The reception has been polarised between those that welcomed these new arrivals and those that 
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expected their government to enforce the borders and prevent so called abuse of the EU’s system of asylum. 
Meanwhile, with a significant number of ageing British migrants resident abroad in the EU, processes of re-
bordering could become a long-term and a significant issue as many rely on reciprocal health agreements. 
The popular vote in favour of Brexit in the UK (although not in Scotland) has been seen to be a reflection of UK 
citizens being worried about too much immigration, and, in particular, the wrong type of immigration. Much of 
this sentiment was developed by the media who have emphasised the economic impact that potential migrants 
might have on UK taxpayers (Vollmer, 2017). A passport literally signifies the ability to move across national 
boundaries unhindered but with Brexit this ability to move will lead to new real and perceived frictions of 
travel where border crossings are slowed and the movement of people and things become more regulated and 
subject to surveillance and sorting (Adey, 2002). Finally, it remains to be seen how the building of a wall 
between the USA and Mexico will lead to new practices of engagement with this border.
Population, Space and Place24
Chief Editors: Allan M. Findlay, Clara H. Mulder and Darren P. Smith
Migration and changing population geographies in a time of flux
In terms of the total number of published papers, migration is a prevalent focus of interest in Population, Space 
and Place. Papers cover both international migration and internal mobility. Some researchers even question the 
validity of distinguishing the two terms, given the complexity of contemporary human mobility, and also given 
the common drivers that underpin many human movements and displacements (Hickey & Yeoh, 2016; see also 
Hugo, 2016). The content of recent research papers in Population, Space and Place reflects the extraordinary 
times in which we live, in terms of issues such as refugee flows (Van Houte et al., 2015), migration and climate 
change (de Campos, 2016), migration responses to global recession (Vargas-Silva, 2016), and the upsurge in 
international student mobility (Frandberg, 2015; Tan & Hugo, 2016). 
Any reader of the journal will notice, however, that migration research published by Population, Space and 
Place is distinctive. This is because of our focus on migration as a key dimension of population geography and 
geographical population studies (Findlay & Mulder, 2015). It is in relation to this rather specific canvas that 
we explore five themes that illuminate the significant scholarly advances that have been achieved by authors 
publishing in our journal. We commence by reviewing some conceptual advances, before turning to research 
on the act of migration itself, the consequences of migration for particular people, issues relating to social 
segregation, and, finally, transnational perspectives.
(Re)conceptualising migration
Population geographers are interested in the multiple contexts of space, place and demography. Arguably the 
most important conceptual advance has been the recognition that human mobilities (including many kinds 
of migration) are relational. For researchers this has meant that migration is no longer viewed as an isolated 
‘event’ driven by an individual decision-maker. Instead, there has been increasing recognition of human 
movement being relational, linking lives over time(s) and space(s). It is relational between the linked lives 
24	 Articles	cited	in	the	journal	editors’	contribution	can	be	found	at:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1544-8452.	
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of people who share a household and who may move together (van Bochove et al., 2015). It is also relational 
between movers and non-movers (for example between parents who migrate internationally for work and their 
children often left behind with their grandparents (Murphy et al., 2016), or between immigrants arriving in 
a community and non-movers living in the same community and adjusting their lives to the impact of new 
arrivals (Phillips & Robinson, 2015). And it is relational between migrants and those with power to enable 
and/or to block mobility (for example those allocating housing to new arrivals), or those who govern migration 
policy and who establish which people have permission to stay and who must return to their place of origin 
(Lietaert et al., 2015). 
An attempt to offer a wider conceptual framework bringing order to diverse migration studies is provided 
by Findlay et al. (2015: 394) who suggest a three-level schema for interpreting changes in migration and 
other human mobilities over time. At one level more fluid lifecourses and longer lifespans have produced 
changes in the human mobilities of individuals and linked lives within households (Coulter et al., 2016). 
Second, structural influences such as those operating in globalising labour markets (Visser, 2016) or segmented 
housing markets have produced distinctive ‘period effects’ in human mobility (Vargas-Silva, 2016). Third, the 
embedded nature of people’s lives in regional, national and global space-time transformations have produced 
long term shifts in many aspects of human mobility. This has been in relation to forces as varied as the upturn 
in secular rootedness (Champion et al., 2016a), and the impact on youth mobility of the UK government’s 
policy to expand Higher Education opportunities (Champion et al., 2016b). 
Two key points arise from this discussion of conceptual advances in migration research. These are, first, that 
knowledges of mobility should be based on the recognition of migration as a relational practice, and, second, 
that migration should be regarded as a key mechanism that inescapably shapes all human geographies, both 
of movers and non-movers (Jons, 2015).  
The act of migration
A major research focus in Population, Space and Place is describing and explaining the act of migration itself, 
either in terms of aggregate migration flows or in terms of behaviour of individuals. Measuring migration is 
not always straightforward, and Bell et al. (2015) describe the worldwide variation in measurement of internal 
migration flows (within a country). Sander and Bell (2016) show how migration flows can be disentangled 
along the lines of age, period and birth cohorts (generations born in the same time). Most other work goes into 
much more detail with regard to how migration is related to individual characteristics. While some of this work 
aims to explain the likelihood of moving in general (Thomas et al., 2016), most articles have a more specific 
focus. Various articles are concerned with specific migration destinations, such as rural areas (Eimermann, 
2015; Stockdale, 2016). Other articles concentrate on specific population categories, such as parents and their 
children (Bennett et al., 2015), doctoral students (Pásztor, 2015) and older people (Marjavaara & Lundholm, 
2016). Yet, other articles focus on specific types of migration, such as return migration (Amcoff & Niedomysl, 
2015; Erdal et al., 2016; Model, 2016), onward migration to a third country (Ahrens et al., 2016) or temporary 
migration (Zander et al., 2016). There are also studies on what motivates people to move (Clark & Maas, 2015; 
Coulter & Scott, 2015; Vilhelmson & Thulin, 2015), and one study focuses on migration decision-making (Baláž 
et al., 2016).
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The consequences of migration
If one thing becomes clear from the contributions to Population, Space and Place published in 2015 and 
2016, it is that migration has numerous individual and societal consequences. While migration is generally 
beneficial to individuals in the sense of labour-market outcomes, labour migrants in some contexts are 
vulnerable and affected by labour policies and the economy in host countries (Maher & Cawley, 2016) or suffer 
from discrimination (Wang et al., 2015). For the case of return migration to Afghanistan, Van Houte et al. 
(2015) argue that migration reinforced existing socio-economic stratification rather than change it. And even 
though highly-skilled migrants likely experience important positive consequences of their move, they also 
face considerable risks (Bradatan 2016, and other papers in the Special Issue on highly-skilled migrants to 
which her article forms the introduction). Kveder and Beauchemin (2015) describe how migration experience 
is associated with investments in real estate and business assets in the home country. Other articles focus on 
the impact of migration on social networks (Newbold et al., 2015), mortality (Mberu & Mutua, 2015; Zarulli, 
2016) or health and well-being (Murphy et al., 2016).
Segregation by migration
Internal and international migration flows into, within and between, and out of neighbourhoods are key 
constituents of contemporary population geographies of segregation.  Numerous recent papers in Population, 
Space and Place have highlighted the ways in which diverse forms of migration are (re)producing socio-spatial 
segregation, as well as underpinning the formation of new spatialities of segregation.  With a prevalent 
focus on dynamic ethnic compositions in local neighbourhoods, recent research papers have shown a growing 
diversification of (non)segregated neighbourhoods (Johnston et al., 2016), some increasing levels of social and 
spatial mixing (Catney, 2016), and evidence of inter-ethnic coexistence fuelled by immigration (Kohlbacher 
et al., 2015).  Differential factors here include the effects of key axes of social difference (e.g. religion, 
ethnicity, culture, social class) based, for example, on differences between countrywide and specific regional 
places of origin (Aradhya et al., 2016), and divisions tied to rural and urban migrant identities (Wang et 
al., 2017).  Compelling evidence has revealed how and why segregation is perpetuated via self-selective/
elective in-migration (Zucotti & Platt, 2016), as well as segregation that is reproduced through immobility/
non-migration linked to anchored senses of local attachment to people and places, such as familiarity, social 
ties and neighbourliness (Fong & Hou, 2015; Clark et al., 2015; Holton, 2015).  Key here are subsequent inter-
generational effects of immigrant social groups that either ‘stay put’ in particular segregated neighbourhoods 
and / or become socially mobile, in situ, within those neighbourhoods (Goodwin-White, 2016), or move into 
to different segregated (and diverse) neighbourhoods (Gustafsson et al., 2016). Other recent papers illuminate 
how socio-spatial segregation extends beyond residential spheres to distinct public spaces for social and 
recreational interactions (Neal et al., 2015), and increasingly within occupational/work spaces (Gandini & 
Lozano-Ascencio, 2015).
Transnational Perspectives
Researchers have a long history of studying transnationalism and its transformative effects on localities 
and regions of origin and destination (Fauser et al, 2016). Recent research has added a new dimension by 
showing the powerful connectivities between different kinds of mobilities (Janta et al., 2015). In particular 
transnational migration has been shown to be a precursor to lots of short-term mobilities involving migrants 
visiting friends and family in their region of origin as well as flows in the other direction of families visiting 
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migrants living in transnational communities in other parts of the world. Research (Humbracht, 2015) shows 
that these visitor mobilities are not just about tourism, but that they also are important in the provision of 
care, the affirmation of identities and also the maintenance of rights (e.g. territorial rights). 
Another emergent research topic is transnational social protection (Faist, 2015). Migrants have different 
strategies to offer informal social protection to their family living in other countries. Their social practices 
have been shown to be critical process in the production of new social and geographical inequalities. This 
raises many questions about the implications of social protection for the life chances of migrants and their 
families living in other countries.    
Conclusion
Clearly, scholars in the fields of population geography and geographical population studies who publish in 
Population, Space and Place have a broad interest in migration and its causes and consequences. This broad 
interest becomes manifest in a wide variety of research, ranging from conceptual explorations via analyses of 
large-scale datasets, and research employing experimental methods to research employing qualitative methods 
such as in-depth interviews.  Recent research papers clearly highlight the important and diverse ways that 
contemporary migration processes and outcomes are (re)shaping population geographies across the globe in 
extraordinary ways.
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Chapter 5
Appendix A. Definitions 
Definitions are organized by first word alphabetical order.
---
Customary International Law
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) identifies key sources of international law. 
These are: 
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.1 
The ICJ’s case law, including in particular the North Sea Continental Shelf case, provides further guidance on 
customary international law (CIL) and its content.2 
Global Governance 
One definition of global governance suggests it can be defined in either procedural or substantive terms:
On a procedural level, it can be understood as the process by which states engage 
in collective action to address common problems arising around a particular issue. 
This process involves agenda-setting, negotiations, monitoring, implementation, and 
enforcement. On a substantive level, global governance is identifiable by the norms, rules, 
principles, and decision-making procedures that regulate the behaviour of states (and 
other transnational actors) in a particular issue area.3 
Organized Criminal Group 
Article 2 of the UNCTOC defines “Organized criminal group” as:
A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established 
in accordance with the Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit.
1	 Emphasis	added.	For	the	full	article,	please	see	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice,	available	at:	www.icj-cij.org/en/
statute	(accessed:	18	July	2017).	
2	 North	Sea	Continental	Shelf	(Federal	Republic	of	Germany	v.	Denmark),	1969.	
3	 Betts,	2011.	See	also	Krasner,	1983,	for	a	definition	of	“regime”,	which	is	incorporated	into	the	above.	
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Smuggling of Migrants 
Article 3(a) of the Smuggling Protocol defines “smuggling of migrants” as: 
The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident. 
Articles 3(b) and (c) also provides further clarification: 
(b) “Illegal entry” shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary 
requirements for legal entry into the receiving State;
(c) “Fraudulent travel or identity document” shall mean any travel or identity document:
(i) That has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other 
than a person or agency lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity 
document on behalf of a State; or
(ii) That has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption 
or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or
(iii) That is being used by a person other than the rightful holder.
Trafficking in Persons 
Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol defines “trafficking in persons” as:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Article 3(b), (c) and (d) also provide further clarification: 
(b)  The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in 
subparagraph (a) have been used; 
(c)  The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose 
of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve 
any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; 
(d)  “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age. 
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Chapter 7
Appendix A. The migration of children: Drivers and challenges  
Tom K. Wong, Nadia Hartvisgen and Elizabeth Arroyo1
Just as with adult migrants, a wide range of factors help to explain why children migrate, and such decisions are 
rarely reducible to any single determinant. However, the migration of children – especially without parents or 
other adults  – raises more pressing questions about the variable roles (or lack thereof) that children may have in 
migratory decisions. In addition, for children left behind after their parents migrate, it may be that “immigrant 
children are active agents in family reunifications and are able to (re)make and negotiate kin relations”.2
It is important to keep in mind that the majority of the world’s child migrants are not refugees and asylum 
seekers who are fleeing violence or escaping persecution. These children may migrate in order to pursue 
improved prospects in other countries, such as greater economic prospects and expanded access to educational 
opportunities. The role of family is deserving of special attention here. Family dynamics may themselves serve 
as push factors for migration, for example, when family breakdown (e.g. loss of the breadwinner or the head 
of household) creates an economic necessity to move elsewhere. Dynamics within families may also lead 
to children, particularly adolescents, shouldering the migratory burden, because they are more physically 
capable of making what can be difficult journeys abroad. In some cases, families may also strategically decide 
that children have a higher likelihood of succeeding in the country of destination.3 
However, children may also migrate as the result of decisions to leave difficult conditions or exigent circumstances – 
conflict, persecution and discrimination, abuse and violence, and environmental disasters, are just a few 
examples of the factors that can drive child migration. Conflict is deserving of special attention, as children 
are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed forces or armed groups, among many other severe forms 
of abuse and exploitation. Indeed, conflict displaces millions of families and children each year.4 
It is important to recognize that not all child migrants lack agency in migratory decisions. The migration of 
adolescents may be less tied to the decisions of adults than the migration of younger children. For example, 
whereas for younger children, parents may face the decision to leave them behind with family members or 
bring them along with them, adolescents may be given a choice. While child migrants, whether adolescents 
or younger children, may have little agency in making migratory decisions in the context of conflict-induced 
migration, adolescents may have more agency than do younger child migrants in other contexts; for example, 
when migratory decisions centre on pursuing better economic or educational opportunities.5
Afghan unaccompanied minors 
Afghanistan has experienced conflict and political instability nearly continuously since the late 1970s. As a 
consequence, Afghan displacement and migration have been a constant feature of the global landscape in recent 
1	 Tom	K.	Wong,	University	of	California,	San	Diego;	Nadia	Hartvisgen,	University	of	California,	San	Diego;	Elizabeth	Arroyo,	Sin	Fronteras,	IAP.
2	 See	Caneva,	2014,	for	a	review	of	children’s	roles	in	migratory	processes.	See	also	Tyrrell	and	Kallis,	2016.	
3	 Mougne,	2010;	Edmonds	and	Salinger,	2007;	Suárez-Orozco	and	Suárez-Orozco,	2009.	
4	 UNICEF,	2016.
5	 For	example,	see	Vervliet	et	al.,	2015.	
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decades. Afghans have consistently been one of the largest groups of asylum seekers in Europe.6 In this context, 
many Afghan children have begun these journeys alone, or become separated somewhere en route. 
A recent study of Afghan unaccompanied minors in Europe finds many are second-generation migrants, meaning 
they have little or no connection to Afghanistan, were living in a country other than Afghanistan, and have now 
made the journey to Europe.7 Interviews with Afghan unaccompanied minors suggest that many do not envision 
their futures in Afghanistan, nor in neighbouring countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran or Pakistan, 
and are prepared to risk their health and safety to reach Europe.8 Afghan unaccompanied minors are thus likely 
to continue to seek refuge in Europe. Afghan unaccompanied minors accounted for more than one half of all 
unaccompanied minors who lodged an asylum claim in the European Union in 2015.9 
When it comes to why Afghan unaccompanied minors are leaving Afghanistan for Europe, the Afghanistan 
Research Unit and the UNHCR find, “Children were motivated to engage in unaccompanied journeys due to 
a combination of frequently interrelated factors, including poverty, insecurity, inadequate opportunities for 
education and employment, and family and peer expectations”.10 Moreover, especially in high-sending areas, 
where migration and smuggling networks have developed, decisions to leave Afghanistan were often shared by 
the heads of the family and the children. It is important to note that research unpacking the decision-making 
logic that families use when sending their children on their own to Europe finds that, in many cases, the risks 
involved are well known a priori. However, these risks are eclipsed by the potential benefits of migrating, or 
because families feel they have no other choice but to send their children.11 
During transit, these children, mostly adolescent boys aged between 13 and 17,12 are vulnerable to physical 
violence, harassment by smugglers and law enforcement officials, sexual exploitation, and many other forms of 
abuse. In interviews conducted by researchers with Afghan unaccompanied minors, while some openly discussed 
their migratory journeys, many did not want to recall their experiences.13 As mentioned above, as Afghan 
unaccompanied minors often leave for Europe with the consent and support of their families, the trauma that 
unaccompanied Afghan minors experience is thus “compounded by their expectations and the pressure not 
to disappoint their families back home”.14 These pressures are made heavier by the debt that families accrue 
when children are entrusted into the care of smugglers. Personal aspirations and hopes for a better life can 
add even greater pressure, which can lead Afghan unaccompanied minors into risky and dangerous situations.15 
Still, despite all of this, “both children who returned from unaccompanied journeys and their family members 
strongly affirmed that they would engage in further unaccompanied travel once they could finance the trip”.16 
Moreover, in a recent IOM report based on 1,206 interviews with unaccompanied child migrants in Greece, 
42 per cent of the children, primarily from Afghanistan (as well as Pakistan), were intent on reaching their final 
destination in Europe, regardless of the services provided to them in Greece; only around 23 per cent expressed 
6	 Echavez	et	al.,	2014.
7	 Donini,	Monsutti	and	Scalettaris,	2016.
8	 Boland,	2010.
9	 Eurostat,	2017.	
10	 Echavez	et	al.,	2014.
11	 Ibid.
12	 Ibid.
13	 Boland,	2010.
14	 Donini,	Monsutti	and	Scalettaris,	2016.	
15	 Mougne,	2010.
16	 Echavez	et	al.,	2014.
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the desire to return to their country of origin. The remainder of those interviewed expressed willingness to 
return to origin countries, but later decided to remain in Greece.17
Unaccompanied children from Central America transiting through Mexico 
In 2014, a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Northern Triangle of Central America, which includes 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, led many unaccompanied minors to leave their homes. Whereas some went 
to neighbouring countries, many sought refuge in the United States and made the trek north through Mexico. 
During that year, the United States Border Patrol apprehended 52,000 Central American unaccompanied minors 
who arrived at the southern border of the United States.18 
As the movement of Central American unaccompanied minors through Mexico has increased, so too has the 
country’s immigration control efforts. In 2015, Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) (National Institute 
of Migration), apprehended nearly 36,000 Central American unaccompanied minors who were transiting through 
Mexico.19 By comparison, in 2014 this figure was significantly less at just over 23,000. 
One of the main drivers of the movement of Central American unaccompanied minors to the United States 
is violence. Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle are among the highest of any region in the world.20 
Unaccompanied minors often leave the Northern Triangle to avoid recruitment by gangs who force young people 
to commit crimes, including homicide and extortion, or coerce them into drug or sex trafficking.21
Migrating within the Northern Triangle can be less fraught than the journey through Mexico, where unaccompanied 
minors enter Mexico in the town of Tenosique in the state of Tabasco (Mexico’s northern border with Guatemala), 
or in Ciudad Hidalgo in the state of Chiapas (Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala). Unaccompanied minors 
generally enter Mexico on cargo trains or are smuggled into the country by human smugglers. Images of children 
riding atop cargo train cars, often with nothing more than the clothes on their bodies or a backpack, and often with 
nothing to hold onto except thin rails along the edges of the train cars, make vivid the dangers of this harrowing 
journey. Moreover, the strong presence of the INM in certain areas has led migrants to abandon safer routes and 
attempt to transit through Mexico along more dangerous routes to avoid apprehension. In addition, via Plan Merida 
(the Merida Initiative), the United States has appropriated billions of dollars to help Mexico tighten security 
along its southern border and expand its immigration detention capacity, including for unaccompanied minors,22 
among other measures. While this has made transit through Mexico more difficult, it has also increased demand 
for smugglers. As unaccompanied minors transit through Mexico, they can be subject to kidnapping, extortion by 
organized criminal networks, labour exploitation and sexual exploitation, among other forms of abuse.23 
While transit through the country has become more dangerous, Central American unaccompanied minors continue 
to make the journey through Mexico to the United States. Recognizing this, the Government of Mexico has also 
17	 IOM,	2016a.
18	 Meyer	et	al.,	2016.	The	52,000	Central	American	unaccompanied	minors	who	were	apprehended	at	the	border	in	2014	represented	
a	150	per	cent	increase	from	the	previous	year	and	a	1,200	per	cent	increase	compared	with	2011.
19	 Secretaría	de	Gobernación,	2016.	
20	 For	example,	in	2015,	El	Salvador	and	Honduras	ranked	first	and	second	in	the	number	of	intentional	homicides	per	100,000	people.	
See	World	Bank,	n.d.
21	 For	example,	see	Ward,	2013;	see	also	Serna,	2016.	
22	 Bochenek,	2016.
23	 Kinne,	Goździak	and	Martin,	2016.	
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made efforts to provide assistance to unaccompanied minors. One example is the creation of the Oficiales de 
Protección de la Infancia, whose mission is to provide assistance and support to migrant children. In 2014, Mexico 
also passed the Ley General de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (General Law on the Rights of Children 
and Adolescents), which included measures to provide legal assistance for unaccompanied minors. 
Protection challenges 
Child migration creates many unique protection challenges, as child migrants face the “double vulnerability” 
of being both a child and a migrant.24 Empirically, child migrants are particularly vulnerable to violence, 
exploitation and trafficking; and concerns about these abuses intensify when children are migrating alone or 
become separated from their families. Even if children may initially migrate alongside their families, they can 
for various reasons become separated during their journey. As UNICEF describes, “violence may come in the form 
of state action (particularly during migration enforcement or detention), the general public (in the form of 
xenophobic attacks), employers (in various forms of child labor), other children (including bullying and abuse 
in schools) or within families (in the form of domestic violence)”.25 
Child forced labour and child forced marriage are among the most severe forms of exploitation to which children 
are uniquely vulnerable. When children or their families are forced to rely on smugglers, concerns about such 
exploitation becomes even more acute. Of course, while migrant smuggling and human trafficking26 are distinct, 
concern about the exploitation of children by smugglers often engenders concern about trafficking in children. 
Although global estimates of victims of trafficking are limited and challenging to collect, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 28 per cent of detected victims of human trafficking were 
children in 2014, with approximately 20 per cent of victims being girls and 8 per cent being boys.27
The death of child migrants makes even more urgent the need to address the protection challenges that attend 
child migration. According to the IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, there have been at least 46,000 migrant deaths 
since 2000, and many of those who died were children.28 In 2015, for example, the IOM estimates that roughly 
one out of every three migrant deaths in the Aegean Sea was of a child.29 Moreover, one quarter of the nearly 
24,000 migrants who were rescued at sea in the Mediterranean by Médecins San Frontières (MSF) between May 
and December 2015 were children.30 
The disappearance of child migrants also demands our urgent attention. In 2016, the disappearance of an 
estimated 10,000 unaccompanied children in Europe captured international media headlines. In addressing 
Members of the European Parliament, Europol noted that while some of these children may have left in search of 
family in Europe, many are likely being exploited by smugglers, including for the purposes of labour exploitation 
(used for begging or being forced to commit crimes) and sexual exploitation.31
24	 UNICEF,	2016.	
25	 Ibid.	
26	 For	definitions	of	 the	 terms	“migrant	 smuggling”	and	“human	 trafficking”,	as	well	as	other	 related	concepts,	 see	Appendix	A	 in	
Chapter	2	of	this	report,	Migration and Migrants: A global overview. 
27	 UNODC,	2016.	
28	 IOM,	2016b.
29	 Ibid.	
30	 Ibid.	
31	 European	Parliament	News,	2016.	
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